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THE

WHOLE WORKS

OF

THE RIGHT REV. JEREMY TAYLOR, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF DOWN, CONNOR, AND DROMORE:

WITH

A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

AND

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HIS WRITINGS,

BY

REGINALD HEBER, A.M.

CANON OF ST. ASAPH, RECTOR OF HODNET, AND LATE FELLOW OF ALL SOULS' COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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RIGHT REV. JEREMY TAYLOR, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF DOWN, CONNOR, AND DROMORE.

VOLUME IX.

CONTAINING

THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF REPENTANCE; DEUS JUSTIFICATUS; AND THE REAL PRESENCE OF CHRIST IN THE HOLY SACRAMENT.

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CHAP. IV.

OF CONCUPISCENCE, AND ORIGINAL SIN; AND WHETHER OR NO, OR HOW FAR, WE ARE BOUND TO REPENT OF IT.

SECTION I.

ORIGINAL sin is so called καταχρηστικῶς, or 'figuratively,' meaning the sin of Adam, which was committed in the original of mankind by our first parent, and which hath influence upon all his posterity. "Nascuntur non propriè, sed originaliter, peccatores:" so St. Austin[n]; and therefore St. Ignatius calls it παλαιὰν δυσσέβειαν, 'the old impiety[o];' that which was in the original or first parent of mankind.

2. This sin brought upon Adam all that God threatened, —but no more. A certainty of dying, together with the proper effects and affections of mortality, were inflicted on him; and he was reduced to the condition of his own nature, and then begat sons and daughters in his own likeness, that is, in the proper temper and constitution of mortal men. For as God was not bound to give what he never promised, viz. an immortal duration and abode in this life; so neither does it appear, in that angry intercourse that God had with Adam, that he took from him or us any of our natural perfections, but his graces only.

3. Man, being left in this state of pure naturals, could not by his own strength arrive to a supernatural end; which was typified in his being cast out of Paradise, and the guarding of it with the flaming sword of a cherub. For eternal life,

[n] De Civit. lib. 16. c. 18. [o] Epist. ad Trallian.

being an end above our natural proportion, cannot be acquired by any natural means. Neither Adam nor any of his posterity could, by any actions or holiness, obtain heaven by desert, or by any natural efficiency; for it is a gift still, and it is 'neque currentis, neque operantis,' 'neither of him that runneth, nor of him that worketh,' but of God; who freely gives it to such persons, whom he, also by other gifts and graces, hath disposed towards the reception of it.

4. What gifts and graces, or supernatural endowments, God gave to Adam in his state of innocence, we know not; God hath no where told us; and of things unrevealed we commonly make wild conjectures. But, after his fall, we find no sign of any thing but of a common man. And therefore, as it was with him, so it is with us; our nature cannot go to heaven, without the helps of the divine grace; so neither could his: and whether he had them or no, it is certain we have; receiving more by the second Adam than we did lose by the first: and the sons of God are now spiritual, which he never was, that we can find.

5. But concerning the sin of Adam, tragical things are spoken; it destroyed his original righteousness, and lost it to us for ever; it corrupted his nature, and corrupted ours; and brought upon him, and not him only, but on us also, who thought of no such thing,—an inevitable necessity of sinning, making it as natural to us to sin as to be hungry, or to be sick and die; and the consequent of these things is saddest of all; we are born enemies of God, sons of wrath, and heirs of eternal damnation.

6. In the meditation of these sad stories, I shall separate the certain from the uncertain, that which is revealed from that which is presumed, that which is reasonable from that which makes too bold reflections upon God's honour, and the reputation of his justice and his goodness. I shall do it in the words of the Apostle, from whence men commonly dispute in this question, right or wrong, according as it happens.

7. "By one man sin came into the world[p]." That sin entered into the world by Adam, is therefore certain, because he was the first man; and unless he had never sinned, it must needs enter by him; for it comes in first by the first; "and

[p] Rom. v. 12.

death by sin," that is, death which, at first, was the condition of nature, became a punishment upon that account; just as it was to the serpent to creep upon his belly, and to the woman to be subject to her husband: these things were so before, and would have been so; for the Apostle pressing the duty of subjection, gives two reasons why the woman was to obey. One of them only was derived from this sin, the other was the prerogative of creation; for "Adam was first formed, then Eve[1]," so that before her fall, she was to have been subject to her husband, because she was later in being; she was a minor, and therefore under subjection; she was also the weaker vessel. But it had not been a curse; and if any of them had been hindered by grace and favour, by God's anger they were now left to fall back to the condition of their nature.

8. "Death passed upon all men;" that is, upon all the old world, who were drowned in the flood of the divine vengeance; and who did sin after the similitude of Adam. And therefore St. Paul adds that for the reason: "Inasmuch as all men have sinned." If all men have sinned upon their own account (as it is certain they have), then these words can very well mean, that Adam first sinned, and all his sons and daughters sinned after him, and so died in their own sin, by a death which, at first and in the whole constitution of affairs, is natural,—and a death which their own sins deserved, but yet, which was hastened or ascertained upon them the rather for the sin of their progenitor. Sin propagated upon that root and vicious example; or rather from that beginning, not from that cause, but "dum ita peccant, et similiter moriuntur," "if they sin so, then so shall they die:" so St. Jerome.

9. But this is not thought sufficient; and men do usually affirm that we are formally and properly made sinners by Adam, and in him we all by interpretation sinned, and therefore think these words ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, "forasmuch as all men have sinned," ought to be expounded thus, 'Death passed upon all men, in whom all men have sinned;' meaning, that in Adam we really sinned, and God does truly and justly impute his sin to us, to make us as guilty as he that

[1] 1 Tim. ii. 13.

did it, and as much punished, and liable to eternal damnation. And all the great force of this fancy relies upon this exposition of ἐφ' ὧ, to signify "in him."

10. Concerning which there will be the less need of a laborious inquiry; if it be observed, that the words being read, "forasmuch as all men have sinned," bear a fair and clear discourse, and very intelligible; if it be rendered "in him," it is violent and hard, a distinct period by itself, without dependance or proper purpose, against the faith of all copies, who do not make this a distinct period, and against the usual manner of speaking. 2. This phrase of ἐφ' ᾧ is used in 2 Cor. v. 4. Ἐφ' ᾧ οὐ θέλομεν ἐκδύσασθαι, "Not for that we would be unclothed;" and so it is used in Polybius, Suidas, and Varinus. Ἐφ' ᾧ, that is, "eâ conditione," for that cause or condition; and ἐφ' ὧ παρεῖ, "ad quid ades," are the words of the Gospel, as Suidas quotes them. 3. Although ἐφ' ᾧ may signify the same with ἐν ᾧ, 'in whom,' or 'in him,' yet it is so very seldom or infrequent, that it were intolerable to do violence to this place to force it to an unnatural signification. 4. If it did always signify the same with ἐν ᾧ, or 'in him,' which it does not; yet we might very well follow the same reading we now do, and which the Apostle's discourse does infer; for even ἐν ᾧ does divers times signify, 'forasmuch,' or 'for that,' as is to be seen in Rom. viii. 3. and Heb. ii. 18. But, 5. supposing all that can be, and that it did signify "in whom," yet the sense were fair enough, as to the whole article; for 'by him,' or 'in him, we are made sinners,' that is, brought to an evil state of things usually consequent to sinners: we are used like sinners 'by him,' or 'in him;' just as when a sinner is justified, he is treated like a righteous person, as if he had never sinned, though he really did sin oftentimes; and this for his sake who is made righteousness to us: so "in Adam we are made sinners," that is, treated ill and afflicted, though ourselves be innocent of that sin, which was the occasion of our being used so severely for other sins, of which we were not innocent. But how this came to pass, is told in the following words.

11. "For until the law, sin was in the world, but sin is not imputed when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not

sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come[r]." By which discourse it appears, that St. Paul does not speak of all mankind, as if the evil occasioned by Adam's sin did descend for ever upon that account; but it had a limited effect, and reached only to those who were in the interval between Adam and Moses. This death was brought upon them by Adam; that is, death, which was threatened to Adam only, went forth upon them also who indeed were sinners, but 'not after the similitude of Adam's transgression;' that is, who sinned not so capitally as he did. For to sin like Adam, is used as a tragical and a high expression. So it is in the Prophet; 'they like *men* have transgressed[s];' so we read it;—but in the Hebrew it is, 'they like *Adam* have transgressed,' and yet death passed upon them that did not sin after the similitude of Adam; for Abel, and Seth, and Abraham, and all the patriarchs, died, Enoch only excepted; and therefore it was no wonder, that, upon the sin of Adam, death entered upon the world, who generally sinned like Adam, since it passed on and reigned upon less sinners. It reigned upon them, whose sins therefore would not be so imputed as Adam's was; because there was no law with an express threatening given to them as was to Adam; but although it was not wholly imputed upon their own account, yet it was imputed upon theirs and Adam's. For God was so exasperated with mankind, that being angry he would still continue that punishment even to the lesser sins and sinners, which he only had first threatened to Adam; and so Adam brought it upon them. They indeed, in rigour, did themselves deserve it; but if it had not been for that provocation by Adam, they who sinned not so bad, and had not been so severely and expressly threatened, had not suffered so severely. The case is this. Jonathan and Michal were Saul's children; it came to pass that seven of Saul's issue were to to be hanged, all equally innocent, equally culpable. David took the five sons of Michal, for she had left him unhandsomely. Jonathan was his friend, and therefore he spared his son Mephibosheth. Here it was indifferent as to the guilt of the persons, whether David should take the sons of Michal, or of Jonathan; but it is likely that as, upon the kindness which David had to Jonathan, he spared his son,

[r] Romans, v. 13, 14. [s] Hos. vi. 7.

so, upon the just provocation of Michal, he made that evil to fall upon them, of which they were otherwise capable; which, it may be, they should not have suffered, if their mother had been kind. Adam was to God, as Michal to David.

12. But there was in it a further design: for by this dispensation of death, Adam was made a figure of Christ: so the Apostle expressly affirms; "who is the figure of him that was to come;" that as death passed upon the posterity of Adam, though they sinned less than Adam; so life should be given to the followers of Christ, though they were imperfectly righteous, that is, not after the similitude of Christ's perfection.

13. But for the further clearing the article depending upon the right understanding of these words, these two things are observable. 1. That the evil of death descending upon Adam's posterity, for his sake went no further than till Moses. For after the giving of Moses's law, death passed no further upon the account of Adam's transgression; but by the sanction of Moses's law, where death was anew, distinctly, and expressly threatened as it was to Adam, and so went forward upon a new score, but introduced first by Adam; that is, he was the cause at first,—and till Moses also, he was in some sense the author, and for ever after, the precedent; and therefore the Apostle said well, "In Adam we all die:" his sin brought in the sentence, in him it began, and from him it passed upon all the world, though by several dispensations. 2. In the discourse of the Apostle, those that were named, were not considered simply as born from Adam, and therefore it did not come upon the account of natural or original corruption, but they were considered as sinners; just as they who have life by Christ, are not considered as merely children by title, or spiritual birth, and adoption, but as just and faithful. But then this is the proportion and purpose of the Apostle; as God gives to these life by Christ, which is a greater thing than their imperfect righteousness without Christ could have expected: so here also; this part of Adam's posterity was punished with death for their own sin: but this death was brought upon them by Adam; that is, the father for his provocation of God by his great transgression.

14. There is now remaining no difficulty but in the words

of the nineteenth verse; "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." Concerning which I need not make use of the word πολλοὶ, or 'many;' whom sometimes St. Paul calls πάντας, sometimes πολλοὺς, 'all,' and 'many,' that is, all from Adam to Moses; but they are but 'many,' and not 'all' in respect of mankind; exactly answering to the 'all' that have life by Christ, which are only the πολλοὶ, or the πιστεύοντες, those 'many that believe,' and are adopted into the covenant of believers: by this indeed it is perceivable, that this was not a natural title or derivation of an inherent corruption from Adam, for that must have included 'all,' absolutely and universally. But that which I here dwell and rely upon, is this:

15. Sin is often in Scripture used for the punishment of sin; and they that suffer, are called sinners, though they be innocent. So it is in this case. "By Adam's disobedience many were made sinners;" that is, the sin of Adam passed upon them, and sat upon their heads with evil effect, like that of Bathsheba; "I and my son shall be accounted sinners [t];" that is, evil will befal us, we shall be used like sinners, like traitors, and usurpers. So, "This shall be the *sin* of Egypt," said the Prophet [u]: this shall be the *punishment*; so we read it. And Cain, complaining of the greatness of his punishment, said, "Mine iniquity is greater than I can bear." And to put it past all doubt, not only punishment is called sin in Scripture, but even he that bears it. "Him that knew no sin, God hath made sin, that we might be the righteousness of God in him [x]:" and the prophet Isaiah, speaking of Christ, saith, "Posuit peccatum animam suam;" "He hath made his soul a sin [y]," that is, obnoxious to the punishment of sin. Thus it is said, that "Christ shall appear the second time without sin," that is, without the punishment of sin, "unto salvation [z]:" for of sin formally or materially, he was at first as innocent as at the second time; that is, pure in both. And if Christ who bare our burden, became sin for us in the midst of his purest innocence, that we also are by Adam made sinners, that is, suffer evil by occasion of his demerit, infers not that we have any formal guilt, or enmity against God upon that account. 'Facti peccatores' in St.

[t] 1 Kings, i. 21. [u] Zech. xiv. 19. [x] 2 Cor. v. 21.
[y] Isa. liii. 10. [z] Heb. ix. 28.

Paul, 'by Adam we are made sinners,' answers both in the story and in the expression to 'Christus factus peccatum pro nobis;' 'Christ was made sin for us,' that is, was exposed to the evil that is consequent to sin, viz. to its punishment.

16. For the further explication of which, it is observable that the word 'sinner' and 'sin,' in Scripture is used for any person, that hath a fault or a legal impurity, a debt, a vitiosity, defect, or imperfection. For the Hebrews use the word חטאת for any obligation which is contracted by the law without our fault. Thus a Nazarite who had touched a dead body, was tied to offer a sacrifice περὶ ἁμαρτίας,' for sin;' and the reason is added, ὅτι ἥμαρτε περὶ ψυχῆς, that is, 'he had sinned concerning the dead body;' and yet it was nothing but a legal impurity, nothing moral. And the offering that was made by the leprous, or the menstruous, or the diseased, 'in profluvio seminis,' is called περὶ ἁμαρτίας, 'an offering for sin,' and yet it might be innocent all the way.

17. Thus in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said, that our blessed Lord, who is compared to the high-priest among the Jews, did "offer first for his own sins[a]:" by which word it is certain that no sin properly could be meant, for Christ was ἀναμάρτητος, 'he knew no sin:' but it means, the state of his infirmity, the condition of his mortal body, which he took for us and our sins, and is a state of misery and of distance from heaven; "for flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven;" whither Christ was not to go, till by offering himself he had unclothed himself of that imperfect vesture, as they that were legally impure, might not go to the temple before their offering: and therefore when by death he quit himself of this condition, it is said "he died unto sin.[b]" Parallel to this is that of St. Paul in the fifth chapter[c] to the Romans, where the state of infirmity is expressly called sin. The high-priest "is himself also compassed with infirmity; and by reason hereof he ought, as for the people, so also for himself to offer for sins." This is also more expressly by St. Paul called ὁμοίωμα τῆς σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας, 'the likeness of the sin of the flesh[d];' and thus, concupiscence, or the first motions and inclinations to sin, is called sin, and said to have the nature of sin, that is, ὁμοίωμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, 'the like-

[a] Heb. vii. 27.
[b] Rom. vi. 10.
[c] Rom. vi. 2, 3.
[d] Rom. viii. 3.

ness,' it may be, the material part 'of sin', or something by which sin is commonly known. And thus Origen observes, that an oblation was to be offered, even for new-born children, ὡς οὐ καθαρῶν ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας, 'as if they were not clean from sin.' But this being a usual expression among the Hebrews, bears its sense upon the palm of the hand, and signifies only the legal impurity in which the ἀρτιγεγενημένοι, 'the new-born' babes, and their mothers, were involved. Even Christ himself, who had no original sin, was subject to this purification. So we read in St. Luke [e]: and "when the days of *her* purification were accomplished:" but in most books, and particularly in the King's MS. it is read, καθαρισμοῦ αὐτῶν, 'the days of *their* purification.' But the things of this nature being called offerings for sins, and the expression usual among the Jews, I doubt not but hath given occasion to the Christian writers to fancy other things than were intended.

18. Having now explicated those words of St. Paul, which, by being misunderstood, have caused strange devices in this article, we may now, without prejudice, examine what really was the effect of Adam's sin, and what evil descended upon his posterity.

19. Adam's sin was punished by an expulsion out of Paradise, in which was a tree appointed to be the cure of diseases and a conservatory of life. There was no more told as done but this, and its proper consequents. He came into a land less blessed, a land which bore thistles and briers easily, and fruits with difficulty, so that he was forced to sweat hard for his bread; and this also, I cannot say, did descend, but must needs be a condition of his children who were left to live so, and in the same place; just as when young Anthony had seized upon Marcus Cicero's land, the son also lost what he never had. And thus death came in, not by any new sentence or change of nature: for man was created mortal; and if Adam had not sinned, he should have been immortal by grace, that is, by the use of the tree of life; and now being driven from the place where the tree grew, was left in its own natural constitution; that is, to be sick and die without that remedy. Οἱ γεγονότες ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀπὸ φθαρτοῦ φθαρτοὶ γεγόναμεν: 'He was mortal of himself, and we are mortal from him [f].' 'Peccando Adam posteros morti subjecit, et univer-

[e] Luke, ii. 22. [f] Cyril. adv. Anthrop.

sos huic delicto obnoxios reddit,' said Justin Martyr: "Adam by his sin made all his posterity liable to the sin, and subjected them to death[g]." One explicates the other; and therefore St. Cyprian calls original sin, "Malum domesticum, contagium mortis antiquæ prima nativitate contractum:" "His sin infected us with death, and this infection we derive in our birth[h];" that is, we are born mortal. Adam's sin was imputed to us unto a natural death; in him we are sinners, as in him we die. But this sin is not real and inherent, but imputed only to such a degree. So St. Cyprian affirms most expressly: "Infans recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quòd, secundum Adam carnalitèr natus, contagium mortis antiquæ primâ nativitate contraxit:" "An infant hath not sinned, save only that being carnally born of Adam, in his first birth he hath contracted the contagion of the old death."

20. This evil, which is the condition of all our natures, viz. to die, was to some a punishment, but to others not so. It was a punishment to all that sinned both before Moses and since; upon the first it fell as a consequent of God's anger upon Adam (as I before discoursed); upon the latter it fell as a consequent of that anger, which was threatened in Moses's law. But to those who sinned not at all, as infants and innocents, it was merely a condition of their nature, and no more a punishment, than to be a child is. It was a punishment of Adam's sin; because by his sin human nature became disrobed of their preternatural immortality; and, therefore, upon that account they die; but as it related to the persons, it was not a punishment, not an evil afflicted for their sin, or any guiltiness of their own, properly so called.

21. We find nothing else in Scripture expressed to be the effect of Adam's sin: and beyond this, without authority, we must not go. Other things are said, but I find no warrant for them in that sense they are usually supposed,—and some of them in no sense at all. The particulars commonly reckoned, are, that from Adam we derive an original ignorance, a proneness to sin, a natural malice, a 'fomes,' or nest of sin imprinted and placed in our souls, a loss of our will's liberty, and nothing is left but a liberty to sin; which liberty upon the sum of affairs is expounded to be a necessity to sin: and the effect of all is, we are born heirs of damnation.

[g] Dial. adv. Tryph. [h] Lib. 3. Ep. 8.

22. Concerning original or natural ignorance, it is true, we derive it from our parents, I mean, we are born with it; but I do not know that any man thinks, that, if Adam had not sinned that sin, Cain should have been wise as soon as his navel had been cut. Neither can we guess at what degree of knowledge Adam had before his fall. Certainly, if he had so great a knowledge, it is not likely he would so cheaply have sold himself and all his hopes, out of a greedy appetite to get some knowledge. But concerning his posterity; indeed it is true a child cannot speak at first, nor understand; and if, as Plato said, 'all our knowledge is nothing but memory,' it is no wonder a child is born without knowledge. But so it is in the wisest men in the world; they also when they see or hear a thing first, think it strange, and could not know it, till they saw or heard it. Now this state of ignorance we derive from Adam, as we do our nature, which is a state of ignorance and all manner of imperfection; but whe- it was not imperfect, and apt to fall into forbidden instances even before his fall, we may best guess at by the event; for if he had not had a rebellious appetite, and an inclination to forbidden things, by what could he have been tempted, and how could it have come to pass, that he should sin? Indeed this nature was made worse by sin, and became divested of whatsoever it had extraordinary, and was left naked, and mere; and, therefore, it is not only an original imperfection, which we inherit, but in the sense now explicated, it is also an original corruption. And this is all: as natural death by his sin became a curse, so our natural imperfection became natural corruption, and that is original sin. Death and imperfection we derive from Adam, but both were natural to us; but by him they became actual, and penal, and by him they became worse, as by every evil act, every principle of evil is improved. And in this sense, this article is affirmed by all the doctors of the ancient church. We are miserable really, sinners in account or effect, that properly, this improperly; and are fallen into so sad a state of things, which we also every day make worse, that we did need a Saviour to redeem us from it. For in original sin we are to consider the principle, and the effects. The principle is the actual sin of Adam. This being to certain purposes by God's absolute dominion imputed to us, hath brought upon us a necessity of dying,

and all the affections of mortality; which although they were natural, yet would by grace have been hindered. Another evil there is upon us, and that is concupiscence; this also is natural, but it was actual before the fall, it was in Adam, and tempted him. This also from him is derived to us, and is by many causes made worse, by him and by ourselves. And this is the whole state of original sin, so far as is fairly warrantable. But for the other particulars the case is wholly differing.

The sin of Adam neither made us, 1. heirs of damnation, nor, 2. naturally and necessarily vicious.

23. I. It could not make us heirs of damnation. This I shall the less need to insist upon, because, of itself, it seems so horrid to impute to the goodness and justice of God to be author of so great a calamity to innocents, that St. Austin's followers have generally left him in that point, and have descended to this lesser proportion, that original sin damns only to the eternal loss of the sight of God's glorious face. But to this, I say these things.

24. I. There are many divines which believe this alone to be the worm that never dies, and the fire that never goeth out; that is, in effect, this, and the anguish for this, is all the hell of the damned. And unless infants remain infants in the resurrection too (which no man that I know affirms), or unless they be senseless and inapprehensive, it is not to be imagined but that all, that know they are by way of punishment deprived of the glorious face of God, must needs have a horrible anguish of soul to eternal ages. And this argument, besides the reasonableness of the thing, hath warrant from the words of St. Austin[1]. "Si hoc eis non erit malum, non ergo amabunt regnum Dei tot innocentes imagines Dei? Si autem amabunt, et tantum amabunt, quantum innocentes amare debent, regnum ejus, à quo ad ipsius imaginem creantur, nihilne mali de hâc ipsâ separatione patientur?" Here the good man and eloquent, supposes the little babes to be innocent, to be images of God, to love the kingdom of God, and yet to be sentenced to hell: which, it may be, he did, but I do not, understand; save only that, in the parable, we find Dives in hell to be very charitable to his living brethren. But that which I make use of for the present, is, that infants, —besides the loss of God's presence, and the beholding his

[1] Lib. 6. in Julian. c. 4.

face,—are apprehensive and afflicted with that evil state of things, whither their infelicity, not their fault, hath carried them.

25. II. But suppose this to be but a mere privative state, yet it cannot be inflicted upon infants as a punishment of Adam's sin; and upon the same account it cannot be inflicted upon any one else. Not upon infants, because they are not capable of a law for themselves; therefore, much less of a law which was given to another, here being a double incapacity of obedience. They cannot receive any law; and if they could, yet of this they never were offered any notice, till it was too late. Now if infants be not capable of this, not chargeable with it,—then no man is; for all are infants first; and if it comes not first by birth, and at first,—it cannot come at all. So that although this privative hell be less than to say they are tormented in flames besides, yet it is as unequal and unjust. There is not, indeed, the same cruelty, but there is the same injustice. I deny not but all persons naturally are so, that they cannot arrive at heaven; but unless some other principle be put into them, or some great grace done for them, must for ever stand separate from seeing the face of God. But this is but accidentally occasioned by the sin of Adam. That left us in our natural state, and that state can never come to heaven in its own strength. But this condition of all men by nature is not the punishment of our sin; for this would suppose, that were it not for this sin superinduced, otherwise we should go to heaven. Now this is not true; for if Adam had not sinned, yet without something supernatural, some grace and gift, we could never go to heaven. Now although the sin of Adam left him in his nakedness, and a mere natural man; yet presently this was supplied, and we were never in it, but were improved and bettered by the promise, and Christ hath died for mankind, and in so doing is become our Redeemer and representative; and therefore this sin of Adam cannot call us back from that state of good things, into which we are put by the mercies of God in our Lord Jesus; and, therefore, now no infant or idiot, or man or woman, shall, for this alone, be condemned to an eternal banishment from the sweetest presence of God. But this will be evinced more certainly in the following periods. For if they stand for ever banished from the presence of God, then

they shall be for ever shut up in hell, with the devil and his angels; for the Scripture hath mentioned no portions but of the right and left hand. Gregory Nazianzen and his scholiast Nicetas did suppose, that there should be a middle state between heaven and hell for infants and heathens; and concerning infants, Pope Innocent III. and some schoolmen[k] have taken it up: but[l] St. Austin hath sufficiently confuted it; and it is sufficient that there is no ground for it but their own dreams.

26. III. But then against those that say, the flames of hell are the portion of Adam's heirs, and that infants, dying in original sin, are eternally tormented, as Judas, or Dives, or Julian,—I call to witness all the economy of the divine goodness, and justice, and truth. "The soul that sins it, shall die; as I live, saith the Lord, the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father[m];" that is, he shall not be guilty of his crime, nor liable to his punishment.

27. IV. Is hell so easy a pain, or are the souls of children of so cheap, so contemptible a price, that God should so easily throw them into hell? God's goodness, which pardons many sins which we could avoid, will not so easily throw them into hell for what they could not avoid. God's goodness is against this.

28. V. It is supposed that Adam did not finally perish for that sin, which himself committed; all antiquity thought so; Tatianus only excepted, who was a heretic accounted, and the father of the Encratites. But, then, what equity is it that any innocents or little children should? for either God pardoned Adam or condemned him. If he pardoned him that sinned, it is not so agreeable to his goodness to exact it of others that did not[n]. For if he pardoned him, then either God took off all that to which he was liable, or only removed it from him to place it somewhere else. If he removed it from him to his posterity, that is it which we complain of as contrary to his justice and his goodness. But if God took off all that was due, how could God exact it of others, it being wholly pardoned? But if God did not pardon him the eternal guilt, but took the forfeiture and made him pay

[k] Ambros. Catharinus, Alberi. Pighius. [l] De Verb. Apost. serm. 14.
[m] Ezek. xviii.
[n] Ex tarditate si Dii sontes prætereant, et insontes plectant, justitiam suam non sic rectè resarciunt.

the full price of his sin, that is, all which he did threaten and intend,—then it is not to be supposed that God should, in justice, demand more than eternal pains as the price to be paid by one man for one sin. So that in all senses this seems unjust.

29. VI. To be born, was a thing wholly involuntary and unchosen, and therefore it could in no sense be chosen, that we were born so; that is, born guilty of Adam's sin, which we knew not of, which was done so many thousand years before we were born; which we had never heard of, if God had not been pleased by a supernatural way to reveal to us, which the greatest part of mankind to this day have never heard of; at which we were displeased as soon as we knew of it; which hath caused much trouble to us, but never tempted us with any pleasure.

30. VII. No man can perish for that, of which he was not guilty; but we could not be involved in the guilt, unless some way or other our consent had been involved. For it is no matter who sins, or who is innocent, if he, that is innocent, may perish for what another does without his knowledge or leave, either asked, or given, or presumed. But if our consent was in it, then either it was included naturally, or by an express will of God that made it so. It can no way be imagined how our will can be naturally included, for we had no natural being. We had no life, and therefore no action, and therefore no consent. For it is impossible there should be an act of will in any sense, when there is an act of understanding in no sense. But if by a divine act or decree it became so, and not by our act, then we only are said to consent, because God would have it so; which, if we speak intelligibly, is to charge God with making us guilty when we were not; to say, we consented when we did not.

31. VIII. In pursuance of which argument, I consider, that whatsoever can be said to consent, must have a being either in or out of its causes. But our will was not in being or actual existence, when Adam sinned; it was then in its causes. But the soul, and so the will of man hath no cause but God, it being with the soul immediately created. If therefore we sinned, we could not sin in ourselves, for we were not born; nor could we sin in Adam, for he was not the cause of our will; it must therefore be that we sinned in God: for as was

our being, so must our action be; but our being was then only in God, our will and our soul were in him only, 'tanquam in suâ causâ,' therefore in him was our action, or consent, or what we please to call it. Which affirmative, what sense, or what piety, or what probability, it can have in it, I suppose, needs not much inquiry.

32. IX. To condemn infants to hell for the fault of another, is to deal worse with them, than God did to the very devils, who did not perish but for an act of their own most perfect choice.

33. X. This, besides the formality of injustice and cruelty, does add and suppose a circumstance of a strange ungentle contrivance. For because it cannot be supposed that God should damn infants or innocents without cause, it finds out this way, that God, to bring his purposes to pass, should create a guilt for them, or bring them into an inevitable condition of being guilty by a way of his inventing*. For if he did make any such agreement with Adam, he beforehand knew that Adam would forfeit all, and therefore that unavoidably all his posterity should be surprised. This is to make pretences, and to invent justifications and reasons of his proceedings, which indeed are all one as if they were not. For he that can make a reason for an action otherwise unjust, can do it without any reason; especially when the reason itself makes the misery as fatal as a decree without a reason: and if God cannot be supposed to damn infants without just cause, and therefore he so ordered it that a cause should not be wanting, but he infallibly and irresistibly made them guilty of Adam's sin; is not this to resolve to make them miserable, and then with scorn to triumph in their sad condition? For if they could not deserve to perish without a fault of their own, how could they deserve to have such a fault put upon them? If it be unjust to damn them without cause, is it not also unjust to make a cause for them whether they will or no?

34. XI. It is supposed and generally taught, that before the fall Adam had original righteousness, that is, not only that he was as innocent as children new-born are of actual sin (which seems to be that which divines call 'original righteousness,' there being no other either taught, or reason-

* Qui vult aliquid in causâ, vult effectum ex istâ causâ profluentem.

able) but a rare rectitude of the inner man, a just subordination of the inferior faculties to the superior, an excellent knowledge and clear light: and therefore that he would sin had so little excuse, that well it might deserve such a punishment, so great as himself suffered. Indeed, if he had no such rare perfections and rectitude, I can say nothing to the particular: but to the question, this; that if Adam had it not, then he could not lose it, nor his posterity after him; as it is fiercely and mightily pretended that they did. But if he had this rectitude and rare endowments, what equity is it that his posterity, who had no such helps to resist the sin, and were so far from having any helps at all to resist it, that they had no notice of it, neither of the law, nor the danger, nor the temptation, nor the action, till it was past; I say, what equity is it that his posterity should, in the midst of all these imperfections, be equally punished with him, who sinned against so great a light, and so mighty helps?

35. XII. Infants cannot justly perish for Adam's sin, unless it be just that their wills should be included in his will, and his will justly become theirs by interpretation. Now if so, I ask, whether, before that sin of Adam, were our wills free, or not free? For if we had any will at all, it must be free or not free. If we had none at all, how could it be involved in his? Now if our wills were free, why are they without our act, and whether we will or no, involved in the will of another? If they were not free, how could we be guilty? If they were free, then they could also dissent. If they were not free, then they could not consent; and so, either they never had, or else, before Adam's fall, they lost, their liberty.

36. XIII. But if it be inquired seriously, I cannot imagine what can be answered. Could we prevent the sin of Adam? Could we hinder it? Were we ever asked? Could we, if we had been asked, after we were born a month, have given our negative? Or could we do more before we were born than after? were we, or could we be tied to prevent that sin? Did not God know that we could not in that case dissent? And why then shall our consent be taken in by interpretation, when our dissent could not be really acted; but if at that time we could not dissent really, could we have dissented from Adam's sin by interpretation? If not, then we could dissent no way, and then it was inevitably decreed that

we should be ruined: for neither really, nor by interpretation, could we have dissented. But if we could by interpretation have dissented, it were certainly more agreeable to God's goodness, to have interpreted for us in the better sense, rather than in the worse; being we did neither, really and actually; and if God had so pleased, he rather might with his goodness have interpreted us to have dissented, than he could with justice have interpreted us to have consented: and therefore, certainly he did so, or would have done, if there had been need.

37. XIV. Lastly; the consequent of these is this. That because God is true, and just, and wise, and good, and merciful, it is not to be supposed that he will snatch infants from their mother's breasts, and throw them into the everlasting flames of hell for the sin of Adam, that is, as to them, for their mere natural state, of which himself was author and creator: that is, he will not damn them for being good. For 'God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good:' and therefore, so is that state of descent from Adam. God is the author of it, and therefore it cannot be ill. It cannot be contrary to God, because it is his work.

38. Upon the account of these reasons I suppose it safe to affirm, that God does not damn any one to hell merely for the sin of our first father, which I sum up in the words of St. Ambrose, or whoever is the author of the commentaries upon the epistles of St. Paul attributed to him; "Mors autem dissolutio corporis est, cum anima à corpore separatur. Est et alia mors, quæ secunda dicitur, in Gehennâ, quam non peccato Adæ patimur, sed ejus occasione propriis peccatis acquiritur:" "Death is the dividing soul and body. There is also another death which is in hell, and is called the second death, which we do not suffer for the sin of Adam; but, by occasion of it, we fall into it by our own sins [p]."

Next we are to inquire, whether or no it does not make us infallibly, naturally, and necessarily vicious, by taking from us original righteousness, by discomposing the order of our faculties, and enslaving the will to sin and folly, concerning which the inquiry must be made by parts.

39. For if the sin of Adam did debauch our nature, and corrupt our will and manners, it is either by a physical or

[p] In cap. 5. Rom.

natural efficiency of the sin itself; or, 2. Because we were all in the loins of Adam; or, 3. By the sentence and decree of God.

40. I. Not by any natural efficiency of the sin itself: because then it must be that every sin of Adam must spoil such a portion of his nature, that before he died, he must be a very beast. 2. We also, by degeneration and multiplication of new sins, must have been at so vast a distance from him at the very worst, that by this time we should not have been so wise as a fly, nor so free and unconstrained as fire. 3. If one sin would, naturally and by physical causality, destroy original righteousness, then every one sin in the regenerate can as well destroy habitual righteousness, because that and this differ not but in their principle, not in their nature and constitution. And why should not a righteous man as easily and as quickly fall from grace, and lose his habits, as Adam did? Naturally it is all one. 4. If that one sin of Adam did destroy all his righteousness and ours too, then our original sin does more hurt, and is more punished, and is of greater malice, than our actual sin. For one act of sin does but lessen and weaken the habit, but does not quite destroy it. If therefore this act of Adam (in which, certainly, at least we did not offend maliciously) destroys all original righteousness, and a malicious act now does not destroy a righteous habit, it is better for us in our own malice, than in our ignorance, and we suffer less for doing evil that we know of, than for doing that which we knew nothing of.

41. II. If it be said, that this evil came upon us, because we all were in the loins of Adam, I consider, 1. That then by the same reason we are guilty of all the sins, which he ever committed while we were in his loins; there being no imaginable reason why the first sin should be propagated, and not the rest; and he might have sinned the second time, and have sinned worse. Add to this, that the later sins are commonly the worse, as being committed not only against the same law, but a greater reason, and a longer experience, and heightened by the mark of ingratitude, and deeply noted with folly, for venturing damnation so much longer: and then he that was born last, should have most original sin; and Seth should in his birth and nature be worse than Abel, and Abel be worse than Cain. 2. Upon this account all the

sins of all our progenitors will be imputed to us, because we were in their loins when they sinned them; and every lustful father must have a lustful son, and so every man, or no man, will be lustful. For if ever any man were lustful or intemperate, when or before he begot his child, upon this reckoning his child will be so too, and then his grandchild, and so on for ever. 3. Sin is seated in the will, it is an action, and transient; and when it dwells or abides, it abides no where but in the will by approbation and love, to which is naturally consequent a readiness in the inferior faculties to obey and act accordingly; and therefore sin does not infect our mere natural faculties, but the will only, and not that in the natural capacity, but in its moral only. 4. And indeed to him that considers it, it will seem strange and monstrous, that a moral obliquity, in a single instance, should make a universal change in a natural suscipient, and in a natural capacity. When it is in nature impossible, that any impression should be made but between those things that communicate in matter or capacity; and therefore if this were done at all, it must be by a higher principle, by God's own act or sanction, and then should be referred to another principle, not this against which I am now disputing. 5. No man can transmit a good habit, a grace, or a virtue, by natural generation; as a great scholar's son cannot be born with learning, and the child of a judge cannot upon his birthday give wise sentences; and Marcus the son of Cicero was not so good an orator as his father: and how can it be then, that a naughty quality should be more apt to be disseminated than a good one; when it is not the goodness or the badness of a quality that hinders its dissemination, but its being an acquired and superinduced quality that makes it cannot descend naturally? Add to this, how can a bad quality, morally bad, be directly and regularly transmitted by an action morally good? And since neither God that is the Maker of all, does amiss, and the father that begets, sins not, and the child that is begotten, cannot sin,—by what conveyance can any positive evil be derived to the posterity? 6. It is generally, now-a-days especially, believed, that the soul is immediately created, not generated, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, affirming τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον; 'that the soul is from without, and

is a divine substance[p];' and therefore sin cannot descend by natural generation, or by our being in Adam's loins. And how can it be, that the father, who contributes nothing to her production, should contribute to her pollution? That he who did not transmit life, should transmit his sin? And yet if the soul were traduced from the parents, and begotten, yet sin could not descend, because it is not a natural, but a superinduced quality; and if it could, then it would follow, that we should from every vicious father derive a proper original sin, besides the general. 7. If in him we sinned, then it were but just, that in him we should be punished: for as the sin is, so ought the punishment to be. But it were unjust, or at least it seems so, that he should sin for us, and we be punished for him, or that he should sin for us and for himself, and yet be punished for himself alone.

42. III. But if it be said, that this happened because of the will and decree of God; then there is no more to be done, but to look into the record, and see what God threatened, and what he inflicted. He threatened death and inflicted it, with all its preparations and solemnities in men and women: hard labour in them both; which St. Chrysostom thus expresses: Ἐκείνου πεσόντος, καὶ οἱ μὴ φαγόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου, γεγένασιν παρ' ἐκείνου πάντες θνητοί: "Adam falling, even they that did not eat of the tree, were of him all born mortal[q]." He and all his posterity were left in the mere natural state; that is, in a state of imperfection, in a state that was not sufficiently instructed and furnished with abilities in order to a supernatural end, whither God had secretly designed mankind. In this state he could never arrive at heaven, but that was to be supplied by other means; for this made it necessary that all should come to Christ, and is the great αὐθεντία and necessity for the baptism of infants, that they, being admitted to supernatural promises and assistances, may be lifted up to a state above their nature; not only to improve their present good, as the Pelagians affirmed,

> Tam dives verò hoc donum baptismatis esse,
> Ut parvis etiam vitioque carentibus omni
> Congruat, ut qui sunt geniti bene, sint meliores,
> Naturæque bonum adjecto illustretur honore;

[p] Lib. 2. de gen. ad.

[q] In 5. Rom.

but to take off that evil state of things whither by occasion of the fall of Adam they were devolved,—and to give them new birth, adoption into Christ, and the seeds of a new nature, so to become children of God and heirs of the promises, who in their mere naturals did inherit from Adam nothing but misery, and imperfection, and death.

Cœlorum regnum sperate, hoc fonte renati;
Non recipit felix vita semel genitos.
Insons esse volens isto mundare lavacro,
Seu patrio premeris crimine, seu proprio.

So Xystus in the verses written upon the fount of Constantine. But, 2. It is not to be supposed that God did inflict any necessity of sinning upon Adam or his posterity, because from that time even unto this, he by new laws hath required innocence of life, or repentance and holiness. For besides that it is a great testimony of the divine favour that God will still employ us, and exact more services of us, and that there is no other argument of joy to us in the world, than that we are God's servants, and there can be no greater testimony, that God is our God; and that of this employing us in his service, there can be no greater evidence, than the giving to us new laws: besides this, I say, if man could not obey, it is not consistent with the wisdom of God, to require of man, what he knows man cannot do; nor with his justice to punish that in man, which he knows, man cannot avoid.

43. But if it be objected, that man had strengths enough in his first creation, but when in Adam he sinned, in him also he forfeited all his strengths; and therefore his consequent disability being his own fault, cannot be his excuse; and to whatsoever laws God shall be pleased afterward to impose, he cannot plead his infirmity, because himself having brought it on himself, must suffer for it: it being just in God to exact the law of him, even where he is unable to keep it, because God once made him able, and he disabled himself. I answer many things.

44. I. That Adam had any more strengths than we have, and greater powers of nature, and by his fall lost them to himself and us, being part of the question, ought not to be pretended, till it be proved. Adam was a man, as his sons are, and no more; and God gave him strength enough to do his duty; and God is as just and loving to us as to him, and

hath promised 'he will lay no more upon us, than he will make us able to bear.' But, 2. He that disables himself from doing his Lord service, if he does it on purpose that he may not serve him, may be punished for not doing all that which was imposed upon him, because that servant did choose his disability, that he might with some pretence refuse the service. He did disobey in all the following particulars; because out of a resolution not to obey in those particulars, he made himself unable in the general. It is all one with the case of voluntary and affected ignorance. He that refuses knowledge lest he should understand his duty, and he that disables himself that he may not do it, may be punished not only for not doing it, but for making it impossible to be done. But that was not Adam's case, so far as we know; and it is certain it was not ours in the matter of his sin. 3. But if he commits a fault which accidentally disables him; as if he eats too much, and be sick the next day, and fall into a fever, he may indeed, and is justly punished for his gluttony, but he is not punishable for omitting that, which in his present weakness he can no ways perform. The reason is, because this disability was involuntary, and an evil accident; of itself a punishment of his sin, and therefore of itself not punishable; and this involuntariness is still the more notorious and certain, as the consequents are the more remote. 4. No man can be answerable to God for the consequent of his sin, unless it be natural, foretold, or foreseen; but for the sin itself he is; and as for the consequents superinduced by God, he must suffer them, but not answer for them. For these being in the hands of God, are not the works of men's hands; God hath effected it upon the sinner, he is the author of it, and by it he is directly glorified; and therefore though by it the sinner is punished, yet for it he cannot be punished again. 5. But that I may come to the case of the present argument. This measure and line of justice are most evident in laws to be imposed after the disability is contracted, and not foreseen before; concerning which, there can be no pretence of justice that the breach of them should be punished. If a law be already imposed, and a man by his fault loses those assistances, without which he could not keep the law, he may nevertheless in the rigour of justice be punished for not keeping it, because the law was given him

when he had strength, and he ought to have preserved it. For though he cannot be obliged to a new law to which he is not enabled, yet for his sin he shall not be disobliged from an old law to which he was enabled. Although God will not exceed his measures, or do wrong to a sinner, yet by his sin he shall receive no favour, or immunity. But in laws to be imposed afterward, the case, I say, is otherwise. Because the persons are not capable of any such law; and God knowing they cannot perform them, cannot intend they should; and therefore cannot justly punish them, for not doing that which himself did never heartily intend they should do, because he knew they could not. The instances will make the matter to be confessed. Suppose a man falling into drunkenness, should, by the divine judgment, fall lame; can God afterward exact it of him that he should leap and dance in public festivities, when he can neither go nor stand? If so, suppose yet further, that by the divine judgment he should fall mad; is the mad man capable of a new law? I suppose it will not be said he is: or if it be, suppose yet further, that he be taken speechless, and senseless, or die: can God still exact of him obedience to any new commandment? If he be dead, his day is done, he can work no more, nor be obliged any more; and so it is, if he be mad, or any ways disabled; the case is all one. For whatsoever the disability be, the incapacity, and imposibility, and the excuse, are the same. 6. When God, as it is said, punished the first sin with a consequent disability of doing any future services, if he also punishes the not doing what he afterward imposes, I ask, whether this later punishment be precisely due to the later, or to the former sin? If to the later, then in vain is it laid upon the former account; and yet, if it be laid upon its own, it is high injustice; because of this law the man was not a subject capable when it was imposed, the man was dead before the law was alive: and a tree is as much capable of a law, as a man is of an impossible commandment. But if the punishment of this later be inflicted upon the sinner for the first transgression by which he disabled himself, then in vain was the later commandment imposed. For since the later sin was unavoidable, and the first sin deserved the whole damnation, what end could there be of imposing this new law, by which God could not serve any new purpose, no, not for the

manifestation of his justice in condemning him? For if the first sin deserved condemnation, there was no need to introduce a new pretence, and to seek an occasion to slay him. But if it did not, it is certain the new sin could not make it just to do what was not just before, because by this new omission there can be no new guilt contracted. But of this I shall give yet a further account, when I shall discourse in what sense God can be said to punish one sin with another.

45. The consequent of the parts of this discourse is this, that since the sin of Adam did not debauch our nature by any natural efficiency of the sin itself, nor by our being in the loins of Adam, nor yet by any sentence or decree of God, we are not by Adam's sin made necessarily and naturally vicious, and inclined to evil, but are left in our mere nature, such as it was, and such as it is[r].

> —— Nec si miserum [Natura] Sinonem
> Finxit, vanum etiam mendacemque improba finget[s].

Nature makes us miserable and imperfect, but not criminal. Ἐὰν εὐσεβῇ τις ἄνθρωπος, Θεοῦ ἐστιν· ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῇ τις ἄνθρωπος, τοῦ διαβόλου· οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης γινόμενος. They are the words of St. Ignatius[t] the martyr: "If any man be a pious and a good man, he is of God; if he be impious, he is of the devil. Not by nature, but made so by his own proceedings." To all which I add this;

46. That in Scripture there is no signification of any corruption or depravation of our souls by Adam's sin; which I shall manifest by examination of all those places, which are the pretence of the contrary doctrine. For if God hath not declared in Scripture any such thing, we have the common notions of his justice, and wisdom, and goodness, and truth, in prejudice of the contrary.

[r] Idem sensit Jacobus Faber in 5. Rom. Nihil nos ex Adamo trahere nisi obligationem ad mortem. Albertus Pighius Controv. de Peccato Orig. et Ambr. Catharinus de Lapsu Hominis et Peccato Orig. statuunt, peccatum originis non habere veram peccati rationem, sed esse tantùm reatum, quo posteri primorum parentum propter transgressionem illorum primævam, sine aliquo vitio proprio et inhærente, naturæ pravitate devincti teneantur.

[s] Æn. 2. [t] Epist. ad Magnes.

SECTION II.

Consideration of the Objections against the former Doctrine.

47. THE first is, "Every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart is only evil continually[u]." I answer, it is true, they were so, but it was their own fault, not Adam's; for so it is said expressly, "All flesh hath corrupted his way upon the earth, and the earth was filled with violence[x]." 2. If this corruption had been natural and unavoidable, why did God punish all the world for it, except eight persons? Why did he punish those that could not help it? and why did others escape that were equally guilty? Is not this a respect of persons, and partiality to some, and iniquity towards all? which far be it from the Judge of all the world. 3. God might as well have punished all the world, for sleeping once in a day, or for being hungry, as for sinning, if so to do be natural and unavoidable. 4. If God in these words complained of their natural and original corruption, why did he but then, as if it were a new thing, complain of it, and repent that he had made man, since he proved so bad? 5. This malice and corruption were such, that God did send Noah, the preacher of righteousness, to draw the world from it. But no man supposes, that it was fit to send a preacher to dehort them from being guilty of original sin. Therefore it was good counsel;

——— Denique te ipsum
Concute, num qua tibi vitiorum inseverit olim
Natura, aut etiam consuetudo mala; namque
Neglectis urenda filix innascitur agris[y].

Blame not nature, but thy own evil customs; for thy neglect of thy fields will make fern and thistles to grow. It is not only because the ground is accursed, but because it is neglected, that it bears thorns. "Errasti, si existimas nobiscum vitia nasci: supervenerunt, ingesta sunt," said Seneca[z]: "Thou art deceived, if thou thinkest that vices are born with us. No, they are superinduced, and come in upon us afterward."

48. And by this we may the better understand the fol-

[u] Gen. vi. 5.
[x] Ver. 12.
[y] Horat. S. 1. 3. 34.
[z] Epist. 94.

lowing words; "I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake; for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth[a]." Concerning which, note, that these words are not two sentences. For this is not the reason why God gave over smiting, because 'man was corrupt from his youth.' For if this had been the reason, it would have come to pass, that the same cause which moved God to smite, would also move him to forbear, which were a strange economy. The words therefore are not a reason of his forbearing, but an aggravation of his kindness; as if he had said, Though man be continually evil, yet I will not, for all that, any more drown the world for man's being so evil: and so the Hebrews note that the particle כי sometimes signifies 'although.'

49. But the great outcry in this question is upon confidence of the words of David; "Behold, I was shapen in wickedness, and in sin hath my mother conceived me[b]." To which I answer, that the words are a Hebraism, and signify nothing but an aggrandation of his sinfulness, and are intended for a high expression, meaning that 'I am wholly and entirely wicked.' For the verification of which exposition, there are divers parallel places in the Holy Scriptures. "Thou wert my hope, when I hanged yet upon my mother's breasts;" and, "The ungodly are froward even from their mother's womb; as soon as they be born, they go astray, and speak lies;" which, because it cannot be true in the letter, must be an idiotism, or propriety of phrase, apt to explicate the other, and signify only a ready, a prompt, a great, and universal wickedness. The like to this is that saying of the Pharisees; "Thou wert altogether born in sin, and dost thou teach us[c]?" which phrase and manner of speaking, being plainly a reproach of the poor blind man and a disparagement of him, did mean only to call him a very wicked person, but not that he had derived his sin originally, and from his birth; for that had been their own case as much as his; and therefore St. Chrysostom explaining this phrase, says, Ὡσανεὶ ἔλεγον, ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἐν ἁμαρτίαις εἶ συ, "It is as if they should say, Thou hast been a sinner all thy life-time." To the same sense are those words of Job; "I have guided her (the widow) from my mother's womb[d]." And in this expression and severity

[a] Gen. viii. 21.
[b] Psal. li. 5.
[c] John, ix. 34.
[d] Job, xxxi. 18.

of hyperbole it is, that God aggravated the sins of his people; "Thou wast called a transgressor from the womb[e]." And this way of expressing a great state of misery we find used among the heathen writers: for so Seneca brings in Œdipus complaining;

> ——— Infanti quoque
> Decreta mors est. Fata quis tam tristia
> Sortitus unquam? videram nondum diem,
> Et jam timebar.
> Mors me antecessit, aliquis intra viscera
> Materna lethum præcoquis fatis tulit:
> Sed numquid et peccavit? ———[f]

Something like St. Bernard's, "Damnatus antequam natus," "'I was condemned before I was born;' dead before I was alive; and death seized upon me in my mother's womb. Somebody brought in a hasty and a too forward death, but did he sin also?" An expression not unlike this we have in Lucian; Συγγίνωσκέ μοι μὴ πεφυκότι κακῷ γίνεσθαι; "Pardon me that I was not born wicked," or 'born to be wicked.' 2. If David had meant it literally, it had not signified that himself was born in original sin, but that his father and mother sinned when they begat him: which the eldest son that he begat of Bathsheba, for aught I know, might have said truer than he in this sense. And this is the exposition of Clemens Alexandrinus[g], save only that by 'my mother' he understands 'Eva:' Καὶ εἰ ἐν ἁμαρτίᾳ συνειλήφθη, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐν ἁμαρτίᾳ. "Though he was conceived in sin, yet he was not in the sin;" 'peccatrix concepit, sed non peccatorem;' she sinned in the conception, not David. And in the following words he speaks home to the main article. Λεγέτωσαν ἡμῖν, ποῦ ἐπόρνευσεν τὸ γεννηθὲν παιδίον; ἢ πῶς ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ὑποπέπτωκεν ἀρὰν τὸ μηδὲν ἐνέργησαν; "Let them tell us where an infant did fornicate, or how he, who had done nothing, could fall under the curse of Adam;" meaning, so as to deserve the same evil that he did. 3. If it did relate to his own person, he might mean that he was begotten with that sanguine disposition, and libidinous temper, that was the original of his vile adultery: and then, though David said this truly of himself, yet it is not true of all, not of those whose temper is phlegmatic and inactive. 4. If David had meant this of him-

[e] Isa. xlviii. 8. [f] Phœniss. 243. Schröder. p. 199.
[g] Lib. 3. Strom. extrem.

self, and that in regard of original sin, this had been so far from being a penitential expression, or a confessing of his sin, that it had been a plain accusation of God, and an excusing of himself. As if he had said, 'O Lord, I confess I have sinned in this horrible murder and adultery; but thou, O God, knowest how it comes to pass, even by that fatal punishment, which thou didst, for the sin of Adam, inflict on me and all mankind above three thousand years before I was born, thereby making me to fall into so horrible corruption of nature, that unless thou didst irresistibly force me from it, I cannot abstain from any sin, being most naturally inclined to all. In this sinfulness hath my mother conceived me, and that hath produced in me this sad effect.'—Who would suppose David to make such a confession, or in his sorrow to hope for pardon for upbraiding not his own folly, but the decrees of God? 5. But that David thought nothing of this, or any thing like it, we may understand by the preceding words, which are as a preface to these in the objection. "Against thee only have I sinned and done this evil in thy sight, that thou mightest be justified in thy saying, and clear when thou art judged." He that thus acquits God, cannot easily be supposed, in the very next breath, so fiercely to accuse him. 6. To which also add the following words; which are a sufficient reproof of all strange senses in the other; "In sin hath my mother conceived me. But lo, thou requirest truth in the inward parts;" as if he had said, 'Though I am so wicked, yet thy laws are good, and I therefore so much the worse, because I am contrary to thy laws: they require truth and sincerity in the soul, but I am false and perfidious.'—But if this had been natural for him so to be, and unavoidable, God, who knew it perfectly well, would have expected nothing else of him. For he will not require of a stone to speak, nor of fire to be cold, unless himself be pleased to work a miracle to have them so.

50. But St. Paul[h] affirms, that, 'by nature we were the children of wrath.' True, we were so, when we were dead in sins, and before we were quickened by the Spirit of life and grace. We *were* so; now we *are* not. We were so by our own unworthiness and filthy conversation; now we being regenerated by the Spirit of holiness, we are alive unto God,

[h] Ephes. ii. 2, 3.

and no longer heirs of wrath. This therefore, as appears by the discourse of St. Paul, relates not to our original sin, but to the actual; and of this sense of the word 'nature,' in the matter of sinning, we have Justin Martyr, or whoever is the author of the questions and answers 'ad orthodoxos' to be witness[i]: for, answering those words of Scripture, 'there is not any one clean who is born of a woman,' and there is none begotten who hath not committed sin: he says, their meaning cannot extend to Christ, for he was not πεφυκὼς ἁμαρτάνειν, "born to sin;" but he is "natura ad peccandum natus," πεφυκὼς ἁμαρτάνειν, ὁ κατὰ τὴν αὐθαίρετον προαίρεσιν ἄγων ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται εἴτε ἀγαθὰ, εἴτε φαῦλα, "by nature born to sin, who by the choice of his own will is author to himself to do what he list, whether it be good or evil." The following words are eaten out by time; but upon this ground whatever he said of infants, must needs have been to better purposes than is usually spoken of in this article. 2. Heirs of wrath, signifies persons liable to punishment, heirs of death. It is a usual expression among the Hebrews. So 'sons of death' in the Holy Scriptures are those that deserve death, or are condemned to die. Thus Judas Iscariot is called, 'the son of perdition[k];' and so is that saying of David to Nathan, 'The man that hath done this, shall surely die[l].' In the Hebrew it is, 'he is the son of death.' And so were those Ephesians, 'children' or sons 'of wrath' before their conversion; that is, they had deserved death. 3. By 'nature' is here most likely to be meant that which Galen calls φύσις ἐπίκτητος, 'an acquisite nature,' that is, τὰ ἤθη, 'customs' and evil habits. And so Suidas expounds the word in this very place; not only upon the account of grammar, and the use of the word in the best authors, but also upon an excellent reason. His words are these: Ὅταν δὲ λέγει ὁ Ἀπόστολος, καὶ ἦμεν τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς, ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ, οὐ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον τῆς φύσεως λέγει· ἐπεὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἂν ἦν τὸ ἔγκλημα. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔμμονον καὶ κακίστην διάθεσιν, καὶ χρονίαν καὶ πονηρὰν συνήθειαν. "When the Apostle says, we were by nature children of wrath, he means not that which is the usual signification of nature, for then it were not their fault, but the fault of him that made them such; but it means an abiding and vile habit, a wicked and a lasting custom." Καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον

[i] Quæst. 88. [k] John, xvii. 12. [l] 2 Sam. xii. 5.

ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίνεται, saith Aristotle[m]: 'Custom is like nature.' For 'often' and 'always' are not far asunder. Nature is 'always,' custom is 'almost always.' To the same sense are those words of Porphyry[n]; Τοὺς παλαιοὺς καὶ ἐγγὺς θεῶν γεγονότας, βελτίστους τε ὄντας φύσει καὶ τῶν ἄριστον ἐζηκότας βίον, ὡς χρυσοῦν γένος νομίζεσθαι—"The ancients who lived likest to God, and were by nature the best, living the best life, were a golden generation.—4. 'By nature,' means not by birth and natural extraction, or any original derivation from Adam, in this place: for of this these Ephesians were no more guilty than every one else, and no more before their conversion than after; but, 'by nature' signifies ὄντως, ἀληθῶς, so the Greek Scholiast renders it; 'really, beyond opinion;' 'plenè et omnino,' 'entirely, or wholly,' so the Syriac; and so St. Jerome affirms that the ancients did expound it: and it is agreeable to the usage of the same phrase, Gal. iv. 8. "Ye did service to them which, 'by nature' are no gods," that is, which 'really' are none. And as these Ephesians were before their conversion, so were the Israelites in the days of their rebellion, a wicked stubborn people, insomuch that they are by the Prophet called "children of transgression, a seed of falsehood[o]." But these and the like places have no force at all but what they borrow from the ignorance of that sense and acceptation of the word in those languages, which ought to be the measure of them.

51. But it is hard upon such mean accounts to reckon all children to be born enemies of God, that is, bastards and not sons, heirs of hell and damnation, full of sin and vile corruption, when the Holy Scriptures propound children as imitable for their pretty innocence and sweetness, and declare them rather heirs of heaven than hell. 'In malice be children:' and, 'unless we become like to children, we shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven[q];' and, 'their angels behold the face of their Father which is in heaven[r].' Heaven is theirs, God is their father, angels are appropriated to them; they are free from malice, and imitable by men. These are better words than are usually given them; and signify, that they are beloved of God, not hated, designed for heaven, and born to it, though brought thither by Christ, and by the Spirit of

[m] Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. [n] Lib. 4. de Esu Anim. [o] Isa. lvii. 4.
[p] 1 Cor. xiv. 20. [q] Matt. xviii. 3. [r] Matt. xviii. 10.

Christ, not born for hell: that was 'prepared for the devil and his angels,' not for innocent babes. This does not call them naturally wicked, but rather naturally innocent; and is a better account than is commonly given them by imputation of Adam's sin.

52. But not concerning children, but of himself St. Paul complains, that his nature and his principles of action and choice are corrupted. "There is a law in my members, bringing me into captivity to the law of sin[s];" and many other words to the same purpose: all which indeed have been strangely mistaken to very ill purposes, so that the whole chapter so, as is commonly expounded, is nothing but a temptation to evil life, and a patron of impiety. Concerning which I have in the next chapter given account, and freed it from the common abuse. But if this were to be understood in the sense which I there reprove, yet it is to be observed in order to the present question, that St. Paul does not say, "This law in our members comes by nature, or is derived from Adam." A man may bring a law upon himself by vicious custom, and that may be as prevalent as nature, and more; because more men have by philosophy and illuminated reason cured the disposition of their nature, than have cured their vicious habits. Add to this, that St. Paul puts this uneasiness, and this carnal law in his members, wholly upon the account of being 'under the law,' and of his not being under Christ, not upon the account of Adam's prevarication, as is plain in the analogy of the whole chapter.

53. As easy also it is to understand these words of St. Paul without prejudice to this question: "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither indeed can he know them[t]:" meaning, as is supposed, that there is in our natures an ignorance and averseness from spiritual things that is, a contrariety to God. But it is observable, that the word which the Apostle uses is ψυχικὸς, which is not properly rendered 'natural' but 'animal,' and it certainly means a man that is guided only by natural reason, without the revelations of the Gospel. Ψυχικὸς καλεῖ ὁ ἀπόστολος τὸν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς λογισμοῖς τὰ πράγματα ἐπιτρέποντα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ενέργειαν μὴ δέχοντα. So Suidas. An animal man; that is a philosopher, or a rational man, such as were the

[s] Rom. vii. 23. [t] 1 Cor. ii. 14.

Greek and Roman philosophers, upon the stock and account of the learning of all their schools, could never discern the excellences of the Gospel mysteries; as of God incarnate, Christ dying, resurrection of the body, and the like. For this word ψυχικὸς, or 'animal,' and another word used often by the Apostle, σαρκικὸς, 'carnal,' are opposed to πνευματικὸς, 'spiritual;' and are states of evil, or of imperfection, in which while a man remains, he cannot do the work of God. For 'animality,' which is a relying upon natural principles without revelation, is a state privatively opposed to the 'Spirit;' and a man in that state cannot be saved, because he wants a vital part, he wants the Spirit, which is a part of the constitution of a Christian in that capacity, who consists of body, and soul, and Spirit; and therefore 'anima without Spiritus,' 'the soul without the Spirit,' is not sufficient. For as the soul is a sufficient principle of all the actions of life, in order to our natural end and perfection, but it can bear us no further; so there must be another principle in order to a supernatural end, and that is the Spirit; called by St. Paul, νέα κτίσις, 'the new creation;' by St. Peter, 'divine nature;' and by this we become renewed in the inner man: the infusion of this new nature into us is called regeneration; and it is the great principle of godliness, called, grace or the Spirit, σπέρμα Θεοῦ, 'the seed of God,' and by it we are begotten by God, and brought forth by the church to the hopes and beginnings of a new life, and a supernatural end. And although I cannot say, that this is a third substance distinct from soul and body, yet it is a distinct principle put into us by God, without which we cannot work, and by which we can; and therefore if it be not a substance, yet it is more than a metaphor; it is a real being, permanent and inherent; but yet such as can be lessened and extinguished.

But 'carnality,' or the state of being in the flesh, is not privatively opposed, but contrarily also, to the spiritual state or the state of grace. But as the first is not a sin derived from Adam, so neither is the second. The first is only an imperfection, or want of supernatural aids; the other is indeed a direct state of sin, and hated by God, but superinduced by choice, and not descending naturally. Now to the spiritual state, nothing is in Scripture opposed but these two; and neither of these, when it is sinful, can be pretended, upon the

stock or argument of any scriptures, to descend from Adam; therefore all the state of opposition to grace, is owing to ourselves, and not to him. Adam indeed did leave us all in an animal estate, but this state is not a state of enmity, or direct opposition to God, but a state insufficient and imperfect. No man can perish for being an animal man, that is, for not having any supernatural revelations, but for not consenting to them when he hath, that is, for being carnal as well as animal; and that he is carnal, is wholly his own choice. In the state of animality he cannot go to heaven; but neither will that alone bear him to hell: and therefore God does not let a man alone in that state: for either God suggests to him what is spiritual; or if he does not, it is because himself hath superinduced something that is carnal.

54. Having now explicated those scriptures which have made some difficulty in this question, to what topic soever we shall return, all things are plain and clear in this article, 'Noxa caput sequitur,' 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die.'—"Neque virtutes, neque vitia parentum liberis imputantur," saith St. Jerome; "Neither the vices nor the virtues of the parents are imputed to the children [u]." And therefore when Dion Chrysostomus had reproved Solon's laws, which in some cases condemn the innocent posterity; he adds this in honour of God's law: Πλὴν παῖδας καὶ γένος οὐκ ἐπέξεισιν, ὡς ἐκεῖ, τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων· ἀλλ' ἕκαστος αὐτῷ γίνεται τῆς ἀτυχίας αἴτιος; "That it does not, like the law of the Athenians, punish the children and kindred of the criminal; but every man is the cause of his own misfortune."—But concerning this, it will not be amiss, in order to many good purposes, to observe the whole economy and dispensation of the divine justice in this affair.

SECTION III.

How God punishes the Father's Sin upon the Children.

55. I. God may and does very often bless children to reward their father's piety; as is notorious in the famous descent of Abraham's family. But the same is not the reason of favours

[u] Epist. 3. de Morte Nepotiani.

and punishments. For such is the nature of benefits, that he in whose power they are, may without injustice give them, why, and when, and to whom, he please.

56. II. God never imputes the father's sin to the son or relative, formally making him guilty, or being angry with the innocent eternally. It were blasphemy to affirm so fierce and violent a cruelty of the most merciful Saviour and Father of mankind; and it was yet never imagined or affirmed by any that I know of, that God did yet ever damn an innocent son, though the father were the vilest person, and committed the greatest evils of the world, actually, personally, choosingly, and maliciously: and why it should by so many, and so confidently, be affirmed in a lesser instance, in so unequal a case, and at so long a distance, I cannot suspect any reason. Plutarch, in his book against Herodotus, affirms, that it is not likely they would, meaning that it was unjust to, revenge an injury which the Samians did to the Corinthians three hundred years before. But to revenge it for ever, upon all generations, and with an eternal anger upon some persons, even the most innocent, cannot without trembling be spoken or imagined of God, who is the great 'lover of souls.' Whatsoever the matter be in temporal inflictions, of which in the next propositions I shall give account, yet if the question be concerning eternal damnation, it was never said, never threatened, by God to pass from father to the son. When God punishes one relative for the sin of another, he does it as fines are taken in our law, 'salvo contenemento,' 'the principal stake being safe;' it may be justice to seize upon all the smaller portions; at least it is not against justice for God in such cases to use the power and dominion of a lord. But this cannot be reasonable to be used in the matter of interest; because if God should as a lord use his power over innocents, and condemn them to hell, he should be author to them of more evil than ever he conveyed good to them; which but to imagine, would be a horrible impiety. And therefore when our blessed Saviour took upon him the wrath of God due to all mankind, yet God's anger even in that case extended no further than a temporal death. Because, for the eternal, nothing can make recompense, and it can never turn to good.

57. III. When God inflicts a temporal evil upon the son for his father's sin, he does it as a judge to the father, but as

a lord only of the son. He hath absolute power over the lives of all his creatures, and can take it away from any man without injustice, when he please, though neither he nor his parents have sinned; and he may use the same right and power when either of them alone hath sinned. But in striking the son, he does not do to him as a judge; that is, he is not angry with him, but with the parent: but to the son he is a supreme lord, and may do what seemeth good in his own eyes.

58. IV. When God, using the power and dominion of a lord, and the severity of a judge, did punish posterity, 'it was but so long as the fathers might live and see it,' οὐ λυποῦσα μᾶλλον ἑτέρα κόλασις ἢ τοὺς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κακὰ πάσχοντας δι' αὐτοὺς ὁρᾶν, said St. Chrysostom[x], to the third and fourth generation, no longer. It was threatened to endure no longer, in the second commandment; and so it happened in the case of Zimri and Jehu; after the fourth generation they prevailed not upon their masters' houses. And if it happen that the parents die before, yet it is a plague to them that they know, or ought to fear the evil shall happen upon their posterity; "quo tristiores perirent," as Alexander said of the traitors, whose sons were to die after them; "They die with sorrow and fear."

59. V. This power and dominion which God used, was not exercised in ordinary cases, but in the biggest crimes only. It was threatened in the case of idolatry; and was often inflicted in the case of perjury, of which the oracle recited by Herodotus said,

> ——— Impete magno
> Advenit, atque omnem vastat stirpemque domúmque.

And in sacrilege the anger of God uses also to be severe; of which it was observed even by the heathens taught by the Delphic priests:

> Sed capiti ipsorum, quique enascuntur ab ipsis,
> Immittet; inque domo cladem subit altera clades.

Those sins which the Greeks called ἄγη, and which the Christians called 'crying sins,' are such, in the punishment of which God did not only use his severe justice as to the offending person; but for the enlargement and extension of

[x] Homil. 29. in 9. Gen.

his justice, and the terror of the world, he used the rights of his power and dominion over their relatives.

60. VI. Although God threatened this, and hath a right and power to do this, yet he did not often use his right, but only in such notable examples as were sufficient to all ages to consign and testify his great indignation against those crimes, for the punishment of which he was pleased to use his right, the rights of his dominion. For although he often does miracles of mercy, yet seldom it is that he does any extraordinaries of judgment: he did it to Corah and Dathan, to Achan and Saul, to Jeroboam and Ahab; and by these and some more expressed his severity against the like crimes sufficiently to all ages.

61. VII. But his goodness and graciousness grew quickly weary of this way of proceeding. They were the terrors of the law, and God did not delight in them. Therefore, in the time of Ezekiel the prophet, he declared against them, and promised to use it no more, that is, not so frequently, not so notoriously, not without great necessity and charity, 'Ne ad parentum exempla succresceret improbitas filiorum:' —"As I live, saith the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge. The soul that sinneth, it shall die[y]."

62. VIII. The iniquity of the people, and the hardness of their heart, did force God to use this harsh course, especially since that then there was no declaration, or intermination, and threatening the pains of hell to great sinners. "Duritia populi ad talia remedia compulerat, ut vel posteritatibus suis prospicientes legi divinæ obedirent," said Tertullian. Something extraordinary was then needful to be done to so vile a people to restrain their sinfulness. But when the Gospel was published, and hell-fire threatened to persevering, and greater sinners, the former way of punishment was quite left off. And in all the Gospel there is not any one word of threatening passing beyond the person offending. "Desivit uva acerba" (saith Tertullian[z]), "à patribus manducata, dentes filiorum obstupefacere: unusquisque enim in suo delicto morietur:" "Now" (that is, in the time of the Gospel), "the sour grape of the fathers shall no more

[y] Ezek. xviii. 3. [z] De Monog.

set on edge the children's teeth, but every one shall die in his own sin."

63. Upon this account alone, it must needs be impossible to be consented to, that God should still, under the Gospel, after so many generations of vengeance, and taking punishment for the sin, after the publication of so many mercies, and so infinite a graciousness as is revealed to mankind in Jesus Christ, after the so great provisions against sin, even the horrible threatenings of damnation, still persevere to punish Adam in his posterity, and the posterity for what they never did.

64. For either the evil that falls upon us for Adam's sin, is inflicted upon us by way of proper punishment, or by right of dominion. If by a proper punishment to us, then we understand not the justice of it, because we were not personally guilty; and all the world says it is unjust directly to punish a child for his father's fault. "Nihil est iniquius quàm aliquem hæredem paterni odii fieri," said Seneca:—and Pausanias, the general of the Grecian army, would not punish the children of Attagines, who persuaded the Thebans to revolt to the Medes, φὰς τοῦ Μηδίσμοῦ παῖδας οὐκ εἶναι μεταιτίους, "saying, the children were not guilty of that revolt:" and when Avidius Cassius had conspired against Mark Anthony, he wrote to the senate to pardon his wife and son-in-law; "Et quid dico *veniam*, cùm illi nihil fecerint?" "But why" (says he) "should I say, *pardon*, when they had done nothing?" But if God inflicts the evil upon Adam's posterity, which we suffer for his sake, not as a punishment, that is, not making us formally guilty, but using his own right and power of dominion which he hath over the lives and fortunes of his creatures; then it is a strange anger which God hath against Adam, that he still retains so fierce an indignation, as not to take off his hand from striking after five thousand six hundred years, and striking him for that of which he repented him, and which in all reason we believe he then pardoned, or resolved to pardon, when he promised the Messias to him. To this I add this consideration; that it is not easily to be imagined how Christ reconciled the world unto his Father; if after the death of Christ, God is still so angry with mankind, so unappeased, that even the most innocent part of mankind may perish for Adam's sin; and the other are per-

petually punished by a corrupted nature, a proneness to sin, a servile will, a filthy concupiscence, and an impossibility of being innocent; that no faith, no sacrament, no industry, no prayers, can obtain freedom from this punishment.

65. Certain it is, the Jews knew of no such thing, they understood nothing of this economy, that the father's sin should be punished in the children by a formal imputation of the guilt; and therefore Rabbi Simeon Barsema said well, that "when God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children, 'jure dominii, non pœnæ utitur,' 'he uses the right of empire,' not of justice,—of dominion, 'not of punishment,'—of a lord, not of a judge." And Philo blames it for the worst of institutions, when the good sons of bad parents shall be dishonoured by their fathers' stain, and the bad sons of good parents shall have their fathers' honour; *τοῦ νόμου δικάζοντος ἕκαστον αὐτὸν, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ συγγενῶν, ἀρεταῖς ἐπαινοῦντος, ἢ κακίαις κολάζοντος*; "for the law praises every one for their own, not for the virtue of their ancestors, and punishes not the fathers, but his own wickedness upon every man's head [a]." And therefore Josephus calls the contrary way of proceeding, which he had observed in Alexander, *ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον δίκην*, 'a punishment above the measures of a man;' and the Greeks and Romans did always call it injustice.

> Illic immeritam maternæ pendere linguæ
> Andromedam pœnas injustus jusserat Hammon [b].

And hence it is, that all laws forbear to kill a woman with child, lest the innocent should suffer for the mother's fault: and therefore this just mercy is infinitely more to be expected from the great Father of spirits, the God of mercy and comfort. And upon this account Abraham was confident with God; "Wilt thou slay the righteous with the wicked? Shall not the Judge of all the world do right?" And if it be unrighteous to slay the righteous with the wicked, it is also unjust to slay the righteous for the wicked. "Ferretne ulla civitas laborem istiusmodi legis, ut condemnetur filius aut nepos, si pater aut avus deliquissent:" "It were an intolerable law, and no community would be governed by it, that the father or grandfather should sin, and the son or nephew should be punished [c]."—I shall add no more testimonies, but

[a] Lib. de Pietate. [b] Ovid. M. iv. 669. Gierig.
[c] Cicero, lib. 3. de Nat. Deor.

only make use of the words of the Christian emperors in their laws; "Peccata igitur suos teneant auctores: nec ulteriùs progrediatur metus, quàm reperiatur delictum[d]:" 'Let no man trouble himself with unnecessary and melancholy dreams of strange, inevitable, undeserved punishments, descending upon us for the faults of others.'—The sin that a man does, shall be upon his own head only. Sufficient to every man is his own evil, the evil that he does, and the evil that he suffers.

SECTION IV.

Of the Causes of the universal Wickedness of Mankind.

66. But if there were not some common natural principle of evil introduced by the sin of our parent upon his posterity, how should all men be so naturally inclined to be vicious, so hard and unapt, so uneasy and so listless, to the practices of virtue? How is it that all men in the world are sinners, and that in many things we offend all? For if men could choose and had freedom, it is not imaginable that all should choose the same thing; as all men will not be physicians, nor all desire to be merchants. But we see that al men are sinners, and yet it is impossible that in a liberty of indifferency there should be no variety. Therefore we must be content to say, that we have only a liberty of adhesion or delight; that is, we so love sin that we all choose it, but cannot choose good.

67. To this I answer many things. 1. If we will suppose that there must now be a cause in our nature determining us to sin by an irresistible necessity, I desire to know why such principle should be more necessary to us than it was to Adam? What made him to sin when he fell? He had a perfect liberty, and no ignorance, no original sin, no inordination of his affections, no such rebellion of the inferior faculties against the superior as we complain of; or at least we say he had not, and yet he sinned. And if his passions did rebel against his reason before the fall, then so they may in us, and yet not belong of that fall. It was before the fall in him, and so may be in us, and not the effect of it. But the truth of the thing is this, he had liberty of choice, and chose

[d] L. Sancimus. c. de Pœnit.

ill, and so do we: and all men say, that this liberty of choosing ill, is still left to us. But because it is left here, it appears that it was there before, and therefore is not the consequent of original sin. But it is said, that as Adam chose ill, so do we; but he was free to good as well as to evil, but so are not we; we are free to evil, not to good; and that we are so, is the consequent of original sin. I reply, that we can choose good, and as naturally love good as evil, and in some instances more. A man cannot naturally hate God, if he knows any thing of him. A man naturally loves his parents. He naturally hates some sort of uncleanness. He naturally loves and preserves himself: and all those sins which are unnatural, are such which nature hates: and the law of nature commands all the great instances of virtue, and marks out all the great lines of justice. *Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ τοῖς λογικοῖς γένεσι ἐνουσιωμένος ὅρκος, μὴ παραβαίνειν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (Θεοῦ) διορισθέντας νόμους.* "It is a law imprinted in the very substance of our natures, and incorporated in all generations of reasonable creatures, not to break or transgress the laws which are appointed by God." Here only our nature is defective; we do not naturally know, nor yet naturally love, those supernatural excellences, which are appointed and commanded by God as the means of bringing us to a supernatural condition. That is, without God's grace, and the renovation of the Spirit of God, we cannot be saved. Neither was Adam's case better than ours in this particular. For that his nature could not carry him to heaven, or indeed to please God in order to it, seems to be confessed by them who have therefore affirmed him to have had a supernatural righteousness: which is affirmed by all the Roman party. But although in supernatural instances it must needs be that our nature is defective; so it must needs have been in Adam: and therefore the Lutherans (who, in this particular, dream not so probably as the other), affirming that justice was natural in Adam, do yet but differ in the manner of speaking, and have not at all spoken against this; neither can they, unless they also affirm that to arrive at heaven was the natural end of man. For if it be not, then neither we nor Adam could by nature do things above nature; and if God did concreate grace with Adam, that grace was nevertheless grace, for being given him as soon as he was made: for even the Holy Spirit may be given

to a chrisom-child; and Christ, and St. John Baptist, and the prophet Jeremy, are, in their several measures and proportions, instances of it. The result of which is this; that the necessity of grace does not suppose that our nature is originally corrupted; for beyond Adam's mere nature, something else was necessary, and so it is to us.

68. I. But to the main objection; I answer, that it is certain there is not only one, but many common principles from which sin derives itself into the manners of all men. 1. The first great cause of a universal impiety is, that at first, God had made no promises of heaven, he had not propounded any glorious rewards, to be as an argument to support the superior faculty against the inferior, that is, to make the will choose the best and leave the worst, and to be as a reward for suffering contradiction. For if the inferior faculty be pleased with its object, and that chance to be forbidden, as it was in most instances, there had need be something to make recompense for the suffering the displeasure of crossing that appetite. I use the common manner of speaking, and the distinction of superior and inferior faculties: though indeed in nature there is no such thing; and it is but the same faculty, divided between differing objects; of which I shall give an account in the chapter 9, section 3. But here I take notice of it, that it may not with prejudice be taken to the disadvantage of this whole article. For if there be no such difference of faculties founded in nature, then the rebellion of the inferior against the superior, is no effect of Adam's sin. But the inclination to sensual objects being chastised by laws and prohibitions, hath made that which we call the rebellion of the inferior, that is, the adherence to sensual objects; which was the more certain to remain, because they were not at first enabled by great promises of good things to contest against sensual temptations. And because there was no such thing in that period of the world, therefore almost all flesh corrupted themselves: excepting Abel, Seth, Enos, and Enoch, we find not one good man from Adam to Noah; and therefore the Apostle calls that world, κοσμὸν ἀσεβῶν, 'the world of the ungodly[a].' It was not so much wonder that when Adam had no promises made to enable him to contest his natural concupiscence, he

[a] 2 Pet. ii. 5.

should strive to make his condition better by the devil's promises. If God had been pleased to have promised to him the glories he hath promised to us, it is not to be supposed he had fallen so easily. But he did not, and so he fell, and all the world followed his example, and most upon this account; till it pleased God, after he had tried the world with temporal promises, and found them also insufficient,—to finish the work of his graciousness, and to cause us to be born anew, by the revelations and promises of Jesus Christ.

69. II. A second cause of the universal iniquity of the world, is because our nature is so hard put to it in many instances; notbecause nature is originally corrupted, but because God's laws command such things, which are a restraint to the indifferent, and otherwise lawful inclinations of nature. I instance in the matters of temperance, abstinence, patience, humility, self-denial, and mortification. But more particularly thus: a man is naturally inclined to desire the company of a woman whom he fancies. This is naturally no sin: for the natural desire was put into us by God, and therefore could not be evil. But then God, as an instance and trial of our obedience, put fetters upon the indefinite desire, and determined us to one woman; which provision was enough to satisfy our need, but not all our possibility. This therefore he left as a reserve, that by obeying God in the so reasonable restraint of our natural desire, we might give him something of our own. But then it is to be considered, that our unwillingness to obey in this instance, or in any of the other, cannot be attributed to original sin, or natural disability derived as a punishment from Adam, because the particular instances were postnate a long time to the fall of man; and it was for a long time lawful to do some things which now are unlawful. But our unwillingness and averseness came by occasion of the law coming cross upon our nature; not because our nature is contrary to God, but because God was pleased to superinduce some commandments contrary to our nature. For if God had commanded us to eat the best meats, and drink the richest wines as long as they could please us, and were to be had, I suppose it will not be thought, that original sin would hinder us from obedience. But because we are forbidden to do some things which naturally we desire to do and love, therefore

our nature is hard put to it; and this is the true state of the difficulty. "Citò nequitia subrepit: virtus difficilis inventa est:" "Wickedness came in speedily; but virtue was hard and difficult[f]."

70. III. But then, besides these, there are many concurrent causes of evil which have influence upon communities of men, such as are, evil examples, the similitude of Adam's transgression, vices of princes, wars, impunity, ignorance, error, false principles, flattery, interest, fear, partiality, authority, evil laws, heresy, schism, spite, and ambition, natural inclination, and other principiant causes, which, proceeding from the natural weakness of human constitution, are the fountain and proper causes of many consequent evils. "Quis dabit mundum ab immundo," saith Job; "How can a clean thing come from an unclean[g]?" We all naturally have great weaknesses, and an imperfect constitution, apt to be weary, loving variety, ignorantly making false measures of good and evil, made up with two appetites, that is, with inclination to several objects serving to contrary interests, a thing between angel and beast, and the later in this life is the bigger ingredient. "Hominem à naturâ noverca in lucem edi corpore nudo, fragili atque infirmo animo, anxio ad molestias, humili ad timores, debili ad labores, proclivi ad libidines, in quo divinus ignis sit obrutus, et ingenium, et mores:" so Cicero, as St. Austin[h] quotes him: "Nature hath like a stepmother sent man into the world with a naked boy, a frail and infirm mind, vexed with troubles, dejected with fears, weak for labours, prone to lusts, in whom the divine fire, and his wit, and his manners, are covered and overturned."—And when Plato had fiercely reproved the baseness of men's manners, by saying, that they are even naturally evil; he reckons two causes of it, which are the diseases of the soul, but contracted he knew not how, ignorance and improbity; which he supposes to have been the remains of that baseness they had before they entered into bodies, whither they were sent as to a prison[i].—This is our natural uncleanness and imperfection, and from such a principle we are to expect proper and proportioned effects; and therefore

[f] Sen. lib. 3. Quæst. Natur. c. 3.
[g] Job, xiv. 14.
[h] Lib. 4. contra Julianum.
[i] In Sophisticâ.—Homines naturâ sunt mali: et non possunt induci, ut justitiam colant. lib. 2. de Rep.

we may well say with Job, "What is man that he should be clean, and he which is born of a woman, that he should be righteous[k]?" That is, our imperfections are many, and we are with unequal strengths called to labour for a supernatural purchase; and when 'our spirit is very willing, even then our flesh is very weak:' and yet it is worse if we compare ourselves, as Job does, to the purities and perfections of God; in respect of which, as he says of us men in our imperfect state, so he says also of the angels, or the holy ones of God, and of the heaven itself, that it is also 'unclean and impure:' for the cause and verification of which, we must look out for something besides original sin. Add to this, that vice is pregnant and teeming, and brings forth new instances, numerous as the spawn of fishes; such as are inadvertency, carelessness, tediousness of spirit, and these also are causes of very much evil.

SECTION V.

Of Liberty of Election remaining after Adam's Fall.

UPON this account, besides that the causes of a universal impiety are apparent without any need of laying Adam in blame for all our follies and miseries, or rather without charging them upon God, who so ordered all things as we see and feel; the universal wickedness of man is no argument to prove our will servile, and the powers of election to be quite lost in us, excepting only that we can choose evil. For admitting this proposition, that there can be no liberty where there is no variety; yet that all men choose sin, is not any testimony that there is no variety in our choice. If there were but one sin in the world, and all men did choose that, it were a shrewd suspicion that they were naturally determined or strongly precipitated. But every man does not choose the same sin, nor for the same cause; neither does he choose it always, but frequently declines it, hates it, and repents of it: many men, even among the heathens, did so. So that the objection hinders not, but that choice and election still remain to man, and that he is not naturally sin-

[k] Job, xv. 14.

ful, as he is naturally heavy, or upright, apt to laugh, or weep. For these he is always, and unavoidable.

72. And indeed the contrary doctrine is a destruction of all laws, it takes away reward and punishment, and we have nothing whereby we can serve God. And precepts of holiness might as well be preached to a wolf as to a man, if man were naturally and inevitably wicked.

Improbitas nullo flectitur obsequio.

There would be no use of reason or of discourse, no deliberation or counsel: and it were impossible for the wit of man to make sense of thousands of places of Scripture, which speak to us as if we could hear and obey, or could refuse. Why are promises made, and threatenings recorded? Why are God's judgments registered? To what purpose is our reason above, and our affections below, if they were not to minister to, and attend upon the will? But upon this account, it is so far from being true that man after his fall did forfeit his natural power of election, that it seems rather to be increased. For as a man's knowledge grows, so his will becomes better attended and ministered unto. But after his fall, his knowledge was more than before; he knew what nakedness was, and had experience of the difference of things, he perceived the evil and mischief of disobedience and the divine anger; he knew fear and flight, new apprehensions, and the trouble of a guilty conscience: by all which and many other things, he grew better able, and instructed with arguments to obey God, and to refuse sin for the time to come. And it is every man's case; a repenting man is wiser, and hath oftentimes more perfect hatred of sin than the innocent, and is made more wary by his fall. But of this thing God himself is witness. "Ecce homo tanquam singularis, ex se ipso habet scire bonum et malum:" so the Chaldee paraphrase reads Gen. iii. 22. Our Bibles read thus: "And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil." Now as a consequent of this knowledge, God was pleased, by ejecting him out of Paradise, 'to prevent his eating of the tree of life:' "Ne fortè mittat manum suam in arborem vitæ:" meaning, that now he was grown wise and apt to provide himself, and use, all such remedies as were before him. He knew more after

his fall than before; therefore ignorance was not the punishment of that sin: and he that knows more, is better enabled to choose, and lest he should choose that which might prevent the sentence of death put upon him, God cast him from thence where the remedy did grow. Upon the authority of this place Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon hath these words: "Potestas libera unicuique data est. Si vult inclinare se ad bonum et esse justus, penes ipsum est: sin vult se ad malum inclinare et esse impius, et hoc ipsum penes est. Hoc illud est quod in lege scribitur, Ecce homo tanquam singularis, ex seipso habet scire bonum et malum:" "To every man is given a power that he may choose and be inclined to good if he please; or else if he please to do evil. For this is written in the Law, Behold, the man is a single one, of himself now he knows good and evil: as if he had said, Behold, mankind is in the world without its like, and can, of his own counsel and thought, know good and evil, in either of these doing what himself shall choose."—"Si lapsus es, poteris surgere, in utramvis partem habes liberum arbitrium," saith St. Chrysostom[1]. "If thou hast fallen, thou mayest rise again. That which thou art commanded to do, thou hast power to do. Thou mayest choose either."

73. I might be infinite in this; but I shall only add this one thing, that to deny to the will of man powers of choice and election, or the use of it in the actions of our life, destroys the immortality of the soul. Κινδυνεύει γὰρ εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὑποφέρεσθαι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ διὰ τῆς εἰς τὸ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν ἐκτροπῆς, said Hierocles: "Human nature is in danger to be lost, if it diverts to that which is against nature."—For if it be immortal, it can never die in its noblest faculty. But if the will be destroyed, that is, disabled from choosing (which is all the work the will hath to do), then it is dead. For to live, and to be able to operate, in philosophy are all one. If the will therefore cannot operate, how is it immortal? And we may as well suppose an understanding that can never understand, and passions that can never desire or refuse, and a memory that can never remember, as a will that cannot choose. Indeed all the faculties of the soul that operate by way of nature, can be hindered in individuals; but in the whole species never. But the will is not impedible, it cannot

[1] In 50. Psal. hom. 2.

be restrained at all, if there be any acts of life; and when all the other faculties are weakest, the will is strongest, and does not all depend upon the body. Indeed it often follows the inclination and affections of the body, but it can choose against them, and it can work without them. And indeed since sin is the action of a free faculty, it can no more take away the freedom of that faculty, than virtue can; for that also is the action of the same free faculty. If sin be considered in its formality, as it is an inordination or irregularity, so it is contrary to virtue; but if you consider it as an effect or action of the will, it is not at all contrary to the will, and therefore it is impossible it should be destructive of that faculty from whence it comes.

74. Now to say, that the will is not dead, because it can choose sin, but not virtue, is an escape too slight. For, besides that it is against an infinite experience, it is also contrary to the very being and manner of a man, and his whole economy in this world. For men indeed, sometimes by evil habits, and by choosing vile things for a long time together, make it morally impossible to choose and to love that good in particular which is contrary to their evil customs. Ἡράκλειτος ἔφη ὡς ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων[m]. Custom is the devil that brings in new natures upon us; for nature is innocent in this particular. "Nulli nos vitio natura conciliat: nos illa integros ac liberos genuit[n]:" "Nature does not engage us upon a vice. She made us entire, she left us free," but we make ourselves prisoners and slaves by vicious habits; or, as St. Cyril expresses it, Ἐλθόντες ἀναμάρτητοι, νῦν ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἁμαρτάνομεν; "We came into the world without sin," meaning, without sin properly so called, "but now we sin by choice," and by election bring a kind of necessity upon us. But this is not so in all men, and scarcely in any man in all instances; and as it is, it is but an approach to that state in which men shall work by will without choice, or by choice without contrariety of objects. In heaven and hell men will do so. The saints love God so fully, that they cannot hate him, nor desire to displease him. And in hell the accursed spirits so perfectly hate him, that they can never love him. But in this life, which is 'status viæ,' a middle condition between both, and a passage to one or the other, it cannot be

[m] Stob. [n] Senec. ep. 94. [o] Catech. 9.

supposed to be so, unless here also a man be already saved or damned.

75. But then I consider this also, that since it is almost by all men acknowledged to be unjust, that infants should be eternally tormented in the flames of hell for original sin; yet we do not say that it is unjust that men of age and reason should so perish, if they be vicious and disobedient. Which difference can have no ground but this, that infants could not choose at all, much less that, which not they, but their father did long before they were born: but men can choose, and do what they are commanded, and abstain from what is forbidden. For if they could not, they ought no more to perish for this, than infants for that.

76. And this is so necessary a truth, that it is one of the great grounds and necessities of obedience and holy living; and if, after the fall of Adam, it be not by God permitted to us to choose or refuse, there is nothing left whereby man can serve God, or offer him a sacrifice. It is no service, it is not rewardable, if it could not be avoided, nor the omission punishable if it could not be done. All things else are determined, and fixed by the Divine Providence, even all the actions of men. But the inward act of the will is left under the command of laws only, and under the arrest of threatenings, and the invitation of promises. And that this is left for man, can no ways impede any of the divine decrees, because the outward act being overruled by the Divine Providence, it is strange if the schools will leave nothing to man, whereby he can glorify God.

77. I have now said something to all that I know objected, and more than is necessary to the question, if the impertinences of some schools, and their trifling arrests, had not so needlessly disturbed this article. There is nothing which from so slight grounds hath got so great, and till of late, so unquestioned footing in the persuasions of men. Origen [p] said enough to be mistaken in the question. Ἡ ἀρὰ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ κοινὴ πάντων ἐστί. Καὶ τὰ κατὰ τῆς γυναικὸς, οὐκ ἔστι καθ' ἧς οὐ λέγεται. "Adam's curse is common to all. And there is not a woman on earth, to whom may not be said those things which were spoken to this woman 'Eve.' Him St. Ambrose did mistake, and followed the error about explicating the nature of ori-

p Contra Celsum, lib. 4.

ginal sin, and set it something forward. But St. Austin gave it complement and authority by his fierce disputing against the Pelagians, whom he would overthrow by all means. Indeed, their capital error was a great one, and such against which all men, while there was need, ought to have contended earnestly, but this might and ought to have been done by truth. For error is no good confuter of error, as it is no good conversion that reforms one vice with another. But his zeal against a certain error, made him take in auxiliaries from an uncertain or less discerned one, and caused him to say many things which all antiquity before him disavowed, and which the following ages took up upon his account. And if such a weak principle as his saying, could make an error spread over so many churches, for so many ages, we may easily imagine that so many greater causes, as I before reckoned, might infect whole nations, and consequently mankind, without crucifying our patriarch or first parent, and declaiming against him, poor man, as the author of all our evil. Truth is, we intend, by laying load upon him, to excuse ourselves, and which is worse, to entertain our sins infallibly, and never to part with them, upon pretence that they are natural, and irresistible.

SECTION VI.

The Practical Question.

78. And now if it be inquired, whether we be tied to any particular repentance relative to this sin, the answer will not be difficult. I remember a pretty device of Jerome of Florence, a famous preacher not long since, who used this argument to prove the blessed Virgin Mary to be free from original sin. Because it is more likely, if the blessed Virgin had been put to her choice, she would rather have desired of God to have kept her free from venial actual sin than from original. Since therefore God hath granted her the greater, and that she never sinned actually, it is to be presumed God did not deny to her the smaller favour, and therefore she was free from original. Upon this many a pretty story hath been made, and rare arguments framed, and fierce contestations,

whether it be more agreeable to the piety and prudence of the Virgin mother to desire immunity from original sin, that is deadly, or from a venial actual sin that is not deadly. This indeed is voluntary, and the other is not; but the other deprives us of grace, and this does not. God was more offended by that, but we offend him more by this. The dispute can never be ended upon their accounts; but this Gordian knot I have now untied as Alexander did, by destroying it, and cutting it all in pieces. But to return to the question.

79. St. Austin was indeed a fierce patron of this device, and one of the chief inventors and finishers of it; and his sense of it is declared in his book 'de Peccatorum Medicinâ[q],' where he endeavours largely to prove, that all our life-time we are bound to mourn for the inconveniences and evil consequents derived from original sin. I dare say, every man is sufficiently displeased that he is liable to sickness, weariness, displeasure, melancholy, sorrow, folly, imperfection, and death, dying with groans, and horrid spasms and convulsions. In what sense these are the effects of Adam's sin, and though of themselves natural, yet also upon his account made penal, I have already declared, and need no more to dispute; my purpose being only to establish such truths as are in order to practice and a holy life, to the duties of repentance and amendment. But our share of Adam's sin, either being in us no sin at all, or else not to be avoided or amended, it cannot be the matter of repentance. "Neminem autem rectè ita loqui pœnitere sese quòd natus sit, aut pœnitere quòd mortalis sit, aut quòd ex offenso fortè vulneratoque corpore dolorem sentiat," said A. Gellius[r]: "A man is not properly said to repent that he was born, or that he shall die, or that he feels pain when his leg is hurt;" he gives this reason, "Quando istiusmodi rerum nec consilium sit nostrum, nec arbitrium:" "As these are besides our choice, so they cannot fall into our deliberation;" and therefore, as they cannot be chosen, so neither refused, and therefore not repented of; for that supposes both; that they were chosen once, and now refused. As Adam was not bound to repent of the sins of all his posterity, so neither are we tied to repent of his sins. Neither did I ever see, in any ancient office or forms of prayer, public or private, any prayer of humiliation prescribed for original sin.

[q] Cap. 3. homil. 50. [r] Lib. 17. c. 1.

They might deprecate the evil consequents, but never confess themselves guilty of the formal sin.

80. Add to this: Original sin is remitted in baptism by the consent of those schools of learning, who teach this article; and therefore is not reserved for any other repentance: and that which came without our own consent, is also to be taken off without it. That which came by the imputation of a sin, may also be taken off without the imputation of righteousness; that is, as it came without sin, so it must also go away without trouble.

But yet because the question may not render the practice insecure, I add these rules by way of advice and caution.

SECTION VII.

Advices relating to the Matter of Original Sin.

81. I. It is very requisite that we should understand the state of our own infirmity, the weakness of the flesh, the temptations and diversions of the spirit, that by understanding our present state, we may prevent the evils of carelessness and security. Our evils are the imperfections and sorrows inherent in, or appendant to, our bodies, our souls, our spirits.

82. In our bodies we find weakness and imperfection, sometimes crookedness, sometimes monstrosity; filthiness, and weariness, infinite numbers of diseases, and an uncertain cure, great pain, and restless nights, hunger and thirst, daily necessities, ridiculous gestures, madness from passions, distempers, and disorders, great labour to provide meat and drink, and oftentimes a loathing when we have them; if we use them they breed sicknesses; if we use them not, we die; and there is such a certain healthiness in many things to all, and in all things to some men and at some times, that to supply a need, is to bring a danger: and if we eat like beasts only of one thing, our souls are quickly weary; if we eat variety, we are sick, and intemperate; and our bodies are inlets to sin, and a stage of temptation. If we cherish them, they undo us; if we do not cherish them, they die: we suffer illusion in our dreams, and absurd fancies when we are waking; our life is soon done, and yet very tedious; it is too long and too short;

darkness and light are both troublesome; and those things which are pleasant, are often unwholesome. Sweet smells make the head ache, and those smells which are medicinal in some diseases, are intolerable to the sense. The pleasures of our body are bigger in expectation, than in the possession; and yet, while they are expected, they torment us with the delay, and when they are enjoyed, they are as if they were not; they abuse us with their vanity, and vex us with their volatile and fugitive nature. Our pains are very frequent alone, and very often mingled with pleasures to spoil them; and he that feels one sharp pain, feels not all the pleasures of the world, if they were in his power to have them. We live a precarious life, begging help of every thing, and needing the repairs of every day, and being beholden to beasts and birds, to plants and trees, to dirt and stones, to the very excrements of beasts, and that which dogs and horses throw forth. Our motion is slow and dull, heavy and uneasy; we cannot move but we are quickly tired, and for every day's labour, we need a whole night to recruit our lost strengths; we live like a lamp,—unless new materials be perpetually poured in, we live no longer than a fly; and our motion is not otherwise than a clock; we must be pulled up once or twice in twenty-four hours; and unless we be in the shadow of death for six or eight hours every night, we shall be scarce in the shadows of life the other sixteen. Heat and cold are both our enemies; and yet the one always dwells within, and the other dwells round about us. The chances and contingences that trouble us, are no more to be numbered than the minutes of eternity. The devil often hurts us, and men hurt each other oftener, and we are perpetually doing mischief to ourselves. The stars do in their courses fight against some men, and all the elements against every man; the heavens send evil influences, the very beasts are dangerous, and the air we suck in, does corrupt our lungs: many are deformed, and blind, and ill coloured; and yet upon the most beauteous face is placed one of the worst sinks of the body; and we are forced to pass that through our mouths oftentimes, which our eye and our stomach hate. Pliny[a] did wittily and elegantly represent this state of evil things: "Itaque feliciter homo natus jacet manibus pedibusque devinctis, flens, ani-

[a] Lib. 6. Proœm.

mal cæteris imperaturum, et à suppliciis vitam auspicatur, unam tantum ob culpam, quia natum est:" "A man is born happily, but at first he lies bound hand and foot by impotency, and cannot stir; the creature weeps that is born to rule over all other creatures, and begins his life with punishments, for no fault, but that he was born."—In short; the body is a region of diseases, of sorrow, and nastiness, and weakness, and temptation. Here is cause enough of being humbled.

Neither is it better in the soul of man, where ignorance dwells and passion rules. Μετὰ γὰρ τὸν θάνατον καὶ πολὺς παθῶν εἰσῆλθεν ἐσμός: "After death came in, there entered also a swarm of passions."—And the will obeys every thing but God[t]. Our judgment is often abused in matters of sense, and one faculty guesses at truth by confuting another; and the error of the eye is corrected by something of reason or a former experience. Our fancy is often abused, and yet creates things of itself, by tying desperate things together, that can cohere no more than music and a cable, than meat and syllogisms: and yet this alone does many times make credibilities in the understandings. Our memories are so frail, that they need instruments of recollection, and laborious artifices to help them; and in the use of these artifices sometimes we forget the meaning of those instruments: and of those millions of sins which we have committed, we scarce remember so many as to make us sorrowful, or ashamed. Our judgments are baffled with every sophism, and we change our opinion with a wind, and are confident against truth, but in love with error. We use to reprove one error by another, and lose truth while we contend too earnestly for it. Infinite opinions there are in matters of religion, and most men are confident, and most are deceived in many things, and all in some; and those few that are not confident, have only reason enough to suspect their own reason. We do not know our own bodies, not what is within us, nor what ails us when we are sick, nor whereof we are made; nay, we oftentimes cannot tell what we think, or believe, or love. We desire and hate the same thing, speak against and run after it. We resolve, and then consider; we bind ourselves, and then find causes why we ought not to be bound, and want not some pretences to make ourselves believe we are not bound. Pre-

[t] Fertur equis auriga, neque audit currus habenas. Georg. 1. 514.

judice and interest are our two great motives of believing; we weigh deeper what is extrinsical to a question, than what is in its nature; and oftener regard who speaks, than what is said. The diseases of our soul are infinite; Τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν, ἀρχῆθεν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν ἀνοήτως ἐξολισθήσασαν, ἡ πολυπαθεστάτη ζωὴ διαδέχεται, καὶ τοῦ φθοροποιοῦ θανάτου πέρας, said Dionysius [u] of Athens: "Mankind of old fell from those good things which God gave him, and now is fallen into a life of passion, and a state of death."—In sum; it follows the temper or distemper of the body, and sailing by such a compass, and being carried in so rotten a vessel, especially being empty, or filled with lightness, and ignorance, and mistakes, it must needs be exposed to the dangers and miseries of every storm; which I choose to represent in the words of Cicero: "Ex humanæ vitæ erroribus et ærumnis fit, ut verum sit illud quod est apud Aristotelem,—sic nostros animos cum corporibus copulatos, ut vivos cum mortuis esse conjunctos:" "The soul joined with the body, is like the conjunction of the living and the dead; the dead are not quickened by it, but the living are afflicted and die [x]."

But then if we consider what our spirit is, we have reason to lie down flat upon our faces, and confess God's glory and our own shame. When it is at the best, it is but willing, but can do nothing without the miracle of grace. Our spirit is hindered by the body, and cannot rise up whither it properly tends, with those great weights upon it. It is foolish and improvident; large in desires, and narrow in abilities; naturally curious in trifles, and inquisitive after vanities; but neither understands deeply, nor affectionately relishes the things of God; pleased with forms, cozened with pretences, satisfied with shadows, incurious of substances and realities. It is quick enough to find doubts, and when the doubts are satisfied, it raises scruples, that is, it is restless after it is put to sleep, and will be troubled in despite of all arguments of peace. It is incredibly negligent of matters of religion, and most solicitous and troubled in the things of the world. We love ourselves, and despise others; judging most unjust sentences, and by peevish and cross measures; covetousness and ambition, gain and empire, are the proportions by which we take account of things. We hate to be governed by others,

[u] Eccles. Hier. c. 3. part 3 [x] In Hortens.

even when we cannot dress ourselves; and to be forbidden to do or have a thing, is the best art in the world to make us greedy of it. The flesh and the spirit perpetually are at strife[7]; the spirit pretending that his ought to be the dominion, and the flesh alleging that this is her state, and her day. We hate our present condition, and know not how to better ourselves, our changes being but like the tumblings and tossings in a fever, from trouble to trouble, that is all the variety. We are extremely inconstant, and always hate our own choice: we despair sometimes of God's mercies, and are confident in our own follies; as we order things, we cannot avoid little sins, and do not avoid great ones. We love the present world, though it be good for nothing, and undervalue infinite treasures, if they be not to be had till the day of recompenses. We are peevish, if a servant does but break a glass, and patient when we have thrown an ill cast for eternity; throwing away the hopes of a glorious crown, for wine, and dirty silver. We know that our prayers, if well done, are great advantages to our state, and yet we are hardly brought to them, and love not to stay at them, and wander while we are saying them, and say them without minding, and are glad when they are done, or when we have a reasonable excuse to omit them. A passion does quite overturn all our purposes, and all our principles, and there are certain times of weakness in which any temptation may prevail, if it comes in that unlucky minute.

84. This is a little representment of the state of man; whereof a great part is a natural impotency, and the other is brought in by our own folly. Concerning the first when we discourse, it is as if one describes the condition of a mole, or a bat, an oyster, or a mushroom, concerning whose imperfections, no other cause cause is to be inquired of, but the will of God, who gives his gifts as he please, and is unjust to no man, by giving or not giving any certain proportion of good things: and supposing this loss was brought first upon Adam, and so descended upon us, yet we have no cause to complain, for we lost nothing that was ours. "Præposterum est," said Paulus the lawyer, "antè nos locupletes dici quàm acquisiverimus." We cannot be said to lose what we never

[7] Πάντη ἡ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς φανεροῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς κρυπτοῖς, ἀπὸ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ πρώτου ἀνθρώπου, εἰς ἡμᾶς διατέτακται. Macar. hom. 21.

had; and our fathers' goods were not to descend upon us, unless they were his at his death. If therefore they be confiscated before his death, ours indeed is the inconvenience too, but his alone is the punishment, and to neither of us is the wrong.

But concerning the second, I mean that which is superinduced, it is not his fault alone, nor ours alone, and neither of us is innocent; we all put in our accursed symbol for the debauching of our spirits, for the besotting our souls, for the spoiling our bodies. "Ille initium induxit debiti, nos fœnus auximus posterioribus peccatis," &c. "He began the principal, and we have increased the interest[z]."—This we also find well expressed by Justin Martyr; for the fathers of the first ages spake prudently and temperately in this article, as in other things. "Christ was not born or crucified because himself had need of these things, but for the sake of mankind;" Ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ὑπὸ θάνατον καὶ πλάνην τὴν τοῦ ὄφεως ἐπεπτώκει, παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου αὐτῶν πονηρευσαμένου: "which from Adam fell into death and the deception of the serpent, besides the evil which every one adds upon his own account[a]."—And it appears in the greatest instance of all, even in that of natural death; which though it was natural, yet from Adam it began to be a curse, just as the motion of a serpent upon his belly, which was concreated with him, yet upon this story was changed into a malediction and an evil adjunct. But though Adam was the gate, and brought in the head of death, yet our sins brought him in further, we brought in 'the body of death.' Our life was left by Adam a thousand years long almost; but the iniquity of man brought it quickly to five hundred years, from thence to two hundred and fifty, from thence to one hundred and twenty, and at last to seventy, and then God would no more strike all mankind in the same manner, but individuals and single sinners smart for it, and are cut off in their youth, and do not live out half their days. And so it is in the matters of the soul and the spirit. Every sin leaves an evil upon the soul; and every age grows worse, and adds some iniquity of its own to the former examples. And therefore Tertullian calls Adam 'mali traducem;' 'he transmitted the original and exemplar,' and we write after his copy.—'Infir-

[z] St. Chrys. in cap. 6. Ephes. [a] Dial. cum Tryph.

mitatis ingenitæ vitium;' so Arnobius calls our natural baseness; 'we are naturally weak:' and this weakness is a vice or defect of nature, and our evil usages make our natures worse; like butchers being used to kill beasts, their natures grow more savage and unmerciful; so it is with us all. If our parents be good, yet we often prove bad, as the wild olive comes from the branch of a natural olive, or as corn with the chaff come from clean grain, and the uncircumcised from the circumcised. But if our parents be bad, it is the less wonder if their children are so; a blackamoor begets a blackamoor, as an epileptic son does often come from an epileptic father, and hereditary diseases are transmitted by generation; so it is in that viciousness that is radicated in the body, for a lustful father oftentimes begets a lustful son; and so it is in all those instances where the soul follows the temperature of the body. And thus not only Adam, but every father, may transmit an original sin, or rather an original viciousness of his own. For a vicious nature, or a natural improbity, when it is not consented to, is not a sin, but an ill disposition: philosophy and the grace of God must cure it; but it often causes us to sin, before our reason and our higher principles are well attended to. But when we consent to, and actuate our evil inclinations, we spoil our natures, and make them worse, making evil still more natural. For it is as much in our nature to be pleased with our artificial delights as with our natural. And this is the doctrine of St. Austin, speaking of concupiscence. "Modo quodam loquendi vocatur peccatum, quòd peccato facta est; et peccati, si vicerit, facit reum:" "Concupiscence, or the viciousness of our nature, is, after a certain manner of speaking, called sin; because it is made worse by sin, and makes us guilty of sin when it is consented to[b]."—"It hath the nature of sin;"—so the article of the church of England expresses it; that is, it is 'in eâdem materia;' it comes from a weak principle, 'à naturæ vitio,' 'from the imperfect and defective nature of man, and inclines to sin.' But (that I may again use St. Austin's words), "Quantum ad nos attinet, sine peccato semper essemus, donec sanaretur hoc malum, si ei nunquam consentiremus ad malum:" "Although we all have concupiscence, yet none of us all should have any sin, if we did not consent to this concupis-

[b] Lib. 1. de Nupt. et Concup. c. 23.

cence unto evil[c]."—Concupiscence is 'naturæ vitium,' but not 'peccatum,' 'a defect' or 'fault of nature,' but not formally 'a sin:' which distinction we learn from St. Austin; "Non enim talia sunt vitia, quæ jam peccata dicenda sunt[d]." Concupiscence is an evil as a weak eye is, but not a sin, if we speak properly, till it be consented to; and then indeed it is the parent of sin. Τίκτει τὴν ἁμαρτίαν: so St. James; "it brings forth sin."—

85. This is the vile state of our natural viciousness, and improbity, and misery, in which Adam had some, but truly not the biggest share; and let this consideration sink as deep as it will in us, to make us humble and careful, but let us not use it as an excuse to lessen our diligence, by greatening our evil necessity. For death and sin were both born from Adam, but we have nursed them up to an ugly bulk and deformity. But I must now proceed to other practical rules.

86. II. It is necessary that we understand that our natural state is not a state in which we can hope for heaven. Natural agents can effect but natural ends, by natural instruments: and now supposing the former doctrine, that we lost not the divine favour by our guilt of what we never did consent to, yet we were born in pure naturals, and they some of them worsted by our forefathers, yet we were at the best born but in pure naturals, and we 'must be born again:' that as by our first birth we are heirs of death, so by our new birth we may be adopted into the inheritance of life and salvation.

87. III. It is our duty to be humbled in the consideration of ourselves, and of our natural condition. That by distrusting our own strengths we may take sanctuary in God through Jesus Christ, praying for his grace, entertaining and caressing of his Holy Spirit, with purities and devotions, with charity and humility, infinitely fearing to grieve him, lest he leaving us, we be left as Adam left us, in pure naturals, but in some degrees worsted by the nature of sin in some instances, and the anger of God in all, that is, in the state of 'flesh and blood,' which 'shall never inherit the kingdom of heaven.'

88. IV. Whatsoever good work we do, let us not impute it to ourselves, or our own choice. For God is the best es-

[c] Lib. 2. ad Julian. [d] Ibid.

timator of that: he knows best what portion of the work we did, and what influence our will had into the action, and leave it to him to judge and recompense. But let us attribute all the glory to God, and to God's grace, for without him we can do nothing. But by him that strengthens us, that works in us to will and to do of his good pleasure, by him alone we are saved. Giving all glory to God, will take nothing of the reward from us.

89. V. Let no man so undervalue his sin, or overvalue himself, as to lessen that, and to put the fault any where but where it ought to be. If a man accuses himself with too great a rigour, it is no more than if he holds his horse too hard when he is running down a hill. It may be, a less force would stop his running; but the greater does so too, and manifests his fear; which in this case of his sin and danger is of itself rewardable.

90. VI. Let no man when he is tempted, say that he is tempted of God. Not only because, as St. James affirms most wisely, "every man is tempted, when he is led away by his own concupiscence[e];" but because he is a very evil speaker that speaks evil things of God. Think it not therefore in thy thought, that God hath made any necessities of sinning. He that hath forbidden sin so earnestly, threatened it so deeply, hates it so essentially, prevents it so cautiously, dissuades us from it so passionately, punishes it so severely, arms us against it so strongly, and sent his Son so piously and charitably to root out sin, so far as may be, from the face of the earth; certainly it cannot be thought that he hath made necessities of sinning. For whatsoever he hath made necessary, is as innocent as what he hath commanded; it is his own work, and he hateth nothing that he hath made, and therefore he hath not made sin. And no man shall dare to say at doomsday unto God, that he hath made him to sin, or made it unavoidable. There are no two cases of conscience, no two duties in any case, so seemingly contradictory, that whichsoever a man choose he must sin: and therefore much less is any one state a state of necessary unavoidable enmity against God.

91. VII. Use thyself to holy company and pious employment in thy early days: follow no evil example, live by rule,

[e] Jam. i. 13.

and despise the world; relieve the usual necessities of thy life, but be not sensual in thy appetite, accustom thyself to religion and spiritual things, and then much of that evil nature thou complainest of, will pass into virtuous habits. It was the saying of Xenocrates in Aristotle[f], Εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι δαίμονα: "Happy is he that hath a diligent studious soul: for that is every man's good angel, and the principle of his felicity."

92. VIII. Educate thy children and charges strictly and severely. Let them not be suffered to swear before they can pray, nor taught little revenges in the cradle, nor pride at school, nor fightings in company, nor drinkings in all their entertainments, nor lusts in private. Let them be drawn from evil company, and do thou give them holy example, and provide for them severe and wise tutors; and what Alexander of Ales said of Buonaventure, 'Adam non peccavit in Buonaventurâ,' will be as truly said of young men and maidens. Impiety will not peep out so soon. It was wisely observed by Quintilian[g], who was an excellent tutor for young gentleman, that ourselves with ill breeding our children are the authors of their evil nature. "Antè palatum eorum, quàm os, instituimus. Gaudemus, si quid licentiùs dixerint. Verba, ne Alexandrinis quidem permittenda deliciis, risu et osculo excipimus." 'We teach their palate before we instruct the tongue. And when the tongue begins first to prattle, they can efform wantonness before words; and we kiss them for speaking filthy things:' 'Fit ex his consuetudo, deinde natura. Discunt hæc miseri antequam sciant vitia esse.' 'The poor wretches sin before they know what it is; and by these actions a custom is made up, and this custom becomes a nature.'"

SECTION VIII.

Rules and Measures of Deportment when a Curse doth descend upon Children for their Parents' Fault, or when it is feared.

93. I. If we fear a curse upon ourselves or family for our fathers' sin, let us do all actions of piety or religion, justice or

[f] Arist. 2. Topic. c. 3. [g] Lib. 1. c. 2. 7. Spalding.

charity, which are contrary to that crime which is suspected to be the enemy; in all things being careful that we do not inherit the sin. "Si quis paterni vitii nascitur hæres; nascitur et pœnæ:" "The heir of the crime must possess the revenue of punishment."

94. II. Let the children be careful not to commend, not to justify, not to glory in, their fathers' sin, but be diligent to represent themselves the more pious, by how much their fathers were impious; for by such a contrariety and visible distance, they will avoid their fathers' shame. Εἰώθασι οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐχ οὕτως ἐπαινεῖν καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πατέρων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων γεγονότας, ὡς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν δυσκόλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἥνπερ φαίνονται μηδὲν ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ὄντες. "For most men love not to honour and praise the sons of good men so much as the sons of wicked men, when they study to represent themselves better, and unlike their wicked parents[h]." Therefore,

95. III. Let no child of a wicked father be dejected and confounded in his spirit, because his fathers were impious. For although it is piety to be troubled for their fathers' regard, and because he died an enemy to God; yet in reference to themselves they must know, that God puts on every head his own punishment. Πατρὸς ὀνείδη καὶ τιμωρίας, παίδων οὐδενὶ ξυνέπεσθαι, said Plato. For every one is submitted to his own fortune by his own act. The father's crime and the father's punishment make no real permanent blot upon the son. "No man is forced to succeed in his father's crime;" said Callistratus the lawyer.

96. IV. Every evil that happens to a son for his father's fault, hath an errand of its own to him. For as God is a just judge to his father; so he is an essential enemy to sin, and a gracious Lord to the suffering person. When God sent blindness upon the man in the Gospel, neither for his parents' sins, nor his own, yet he did it for his own glory. Let the afflicted person study by all ways to advance God's glory in the sufferance, and the sharpness of the evil will be taken off.

97. V. Let not a son retain the price of his father's sin, the purchase of his iniquity. If his father entered into the fields of the fatherless, let not the son dwell there. If his

[h] Isocrat. ep. ad Tim. Lange. p. 746.

ancestors were sacrilegious, let not the son declaim against the crime and keep the lands, but cast off that which brings the burden along with it. And this is to be observed in all those sins, the evil consequent and effect of which remain upon the posterity or successors of the injured person; for in those sins very often the curse descends with the wrong. So long as the effect remains, and the injury is complained of, and the title is still kept on foot, so long the son is tied to restitution. But even after the possession is settled, yet the curse and evil may descend longer than the sin; as the smart and the aching remain after the blow is past. And therefore, even after the successors come to be lawful possessors, it may yet be very fit for them to quit the purchase of their fathers' sin, or else they must resolve to pay the sad and severe rent-charge of a curse.

98. VI. In such cases in which there cannot be a real, let there be a verbal and public disavowing their fathers' sin, which was public, scandalous, and notorious. We find this thing done by Andronicus Palæologus, the Greek emperor[i], who was the son of a bad father; and it is to be done, when the effect was transient, or irremediable.

99. VII. Sometimes no piety of the children shall quite take off the anger of God from a family or nation: as it happened to Josiah, who above all the princes that were before or after him, turned to the Lord. "Notwithstanding, the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations that Manasseh had provoked him withal[k]." In such a case as this we are to submit to God's will, and let him exercise his power, his dominion, and his kingdom, as he pleases, and expect the returns of our piety in the day of recompenses: and it may be, our posterity shall reap a blessing for our sakes, who feel a sorrow and an evil for our fathers' sake.

100. VIII. Let all that have children, endeavour to be the beginners and the stock of a new blessing to their family; by blessing their children, by praying much for them, by holy education and a severe piety, by rare example, and an excellent religion. And if there be in the family a great curse, and an extraordinary anger gone out against it, there

[i] Gregoras, lib. 5. c. 81. [k] 2 Kings, xxiii. 26.

must be something extraordinary done in the matter of religion, or of charity, that the remedy be no less than the evil.

101. IX. Let not the consideration of the universal sinfulness and corruption of mankind, add confidence to thy person, and hardness to thy conscience, and authority to thy sin; but let it awaken thy spirit, and stir up thy diligence, and endear all the watchfulness in the world for the service of God; for there is in it some difficulty, and an infinite necessity.

Ὦ φύσις, ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὡς μέγ' εἶ κακὸν,
Σωτήριόν τε τοῖς καλῶς κεκτημένοις,

said Electra in the tragedy[l]. Our nature is very bad in itself; but very good to them that use it well.

Prayers and Meditations.

The first Adam bearing a wicked heart transgressed and was overcome: and so be all they that are born of him. Thus infirmity was made permanent: and the law also in the heart of the people with the malignity and root, so that the good departed away, and the evil abode still[m].

Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright: but they have sought many inventions[n].

For there is not a just man upon the earth that doth good and sinneth not[o].

Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me. Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow: create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me[p].

The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. They are corrupt, they have done abominable works, there is none that doth good. The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand and seek after God. They are all gone aside, they are all become filthy: there is not one that doth good, no, not one[q]. O that the salvation of Israel were come out of Sion! When the Lord bringeth back the captivity of his people, Jacob shall rejoice, and Israel shall be glad[r].

[l] Eurip. Orest. 126. Priestley's edition, vol. 1. p. 215.
[m] Esdras, ii. 3. 21, 22. [n] Eccl. vii. 29. [o] Ver. 20.
[p] Psal. li. 5. 7. 10. [q] Psal. xiv. 1—3. [r] Ver. 7.

Man dieth and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? For now thou numberest my steps: dost thou not watch over my sin? My transgression is sealed up in a bag, and thou sewest up my iniquity. Thou destroyest the hope of man: thou prevailest against him for ever, and he passeth: thou changest his countenance, and sendest him away. But his flesh upon him shall have pain, and his soul within him shall mourn[s].

What is man that he should be clean, and he that is born of a woman that he should be righteous? Behold, he putteth no trust in his saints, yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight. How much more abominable and filthy is man, which drinketh iniquity like water[t]!

Trouble and anguish shall make him afraid. They shall prevail against him as a king ready to battle. For he stretcheth out his hand against God, and strengtheneth himself against the Almighty[u].

Let not him that is deceived, trust in vanity, for vanity shall be his recompense. Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean thing? no, not one[x].

I have sewed sackcloth upon my skin, and defiled my horn in the dust. My face is foul with weeping, and on my eyelids is the shadow of death. Not for any injustice in my hand: also my prayer is pure[y].

Wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God I am delivered through Jesus Christ our Lord[z].

But now being made free from sin, and become servants of God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life: for the wages of sin is death: but the gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord[a].

Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof. For sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace[b].

The Prayer.

O ALMIGHTY God, great Father of men and angels, thou art the preserver of men, and the great lover of souls; thou

[s] Job, xiv. 10, &c. [t] Job, xv. 14. [u] Ver. 24. [x] Ver. 31.
[y] Job, xvi. 15. [z] Rom. vii. 24. [a] Rom. vi. 22. [b] Ver. 12, 14.

didst make every thing perfect in its kind, and all that thou didst make, was very good: only we miserable creatures, sons of Adam, have suffered the falling angels to infect us with their leprosy of pride, and so we entered into their evil portion, having corrupted our way before thee, and are covered with thy rod, and dwell in a cloud of thy displeasure; behold me, the meanest of thy servants, humbled before thee, sensible of my sad condition, weak and miserable, sinful and ignorant, full of need, wanting thee in all things, and neither able to escape death without a Saviour, nor to live a life of holiness without thy Spirit. O be pleased to give me a portion in the new birth: break off the bands and fetters of my sin, cure my evil inclinations, correct my indispositions, and natural averseness from the severities of religion; let me live by the measures of thy law, not by the evil example and disguises of the world; renew a right spirit within me, and cast me not away from thy presence, lest I should retire to the works of darkness, and enter into those horrible regions, where the light of thy countenance never shineth.

II.

I am ashamed, O Lord, I am ashamed, that I have dishonoured so excellent a creation. Thou didst make us upright, and create us in innocence. And when thou didst see us unable to stand in thy sight, and that we could never endure to be judged by the covenant of works, thou didst renew thy mercies to us in the new covenant of Jesus Christ; and now we have no excuse, nothing to plead for ourselves, much less against thee; but thou art holy and pure, and just and merciful. Make me to be like thee, holy as thou art holy, merciful as our heavenly Father is merciful, obedient as our holy Saviour Jesus, meek and charitable, temperate and chaste, humble and patient, according to that holy example, that my sins may be pardoned by his death, and my spirit renewed by his Spirit, that passing from sin to grace, from ignorance to the knowledge and love of God, and of his Son Jesus Christ, I may pass from death to life, from sorrow to joy, from earth to heaven, from the present state of misery and imperfection, to the glorious inheritance prepared for the saints and sons of light, the children of the new birth, the brethren of our Lord and Brother, our Judge and our Advocate, our blessed Saviour and Redeemer, Jesus. Amen.

A Prayer to be said by a Matron in Behalf of her Husband and Family, that a Blessing may descend upon their Posterity.

I.

O ETERNAL God, our most merciful Lord, and gracious Father, thou art my guide, the light of mine eyes, the joy of my heart, the author of my hope, and the object of my love and worshippings; thou relievest all my needs, and determinest all my doubts, and art an eternal fountain of blessing, open and running over to all thirsty and weary souls that come and cry to thee for mercy and refreshment. Have mercy upon thy servant, and relieve my fears and sorrows, and the great necessities of my family; for thou alone, O Lord, canst do it.

II.

Fit and adorn every one of us with a holy and a religious spirit, and give a double portion to thy servant my dear husband: give him a wise heart, a prudent, severe, and indulgent care, over the children which thou hast given us. His heart is in thy hand, and the events of all things are in thy disposition. Make it a great part of his care, to promote the spiritual and eternal interest of his children, and not to neglect their temporal relations and necessities; but to provide states of life for them in which with fair advantages they may live cheerfully, serve thee diligently, promote the interest of the Christian family in all their capacities, that they may be always blessed, and always innocent, devout and pious, and may be graciously accepted by thee to pardon, and grace, and glory, through Jesus Christ. Amen.

III.

Bless, O Lord, my sons with excellent understandings, love of holy and noble things, sweet dispositions, innocent deportment, diligent souls, chaste, healthful, and temperate bodies, holy and religious spirits, that they may live to thy glory, and be useful in their capacities to the servants of God, and all their neighbours, and the relatives of their conversation. Bless my daughters with an humble and a modest carriage, and excellent meekness, a great love of holy things, a severe chastity, a constant, holy, and passionate religion. O my God, never suffer them to fall into folly, and the sad ef-

fects of a wanton, loose, and indiscreet spirit: possess their fancies with holy affections; be thou the covering of their eyes, and the great object of their hopes, and all their desires. Blessed Lord, thou disposest all things sweetly by thy providence, thou guidest them excellently by thy wisdom, thou unitest all circumstances and changes wonderfully by thy power, and by thy power makest all things work for the good of thy servants; be pleased so to dispose my daughters, that if thou shouldest call them to the state of a married life, they may not dishonour their family, nor grieve their parents, nor displease thee; but that thou wilt so dispose of their persons, and the accidents and circumstances of that state, that it may be a state of holiness to the Lord, and blessing to thy servants. And until thy wisdom shall know it fit to bring things so to pass, let them live with all purity, spending their time religiously and usefully. O most blessed Lord, enable their dear father with proportionable abilities and opportunities of doing his duty and charities towards them, and them with great obedience and duty towards him, and all of us with a love towards thee above all things in the world, that our portion may be in love and in thy blessings, through Jesus Christ, our dearest Lord, and most gracious Redeemer.

IV.

O my God, pardon thy servant, pity my infirmities, hear the passionate desires of thy humble servant; in thee alone is my trust, my heart and all my wishes are towards thee. Thou hast commanded me to pray to thee in all needs, thou hast made gracious promises to hear and accept me; and I will never leave importuning thy glorious Majesty, humbly, passionately, confidently, till thou hast heard and accepted the prayer of thy servant. Amen, dearest Lord; for thy mercy's sake hear thy servant. Amen.

TO THE

RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,

JOHN WARNER, D.D.

LATE LORD BISHOP OF ROCHESTER.

MY LORD,

I NOW see cause to wish that I had given to your Lordship the trouble of reading my papers of "Original Sin," before their publication; for though I have said all that which I found material in the question, yet I perceive that it had been fitting I had spoken some things less material, so to prevent the apprehensions that some have of this doctrine, that it is of a sense differing from the usual expressions of the church of England. However, my Lord, since your Lordship is pleased to be careful not only of truth, and God's glory, but desirous also that even all of us should speak the same thing, and understand each other without jealousies, or severer censures, I have now obeyed your counsel, and done all my part towards the asserting the truth, and securing charity and unity: professing with all truth and ingenuity, that I would rather die than either willingly give occasion or countenance to a schism in the church of England; and I would suffer much evil before I

would displease my dear brethren in the service of Jesus, and in the ministries of the church. But as I have not given just cause of offence to any, so I pray that they may not be offended unjustly, lest the fault lie on them, whose persons I so much love, and whose eternal interest I do so much desire may be secured and advanced.

Now, my Lord, I had thought I had been secured in the article, not only for the truth of the doctrine, but for the advantages and comforts it brings. I was confident they would not, because there was no cause any men should be angry at it; for it is strange to me that any man should desire to believe God to be more severe and less gentle: that men should be greedy to find out inevitable ways of being damned, that they should be unwilling to have the veil drawn away from the face of God's goodness, and that they should desire to see an angry countenance; and be displeased at the glad tidings of the Gospel of peace; it is strange to me that men should desire to believe that their pretty babes, which are strangled at the gates of the womb or die before baptism, should, for aught they know, die eternally and be damned, and that themselves should consent to it, and to them that invent reasons to make it seem just; they might have had not only pretences but reasons to be troubled, if I had represented God to be so great a hater of mankind, as to damn millions of millions for that which they could not help, or if I had taught that

their infants might by chance have gone to hell, and as soon as ever they came for life, descend to an eternal death; if I had told them evil things of God, and hard measures, and evil portions to their children, they might have complained; but to complain because I say God is just to all, and merciful and just to infants; to fret and be peevish because I tell them, that nothing but good things are to be expected from our good God, is a thing that may well be wondered at. My Lord, I take a great comfort in this, that my doctrine stands on that side, where God's justice and goodness and mercy stand apparently: and they that speak otherwise in this article, are forced by convulsions and violences to draw their doctrine to comply with God's justice and the reputation of his most glorious attributes. And after great and laborious devices, they must needs do it pitifully and jejunely: but I will prejudice no man's opinion; I only will defend my own, because in so doing I have the honour to be an advocate for God, who will defend and accept me, in the simplicity and innocency of my purposes, and the profession of his truth.

Now, my Lord, I find that some believe this doctrine ought not now to have been published: others think it not true. The first are the wise and few: the others are the many who have been taught otherwise, and either have not leisure or abilities to make right judgments in the question. Concerning the first I have given what accounts I could, to that ex-

cellent man the Lord Bishop of Sarum, who, out of his great piety and prudence and his great kindness to me, was pleased to call for accounts of me. Concerning the other, your Lordship, in great humility, and in great tenderness to those who are not persuaded of the truth of this doctrine, hath called upon me to give all those just measures of satisfaction, which I could be obliged to, by the interest of any Christian virtue. In obedience to this pious care and prudent counsel of your Lordship, I have published these ensuing papers, hoping that God will bless them to the purposes whither they are designed: however, I have done all that I could, and all that I am commanded, and all that I was counselled to. And as I submit all to God's blessing, and the events of his providence and economy; so my doctrine I humbly submit to my holy mother the church of England, and rejoice in any circumstances by which I can testify my duty to her, and my obedience to your Lordship.

CHAP. VII.

A FURTHER EXPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

SECTION I.

Of the Fall of Adam, and the Effects of it upon him and us.

It was well said of St. Austin in this thing, though he said many others in it less certain, "Nihil est peccato originali ad prædicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius." The article we all confess; but the manner of explicating it, is not an apple of knowledge, but of contention. Having therefore turned to all the ways of reason and Scripture, I at last apply myself to examine how it was affirmed by the first and best antiquity. For the doctrine of original sin, as I have explicated it, is taxed of singularity and novelty; and though these words are very freely bestowed upon any thing we have not learned, or consented to; and that we take false measures of these appellatives; reckoning that new that is but renewed, and that singular that is not taught vulgarly, or in our own societies; yet I shall easily quit the proposition from these charges; and though I do confess, and complain of it, that the usual affirmations of original sin are a popular error; yet I will make it appear, that it is no catholic doctrine, that it prevailed by prejudice, and accidental authorities; but after such prevailing, it was accused and reproved by the greatest and most judicious persons of Christendom.

And, first, that judgment may the better be given of the allegations I shall bring from authority, I shall explicate and state the question, that there may be no impertinent allegations of antiquity for both sides, nor clamours against the persons interested in either persuasion, nor any offence taken by error and misprision. It is not therefore intended, nor affirmed, that there is no such thing as original sin; for it is certain, and affirmed by all antiquity, upon many grounds of Scripture, that Adam sinned, and his sin was personally his, but derivatively ours; that is, it did great hurt to us,

to our bodies directly, to our souls indirectly and accidentally.

2. For 'Adam was made a living soul,' the great representative of mankind, and the beginner of a temporal happy life; and to that purpose he was put in a place of temporal happiness, where he was to have lived as long as he obeyed God (so far as he knew nothing else being promised to him, or implied); but when he sinned, he was thrown from thence, and spoiled of all those advantages, by which he was enabled to live and be happy. This we find in the story; the reasonableness of the parts of which, teaches us all this doctrine. To which if we add the words of St. Paul, the case is clear. "The first Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit, that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthly; the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthly, such are they that are earthly; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly; and as we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly: now this I say, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption[a]." This discourse of the Apostle hath in it all these propositions, which clearly state this whole article. There are two great heads of mankind, the two Adams; the first and the second. The first was framed with an earthly body, the second had (*viz.* after his resurrection, when he died unto sin once) a spiritual body. The first was earthly, the second is heavenly: from the first we derive an earthly life, from the second we obtain a heavenly; all that are born of the first are such as he was naturally, but the effects of the Spirit came only upon them, who are born of the second Adam: from him who is earthly, we could have no more than he was, or had; the spiritual life, and consequently the heavenly, could not be derived from the first Adam, but from Christ only. All that are born of the first, by that birth inherit nothing but temporal life and corruption; but in the new birth only we derive a title to heaven. For 'flesh and blood,' that is, whatsoever is born of Adam, 'cannot inherit the kingdom of God.' And they

[a] 1 Cor. xv. 45, &c.

are injurious to Christ, who think, that from Adam we might have inherited immortality. Christ was the giver and preacher of it; 'he brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel.' It is a singular benefit given by God to mankind, through Jesus Christ.

3. Upon the affirmation of these premises, it follows, that if Adam had stood, yet from him we could not have, by our natural generation, obtained a title to our spiritual life, nor by all the strengths of Adam have gone to heaven: Adam was not our representative to any of these purposes, but in order to the perfection of a temporal life. Christ only is and was from eternal ages designed to be the head of the church, and the fountain of spiritual life. And this is it which is affirmed by some very eminent persons in the church of God; particularly by Junius and Tilenus, that 'Christus est fundamentum totius prædestinationis;' all that are, or ever were, predestinated, were predestinated in Christ: even Adam himself was predestinated in him, and therefore from him, if he had stood, though we should have inherited a temporal happy life, yet the Scripture speaks nothing of any other event. Heaven was not promised to Adam himself; therefore from him we could not have derived a title thither. And therefore that inquiry of the schoolmen—whether if Adam had not sinned, Christ should have been incarnate—was not an impertinent question, though they prosecuted it to weak purposes, and with trifling arguments; Scotus and his scholars were for the affirmative; and though I will not be decretory in it, because the Scripture hath said nothing of it, nor the church delivered it; yet to me it seems plainly the discourse of the Apostle now alleged:—That if Adam had not sinned, yet that by Christ alone we should have obtained everlasting life. Whether this had been dispensed by his incarnation, or some other way of economy, is not signified.

4. But then, if from Adam we should not have derived our title to heaven, though he had stood, then neither by his fall can we be said to have lost heaven. Heaven and hell were to be administered by another method. But then, if it be inquired what evil we thence received? I answer, that the principal effect was the loss of that excellent condition in which God placed him, and would have placed his pos-

terity, unless sin had entered. He should have lived a long and lasting life, till it had been time to remove him, and very happy. Instead of this, he was thrown from those means which God had designed to this purpose, that is, Paradise and the trees of life; he was turned into a place of labour and uneasiness, of briers and thorns, ill air and violent chances, "et nova febrium Terris incubuit cohors;" the woman was condemned to hard labour and travail, and (that which troubled her most) obedience to her husband; his body was made frail, and weak, and sickly; that is, it was left such as it was made, and left without remedies, which were to have made it otherwise. For that Adam was made mortal in his nature, is infinitely certain, and proved by his very eating and drinking, his sleep and recreation; by ingestion and egestion, by breathing and generating his like, which immortal substances never do; and by the very tree of life, which had not been needful, if he should have had no need of it to repair his decaying strength and health.

5. The effect of this consideration is this, that all the product of Adam's sin, was by despoiling him, and consequently us, of all the superadditions and graces brought upon his nature. Even that which was threatened to him, and in the narrative of that sad story expressed to be his punishment, was no lessening of his nature, but despoiling him of his supernaturals: and therefore Manuel Palæologus calls it κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως αὐχμόν, 'the common dryness of our nature;' and he adds, προλέγω δὲ προπατορικὴν ἁμαρτίαν δι' ἧς τῆς χάριτος ἐκπεπτώκαμεν, 'by our fathers' sin we fell from our fathers' graces.' Now, according to the words of the Apostle, 'As is the earthly, such are they that are earthly;' that is, all his posterity must be so as his nature was left; in this there could be no injustice. For if God might at first, and all the way have made man with a necessity as well as a possibility of dying, though men had not sinned; then so also may he do, if he did sin; and so it was; but this was effected by disrobing him of all the superadded excellences with which God adorned and supported his natural life. But this also I add, that if even death itself came upon us without the alteration or diminution of our nature, then so might sin, because death was in 're naturali,' but sin is not, and there-

fore need not suppose that Adam's nature was spoiled to introduce that.

6. As the sin of Adam brought hurt to the body directly, so indirectly it brought hurt to the soul. For the evils upon the body, as they are only felt by the soul; so they grieve, and tempt, and provoke, the soul to anger, to sorrow, to envy; they make weariness in religious things; cause desire for ease, for pleasure; and as these are by the body always desired, so sometimes being forbidden by God, they become sins, and are always apt to it; because the body, being a natural agent, tempts to all it can feel, and have pleasure in. And this is also observed and affirmed by St. Chrysostom, and he often speaks it, as if he were pleased in this explication of the article: Μετὰ γὰρ τοῦ θανάτου καὶ ὁ τῶν παθῶν ἐπεισῆλθεν ὄχλος· ὅτε γὰρ θνητὸν ἐγένετο τὸ σῶμα, ἐδέξατο γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναγκαίως, λοιπὸν, καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ἃ πολλῆς ἐδεῖτο φιλοσοφίας· ἵνα μὴ πλημμύρα τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν καταποντίσῃ λογισμὸν εἰς τὸν τῆς ἁμαρτίας βυθόν· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἦν ἁμαρτία, ἡ δὲ ἀμετρία αὐτῶν μὴ χαλινουμένη τοῦτο εἰργάζετο. "Together with death entered a whole troop of affections or passions. For when the body became mortal, then of necessity it did admit desires, or lust, and anger, and grief, and all things else which need great constancy and wisdom; lest the storm should drown reason in us, in the gulf of sin. For these affections or passions were not sin; but the excess of them, not being bridled, did effect this[b]." The same he affirms in homil. 11. ad Rom. vi. and homil. 12. on Rom. vii. And not much unlike this was that excellent discourse of Lactantius, in his seventh book 'de Divino Præmio,' cap. 5. But Theodoret, in his commentaries upon the Romans, follows the same discourse exactly. And this way of explicating the entrance and facility of sin upon us, is usual in antiquity; affirming, that because we derive a miserable and an afflicted body from Adam, upon that stock sin enters.

> Quæ quia materiam peccati ex fomite carnis
> Consociata trahit, nec non simul ipsa sodali
> Est incentivum peccaminis, implicat ambas
> Vindex pœna reas, peccantes mente sub unâ
> Peccandique cremat socias cruciatibus æquis[c].

'Because the soul joined to the body draws from the society

[b] Ad 7. Rom. homil. 13. [c] Prudentius in Apotheosi.

of the flesh, incentives and arguments to sin; therefore both of them are punished, as being guilty by consociation.' But then thus it was also before the fall: for by this it was that Adam fell. So the same Prudentius:

> Hæc prima est natura animæ, sic condita simplex
> Decidit in vitium per sordida fœdera carnis.

'The soul was created simple and pure, but fell into vice by the evil combination with the flesh.' But at first the appetites, and necessities, and tendencies, of the body, when it was at ease, and health, and blessed, did yet tempt the soul to forbidden instances; much more will this be done, when the body is miserable and afflicted, uneasy and dying. For even now we see, by a sad experience, that the afflicted and the miserable are not only apt to anger and envy, but have many more desires, and more weaknesses, and consequently more aptnesses to sin in many instances, than those who are less troubled. And this is that which was said by Arnobius, "Proni ad culpas, et ad libidinis varios appetitus vitio sumus infirmitatis ingenitæ:" "By the fault of our natural infirmity, we are prone to the appetites of lust and sins[d]."

7. From hence it follows, that naturally a man cannot do or perform the law of God; because being so weak, so tempted by his body; and this life being the body's day, that is, the time in which its appetites are properly prevailing; to be born of Adam, is to be born under sin, that is, under such inclinations to it, that as no man will remain innocent, so no man can of himself keep the law of God; "Vendidit se prior, ac, per hoc, omne semen subjectum est peccato. Quamobrem infirmum esse hominem ad præcepta legis servanda;" said the author of the commentary on St. Paul's epistles usually attributed to St. Ambrose[e].

But beyond this there are two things more considerable; the one is, that the soul of man being divested by Adam's fall, by way of punishment, of all those supernatural assistances, which God put into it; that which remained was a reasonable soul, fitted for the actions of life and of reason, but not of any thing that was supernatural. For the soul, being immerged in flesh, feeling grief by participation of evils from the flesh, hath and must needs have discourses in

[d] Lib. 1. advers. Gentes. [e] In cap. 7. Rom.

order to its own ease and comfort, that is in order to the satisfaction of the body's desires; which, because they are often contradicted, restrained, and curbed, and commanded to be mortified and killed, by the laws of God, must of necessity make great inlets for sin; for while reasón judges of things in proportion to present interests, and is less apprehensive of the proportions of those good things which are not the good things of this life, but of another; the reason abuses the will as the flesh abuses the reason. And for this there is no remedy but the grace of God, the Holy Spirit, to make us be born again, to become spiritual; that is, to have new principles, new appetites, and new interests.

The other thing I was to note is this; that as the devil was busy to abuse mankind, when he was fortified by many advantages and favours from God: so now that man is naturally born naked, and divested of those graces and advantages, and hath an infirm sickly body, and enters upon the actions of life through infancy, and childhood, and youth, and folly, and ignorance; the devil, it is certain, will not omit his opportunities, but will with all his power possess and abuse mankind; and upon the apprehension of this, the primitive church used, in the first admission of infants to the entrance of a new birth to a spiritual life, to pray against the power and frauds of the devil; and that brought in the ceremony of exsufflation, for ejecting of the devil. The ceremony was fond and weak, but the opinion that introduced it was full of caution and prudence. For as Optatus Milevitanus said, "Neminem fugit, quod omnis homo qui nascitur, quamvis de Christianis parentibus nascitur, sine spiritu immundo esse non possit; quem necesse sit, ante salutare lavacrum, ab homine excludi ac separari [f]." It is but too likely the devil will take advantages of our natural weaknesses, and with his temptations and abuses enter upon children as soon as they enter upon choice, and indeed prepossess them with imitating follies, that may become customs of sinfulness before they become sins; and therefore with rare wisdom it was done by the church, to prevent the devil's frauds and violences, by an early baptism, and early offices.

8. As a consequent of all this, it comes to pass, that we being born thus naked of the divine grace, thus naturally

[f] Lib. 4. contr. Parmen.

weak, thus encumbered with a body of sin, that is, a body apt to tempt to forbidden instances, and thus assaulted by the frauds and violences of the devil; all which are helped on by the evil guises of the world, it is certain, we cannot with all these disadvantages aad loads soar up to heaven; but, in the whole constitution of affairs, are in sad dispositions to enter into the devil's portion, and go to hell: not that if we die before we consent to evil, we shall perish; but that we are evilly disposed to do actions that will deserve it, and because if we die before our new birth, we have nothing in us that can, according to the revelations of God, dispose us to heaven; according to these words of the Apostle; "In me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing [g]."

But this infers not, that in our flesh, or that in our soul, there is any sin properly inherent, which makes God to be our present enemy; that is, the only or the principal thing I suppose myself to have so much reason to deny; but that the state of the body is a state not at all fitted for heaven, but too much disposed to the ways that lead to hell. For even in innocent persons, in Christ himself it was a hinderance or a state of present exclusion from heaven; "he could not enter into the second tabernacle" (that is, into heaven), "so long as the first tabernacle of his body was standing;" the body of sin, that is, of infirmity, he was first to lay aside, and so by dying unto sin once, he entered into heaven; according to the other words of St. Paul, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God [h]," it is a state of differing nature and capacity; Christ himself could not enter thither, till he had first laid that down, as the divine author to the Hebrews rarely and mysteriously discourses [i].

9. This is the whole sum of original sin, which now I have more fully explicated than formerly; it being then only fitting to speak of so much of it, as to represent it to be a state of evil, which yet left in us powers enough to do our duty, and to be without excuse (which very thing the Belgic confession in this article acknowledges), and that not God but ourselves are authors of our eternal death in case we do perish.

But now though thus far I have admitted as far as can be consonant to antiquity, and not unreasonable, though in

[g] Rom. vii. 18. [h] 1 Cor. xv. 50. [i] Heb. ix. 8. vii. 27. v. 2, 3.

Scripture so much is not expressed; yet now I must be more restrained, and deny those superadditions to this doctrine, which the ignorance, or the fancy, or the interest, or the laziness, of men have sewed to this doctrine.

SECTION II.

Adam's Sin is in us no more than an imputed Sin, and how it is so.

10. ORIGINAL sin is not our sin properly, not inherent in us, but is only imputed to us, so as to bring evil effects upon us: for that which is inherent in us, is a consequent only of Adam's sin, but of itself no sin; for there being but two things affirmed to be the constituent parts of original sin, the want of original righteousness, and concupiscence, neither of these can be a sin in us, but a punishment and a consequent of Adam's sin they may be: for the case is thus:

One half of Christians that dispute in this article, particularly the Roman schools, say, that concupiscence is not a sin, but a consequent of Adam's sin: the other half of Christians (I mean in Europe), that is, the protestants, generally say, that the want of original righteousness is a consequent of Adam's sin, but formally no sin. The effect of these is this, that it is not certain amongst the churches, that either one or the other is formally our sin, or inherent in us; and we cannot affirm either, without crossing a great part of Christendom in their affirmative.

There have indeed been attempts made to reconcile this difference; and therefore in the conference at Worms, and in the book offered at Ratisbon to the emperor, and in the 'Interim' itself they jumbled them both together, "saying, "Originale peccatum est carentia justitiæ originalis, cum concupiscentiâ." But the church of England defines neither, but rather inclines to believe that it consists in concupiscence, as appears in the explication of the article which I have annexed. But because she hath not determined, that either of them is formally a sin, or inherent in us, I may with the greater freedom, discourse concerning the several parts.

The want of original righteousness is not a thing, but the privation of a thing, and therefore cannot be inherent in us; and therefore if it be a sin at all to us, it can only be such by imputation. But neither can this be imputed to us as a sin formally, because, if it be at all, it is only a consequent or punishment of Adam's sin, and unavoidable by us: for though Scotus is pleased to affirm, that there was an obligation upon human nature, to preserve it; I doubt not but as he intended it, he said false. Adam indeed was tied to it, for if he lost it for himself and us, then he only was bound to keep it for himself and us; for we could not be obliged to keep it, unless we had received it; but he was, and because he lost it, we also missed it; that is, are punished, and feel the evil effects of it. But besides all this, the matter of original righteousness is a thing framed in the school-forges, but not at all spoken of in Scripture, save only that 'God made man upright,' that is, he was brought innocent into the world, he brought no sin along with him, he was created in the time and stature of reason and choice; he entered upon action when his reason was great enough to master his passion, all which we do not: it is that which, as Prosper describes it, made a man 'expertem peccati, et capacem Dei;' for by this is meant that he had grace and helps enough, if he needed any, besides his natural powers; which we have not by nature, but by another dispensation.

11. Add to all this, that they who make the want of original righteousness to be a sin formally in us, when they come to explicate their meaning by material or intelligible events, tell us it is an aversion from God; that is, in effect a turning to the creature, and differs no otherwise from concupiscence, than going from the west directly does from going directly to the east; that is, just nothing. It follows then, that if concupiscence be the effect of Adam's sin, then so must the want of original righteousness, because they are the same thing in real event: and if that be no sin in us, because it was only the punishment of his sin, then neither is the other a sin, for the same reason.

But then for concupiscence, that this is no sin, before we consent to it, appears by many testimonies of antiquity, and of St. Austin himself: "Quantum ad nos attinet, sine peccato semper essemus, donec sanaretur hoc malum, si nunquam

consentiremus ad malum[e]." And it is infinitely against reason it should; for in infants the very actions and desire of concupiscence are no sins, therefore much less is the principle; if the little emanations of it in them be innocent, although there are some images of consent, much more is that principle innocent, before any thing of consent at all is applied to it.

By the way, I cannot but wonder at this, that the Roman schools, affirming the first motions of concupiscence to be no sin, because they are involuntary, and not consented to by us, but come upon us whether we list or no, yet that they should think original sin to be a sin in us really and truly, which, it is certain, is altogether as involuntary and unchosen as concupiscence. But I add this also, that concupiscence is not wholly an effect of Adam's sin; if it were, then it would follow, that if Adam had not sinned we should have no concupiscence, that is, no contrary appetites; which is infinitely confuted by the experience of Adam's fall; for by the rebellion and prevailing of his concupiscence it was that he fell, and that which was the cause, could not be the effect of the same thing: as no child can beget his own father, nor any thing, which it leads and draws in after itself. Indeed, it is true that by Adam's sin this became much worse, and by the evils of the body, and its infirmities, and the nakedness of the soul as well as the body, and new necessities and new emergencies, Πάντη ἡ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς φανεροῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς κρυπτοῖς, ἀπὸ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ πρώτου ἀνθρώπου, εἰς ἡμᾶς κατήντησεν, as Macarius said; "An entire contrariety, both manifest and secret, came in upon us from the transgressions of Adam[f];" this, I say, became much worse, and more inordinate and tempted and vexed, and we were more under the devil's power, because we had the loss of our own.

12. The result is this, that neither the one nor the other is our sin formally, but by imputation only, that is, we are not sinners, but we are afflicted for his sin, and he is punished in us, and that it cannot be our sin properly, but metonymically, that is, our misery only; appears to me demonstratively certain upon this account: for how can that in another be our sin, when it is in us involuntary, when our own acts, if involuntary, are not sins?

[e] Lib. 2. ad Julianum. [f] Homil. 5.

If it be asked, how can we have the punishment unless we also have the fault? I return this answer, that St. Austin[g] and some others, who make this objection, have already given answers themselves, and 'Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi[h],' is an answer enough; as Saul sinned and his seven sons were hanged: and all that evil which is upon us, being not by any positive infliction, but by privative, or the taking away gifts and blessings and graces from us, which God, not having promised to give, was neither naturally nor by covenant obliged to give, it is certain, he could not be obliged to continue that to the sons of a sinning father, which to an innocent father he was not obliged to give.

But these things, which are only evils and miseries to us upon Adam's account, become direct punishments upon our own account, that is, if we sin. But then as to the argument itself: certainly it were more probable to say, we had not the fault, we did not do the sin which another did: therefore, the evil that we feel is our misery, but not our punishment; rather than to say, we are punished, therefore we are guilty. For let what will happen to us, it is not true that we are guilty of what we never did: and whatever comes upon us by the way of empire and dominion, nothing can descend upon us by the way of justice, as relating to our own fault.

But thus it was, that 'in him we are all sinners;' that is, his sin is reckoned to us so as to bring evil upon us; because we were born of him, and consequently put into the same natural state where he was left after his sin; no otherwise than as children, born of a bankrupt father, are also miserable; not that they are guilty of their fathers' sin, or that it is imputed so as to involve them in the guilt, but it is derived upon them and reckoned to evil events; the very nature of birth and derivation from him infers it.

13. And this it is that St. Austin once said; "Nascimur non propriè, sed originaliter peccatores[i];" that is, Adam's sin is imputed to us, but we have none of our own born with us: and this expression of 'having Adam's sin imputed to us,' is followed by divers of the modern doctors: by St. Bernard, serm. 11. 'de Dominicâ prima post 8. Epiph.:' by Lyra

[g] Lib. 4. contra duas epist. Pelag. c. 4. [h] Hor. ep. 1. 2. 14.
[i] De Civ. Dei, lib. 18.

in 5. cap. Rom.: by Cajetan 'ibidem:' by Bellarmine, tom. 3. 'de Amiss. Gratiæ,' lib. 5. cap. 17.: by Dr. Whitaker, lib. 1. 'de Peccato Originali,' cap. 7. et 9.: by Paræus in his Animadversions upon Bellarmine, lib. 5. 'de Amiss. Gratiæ,' cap. 16.: by Dr. George Charleton, lib. 'de Consensu Ecclesiæ Catholicæ contra Tridentinos,' controvers. 4.: which is the fifth chapter of Grace in these words: "Either we must, with Pelagius, wholly deny original sin, or it must be by the imputation of the injustice that was in Adam, that we are made sinners, because original sin is an imputed sin."—The effect of this is, that therefore it is not formally ours, and it is no sin inherent in us; and then the imputation means nothing but that it brought evils upon us; our dying, our sorrow, and the affections of mortality and concupiscence, are the consequents of Adam's sin, and the occasion of ours, and 'so we are in him and by him made sinners:' and in this there can be no injustice, for this imputation brings nothing upon us as in relation to Adam's sin, but what by his power and justice he might have done without such relation; and what is just, if done absolutely, must needs be just if done relatively; and because there is no other way to reconcile this with God's justice, it follows, that there is no other sense of imputation than what is now explicated.

SECTION III.

The Doctrine of the ancient Fathers was, that Free-will remained in us after the Fall.

14. Adam's sin did not destroy the liberty of our election, but left it naturally as great as before the fall.

And here I observe, that the fathers before St. Austin, generally maintained the doctrine of man's liberty remaining after the fall; the consequents of which are incompossible and inconsistent with the present doctrines of original sin.

That the doctrine of man's liberty remaining was general and catholic, appears by these few testimonies instead of very many. Justin Martyr, in his second apology for the Christians, hath these words; Καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν νοερὸν καὶ δυνά-

μενον αἱρεῖσθαι τἀληθῆ καὶ εὖ πράττειν, τὸ γένος τὸ ἀνθρώπινον πεποίηκεν, ὥστ' ἀναπολόγητον εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις παρὰ τῷ θεῷ· λογικοὶ γὰρ καὶ θεωρητικοὶ γεγένηνται. "Christ hath declared, that the devil and his angels, and men that follow him, shall be tormented in hell for ever; which thing is not yet done for the sake of mankind, because God foresees that some by repentance shall obtain salvation, even some that are not yet born: and from the beginning he created mankind, so that he should be endued with understanding, and by the power of his free-will should obtain choice to follow truth, and to do well: wherefore, all men are wholly left without excuse and defence before God; for they are created by him reasonable and fit for contemplation."

St. Cyrillus, lib. 4. in Johan. 1. 7.: "Non possumus, secundum Ecclesiæ veritatisque dogmata, liberam potestatem hominis, quod liberum arbitrium appellatur, ullo modo negare."

St. Hieronymus epist. 'ad Ctesiphontem' extrem.: "Frustra blasphemas et ignorantiam auribus ingeris, nos liberum arbitrium condemnare. Damnetur ille qui damnat."

Autor Hypognosticῶn, lib. 3.: "Ipsum liberum arbitrium in hominibus esse certâ fide credimus et prædicamus indubitanter: [et infra] est igitur liberum arbitrium: quod quisquis negaverit, catholicus non est.

Gregory Nyssenus, the great divine, saith, lib. 7. 'de Philosoph.' c. 2.: "Concupiscere et non concupiscere, mentiri et non mentiri, et quæcunque talia in quibus consistunt virtutis et vitii opera, hæc sunt in nostro libero arbitrio."

B. Macarius Ægyptius, hom. 15.: "Cæterumve semel et omnino resonet, et permaneat delectus et arbitrii libertas, quam primitus homini dedit Deus, ea propter dispensatione suâ res administrantur, et corporum solutio sit, ut in voluntate hominis situm sit, ad bonum, vel malum converti."

Marcus Heremita, lib. 'de Baptismo,' ultra medium, speaks more home to the particular question: "Hæc et similia, cum sciat scriptura in nostrâ potestate positum esse, ut hæc agamus nec ne, propterea non Satanam, neque peccatum Adæ, sed nos increpat. [et infra.] Primam conceptionem habemus ex dispensatione quemadmodum et ille, et perinde ac ille pro arbitrio possumus obtemperare vel non obtemperare."

Julius Firmicus 'de Erroribus Profanarum Religionum,' cap. 29.: "Liberum te Deus fecit: in tuâ manu est, ut aut vivas aut pereas, quia te per abrupta præcipitas."

St. Ambrose, in exposit. Psalm. 40.: "Homini dedit eligendi arbitrium quod sequatur; ante hominem vita et mors; si deliqueris, non natura in culpa est, sed eligentis affectus."

Gaudentius Brixianus tertio tractat. super Exod.: "Horum concessa semel voluntatis libertas non aufertur, ne nihil de eo judicare possit, qui liber non fuerit in agendo."

Boetius libro 'de Consolatione Philosophiæ:' "Quæ cum ita sint, manet intemerata mortalibus libertas arbitrii."

Though it were easy to bring very many more testimonies to this purpose, yet I have omitted them because the matter is known to all learned persons, and have chosen these, because they testify 'that our liberty of choice remains after the fall: that if we sin, the fault is not in our nature, but in our persons and election: that still it is in our own powers to do good or evil; that this is the sentence of the church: that he who denies this, is not a catholic believer.'

15. And this is so agreeable to nature, to experience, to the sentence of all wise men, to the nature of laws, to the effect of reward and punishments, that I am persuaded no man would deny it, if it were not upon this mistake; for many wise and learned men dispute against it, because they find it affirmed in Holy Scripture every where, 'that grace is necessary; that we are servants of sin; that we cannot come to God unless we be drawn;' and very many more excellent things, to the same purpose. Upon the account of which they conclude, that therefore our free-will is impaired by Adam's fall, since without the grace of God we cannot convert ourselves to godliness,—and being converted, without it we cannot stand,—and if we stand, without it we cannot go on,—and going on, without it we cannot persevere. Now though all this be very true, yet there is a mistake in the whole question. For when it is affirmed, that Adam's sin did not, could not, impair our liberty, but all that freedom of election which was concreated with his reason, and is essential to an understanding creature, did remain inviolate, there is no more said: but that after Adam's fall, all that which was natural, remained, and that what Adam could na-

turally do, all that he and we can do afterward. But yet this contradicts not all those excellent discourses, which the church makes of the necessity of grace, of the necessity and effect of which, I am more earnestly persuaded, and do believe more things, than are ordinarily taught in the schools of learning: but when I say, that our will can do all that it ever could, I mean all that it could ever do naturally, but not all that is to be done supernaturally.

But then this I add, that the things of the Spirit, that is, all that belongs to spiritual life, are not naturally known, not naturally discerned; but are made known to us by the Spirit; and when they are known, they are not naturally amiable, as being in great degrees, and many regards contradictory to natural desires; but they are made amiable by the proposition of spiritual rewards, and our will is moved by God in ways not natural, and the active and passive are brought together by secret powers; and after all this, our will, being put into a supernatural order, does, upon these presuppositions, choose freely, and work in the manner of nature. Our will is after Adam naturally as free as ever it was, and in spiritual things it is free, when it is made so by the Spirit; for nature could never do that: according to that saying of Celestine: "Nemo nisi per Christum libero arbitrio bene utitur. Omnis sancta cogitatio et motus bonæ voluntatis ex Deo est:" "A man before he is in Christ, hath free-will, but cannot use it well. He hath motions and operations of will; but without God's grace they do not delight in holy things."

But then in the next place there is another mistake also, when it is affirmed in the writings of some doctors, that the will of man is depraved; men presently suppose, that depravation is a natural or physical effect, and means a diminution of powers; whereas it signifies nothing but a being in love with, or having chosen an, evil object, and not an impossibility or weakness to do the contrary: but only because it will not; for the powers of the will cannot be lessened by any act of the same faculty, for the act is not contrary to the faculty, and therefore can do nothing towards its destruction.

III. As a consequent of this I infer, that there is no natural necessity of sinning; that is, there is no sinful action to which naturally we are determined; but it is our own

choice that we sin. This depending upon the former, stands or falls with it. But because God hath superinduced so many laws, and the devil superinduces temptations upon our weak nature, and we are to enter into a supernatural state of things; therefore it is that we need the helps of supernatural grace to enable us to do a supernatural duty in order to a divine end; so that the necessity of sinning which we all complain of, though it be greater in us than it was in Adam before his fall, yet is not absolute in either, nor merely natural, but accidental and superinduced; and in remedy to it, God also hath superinduced and 'promised his Holy Spirit to them that ask him.'

SECTION IV.

Adam's Sin is not imputed to us to our Damnation.

16. But the main of all is this; that this sin of Adam is not imputed unto us to eternal damnation. For eternal death was not threatened to Adam for his sin, and therefore could not from him come upon us for that which was none of ours. Indeed, the Socinians affirm, that the death which entered into the world by Adam's sin, was death eternal; that is, God then decreed to punish sinners with the portion of devils. It is likely he did so, but that this was the death introduced for the sin of Adam upon all mankind, is not at all affirmed in Scripture: but temporal death is the effect of Adam's sin; 'in Adam we all die,' and the death that Adam's sin brought in, is such as could have a remedy or recompense by Christ; but eternal death hath no recompense, and shall never be destroyed; but temporal death shall. But that which I say is this; that for Adam's sin alone, no man but himself is or can justly be condemned to the bitter pains of eternal fire.

This depends also upon the former accounts, because mere nature brings not to hell, but choice. "Nihil ardet in inferno nisi propria voluntas," said St. Bernard; and since original sin is not properly ours, but only by imputation, if God should impute Adam's sin so as to damn any one for it, all our good we receive from God, is much less than that

evil; and we should be infinitely to seek for justification of God's justice and glorifications of his mercy, or testimonies of his goodness.

But now the matter is on this side so reasonable in itself, that let a man take what side he will, he shall have parties enough, and no prejudices, or load of a consenting authority, can be against him, but that there shall be on the side of reason as great and leading persons, as there are those who have been abused by error and prejudice. In the time of St. Austin, Vincentius, Victor, and some others, did believe, that infants dying without baptism should nevertheless be saved, although he believed them guilty of original sin: Bucer, Peter Martyr, and Calvin, affirmed the same of the children of faithful parents, but Zuinglius affirmed it of all, and that no infant did lose heaven for his original stain and corruption.

Something less than this was the doctrine of the Pelagians; who exclude infants unbaptized, from the kingdom of heaven: but promised to them an eternal and a natural beatitude, and for it St. Augustine[k] reckons them for heretics, as indeed being impatient of every thing almost which they said. But yet, the opinion was embraced lately by Ambrosius Catherinus, Albertus Pighius, and Hieronymus Savanarola. And though St. Austin sometimes calls as good men as himself by the name of Pelagians, calling all them so that assign a third place or state to infants; yet besides these now reckoned, St. Gregory Nazianzen[l] and his scholiast Nicetes did believe and teach it; and the same is affirmed also by St. Athanasius, or whoever is the author of the 'Questions[m] to Antiochus' usually attributed to him, and also by St. Ambrose, or the author of the commentaries on St. Paul's epistles, who lived in the time of Pope Damasus, that is, before four hundred years after Christ: and even by St. Austin himself expressly in his third book 'de Libero Arbitrio,' cap. 23.—But when he was heated with his disputations against the Pelagians, he denied all, and said that a middle place or state was never heard of in the church.

For all this, the opinion of a middle state for unbaptized infants continued in the church, and was expressly affirmed

[k] Lib. de Hæresib. c. 18. [l] Orat. in Sanctum Baptis.
[m] Quæst. 114. in cap. 5. Rom.

by Pope Innocent the Third[n]; who although he says, infants shall not see the face of God, yet he expressly denies that they shall be tormented in hell: and he is generally followed by the schoolmen; who almost universally teach, that infants shall be deprived of the vision beatifical; but shall not suffer hell-torments; but yet they stoop so much towards St. Austin's harsh and fierce opinion, that they say, this deprivation is a part of hell, not of torment, but of banishment from God, and of abode in the place of torment. Among these they are also divided, some affirming, that they have some pain of sense, but little and light: others saying they have none, even as they pleased to fancy; for they speak wholly without ground, and merely by chance and interest; and against the consent of antiquity, as I have already instanced. But Gregorius Ariminensis, Driedo, Luther, Melancthon, and Tilmanus Heshusius, are fallen into the worst of St. Austin's opinion, and sentence poor infants to the flames of hell for original sin, if they die before baptism.

To this I shall not say much more than what I have said otherwhere: but that no catholic writers for four hundred years after Christ did ever affirm it, but divers affirmed the contrary. And indeed if the unavoidable want of baptism should damn infants, for the fault which was also unavoidable, I do not understand how it can in any sense be true, that Christ died for all, if at least the children of Christian parents should not find the benefit of Christ's death, because that without the fault of any man they want the ceremony. Upon this account some good men, observing the great sadness and the injustice of such an accident, are willing upon any terms to admit infants to heaven, even without baptism, if any one of their relatives desire it for them, or if the church desires it; which in effect admits all Christian infants to heaven; of this opinion were Gerson, Biel, Cajetan, and some others[o]. All which to my sense seems to declare, that if men would give themselves freedom of judgment, and speak what they think most reasonable, they would speak honour of God's mercy, and not impose such fierce and un-

[n] De Verb. Apost. serm. 25. Lib. 3. decretat. tit. de bapt. et ejus effectu: cap. majores.

[o] 17 tom. 3. serm. de Nativ. B. Mariæ in Concit. const. lib. 4. dist. 4. q. 2. in 3. Thom. q. 68. Act. 1. 2. 11.

intelligible things concerning his justice and goodness, since our blessed Saviour, concerning infants and those only who are like infants, affirms, that 'of such is the kingdom of heaven.' But now in the midst of this great variety of opinions it will be hard to pick out any thing that is certain. For my part I believe this only as certain, that nature alone cannot bring them to heaven; and that Adam left us in a state in which we could not hope for it; but this I know also, that as soon as this was done, Christ was promised, and that before there was any birth of man or woman; and that God's grace is greater and more communicative than sin, and Christ was more gracious and effective than Adam was hurtful; and that therefore it seems very agreeable to God's goodness to bring them to happiness by Christ, who were brought to misery by Adam, and that he will do this by himself alone, in ways of his own finding out.

And yet, if God will not give them heaven by Christ, he will not throw them into hell by Adam: if his goodness will not do the first, his goodness and his justice will not suffer him to do the second: and therefore I consent to antiquity and the schoolmen's opinion thus far; that the destitution or loss of God's sight are the effect of original sin, that is, by Adam's sin we were left so as that we cannot by it go to heaven. But here I differ: whereas they say this may be a final event; I find no warrant for that; and think it only to be an intermedial event; that is, though Adam's sin left us there, yet God did not leave us there; but instantly gave us Christ as a remedy; and now what in particular shall be the state of unbaptized infants, so dying, I do not profess to know or teach, because God hath kept it as a secret; I only know that he is a gracious Father, and from his goodness, nothing but goodness is to be expected; and that is, since neither Scripture, nor any father, till about St. Austin's time, did teach the poor babes could die, not only once for Adam's sin, but twice and for ever, I can never think that I do my duty to God, if I think or speak any thing of him that seems so unjust, or so much against his goodness: and therefore, although by baptism, or by the ordinary ministry, infants are new born, and rescued from the state of Adam's account, which metonymically may be called a remitting of original sin, that is, a receiving them from the punishment of Adam's

sin, or the state of evil, whither in him they are devolved; yet baptism does but consider that grace which God gives in Jesus Christ, and he gives it more ways than one, to them that desire baptism, to them that die for Christianity; and the church, even in Origen's time, and before that, did account the babes, that died in Bethlehem by the sword of Herod, to be saints; and I do not doubt but he gives it many ways that we know not of.

And therefore St. Bernard, and many others, do suppose, that the want of baptism is supplied by the baptism of the Holy Ghost. To which purpose the eighty-seventh epistle of St. Bernard is worth the reading. But this I add, that those who affirmed that infants without actual baptism could not be saved, affirmed the same also of them, if they wanted the holy eucharist, as is to be seen in Paulinus, epigr. 6. the writer of 'Hypognosticon,' lib. 5. 8. St. Austin, hom. 13. serm. 8. de Verbis Apostoli; and the one hundred and seventh epistle to Vitalis.

And since no church did ever enjoin to ony catechumen, any penance or repentance for original sin, it seems horrible and unreasonable, that any man can be damned for that, for which no man is bound to repent.

SECTION V.

The Doctrine of Antiquity in this whole Matter.

The sum of all is this.

18. I. ORIGINAL sin is Adam's sin imputed to us to many evil effects.

II. It brings death and the evils of this life.

III. Our evils and necessity being brought upon us, bring in a flood of passions which are hard to be bridled, or mortified.

IV. It hath left us in pure naturals, disrobed of such aids extraordinary as Adam had.

V. It deprives us of all title to heaven or supernatural happiness, that is, it neither hath in it strength to live a spiritual life, nor title to a heavenly.

VI. It leaves in us our natural concupiscence, and makes it much worse.

Thus far I admit and explicate this Article.

But all that I desire of the usual propositions which are variously taught now-a-days, is this.

I. Original sin is not an inherent evil; not a sin properly, but metonymically; that is, it is the effect of one sin, and the cause of many; a stain, but no sin.

II. It does not destroy our liberty, which we had naturally.

III. It does not introduce a natural necessity of sinning.

IV. It does not damn any infant to the eternal pains of hell.

And now how consonant my explication of the article is to the first and best antiquity, besides the testimonies I have already brought here concerning some parts of it, will appear by the following authorities, speaking to the other parts of it, and to the whole question.

St. Ignatius the martyr, in his epistle to the Magnesians, hath these words: Ἐὰν εὐσεβῆ τις, ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ ἐστιν· ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῆ τις, ἄνθρωπος τοῦ διαβόλου· οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης γινόμενος: "If a man be a pious man, he is a man of God: if he be impious, he is of the devil: not made so by nature, but by his own choice and sentence[p];" by which words he excludes nature, and affirms our natural liberty to be the cause of our good or evil; that is, we are in fault: but not Adam, so as we are.

And it is remarkable that Ignatius hath said nothing to the contrary of this, or to infirm the force of these words; and they who would fain have alleged him to contrary purposes, cite him calling Adam's sin παλαιὰν δυσσέβειαν, 'the old iniquity;' which appellative is proper enough, but of no efficacy in this question.

Dionysius the Areopagite (if he be the author of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy[q]) does very well explicate this article: Τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν ἀρχῆθεν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν ἀνοήτως ἐξολισθήσασαν ἡ πολυπαθεστάτη ζωὴ διαδέχεται καὶ τοῦ φθοροποιοῦ θανάτου πέρας. "When in the beginning human nature

p St. Ignatius. q Dionysius Areopag. cap. 3. part. 3.

foolishly fell from the state of good things which God gave it, it was then entered into a life of passions, and the end of the corruption of death." This sentence of his differs not from that of St. Chrysostom before alleged; for when man grew miserable by Adam's fall, and was disrobed of his aids, he grew passionate, and peevish, and tempted, and sick, and died. This is all his account of Adam's story: and it is a very true one. But the writer was of a later date, not much before St. Austin's time, as it is supposed; but a learned and a catholic believer[r].

19. Concerning Justin Martyr, I have already given this account, that he did not think the liberty of choice impaired by Adam's sin; but in his 'dialogue with Tryphon the Jew,' he gives no account of original sin but this, that "Christ was not crucified or born as if himself did need it, but for the sake of mankind, which by Adam fell into death, and the deception of the serpent, besides all that which men commit wickedly upon their own stock of impiety."—So that the effect of Adam's sin was death, and being abused by the devil; for this very reason to rescue us from the effects of this deception, and death, and to redeem us from our impiety, Christ was born and died. But all this meddles not with any thing of the present questions; for to this all interests, excepting the Pelagians' and Socinians', will subscribe. It is material which is spoken by him, or some under his name in the 'Questions and Answers to the Orthodox:' Οὐδεὶς πεφυκὼς ἁμαρτάνειν ἢ ἀνομεῖν, ὃς οὐχ ἥμαρτεν ἢ οὐχ ἠνόμησεν. Πέφυκε δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν ὁ κατὰ τὴν αὐθαίρετον προαίρεσιν ἄγων ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται, εἴτε ἀγαθὰ εἴτε φαῦλα. Τὸ δὲ βρέφος, ἅτε οὔπω ὂν τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ πέφυκεν ἁμαρτάνειν. "There is no man who is by nature born to sin and do wickedly, but hath sinned and done wickedly. But he is by nature born to sin, who by the choice of his free-will is author to himself of doing what he will, whether it be good or bad. But an infant, as being not endued with any such power, it appears sufficiently that he is not by nature born to sin[s]."—These words, when they had been handled as men pleased, and turned to such senses as they thought they could escape by, at last they appear to be the words of one, who understood nothing of original sin,

[r] Justin Martyr. [s] Quest. 88.

as it is commonly explicated at this day. For all that this author (for it was indeed some later catholic author, but not Justin) did know of original sin, was that which he relates in the answer to the one hundred and second question. *Περιτεμνόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς τῇ περιτομῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος, ἐκδυόμενοι τὸν Ἀδὰμ, δι' ὃν ἁμαρτωλοὶ γεγονότες τεθνήκαμεν, καὶ ἐνδυόμενοι τὸν Χριστὸν, δι' ὃν δικαιωθέντες ἀνιστάμεθα ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν· ἐνῷ φησιν ὁ Ἀπόστολος) περιετμήθητε περιτομὴν ἀχειροποίητον τῇ ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ σώματος ὑμῶν.* "We also are circumcised with the circumcision of Christ by baptism, putting off Adam, by whom we being made sinners did die, and putting on Christ, by whom being justified, we are risen from the dead: in whom (saith the Apostle) we were circumcised with the circumcision which is made without hands, while you have put off your body."—That is, Adam's sin made us to become sinners, that is, was imputed to us, so that in him we die; but by Christ being justified we are made alive; that is, in him we are admitted to another life, a life after our resurrection; and this is by baptism; for there we die to Adam and live to Christ, we are initiated in a new birth to a new and more perfect state of things. But all this leaves infants in a state of so much innocence, 'that they are not formally guilty of a sin, but imperfect and insufficient to righteousness, and every one hath his liberty left him to do as he please[1]:' so far is affirmed by the author of these answers. But the sentence of Justin Martyr in this article may best be conjectured by his discourse, at large undertaking to prove *τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐλευθερὰν πρὸς τὸ φεύγειν τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰ καλά,* "a freedom of election to fly evil things, and to choose that which is good;" set down in his second Apology for the Christians.

Theophilus Antiochenus affirms that which destroys the new *φαινόμενα,* about Adam's perfection and rare knowledge in the state of innocence. *Τῇ δὲ οὔσῃ ἡλικίᾳ ὁ Ἀδὰμ ἔτι νήπιος ἦν, διὸ οὔπω ἐδύνατο τὴν γνῶσιν κατ' ἀξίαν χωρεῖν.* "Adam in that age was yet as an infant, and therefore did not understand that secret, viz. that the fruit which he ate, had in it nothing but knowledge:" and a little after, reckoning the evil consequents of Adam's sin, he names these only,

[1] Quest. 88.

πόνος, ὀδύνη καὶ τὸ τέλος θάνατος, "grief, sorrow, and death at last[u]."

20. Clemens of Alexandria, having affirmed ὅτι φύσει μὲν ἐπιτήδειοι γεγόναμεν πρὸς ἀρετήν, that "by nature we are born apt to virtue, not that we have virtue from our birth, but that we are apt to require it from thence[x]," takes opportunity to discuss this question, 'whether Adam was formed perfect or imperfect?—If imperfect, how comes it to pass that the works of God, especially man, should be imperfect? If perfect, how came he to break the commandments?'—He answers, that Adam was not made perfect in his constitution, but prepared indeed for virtue. Ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σώζεσθαι· αὐτὴ οὖν φύσις ψυχῆς ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ὁρμᾷν. For "God would have us by ourselves, that is, by our own choice, to be saved: for it is the nature of the soul to be driven and stirred up by itself."—Many more things to the same purpose he affirms in perfect contradiction to them, who believe Adam's sin so to have debauched our faculties, that we have lost all our powers of election: our powers of election grow stronger, not weaker, according as our knowledge increases. Τοῦτο ἦν ἀπανδρούμενον τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ κείμενον. "That which was in Adam (meaning his free will), that was it which grew with the increase of a man[y]." Therefore it was not lost by Adam. But more pertinent to the present questions are these words: 'An innocent martyr suffers like an infant.' Τὸ νήπιον οὐ προημαρτηκός, ἢ ἐνεργῶς μὲν ἡμαρτηκὸς οὐδ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ; "An infant neither committed actual sin, or sin in himself; neither hath he sinned beforehand[z];" that is, properly in Adam, to whose sin he gave no consent; for else there can be no antithesis or opposition in the parts of his distinction; "he sinned not actually in himself,"—being one member; the other προημαρτηκός, or "sinning before,"—being opposed to actual sin, ἐνεργῶς or ἐν ἑαυτῷ, "in himself,"—must mean 'original' and 'in another.' And this he also expressly affirms: Λεγέτωσαν ἡμῖν ποῦ ἐπόρνευσεν τὸ γεννηθὲν παιδίον, ἢ πῶς ὑπὸ τὴν Ἀδὰμ ὑποπέπτωκεν ἀρὰν τὸ μηδὲν ἐνέργασαν[a]. When Tatianus and the Encratites did design to prove marriage to be unlawful, because it produced nothing but sinners; and to that purpose

[u] Theophilus Antiochenus ad Autolycum, l. 2.
[x] Clemens Alexandrinus. Stromat. lib. 6.
[y] Stromat. lib. 4. pag. 535. edit. Morelliana.
[z] Pag. 506. [a] Pag. 468.

urged those words of Job, "There is no man free from pollution," οὐδ' εἰ μία ἡμέρα ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ, "though his life be but of one day." For so antiquity did generally quote Job, xxv. 4. following the LXX. which interprets the place; there being neither the same words nor the like sense in the Hebrew. But that very quotation had no small influence into the forward persuasions of the article concerning original sin, as is visible to them that have read the writings of the ancient doctors. But to the things here objected, Clemens replied, "Let them tell us, then, how an infant newly born hath fornicated or polluted himself, or how he is fallen under the curse of Adam, he who hath done nothing?" He had no other way to extricate himself. For if marriage produces none but sinners, persons hated by God, formally guilty of sin, then as the fruit is, such is the tree. He answers, 'True, if it were so; but marriage produces infants that are innocent, and having done nothing evil yet, they never deserved to fall under Adam's curse. The effect of which is this, that to them, sickness and death are a misery, but not formally a punishment; because they are innocent, and formally are no sinners.' Some, to elude this testimony, would make these words to be the words of the Encratites or Julius Cassianus: but then, they are no sense, but a direct objection to themselves. But the case is clear to them that read and understand; and therefore the learned and good man Johannes Gerardus Vossius confesses downright, "Clementem Alexandrinum non satis intellexisse peccatum originale:" "That he did not understand the doctrine of original sin."—This only I add, that he takes from the objector that place of David, "In sin hath my mother conceived me;" affirming that by 'my mother,' he means 'Eve,' and that she "peccatrix concepit sed non peccatorem;" "she was in sin when she conceived him, but he was not in sin when he was conceived."—But the meaning of Clemens Alexandrinus is easily to be understood to be consonant to truth, and the usual doctrine of the first ages, which makes Adam's sin to be ours by imputation, but that no sin upon that title is inherent in us; and Clemens Alexandrinus understood the question very well, though not to the purposes of our new opinions.

21. Tertullian speaks of the sin of Adam several times, but affirms not, that we have any 'formal, proper, and inherent

sin:' but 'that the soul of man is a sinner, because it is unclean,' just as it was amongst the rites of Moses's law, where legal impurity was called 'sin,' and that we derive from Adam a shame rather than a sin, an ignominy or reproach, like that of being born of dishonourable parents,—or rather, 'from the society of the flesh,' as he expresses it; and that this dishonour lasts upon us till we enter upon a new relation in Christ. "Ita omnis anima eousque in Adam censetur, donec in Christo recenseatur, tamdiu immunda quamdiù recenseatur. Peccatrix autem quia immunda, recipiens ignominiam suam ex carnis societate[b]." And this which he here calls 'a reproach,' he otherwhere calls an 'imperfection' or a 'shame,' saying, "By Satan, man at first was circumvented, and therefore given up unto death, and from thence all the kind was, from his seed, infected; he made a traduction of his sentence or damnation[c]:" to wit, unto death, which was his condemnation; and therefore speaking of the woman, he says, "The sentence remaining upon her in this life, it is necessary that the guilt also should remain[d];" which words are rough and hard to be understood, because after baptism the guilt does not remain; but by the following words we may guess that he means, that women still are that which Eve was, 'even snares to men, gates for the devil to enter,' and that they, as Eve did, 'dare and can prevail with men, when the devil by any other means cannot.' I know nothing else that he says of this article, save only, that according to the constant sense of antiquity he affirms, that 'the natural faculties of the soul were not impaired.' "Omnia naturalia animæ, ut substantiva ejus, ipsi inesse, et cum ipsâ procedere atque proficere[e]." And again: "Hominis anima, velut surculus quidam, ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta, et genitalibus fœminæ foveis commendata, cum omni sua paritura pullulabit, tam in intellectu quam in sensu:" "The soul, like a sprig from Adam derived unto his offspring, and put into the bed of its production, shall, with all its appendages, spring or increase both in sense and understanding."—And that there is 'a liberty of choice' (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον which supposes liberty) he proved against Marcion and Hermogenes, as himself affirms in chap. 21. of the same book.

[b] Lib. de Animâ, cap. 39, 40.
[c] Lib. de Testimon. Anim. adv. Gentes, c. 3.
[d] De Habitu Muliebri, c. 1.
[e] Lib. de Animâ, c. 20.
[f] Cap. 9.

St. Cyprian, proving the effect of baptism upon all, and consequently the usefulness to infants, argues thus: "If pardon of sins is given to the greatest sinners, and them that before sinned much against God, and afterward believed, and none is forbidden to come to baptism and grace,—how much more must not an infant be forbidden, 'qui recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod, secundum Adam carnaliter natus, contagium mortis antiquæ primâ nativitate contraxit; qui ad remissam peccatorum accipiendam hoc ipso facilius accedit, quod illi remittuntur non propria sed aliena peccata,' 'who being new born hath not sinned at all, but only being born carnally of Adam, he hath, in his first birth, contracted the contagion of the old death: which comes to the remission of sin the more easily, because not his own sins, but the sins of another, are forgiven him[g].'" In which it is plainly affirmed, that the infant is innocent, that he hath sinned himself, that there is in him no sin inherent, that Adam's sin therefore only is imputed, that all the effect of it upon him is the contagion of death, that is, mortality, and its affections; and according as the sins are, so is the remission, they are the infants' improperly and metonymically, therefore so is the remission.

But Arnobius speaks yet more plainly: "Omne peccatum cordé concipitur, et ore consummatur. Hic autem qui nascitur, sententiam Adæ habet, peccatum verò suum non habet:" "He that is born of Adam hath the sentence of Adam upon him, but not the sin[h];" that is, he hath no sin inherent, but the punishment inflicted by occasion of it.

The author of the Short Commentaries upon the Epistles of St. Paul attributed to St. Ambrose, speaks so much, that some have used the authority of this writer, to prove that there is no original sin: as Sixtus Senensis relates. His words are these; "Mors autem dissolutio corporis est, cum anima à corpore separatur: est et alia mors quæ secunda dicitur, in gehenna; quam non peccato Adæ patimur, sed, ejus occasione, propriis peccatis acquiritur:" "Death is the dissolution of the body, when the soul is separated from it. There is also another death in hell which is called the second death, which we suffer not from Adam's sin, but by occasion of it, it is acquired by our own sins[i]." These words need no

[g] St. Cyprian. lib. 5. Ep. 8. ad Fidum. [h] In comment. in Psal. l.
[i] Lib. 6. Biblioth. Sanct. annot. 136.

explication; for when he had in the precedent words affirmed that we all sinned in the mass of Adam, this following discourse states the question right, and declares, that though Adam's sin be imputed to us, to certain purposes, yet no man can be damned to the second death for it: it is a testimony so plain for the main part of my affirmation in this article, that as there is not any thing against it within the first four hundred years,—so he could not be accounted a catholic author, if the contrary had been the sense or the prevailing opinion of the church.

22. To these I shall add the clearest testimonies of St. Chrysostom: "It seems to have in it no small question, that it is said, that, by the disobedience of one, many become sinners. For sinning and being made mortal, it is not unlikely that they which spring from him, should be so too. But that another should be made a sinner by his disobedience, what agreement or consequent, I beseech you, can it have? What therefore doth this word 'sinner' in this place signify? It seems to me to signify the same that 'liable to punishment, guilty of death,' does signify, because Adam dying, all are made mortal by him[k]." And again, "Thou sayest, What shall I do? By him, that is, by Adam, I perish. No, not for him, For hast thou remained without sin? For though thou hast not committed the same sin, yet another thou hast[l]."—And in the twenty-ninth homily upon the same epistle, he argues thus: "What therefore? tell me, are all dead in Adam by the death of sin? How then was Noah a just man in his generation? How were Abraham and Job? If this be to be understood of the body, the sentence will be certain, but if it be understood of justice and sin, it will not."—But to sum up all; he answers the great argument used by St. Austin to prove infants to be in a state of damnation and sin properly, "because the church baptizes them, and baptism is for the remission of sins. Thou seest how many benefits there are of baptism; but many think that the grace of baptism consists only in the remission of sins: but we have reckoned ten honours of baptism. For this cause we baptize infants; although they are not polluted with sin, to wit, that to them may be added sanctity, justice, adoption, inheritance, and the

[k] St. Chrysostom. homil. 10. in Rom. [l] Hom. 17. in 1 Cor.

fraternity of Christ[m]." Divers other things might be transcribed to the same purposes out of St. Chrysostom, but these are abundantly sufficient to prove, that I have said nothing new in this article.

Theodoret does very often consent with St. Chrysostom, even when he differs from others, and in this article he consents with him and the rest now reckoned: "When God made Adam and adorned him with reason, he gave him one commandment that he might exercise his reason: he being deceived broke the commandment and was exposed to the sentence of death, and so he begat Cain, and Seth, and others: but all these, as being begotten of him, had a mortal nature. This kind of nature wants many things, meat and drink and clothes, and dwelling and divers arts: the use of these things oftentimes provokes to excess; and the excess begets sin. Therefore the divine Apostle saith, that when Adam had sinned, and was made mortal for his sin, both came to his stock, that is, death and sin; for 'death came upon all, inasmuch as all men have sinned.' For every man suffers the decree of death, not for the sin of the first man, but for his own[n]." Much more to the same purpose he hath upon the same chapter: but this is enough to all the purposes of this question.

Now if any man thinks, that though these give testimony in behalf of my explication of this article, yet that it were easy to bring very many more to the contrary[o]; I answer, and profess ingenuously, that I know of none till about St. Austin's time; for that the first ages taught the doctrine of original sin, I do no ways doubt, but affirm it all the way; but that it is a sin improperly, that is, a stain and a reproach rather than a sin, that is, the effect of one sin, and the cause of many, that it brought in sickness and death, mortality and passions, that it made us naked of those supernatural aids that Adam had, and so more liable to the temptations of the devil; this is all I find in antiquity, and sufficient for the explication of this question, which the more simply it is handled, the more true and reasonable it is. But that I may use the words of Solomon, according to the vulgar translation; "Hoc inveni, quod fecerit Deus hominem rectum, et ipse se

[m] Homil. ad Neophytos. [n] Theodoret. in 5. Rom.
[o] Vide eundem in exposit. Psal. l.

infinitis miscuerit quæstionibus;" "God made man upright, and he hath made himself more deformed than he is, by mingling with innumerable questions."

23. I think I have said enough to vindicate my sentence from novelty, and though that also be sufficient to quit me from singularity, yet I have something more to add as to that particular, and that is, that it is very hard for a man to be singular in this article, if he would. For first, in the primitive church, when Valentinus and Marcion, Tatianus, Julius Cassianus, and the Encratites, condemned marriage upon this account, because 'it produces that only which is impure,' many good men and right believers, did, to justify marriages, undervalue the matter of original sin; this begat new questions in the manner of speaking, and at last, real differences were entertained, and the Pelagian heresy grew up upon this stock. But they changed their propositions so often, that it was hard to tell what was the heresy: but the first draught of it was so rude, so confused, and so unreasonable, that when any of the followers of it spake more warily, and more learnedly, yet by this time, the name Pelagian was of so ill a sound, that they would not be believed if they spake well, nor trusted in their very recantations, nor understood in their explications, but cried out against in all things, right or wrong: and in the fierce prosecution of this, St. Austin and his followers, Fulgentius, Prosper, and others, did 'excedere in dogmate, et pati aliquid humanum.' St. Austin called them all Pelagians who were of the middle opinion concerning infants; and yet many catholics, both before and since his time, do profess it. The Augustan confession calls them Pelagians, who say, that concupiscence is only the effect of Adam's sin, and yet all the Roman churches say it confidently; and every man that is angry in this question, calls his enemy Pelagian, if he be not a Stoic, or a Manichee, a Valentinian, or an Encratite. But the Pelagians say so many things in their controversy, that like them that talk much, they must needs say some things well, though very many things amiss: but if every thing which was said against St. Austin in these controversies, be Pelagianism, then all antiquity were Pelagians and himself besides; for he, before his disputes in these questions, said much against what he said after, as every learned man knows. But yet it is certain, that even

after the Pelagian heresy was conquered, there were many good men, who, because they from every part take the good and leave the poison, were called Pelagians by them that were angry at them for being of another opinion in some of their questions. Cassian was a good and holy man, and became the great rule of Monastines, yet because he spake reason in his exhortations to piety, and justified God, and blamed man, he is called Pelagian: and the epistle 'ad Demetriadem,' and 'the Little Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles,' were read and commended highly by all men, so long as they were supposed to be St. Jerome's; but when some fancied that Faustus was the author, they suspect the writings for the man's sake; and however St. Austin was triumphant in the main article against those heretics, and there was great reason he should, yet that he took in too much, and confuted more than he should, appears in this,—that though the world followed him in the condemnation of Pelagianism, yet the world left him in many things which he was pleased to call Pelagianism. And therefore, when the archbishop Bradwardin wrote his books 'de Causa Dei,' against the liberty of will, and for the fiercer way of absolute decrees; he complains in his preface, that 'the whole world was against him, and gone after Pelagius 'in causa liberi arbitrii.' Not that they really were made so, but that it is a usual thing to affright men from their reasons by names and words, and to confute an argument by slandering him that uses it.

Now this is it that I and all men else ought to be troubled at, if my doctrine be accused of singularity,—I cannot acquit myself of the charge, but by running into a greater. For if I say, that one proposition is taught by all the Roman schools, and therefore I am not singular in it; they reply, It is true, but then it is popery which you defend. If I tell, that the Lutherans defend another part of it, then the Calvinists hate it, therefore because their enemies avow it; either it is popery, or Pelagianism; you are an Arminian, or a Socinian. And either you must say that which nobody says, and then you are singular; or if you do say as others say, you shall feel the reproach of that party that you own, which is also disowned by all but itself.

That therefore which I shall choose to say, is this, that the doctrine of original sin, as I explicate it, is wholly against

the Pelagians, for they wholly deny original sin, affirming, that Adam did us no hurt by his sin, except only by his example. These men are also followed by the Anabaptists, who say, that death is so natural, that it is not by Adam's fall so much as made actual. The Albigenses were of the same opinion. The Socinians affirm, that Adam's sin was the occasion of bringing eternal death into the world, but that it no way relates to us, not so much as by imputation. But I having shewed in what sense Adam's sin is imputed to us, am so far, either from agreeing with any of these, or from being singular, that I have the acknowledgment of an adversary, even of Bellarmine himself[p], that it is the doctrine of the church; and he laboriously endeavours to prove, that original sin is merely ours by imputation. Add to this, that he also affirms, that when Zuinglius says that 'original sin is not properly a sin, but metonymically,' that is, 'the effect of one sin, and the cause of many,' that in so saying he agrees with the catholics. Now these being the main affirmatives of my discourse, it is plain that I am not alone, but more are with me than against me. Now though he is pleased afterward[q] to contradict himself, and say it is 'veri nominis peccatum,' yet because I understood not how to reconcile the opposite parts of a contradiction, or tell how the same thing should be really a sin, and yet be so but by a figure only,—how it should be properly a sin, and yet only metonymically,—and how it should be the effect of sin, and yet that sin whereof it is an effect,—I confess here I stick to my reason and my proposition, and leave Bellarmine and his catholics to themselves.

25. And indeed they that say original sin is any thing really, any thing besides Adam's sin imputed to us to certain purposes, that is, effecting in us certain evils, which dispose to worse, they are, according to the nature of error, infinitely divided, and agree in nothing but in this, that none of them can prove what they say. Anselme Buonaventure, Gabriel, and others, say, that 'original sin is nothing but a want of original righteousness.' Others say, that they say something of truth, but not enough; for 'a privation can never be a po-

[p] Tom. 4. l. 5. c. 17. de Amiss. Gratiæ et.
[q] Ibid. c. 2. sect. unam hoc et ex his tribus.

sitive sin, and if it be not positive, it cannot be inherent:' and therefore that it is necessary that they add "indignitatem habendi:" "a certain unworthiness to have it" being in every man, that is the sin. But then if it be asked, What makes them unworthy, if it be not the want of original righteousness,—and that then they are not two things but one, seemingly, and none really;—they are not yet agreed upon an answer. Aquinas and his scholars say, original sin is 'a certain spot upon the soul.' Melancthon, considering that concupiscence, or the faculty of desiring, or the tendency to an object, could not be a sin, fancied original sin to be 'an actual depraved desire.'—Illyricus says, it is 'the substantial image of the devil.' Scotus and Durandus say, it is nothing but a 'mere guilt,' that is, an obligation passed upon us, to suffer the evil effects of it: which indeed is most moderate of all the opinions of the school, and differs not at all, or scarce discernibly, from that of Albertus Pighius, and Catharinus, who say that 'original sin is nothing, but the disobedience of Adam imputed to us.' But the Lutherans affirm it to be the 'depravation of human nature without relation to the sin of Adam, but a vileness that is in us;' the church of Rome of late says, that, 'besides the want of original righteousness with an habitual aversion from God, it is a guiltiness and a spot; but it is nothing of concupiscence, that being the effect of it only.'—But the protestants of Mr. Calvin's persuasion affirm, that 'concupiscence is the main of it, and is a sin before and after baptism;' but amongst all this infinite uncertainty, the church of England speaks moderate words, apt to be construed to the purposes of all peaceable men that desire her communion.

26. Thus every one talks of original sin, and agree that there is such a thing, but what it is, they agree not: and therefore in such infinite variety, he were of a strange imperious spirit that would confine others to his particular fancy; for my own part, now that I have shewn what the doctrine of the purest ages was, what uncertainty there is of late in the question, what great consent there is in some of the main parts of what I affirm, and that in the contrary particulars men cannot agree, I shall not be ashamed to profess what company I now keep in my opinion of the article; no

worse men than Zuinglius, Stapulensis, the great Erasmus, and the incomparable Hugo Grotius[r], who also says there are "multi in Gallia, qui eandem sententiam magnis sane argumentis tuentur," "many in France, which with great argument defend the same sentence;" that is, who explicate the article entirely as I do; and as St. Chrysostom and Theodoret did of old, in compliance with those holy fathers that went before them: with whom although I do not desire to err, yet I suppose their great names are guard sufficient against prejudices and trifling noises, and an amulet against the names of Arminian, Socinian, Pelagian, and I cannot tell what monsters of appellatives; but these are but boys' tricks, and arguments of women; I expect from all that are wiser, to examine whether this opinion does not, or whether the contrary does better, explicate the truth, with greater reason, and to better purposes of piety; let it be examined which best glorifies God, and does honour to his justice and the reputation of his goodness; which does with more advantage serve the interest of holy living, and which is more apt to patronize carelessness and sin: these are the measures of wise and good men; the other are the measures of fairs and markets; where fancy and noise do govern.

SECTION VI.

An Exposition of the Ninth Article of the Church of England concerning Original Sin; according to Scripture and Reason.

27. After all this, it is pretended and talked of, that my doctrine of original sin is against the ninth article of the church of England; and that my attempt to reconcile them was ineffective. Now although this be nothing to the truth or falsehood of my doctrine, yet it is much concerning the reputation of it. Concerning which, I cannot be so much displeased that any man should so undervalue my reason, as I am highly content that they do so very much value her authority. But then to acquit myself and my doctrine from being contrary to the article, all that I can do is to expound the article, and make it appear, that not only the words of it are capable of a fair construction, but also that it is rea-

[r] Lib. de Bapt. tract. 3. in cap 5. hom.

sonable they should be expounded so as to agree with Scripture and reason, and as may best glorify God, and that they require it. I will not pretend to believe that those doctors who first framed the article, did all of them mean as I mean; I am not sure they did or that they did not,—but this I am sure, that they framed the words with much caution and prudence, and so as might abstain from grieving the contrary minds of differingmen. And I find that in the 'Harmony of Confessions' printed in Cambridge 1586, and allowed by public authority, there is no other account given of the English confession in this article, but that "every person is born in sin, and leadeth his life in sin, and that nobody is able truly to say his heart is clean. That the most righteous person is but an unprofitable servant: that the law of God is perfect, and requireth of us perfect and full obedience: that we are able by no means to fulfil that law in this worldly life: that there is no mortal creature which can be justified by his own deserts in God's sight." Now this was taken out of the English confession inserted in the 'General Apology' written in the year 1562, in the very year the articles were framed. I therefore have reason to believe, that the excellent men of our church, bishops and priests, did with more candour and moderation opine in this question; and therefore, when by the violence and noises of some parties they were forced to declare something, they spake warily, and so as might be expounded to that doctrine, which in the 'General Apology' was their allowed sense. However, it is not unusual for churches, in matters of difficulty, to frame their articles so as to serve the ends of peace, and yet not to endanger truth, or to destroy liberty of improving truth, or a further reformation. And since there are so very many questions and opinions in this point, either all the dissenters must be allowed to reconcile the article and their opinion, or must refuse her communion; which whosoever shall enforce, is a great schismatic and an uncharitable man. This only is certain, that to tie the article and our doctrine together, is an excellent art of peace, and a certain signification of obedience; and yet is a security of truth, and that just liberty of understanding, which, because it is only God's subject, is then sufficiently submitted to men, when we consent in the same form of words.

The Article is this.

Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam, as the Pelagians do vainly talk.

28. "The following of Adam," that is, the doing as he did, is actual sin, and in no sense can it be original sin; for that is as vain as if the Pelagians had said the 'second' is the 'first;' and it is as impossible that what we do should be Adam's sin, as it is unreasonable to say that his should be really and formally our sin; imitation supposes a copy, and those are two terms of a relation, and cannot be coincident, as '*like* is not the *same*.' But then if we speak of original sin as we have our share in it, yet cannot our imitation of Adam be it, possibly it may be an effect of it, or a consequent. But therefore Adam's sin did not introduce a necessity of sinning upon us: for if it did, original sin would be a fatal curse, by which is brought to pass, not only that we do, but that we cannot choose but, follow him: and then the following of Adam would be the greatest part of original sin expressly against the article.

29. "But it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man."—

"The fault:" 'vitium naturæ;' so it is in the Latin copies, not *a sin* properly, "non talia sunt vitia, quæ jam peccata dicenda sunt[a]," but a disease of the soul, as blindness, or crookedness; that is, it is an imperfection or state of deficiency from the end whither God did design us: we cannot with this nature alone go to heaven; for it having been debauched by Adam, and disrobed of all its extraordinaries and graces whereby it was, or might have been, made fit for heaven,—it is returned to its own state, which is perfect in its kind, that is, in order to all natural purposes, but imperfect in order to supernatural, whither it was designed. The case is this. The eldest son of Crœsus, the Lydian, was born dumb, and by the fault of his nature was unfit to govern the kingdom; therefore his father, passing him by, appointed the crown to his younger brother; but he in a battle seeing his father in danger to be slain, in zeal to save his father's life, strained the ligatures of his tongue, till that broke which

[a] S. Aug.

bound him; by returning to his speech, he returned to his title. We are born thus imperfect, unfit to reign with God for ever, and can never return to a title to our inheritance, till we by the grace of God be redintegrate and made perfect like Adam: that is, freed from this state of imperfection by supernatural aids, and by the grace of God be born again.

"Corruption." This word is exegetical of the other, and though it ought not to signify the diminution of the powers of the soul,—not only because the powers of the soul are not corruptible, but because if they were, yet Adam's sin could not do it, since it is impossible that an act proper to a faculty should spoil it, of which it is rather perfective: and an act of the will can no more spoil the will, than an act of understanding can lessen the understanding:—yet this word 'corruption' may mean a spoiling or disrobing our nature of all its extraordinary investitures, that is, supernatural gifts and graces, 'a comparative corruption:' so as Moses's face, when the light was taken from it; or a diamond, which is more glorious by a reflex ray of the sun, when the light was taken off, falls into darkness, and yet loses nothing of its nature. But 'corruption' relates to the body, not to the soul, and in this article may very properly and aptly be taken in the same sense as it is used by St. Paul[a]; "The body is sown in corruption," that is, in all the effects of its mortality; and this indeed is a part of original sin, or the effect of Adam's sin,—it introduced natural corruption, or the affections of mortality, the solemnities of death; for indeed this is the greatest part of original sin; fault and corruption, mean the concupiscence and mortality.

"Of the nature of every man." This gives light to the other, and makes it clear it cannot be in us properly a sin,—for sin is an affection of persons, not of the whole nature: for a universal cannot be the subject of circumstances, and particular actions, and personal proprieties; as human nature cannot be said to be drunk, or to commit adultery; now because sin is an action or omission, and it is made up of many particularities, it cannot be subjected in human nature: for if it were otherwise, then a universal should be more particular than that which is individual, and a whole should

[a] 1 Cor. xv.

be less than a part; 'actiones sunt suppositorum,' and so for omissions; now every sin is either one or other: and therefore it is impossible that this, which is an affection of a universal, viz. of human nature, can be a sin, for a sin is a breach of some law, to which not natures, but persons, are obliged; and which natures cannot break, because not natures, but persons only, do or neglect.

30. "That naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam."—

This clause is inserted to exclude Christ from the participation of Adam's sin. But if concupiscence, which is in every man's nature, be a sin, it is certain Christ had no concupiscence or natural desires, for he had no sin. But if he had no concupiscence or natural desires, how he should be a man, or how capable of law, or how he should serve God with choice, where there could be no 'potentia ad oppositum,' I think will be very hard to be understood: Christ felt all our infirmities, yet without sin: all our infirmities are the effects of the sin of Adam, and part of that which we call original sin; therefore all these our infirmities which Christ felt, as in him they were for ever without sin, so as long as they are only natural, and unconsented to, must be in us without sin. For whatsoever is naturally in us, is naturally in him; but a man is not a man without natural desires; therefore these were in him, in him without sin; and therefore so in us, without sin, I mean, properly, really, and formally.

But there is a catachresis also in these words, or an ἔλλειψις, "naturally engendered of the offspring of Adam:" Cain, and Abel, and Seth, and all the sons of Adam, who were the first offspring, and not engendered of the offspring of Adam, were as guilty as we: but they came from Adam, but not from Adam's offspring, therefore the article is to be expounded to the sense of these words, "naturally engendered," or *are* "of the offspring of Adam."

31. "Whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness."—

That is, men are devolved to their natural condition, divested of all those gifts and graces which God gave to Adam, in order to his supernatural end, and by the help of which he stood in God's favour, and innocent, until the fatal period of his fall: this original righteousness or innocence, we have

not naturally, for our natural innocence is but negative, that is, we have not consented to sin. The righteousness he had before his fall, I suppose, was not only that, but also his doing many actions of obedience, and intercourse with God, even all which passed between God and himself till his eating the forbidden fruit: for he had this advantage over us. He was created in a full use of reason; we his descendants enter into the world in the greatest imperfection, and are born under a law, which we break before we can understand, and it is imputed to us as our understanding increases: and our desires are strongest when our understanding is weakest: and therefore by this very economy, which is natural to us, we must needs, in the condition of our nature, be very far from Adam's original righteousness, who had perfect reason before he had a law, and had understanding as soon as he had desires. This clause thus understood is most reasonable and true, but the effect of it can be nothing in prejudice of the main business, and if any thing else be meant by it, I cannot understand it to have any ground in Scripture or reason; and I am sure our church does not determine for it.

32. "And is inclined to evil."—

That every man is inclined to evil, some more, some less, but all in some instances, is very true: and it is an effect or condition of nature, but no sin properly. Because that which is unavoidable, is not a sin. 2. Because it is accidental to nature, not intrinsical and essential. 3. It is superinduced to nature, and is after it, and comes by reason of the laws which God made after he made our nature; he brought us laws to check our nature, to cross and displease, that by so doing we may prefer God before ourselves: this also with some variety; for in some laws there is more liberty than in others, and therefore less natural inclination to disobedience. 4. Because our nature is inclined to good and not to evil in some instances, that is, in those which are according to nature, and there is no greater endearment of virtue, than the law and inclination of nature in all the instances of that law. 5. Because that which is intended for the occasion of virtue and reward, is not naturally and essentially the principle of evil. 6. In the instances in which naturally we incline to evil, the inclination is naturally good, because it is to its proper object, but that it becomes morally evil, must be per-

sonal, for the law is before our persons; it cannot be natural, because the law by which that desire can become evil, is after it.

33. "So that the flesh lusteth against the spirit."—

This clause declares what kind of inclination to evil is esteemed criminal; that which is approved, that which passeth to act, that which is personally delighted in, in the contention which is after regeneration or reception of the Holy Spirit; for the flesh cannot lust against the spirit in them that have not the Spirit; unless both the principles be within, there can be no contention between them, as a man cannot fight a duel alone, so that this is not the sin of nature, but of persons, for though potentially it is sin, yet actually and really it is none, until it resist the Spirit of God, which is the principle put into us to restore us to as good a state at least, as that was which we were receded from in Adam. By the way, it is observable, that the article makes only concupiscence or lusting to be the effect of Adam's sin, but affirms nothing of the loss of the will's liberty, or diminution of the understanding, or the rebellion of the passions against reason, but only against the Spirit, which certainly is natural to it, and in Adam did rebel against God's commandments when it was the inlet to the sin, and therefore could not be a punishment of it.

"And therefore:"—The illative conjunction expressly declares, that the sense of the church of England is, that this corruption of our nature, in no other sense, and for no other reason, is criminal, but because it does resist the Holy Spirit: therefore it is not evil till it does so, and therefore if does not, it is not evil. For if the very inclination were a sin, then when this inclination is contested against,—at the same time, and in the same things, the man sins and does well, and he can never have a temptation but he offends God; and then how we should understand St. James's rule, that "we should count it all joy when we enter into temptation," is beyond my reach and apprehension. The natural inclination hath in it nothing moral, and therefore as it is good in nature, so it is not ill in manners; the supervening consent or dissent makes it morally good or evil.

34. "In every person born into the world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation."—

Viz. When it is so consented to, when it resists and overcomes the Spirit of grace. For we, being divested of the grace given to the first Adam, are to be renewed by the Spirit of grace, the effect of the second Adam; which grace when we resist, we do as Adam did, and reduce ourselves back into the state where Adam left us. That was his sin and not ours, but this is our sin and not his; both of them deserve God's wrath and damnation, but by one he deserved it, and by the other we deserve it. But then it is true, that this corrupted nature deserves God's wrath, but we and Adam deserve not in the same formality, but in the same material part we do. He left our nature naked, and for it he deserved God's wrath; if we divest our nature of the new grace, we return to the same state of nature, but then we deserve God's wrath; so that still the object of God's wrath is our mere nature so as left by Adam; but though he sinned in the first disrobing, and we were imperfect by it, yet we sin not till the second disrobing, and then we return to the same imperfection, and make it worse. But I consider, that although some churches in their confessions express it, yet the church of England does not: they add the word 'eternal' to 'damnation;' but our church abstains from that: therefore "God's wrath and damnation," can signify the same that 'damnation' does in St. Paul;—all the effects of God's anger. Temporal death, and the miseries of mortality, were the effects of Adam's sin, and of our being reduced to the natural and corrupted, or worsted state: or secondly, they may signify the same that 'hatred' does in St. Paul and in Malachi; "Esau have I hated," that is, 'loved him less,' or did not give him what he was born to: he lost the primogeniture, and the priesthood, and the blessing. So do we naturally fall short of heaven. This is hatred or the wrath of God, and his judgment upon the sin of Adam to condemn us to a state of imperfection, and misery, and death, and deficiency from supernatural happiness, all which I grant to be the effect of Adam's sin, and that our imperfect nature deserves this, that is, it can deserve no better.

35. "And this infection of nature."—

Viz. This imperfection,—not any inherent quality that by contact pollutes the relatives and the descendants, but this abuse and reproach of our nature, this stain of our nature,

by taking off the supernatural grace and beauties put into it, like the cutting off the beards of David's ambassadors, or stripping a man of his robe, and turning him abroad in his natural shame, leaving him naked as Adam and we were. But the word 'infection,' being metaphorical, may aptly signify any thing that is analogical to it: and may mean a natural habitude or inclination to forbidden instances: but yet it signifies a very great evil, for in the best authors, to be such 'by nature,' means an aggravation of it. So Carion in Aristophanes[u]: Ἄνθρωπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἄθλιος φύσει. 'This man is very miserable, or 'miserable by nature:' and again;

Πάντως γὰρ ἄνθρωπον φύσει τοιοῦτον ἐς τὰ πάντα
Ἡγεῖσθέ μ' εἶναι, κοὐδὲν ἂν νομίζεθ' ὑγιὲς εἰπεῖν;

"Do you believe me to be such a man *by nature*, that I can speak nothing well[x]?"

36. "Doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated."—

That is, all the baptized and unbaptized receive from Adam nothing but what is inclined to forbidden instances, which is a principle, against which, and above which, the Spirit of God does operate. For this is it which is called 'the lust of the flesh;' for so it follows, "whereby the lust of the flesh;" that is, the desires and pronenesses to natural objects, which by God's will came to be limited, ordered and chastised, curbed and restrained.

37. "Called in Greek, φρόνημα σαρκός."—

Here it is plain, that the church of England, though she found it necessary to declare something in the fierce contention of the time, in order to peace and unity of expression, yet she was not willing too minutely to declare and descend to the particulars on either side, and therefore she was pleased to make use of the Greek word, of the sense of which there were so many disputes, and recites the most usual redditions of the word.

38. "Which some do expound, the wisdom, some the sensuality, some the affection, some the desire, of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God."—

These several expositions reciting several things, and the church of England reciting all indefinitely, but definitely declaring for none of them, does only in the generality affirm, that the flesh and spirit are contrary principles, that the

[u] Plut. 118. Brunck. [x] Id. Plut. 273.

flesh resists the law of God, but the spirit obeys it,—that is, by the flesh alone we cannot obey God's law, naturally we cannot become the sons of God, and heirs of heaven, but it must be a new birth, by a spiritual regeneration. The 'wisdom of the flesh,' that is, natural and secular principles, are not apt dispositions to make us obedient to the Law of God: 'sensuality,' that signifies, 'an habitual lustfulness.' 'Desires' signify 'actual lustings.' 'Affections' signify the 'natural inclination:' now which of these is here meant, the church hath not declared, but by the other words of the article, it is most probable, she rather inclines to render φρόνημα σαρκός, by 'desires and sensuality,' rather than by 'affection or wisdom,' though of these also, in their own sense, it is true to affirm, that they are not subject to the law of God: there being some foolish principles, which the flesh and the world are apt to entertain, which are hinderances to holiness: and the affection, that is, inclination to some certain objects, being that very thing which the laws of God have restrained more or less in several periods of the world, may, without inconvenience to the question, be admitted to expound φρόνημα σαρκός.

39. "And although there is no condemnation to them that believe and are baptized."—

That is, this concupiscence, or inclination to forbidden instances, is not imputed to the baptized nor to the regenerate, that is, when the new principle of grace and of the Spirit is put into us, we are reduced to as great a condition, and as certain an order, and a capacity of entering into heaven, as Adam was before his fall; for then we are drawn from that mere natural state where Adam left us: and therefore, although these do die, yet it is but the condition of nature, not the punishment of the sin. For Adam's sin brought in death, and baptism and regeneration do not hinder that, but it takes away the formality of it, it is not a punishment to such, but a condition of nature, as it is to infants; for, that even to them also there is no condemnation for their original concupiscence, is undeniable and demonstratively certain upon this account. Because, even the actual desires and little concupiscences of children are innocent, and therefore, much more their natural tendencies and inclinations. For if a principle be criminal, if a faculty be a sin, much

more are the acts of that faculty also a sin, but if these be innocent, then much more is that.

40. "Yet the Apostle does confess, that concupiscence or lust hath of itself the nature of sin."—

"Of itself:" That is, it is in the whole kind to be reproved, it is not a sin to all persons, not to unconsenting persons: for if it be no sin to them that resist, then, neither is it a sin to them that cannot consent. But it hath the 'nature of sin,' that is, it is the material part of sin, a principle and root from whence evil may spring, according to St. Austin's words: "Modo quodam loquendi vocatur peccatum quod peccato factum est, et peccati, si vicerit, facit reum [y]." Just as if a man have a natural thirst, it may tempt him, and is apt to incline him to drunkenness; if he be of a sanguine disposition, it disposes him to lust; if choleric, to anger; and is so much a sin as the fuel is a part of the fire; but because this can be there, where damnation shall not enter, this nature of sin is such as does not make a proper guiltiness; for it is a contradiction to say, the sin remains and the guilt is taken away: for he that hath a sin, is guilty of punishment, that is, he is liable to it, if God pleases: he may pardon if he pleases; but if he pardons he takes away the sin: for in the justified, no sin can be inherent or habitual; "Quomodo justificati, et sanctificati sumus, si peccatum aliquod in nobis relinquitur [z]?" If concupiscence be an inherent sin in us before baptism, it must either be taken away by baptism, or imputed to us after baptism: for if the malice remains, the guilt cannot go away; for God will by no means justify the remaining sinner.

41. These things I have chose to say and publish, because I find that the usual doctrines about original sin, are not only false, and presumed without any competent proof, but because, as they are commonly believed, they are no friends to piety, but pretences of idleness, and dishonourable to the reputation of God's goodness and justice, for which we ought to be very zealous, when a greater indifference would better become us in the matter of our opinion, or the doctrine of our sect; and therefore it is not to be blamed in me, that I move the thoughts of men in the proposition; for it is not a useless one, but hath its immediate

[y] Lib. 1. de Nup. et Concup. c. 23. [z] Hieron. ad Oceanum.

effects upon the honour of God, and the next, upon the lives of men. And therefore this hath in it many degrees of necessary doctrine, and the fruits of it must needs do more than make recompense for the trouble I put them to, in making new inquiries into that doctrine, concerning which they were so long at ease.

But if men of a contrary judgment can secure the interests and advantages of piety, and can reconcile their usual doctrines of original sin with God's justice and goodness and truth, I shall be well pleased with it, and think better of their doctrine than now I can: but until that be done, they may please to consider that there is in Holy Scripture no sign of it, nor intimation, that at the day of judgment Christ shall say to any, Go, ye cursed sons of Adam, into everlasting fire, because your father sinned; and though I will pardon millions of sins which men did choose and delight in, yet I will severely exact this of you, which you never did choose, nor could delight in: this, I say, is not likely to be in the event of things, and in the wise and merciful dispensation of God, especially since Jesus Christ himself, so far as appears, never spake one word of it, there is not any tittle of it in all the four Gospels; it is a thing of which no warning was or could be given to any of Adam's children, it is not mentioned in the Old Testament (for that place of David in the fifty-first Psalm, Clemens Alexandrinus and others of the fathers snatch from any pretence to it); and that one time where it is spoken of in the New Testament, there is nothing said of it, but that it is imputed to us to this purpose only, that it brought in death temporal: and why such tragedies should be made of it, and other places of Scripture drawn by violence to give countenance to it, and all the systems of divinity of late made to lean upon this article, which yet was never thought to be fundamental, or belonging to the foundation, was never put into the creed of any church, but is made the great support of new and strange propositions, even of the fearful decree of absolute reprobation, and yet was never consented in, or agreed upon what it was, or how it can be conveyed, and was (in the late and modern sense of it) as unknown to the primitive church, as it was to the doctors of the Jews, that is, wholly unknown to them both; why, I say, men should be so fierce in their new sense of

this article, and so impatient of contradiction, it is not easy to give a reasonable account.

For my own particular, I hope I have done my duty, having produced scriptures, and reasons, and the best authority, against it. "Qui potest capere, capiat."

For—"I had a good spirit; yea, rather being good, I came into a body undefiled." Wisd. viii. 19. 20.

CHAP. VIII.

OF SINS OF INFIRMITY.

SECTION I.

1. All mankind hath for ever complained of their irremediable calamity, their 'propensity to sin.' For though by the dictates of nature all people were instructed in the general notices of virtue and vice, right reason being our rule: insomuch that the old philosophers, as Plutarch reports, said that virtue was nothing else but τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσίς τις καὶ δύναμις γεγενημένη ὑπὸ λόγου, 'a disposition and force of reason.' And this reason having guided the wisest, was formed into laws for others; yet this reason served to little other purposes, but to upbraid our follies and infelicities, and to make our actions punishable, by representing them to be unreasonable: for they did certainly sin, and they could no more help it, than they could prevent their being sick, or hungry, or angry, or thirsty. Nature had made organs for some, and senses for others, and conversation and example brought in all. So that if you reproved a criminal, he heard and understood you, but could not help it: as Laius in the tragedy;

> Δέληθεν οὐδὲν τῶνδέ μ', ὧν σὺ νουθετεῖς.
> Γνώμην δ' ἔχοντά μ' ἡ φύσις βιάζεται [b].

'Reason taught him well, but nature constrained him to the contrary; his affections were stronger than his reason.'

2. And it is no wonder that while flesh and blood are the

[a] Περὶ ἠθικῆς ἀρετ. [b] Eurip. Chrys. Priestley's edition, vol. vii. p. 592.

prevailing ingredient, while men are in the state of conjunction, and the soul serves the body, and the necessities of this are more felt than the discourses of that,—that men should be angry and lustful, proud and revengeful, and that they should follow what they lust after, not what they are bidden to do. For passions and affections are our first governors, and they being clearly possessed of all mankind in their first years, have almost secured to themselves the soul of man, before reason is heard to speak: and when she does speak, she speaks at first so little and so low, that the common noises of fancy and company drown her voice. This, I say, is 'the state of nature.' And therefore Lactantius brings in a pagan complaining, "Volo equidem non peccare, sed vincor. Indutus enim sum carne fragili, et imbecillâ. Hæc est quæ concupiscit, quæ irascitur, quæ dolet, quæ mori timet. Itaque ducor incertus, et pecco non quia volo, sed quia cogor. Sentio me et ipse peccare; sed necessitas fragilitatis impellit, cui repugnare non possum:" "I would fain avoid sin, but I am compelled. I am invested with a frail and weak flesh: This is it which lusteth, which is angry, which grieves, which fears to die. Therefore I am led uncertainly, and I sin, not because I will, but because I am constrained. I perceive that I do ill, but the necessity of my weakness drives me on, and I cannot resist it[c]."

Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά·
Θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων[d].

"I know well and perceive the evils that I go upon, and they are horrid ones, but my anger is greater than my reason." So Medea in the tragedy. This is the state of a natural man in his mere naturals, especially as they are made worse by evil customs, and vile usages of the world.

3. Now this is a state of infirmity; and all sins against which there is any reluctancy and contrary desires of actual reason, are sins of infirmity. But this infirmity excuses no man: for this state of infirmity is also a state of death; for by this St. Paul[e] expressed that state from which Christ came to redeem us: ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν, "when we were yet" in infirmity, or "without strength, in due time Christ died for us;" that is, when we were ἀσεβεῖς, impious, or

[c] Lib. iv. Instit. c 24. [d] Euripid. Med. Porson. 1074. [e] Rom. v. 6.

"sinners," such as the world was before it was redeemed, before Christ came. These are the sick and weak, whom Christ, the great physician of our souls, came to save. This infirmity is the shadow of death; and it signifies that state of mankind which is the state of nature, not of original and birth, but in its whole constitution, as it signifies not only the natural imperfection, but the superinduced evil from any principle; all that which is opposed to grace.

4. To this state of nature being so pitiable, God began to find a remedy, and renewed the measures of virtue, and by a law made them more distinct and legible, and imposed punishments on the transgressors. For by little and little, the notices of natural reason were made obscure, some were lost, some not attended to, all neglected some way or other; till God by a law made express prohibition of what was unreasonable, forbidding us to desire what before was unfit and unnatural, and threatening them that did things unlawful. But this way, by reason of the peevishness of men, succeeded not well, but men became worse by it. For what the law did forbid without the threatening of any penalty, they took for an advice only, and no severe injunction: and those commandments which were established with a threatening to the transgressors, they expounded only by the letter, and in the particular instance, and in the outward act.

5. Before the law, men allowed to themselves many impieties, which reason indeed marked out to be such, but no law had forbidden them in express letter. They thought it lawful to seduce and tempt another man's wife, and invite her to his house and conjugation, so he did not steal, or force her away: but if they found a coldness between her and her husband, they would blow the coals, and enkindle an evil flame. It is supposed that Herod did so to Herodias, his brother Philip's wife, even after the law. They would not by violence snatch the estate from a young prodigal heir, but if he were apt, they would lend him money, and nurse his vice, and entangle his estate, and at last devour it. They would not directly deny to pay the price of a purchase; but they would detain it, or divert it, or pay it in trifling sums, or in undesired commodities. This was 'concupiscere rem alienam.' They did not steal, but coveted it, and so entered indirectly: and this God seeing, forbade it by a law: "For

I had not known lust or desires to be a sin," saith St. Paul[f], "but that the law said, Thou shalt not covet."

6. But because the law only forbade lustings, but imposed no penalty, they despised it; and those things which were forbidden with an appendant penalty, they would act them privately. For if they avoided the notice of the criminal judge, they feared not the face of an angry God: and this Lactantius observed of them. "Metus legum non scelera comprimebat, sed licentiam submovebat. Poterant enim leges delicta punire, conscientiam munire non poterant. Itaque quæ antè palam fiebant, clam fieri cœperunt: circumscribi etiam jura:" "For all the threatenings of the law they were wicked still, though not scandalous; vile in private, and wary in public; they did circumscribe their laws," and thought themselves bound only to the letter, and obliged by nothing but the penalty, which if they escaped, they reckoned themselves innocent. Thus far the law instructed them, and made them afraid. But for the first, they grew the more greedy to do what now they were forbidden to desire. The prohibition of the law being like a dam to the waters, the desire swells the higher for being checked; and the wisdom of Romulus in not casting up a bank against parricide, had this effect, that until the end of the second Punic war, which was almost six hundred years, there was no example of one that killed his father. Lucius Ostius was the first. And it is certain that the Easterlings neither were, nor had they reason to be, fond of circumcision; it was part of that load which was complained of by the apostles in behalf of the Jewish nation, which neither they nor their fathers could bear; and yet as soon as Christ took off the yoke, and that it was forbidden to his disciples, the Jews were as fond of it, as of their pleasures; and fifteen bishops of Jerusalem in immediate succession, were all circumcised, and no arguments, no authority, could hinder them. And for their fear, it only produced caution, and sneaking from the face of men, and both together set them on work to corrupt the spirit of the law by expositions too much according to the letter: so that by this means, their natural desires, their lustings and concupiscence, were not cured.

7. For as Lactantius brought in the heathen complaining,

[f] Rom. vii. 7.

so does St. Paul bring in the Jew: "That which I do I allow not; for what I would, that I do not, but what I hate, that I do[g]." I say, this is the state of a man under the law; a man who is not regenerate and made free by the Spirit of Christ; that is, a man who abides in the infirmities of nature: of which the law of nature warned him first, and the superinduced law of God warned him more; but there was not in these covenants or laws sufficient either to endear or to secure obedience; they did not minister strength enough to conquer sin, to overthrow its power, to destroy the kingdom and reign of sin: this was reserved for the great day of triumph; it was the glory of the Gospel, the power of Christ, the strength of the Spirit, which alone was able to do it; and by this with its appendages, that is, the pardon of sin and a victory over it, a conquest by the prevailing and rule of the Spirit, by this alone the Gospel is the most excellent above all the covenants, and states, and institutions, of the world.

8. But then the Christian must not complain thus; if he be advanced into the secrets of the kingdom, if he be a Christian in any thing beyond the name; he cannot say that sin gives him laws, that it reigns in his mortal body, that he is led captive by Satan at his will, that he sins against his will frequently, and habitually, and cannot help it. But so it is, men do thus complain; and, which is worse, they make this to be their excuse, and their encouragement. If they have sinned foully, they say, It is true; but "It is not I, but sin that dwelleth in me. For that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that I do not; and what I hate, that do I[h]."—And if they be tempted to a sin, they cannot be dissuaded from it, or encouraged to a noble and pertinacious resistance, because they have this in excuse ready; "To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find not. For the good which I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do[i]." That is, 'it is my infirmity, give me leave to do it, I am the child of God for all my sin; for I do it with an unwilling willingness. I shall do this always, and shall never be quit of this tyranny of sin: it was thus with St. Paul himself, and I ought not to hope to be otherwise than he, and a person more free from sin.'—We find in the life of Andronicus,

[g] Rom. vii. 15. 19. [h] Ver. 15. [i] Ver. 18.

written by Nicetas Choniates, the same pretence made in excuse for sin; 'they could not help it:' and we find it so in our daily experience; and the thing itself warranted by many interpreters of Scripture, who suppose that St. Paul, in the seventh chapter to the Romans, from the fourteenth verse to the end, describes his own state of infirmity and disability, or, which is all one, the state of a regenerate man, that it is no other but an ineffective striving and struggling against sin, a contention, in which he is most commonly worsted; and that this striving is all that he can shew of holiness to be a testimony of his regeneration.

SECTION II.

9. How necessary it is to free the words of St. Paul from so dangerous a sense, we may easily believe, if we consider, that to suppose a man who is regenerate by the Spirit of Christ, to be still a slave under sin, and within its power, and that he fain would but cannot help it, is very injurious to the power of Christ and the mightiness of the Spirit of grace: when all its effect is only said to be, that it strives, but can do nothing; that is, sin abounds more than grace, and the man that is redeemed by Christ, is still unredeemed, and a captive under sin and Satan; this is not only an encouragement of evil life, but a reproach and scorn cast upon the Holy Spirit; it is "verbum dictum contra Spiritum Sanctum," "a word spoken against the Holy Ghost[k]:"—and as St Austin calls it, it is "tuba hostis, non nostra, unde ille incitetur, non unde vincatur;" "the devil's trumpet, to encourage him in his war against poor mankind; but by this means he shall never be overcome[l]." And therefore he gives us caution of it; for speaking of these words, 'The good which I would, that do I not; but the evil that I would not, that I do,'—he advises thus, "Lectio divina, quæ de apostoli Pauli epistolâ recitata est, quotiescunque legitur, timendum est, ne malè intellecta det hominibus quærentibus occasionem:" "Whenever these words of St. Paul are read, we must fear lest the

[k] Serm. 43. et 45. de Tempore.

misunderstanding of them should minister an occasion of sin to them that seek it. For men are prone to sin, and scarce restrain themselves. When therefore they hear the Apostle saying, I do not the good which I would, but I do the evil which I hate, they do evil, and as it were displeasing themselves because they do it, think themselves like the Apostle."—In pursuance of this caution, I shall examine the expositions which are pretended.

10. I. These words, 'I do not the good which I would, but I do the evil which I hate [m],' are not the words or character of a regenerate person in respect of actual good or bad. A regenerate man cannot say, that he does frequently or habitually commit the sin that he hates, and is against his conscience. 1. Because 'no man can serve two masters;' if he be a servant of sin, he is not a servant of the Spirit. 'No man can serve Christ and Belial.' If therefore he be brought into captivity to the law of sin, he is the servant of sin; and such was he whom St. Paul describes in this chapter [n]. Therefore this person is not a servant of Christ; he that is a servant of righteousness, is freed from sin; and he who "is a servant of sin, is not a servant of, but freed from, righteousness [o]." A regenerate person therefore, is a servant of the Spirit, and so cannot at the same time be a servant, or a slave and a captive under sin.

11. II. When the complaint is made, 'I do the evil which I hate,'—the meaning is, 'I do it seldom, or I do it commonly and frequently:' if it means, 'I do it seldom,' then a man cannot use these words so well as the contrary; he can say, 'The good which I would, I do regularly and ordinarily,—and, the evil which I hate, I do avoid; sometimes indeed I am surprised, and when I do neglect to use the aids and strengths of the Spirit of grace, I fall; but this is because I will not, and not because I cannot help to it; and in this case the man is not a servant or captive of sin, but a servant of Christ, though weak and imperfect.'—But if it means, 'I do it commonly, or constantly, or frequently,' which is certainly the complaint here made, then to be a regenerate person is to be a vile person, sold under sin, and not God's servant. For if any man shall suppose these words to mean only thus; 'I do not do so much good as I would, and do

[m] Rom. vii. 15. [n] Ver. 23. [o] Rom. vi. 20.

sometimes fall into evil, though I would fain be entirely innocent,' indeed this man teaches no false doctrine as to the state or duty of the regenerate, which in this life will for ever be imperfect; but he speaks not according to the sense and design of the Apostle here. For his purpose is to describe that state of evil in which we are by nature, and from which we could not be recovered by the law, and from which we can only be redeemed by the grace of Jesus Christ; and this is a state of death, of being killed by sin, of being captivated and sold under sin, after the manner of slaves; as will further appear in the sequel.

12. III. Every regenerate man, and the servant of Christ, "hath the Spirit of Christ[p]." But "where the Spirit of God is, there is liberty[q];" therefore no slavery; therefore sin reigns not there. Both the propositions are the words of the Apostle; the conclusion therefore infers, that the man whom St. Paul describes in this chapter, is not the regenerate man, for he hath not liberty, but is "in captivity to the law of sin[r]"—from which every one that is Christ's, every one that hath the Spirit of Christ, is freed.

13. IV. And this is that which St. Paul calls "being under the law," that is, a being carnal, and in the state of the flesh; not but that the "law itself is spiritual;" but that we, being carnal of ourselves, are not cured by the law, but by reason of "the infirmity of the flesh" made much worse; curbed, but not sweetly won; admonished, but assisted by no spirit but the "spirit of bondage and fear[s]." This state is opposed to the spiritual state. The giving of the Law is called the 'ministry of death[t];' the Gospel is called the 'ministry of the Spirit,' and that is 'the ministration of life;' and therefore if 'we be led by the Spirit, we are not under the law[u]:' but if we be under the law, we are dead, and sin is revived; and 'sin by the law brings forth fruit unto death[x].' From hence the argument of the Apostle is clear. The man whom he here describes, is such a one who is under the law; but such a man is dead by reason of sin, and therefore hath not in him the Spirit of God, for that is the ministration of life. A regenerate person is alive unto God; he lives

[p] Rom. viii. 9. [q] 2 Cor. iii. 17. [r] Rom. vii. 23.
[s] Rom. viii. 15. [t] 2 Cor. iii. 6—8.
[u] Gal. v. 18. [x] Rom. vii. 5.

the life of righteousness: but he that is under the law is killed by sin; and such is the man that is here described, as appears verse 9. and I shall in the sequel further prove; therefore this man is not the regenerate.

14. V. To which, for the likeness of the argument, I add this; that the man who can say, 'I do that which I hate,' is a man in whom sin is not mortified, and therefore he lives after the flesh: but then he is not regenerate; for if "ye live after the flesh, ye shall die (saith St. Paul), but if ye, through the Spirit, do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live [y]."

These arguments are taken from consideration of the rule and dominion of sin in the man whom St. Paul describes, who therefore cannot be a regenerate person. To the same effect and conclusion are other expressions in the same chapter.

15. VI. The man whom St. Paul here describes, who complains, "that he does not the good which he would, but the evil that he would not,"—is such a one in whom 'sin does inhabit: It is no more I, but sin that dwelleth in me [z].' But in the regenerate sin does not inhabit: "My Father and I will come unto him, and make our abode with him [a]." So Christ promised to his servants; to them who should be regenerate; and 'the Spirit of God dwelleth in them;' 'the Spirit of him that raised Jesus from the dead [b];' and therefore the regenerate are called the "habitation of God through the Spirit [c]." Now if God the Father, if Christ, if the Spirit of Christ dwells in a man, there sin does not dwell. The strong man that is armed, keeps possession; but if a stronger than he comes, he dispossesses him. If the Spirit of God does not drive the devil forth, himself will leave the place. They cannot both dwell together. Sin may be in the regenerate and grieve God's Spirit, but it shall not abide or dwell there, for that extinguishes him. One or the other must depart. And this also is noted by St. Paul in this very place; "sin dwelleth in me," and, "no good thing dwelleth in me [d]." If one does, the other does not; but yet as in the unregenerate there might be some good, such as are, good desires,

[y] Rom. viii. 13. [z] Rom. vii. 20. [a] John, xiv. 23. [b] Rom. viii. 11.
[c] 1 Cor. iii. 16. Eph. iii. 17. ii. 22. 2 Tim. i. 14. [d] Rom. vii. 18.

knowledge of good and evil, single actions of virtue, beginnings and dispositions to grace, acknowledging of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, some lightnings and flashes of the Holy Ghost, a knowing of the way of righteousness; but sanctifying, saving good does not dwell, that is, does not abide, with them, and rule; so in the regenerate there is sin, but because it does not dwell there, they are under the empire of the Spirit, and in Christ's kingdom; or, as St. Paul expresses it, "Christ liveth in them[e]:" and that cannot be, unless "sin be crucified and dead in them." The sum of which is thus in St. Paul's words: "Reckon yourselves indeed to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof. For sin shall not have dominion over you, because we are not under the law, but under grace[f]."

16. VII. Lastly: the man whom St. Paul describes is 'carnal[g],' but the 'regenerate' is never called 'carnal' in the Scripture, but is 'spiritual,' opposed to 'carnal.' A man not only in pure naturals, but even placed under the law, is called 'carnal;' that is, until he be redeemed by the Spirit of Christ, he cannot be called 'spiritual,' but is yet in the flesh. Now that the regenerate cannot be the carnal man, is plain in the words of St. Paul: 'The carnal mind is enmity against God;' and, 'they that are in the flesh cannot please God[h].' To which he adds, 'But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you[i]. But the Spirit of God does dwell in all the servants of God, in all the regenerate. "For if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." Now as these are in Scripture distinguished in their appellatives and in their character, so also in their operations. "They that are carnal, κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες, according to the flesh, do mind, or relish, the things of the flesh: they that are after the Spirit, do mind the things of the Spirit[k]."—And, "they that are Christ's, have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts[l]." Now they that have crucified the flesh, cannot, in any sense of Scripture or religion, be called 'carnal.' That there is something of carnality in the regenerate, is too true, because our regeneration

[e] Gal. ii. 20. [f] Rom. vi. 11, 12. 14. [g] Rom. vii. 14.
[h] Rom. viii. 7, 8. [i] Ver. 9. [k] Ver. 5. [l] Gal. v. 24.

and spirituality in this life are imperfect. But when carnal and spiritual are opposed in Scripture; and the question is, whether of these two is to be attributed to the servants and sons of God, to the regenerate? It is certain, by the analogy of the thing, and the perpetual manner of speaking in Scripture, that by this word 'carnal,' the Spirit of God never means 'the sons of God,' or the 'spiritual;' that is, the 'regenerate:'—"The sons of God are led by the Spirit of God [m];" therefore not by the flesh, which they have crucified. Whatsoever is essential to regeneration, to new birth, to the being the sons of God, all that is in the regenerate; for they cannot be that thing, of which they want an essential part: as a thing cannot be a body unless it be divisible, nor a living creature if it have not life. Therefore regeneration is perfect in respect of its essentials or necessary parts of constitution. But in the degrees there is imperfection, and therefore the abatement is made by the intermixture of carnality. For it is in our new and spiritual birth, as in our natural. The child is a man in all essential parts, but he is as a beast in some of his operations; he hath all the faculties of a man, but not the strengths of a man, but grows to it by the progression and increase of every day. So is the spiritual man regenerate in his mind, his will, his affections; and therefore when carnal and spiritual are opposed in their whole nature and definitions, the spiritual man is not the carnal, though he still retain some of the weaknesses of the flesh, against which he contends every day. To this purpose are those words of St. Leo: "Quamvis spe salvi facti sumus, et corruptionem adhuc carnemque mortalem gestamus; rectè tamen dicimur in carne non esse, si carnales nobis non dominentur affectus; et meritò ejus deponimus nuncupationem, cujus non sequimur voluntatem:" "We are not to be called carnal, though we bear about us flesh and its infirmities; yet if carnal affections do not rule over us, well are we to quit the name, when we do not obey the thing [n]." Now if any man shall contend that a man may be called carnal, if the flesh strives against the Spirit, 'though sin does not rule;' I shall not draw the saw of contention with him, but only say that it is not usually so in Scripture; and in this place, of which we now dispute the sense and use, it is not so: for by 'carnal' St. Paul means

[m] Rom. viii. 14. [n] De Resur. Dom.

such a person, upon whom 'sin reigns.'—"I am carnal, sold under sin[o]," therefore this person is not the spiritual, not the regenerate or the son of God. St. Paul[p] uses not the word 'carnal' in a comparative locution, for babes and infants, or unskilful persons in the religion; but then this carnality he proves to be in them, wholly by their inordinate walking, by their strifes and contentions, by their being schismatics; and therefore he reproves them, which he had no reason to do, if himself also had been carnal in that sense which he reproves.

17. The conclusion from all these premises is, I suppose, sufficiently demonstrated; that St. Paul does not, in the seventh chapter to the Romans, describe the state of himself really, or of a regenerate person, neither is this state 'of doing sin frequently, though against our will,' a state of unavoidable infirmity, but a state of death and unregeneration.

SECTION III.

18. St. Austin did for ever reject that interpretation, and indeed so did the whole primitive church; but yet, he having once expounded this chapter of the unregenerate[q], or a man under the law, not redeemed by the Spirit of Christ from his vain conversation, he retracted this exposition, and construed those words in question thus: "Non ergo quod vult agit Apostolus, quia vult non concupiscere; et tamen concupiscit, ideo non quod vult agit:" "The Apostle does not do what he would, because he would fain not desire; but yet because he desires, he does what he would not. Did that desire lead him captive to fornication? God forbid: he did strive, but was not mastered; but because he would not have had that concupiscence left, against which he should contend, therefore he said, What I would not, that I do; meaning, I would not lust, but I do lust[r]."—The same also I find in Epiphanius[s]; "Nam quod dictum est, 'Quod operor non cognosco, et facio quod odio habeo,' non de eo quod operati sumus ac perfecimus malum, accipiendum est, sed de eo quod

[o] Rom. vii. 14. [p] 1 Cor. iii. 1—3. [q] Rom. vii. 15. 19.
[r] Serm. 43. 45. de Temp. [s] Hæres. 64. contra Origen.

solum cogitavimus." Now this interpretation hath in it no impiety as the other hath; for these doctors allow nothing to be unavoidable, or a sin of infirmity, and consistent with the state of grace and regeneration, but the mere ineffective, unprocured, desirings or lustings after evil things, to which no consent is given, and in which no delight is taken; "Extraneæ cogitationes quas cogitavimus aliquando, et non volentes et non scientes ex quâ causâ," as Epiphanius expresses this article[t]. But St. Austin may be thought to have had some design in choosing this sense, as supposing it would serve for an argument against the Pelagians, and their sense of free-will. For by representing the inevitability of sin, he destroyed their doctrine of the sufficiency of our natural powers in order to heaven; and therefore, by granting that St. Paul complains thus of his own infirmity, he believed himself to have concluded firmly for the absolute necessity of God's grace to help us. But by limiting this inevitability of sinning to the matter of desires or concupiscence, he gave no allowance or pretence to any man to speak any evil words, or to delight or consent to any evil thoughts, or to commit any sinful actions, upon the pretence of their being sins of an unavoidable infirmity. So that though he was desirous to serve the ends of his present question, yet he was careful that he did not disserve the interests of religion and a holy life. But besides that the Holy Scriptures abound in nothing more than in affirming our needs, and the excellency of the divine grace, and St. Austin needed not to have been put to his shifts in this question, it is considerable that his first exposition had done his business better. For if these words of St. Paul be, as indeed they are, to be expounded of an unregenerate man, one under the law, but not under grace; nothing could more have magnified God's grace, than that an unregenerate person could not, by all the force of nature, nor the aids of the law, nor the spirit of fear, nor temporal hopes, be redeemed from the slavery and tyranny of sin; and that from this state there is no redemption but by the Spirit of God, and the grace of the Lord Jesus; which is expressly affirmed and proved by St. Paul, if you admit this sense of the words. And therefore Irenæus[u], who did so, cites these words to the same

[t] Hæres. 64. contra Origen. [u] Lib. 3. c. 22.

effect, viz. for the magnifying the grace of God. "Ipse Dominus erat qui salvabat eos, quia per semetipsos non habebant salvari. Et propter hoc Paulus infirmitatem hominis annuncians, ait, 'Scio enim quoniam non habitat in carne meâ bonum:' significans quoniam non à nobis sed à Deo est bonum salutis."—Et iterum: "'Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus?' Deinde infert liberatorem: 'gratia Jesu Christi Domini nostri:'" "St. Paul's complaint shews our own infirmity, and that of ourselves we cannot be saved; but that our salvation is of God, and the grace of our Redeemer Jesus Christ."—But whatever St. Austin's design might be in making the worse choice, it matters not much: only to the interpretation itself I have these considerations to oppose.

19. I. Because the phrase is insolent, and the exposition violent to render πράσσειν by 'concupiscere [x];' *to do* is more than *to desire*: 'factum, dictum, concupitum,' are the several kinds and degrees of sinning assigned by St. Austin himself, and therefore they cannot be confounded, and one made to expound the other. Ποιεῖν is also used here by the Apostle, which in Scripture signifies sometimes to sin habitually, never less than actually; and the other word is κατεργάζεσθαι, which signifies 'perficere, patrare,' 'to finish the act at least, or to do a sin thoroughly,' and can in no sense be reasonably expounded by natural, ineffective, and unavoidable desires. And it is observable that when St. Austin, in prosecution of this device, is to expound those words, 'To will is present with me,' τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν, 'but to perform what is good, I find not [y],' he makes the word to signify, to do it perfectly; which is as much beyond, as the other sense of the same word is short, 'What I do,' ὃ κατεργάζομαι, 'I approve not:'—therefore the man does not do his sin perfectly; he does the thing imperfectly, for he does it against his conscience, and with an imperfect choice; but he does the thing however. So κατεργάζεσθαι καλὸν, must signify 'to do the good imperfectly,' the action itself only; for such was this man's impotency, that he could not obtain power to do even imperfectly the good he desired. The evil he did, though against his mind; but the good he could not, because it was against the law of sin which reign-

[x] Rom. vii. 15. Πράσσειν, ποιεῖν, κατεργάζεσθαι. [y] Rom. vii. 18.

ed in him. But then the same word must not, to serve ends, be brought to signify a perfect work, and yet not to signify so much as a perfect desire.

20. II. The sin which St. Paul, under another person, complains of, is such a sin as did 'first deceive him, and then slew him[a];" but concupiscence does not kill till it proceeds further,—as St. James expressly affirms, "that concupiscence, when it hath conceived, brings forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, brings forth death[a]:" which is the just parallel to what St. Paul says in this very chapter: "The passions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death[b]: 'peccatum perpetratum,' when the desires are acted, then sin is deadly; the παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, 'the passions or first motions of sin' which come upon us, 'nobis non volentibus nec scientibus,' 'whether we will or no,'—these are not imputed to us unto death, but are the matter of virtue when they are resisted and contradicted; but when they are consented to and delighted in, then it is ἁμαρτία συλλαβοῦσα, 'sin in conception' with death, and will proceed to action, unless it be hindered from without; and therefore it is then the same sin by interpretation: 'adulterium cordis;' so our blessed Saviour called it in that instance, 'the adultery of the heart:' but till it be an actual sin some way or other, it does not bring forth death.

21. III. It is an improper and ungrammatical manner of speaking, to say, 'Nolo concupiscere,' or 'Volo non concupiscere,' 'I will lust, or I will not lust,' i. e. I will, or I will not, desire or will. For, this lust or first motions of desire are before an act of will; the first act of which is, when these παθήματα, these motions and 'passions' are consented to or rejected. These motions are natural and involuntary, and are no way in our power, but when they are occasioned by an act of the will collaterally and indirectly, or by applying the proper incentives to the faculty. 'Vellem non concupiscere;' every good man must say, 'I would fain be free from concupiscence;' but because he cannot, it is not subject to his will, and he cannot say, 'Volo,' 'I will be free:' and therefore St. Paul's 'Volo' and 'Nolo' are not intended of 'concupiscence' or desires.

22. IV. The good which St. Austin says the Apostle fain

[a] Rom. vii. 11. [a] James, i. 15. [b] Rom. vii. 5. [c] Παθήματα.

would, but could not perfect, or do it perfectly, is, 'non concupiscere,' 'not to have concupiscence.'—'Volo, non perficio;' but 'concupiscere' is but 'velle:' it is not so much, and therefore cannot be more. So that when he says, 'To will is present with me[c],' he must mean, 'To desire well is present with me, but to do this I find not;' that is, if St. Austin's interpretation be true, "Though I do desire well, yet I do lust, and do not desire well, for still 'concupisco;' 'I lust,' and I lust not,—I have concupiscence, and I have it not:"—which is a contradiction.

23. Many more things might be observed from the words of the Apostle to overthrow this exposition; but the truth when it is proved, will sufficiently reprove what is not true: and therefore I shall apply myself to consider the proper intention and design of the Apostle in those so-much-mistaken periods.

SECTION IV.

24. Concerning which, these things are to be cleared, upon which the whole issue will depend. 1. That St. Paul speaks not in his own person, as an apostle, or a Christian, a man who is regenerate; but in the person of a Jew, one under the law, one that is not regenerate. 2. That this state which he describes, is the state of a carnal man, under the corruption of his nature, upon whom the law had done some change, but had not cured him. 3. That from this state of evil we are redeemed by the Spirit of Christ, by the grace of the Gospel; and now, a child of God cannot complain this complaint.

25. I. That he puts on the person of another, by a μετασχηματισμὸς, or 'translation' (as was usual with St. Paul in[d] very many places of his Epistles), is evident by his affirming that of the man whom he here describes, which of himself were not true. "I was alive without the law once[e]."—Of St. Paul's own person this was not true; for he was bred and born under the law, "circumcised the eighth day, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, as touching the law a Pharisee:" he never was alive without the law. But the Israelites were,

[c] Rom. vii. 18. [d] 1 Cor. x. 29, 30. iv. 6. vi. 12. xiii. 2. Gal. ii. 18.
[e] Rom. vii. 9.

whom he therefore represents indefinitely under a single person; the whole nation, before and under the law: "I was alive once without the law; but when the commandment came," that is, when the law was given, "sin revived, and I died;" that is, by occasion of the law, sin grew stronger and prevailed. 2. But concerning the Christian and his present condition, he expressly makes it separate from that of being under the law, and consequently under sin. "But now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held, that we should serve in newness of the spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter."—*We are delivered:* it is plain that some sort of men are freed from that sad condition of things of which he there complains; and if any be, it must be the regenerate. And so it is. For the scope of the Apostle in this chapter is to represent and prove, that salvation is not to be had by the law, but by Jesus Christ; and that by that discipline men cannot be contained in their duty, and therefore that it was necessary to forsake the law, and to come to Christ. To this purpose he brings in a person complaining, that under the discipline of the law, he was still under the power of sin. Now if this had been also true of a regenerate person, of a Christian renewed by the Spirit of grace, then it had been no advantage to have gone from the law to Christ, as to this argument; for still the Christian would be under the same slavery, which to be the condition of one under the law, St. Paul was to urge as an argument to call them from Moses to Christ.

26. II. That this state which he now describes, is the state of a carnal man, under the corruption of his nature, appears, by his saying 'that sin had wrought in him all manner of concupiscence[f]; that 'sin revived, and he died[g];' that 'the motions of sin which were by the law, did work in the members to bring forth fruit unto death[h];' and that this was 'when we were in the flesh;' that he is 'carnal, sold under sin[i];' that he is 'carried into captivity to the law of sin;' that 'sin dwells in him[k];' and is like another person, doing or constraining him to do things against his mind; that it is a state, and a government, a law, and a tyranny; 'for that which I do, I allow not[l]:' plainly saying, that this

[f] Rom. vii. 8. [g] Ver. 9. [h] Ver. 5.
[i] Ver. 14. [k] Ver. 20. [l] Ver. 15.

doing what we would not, that is, doing against our conscience upon the strength of passion, and in obedience to the law of sin, was the state of them who indeed were under the law, but the effect of carnality, and the viciousness of their natural and ungracious condition. Here then is the description of a natural and carnal man: 'He sins frequently, —he sins against his conscience,—he is carnal and sold under sin,—sin dwells in him,—and gives him laws,—he is a slave to sin,—and led into captivity.—Now if this could be the complaint of a regenerate man, from what did Christ come to redeem us? How did he 'take away our sins?' Did he only take off the punishment, and still leave us to wallow in the impurities, and baser pleasures, perpetually to rail upon our sins, and yet perpetually to do them? How did he come to "bless us in turning every one of us from our iniquity[m]?" How and in what sense could it be true, which the Apostle affirms; "He did bear our sins in his own body on the tree, that we, being dead unto sin, should live unto righteousness[n]? But this proposition I suppose myself to have sufficiently proved in the reproof of the first exposition of these words in question: only I shall in present add the concurrent testimony of some doctors of the primitive church.

Tertullian hath these words: "Nam etsi habitare bonum in carne suâ negavit, sed secundum legem literæ in quâ fuit, secundum autem legem Spiritus cui nos annectit, liberat ab infirmitate carnis. Lex enim (inquit) Spiritus vitæ manumisit te à lege delinquentiæ et mortis. Licet enim ex parte, ex Judaismo disputare videatur, sed in nos dirigit integritatem et plenitudinem disciplinarum, propter quos laborantes in lege per carnem miserit Deus filium suum in similitudinem carnis delinquentis, et propter delinquentiam damnaverit delinquentiam in carne:" "Plainly he expounds this chapter to be meant of a man under the law,—according to the law of the letter, under which himself had been, he denied any good to dwell in his flesh; but according to the law of the Spirit under which we are placed, he frees us from the infirmity of the flesh: for he saith, The law of the Spirit of life hath freed us from the law of sin and death[o]."

Origen affirms, "that when St. Paul says, I am carnal, sold under sin, 'tanquam doctor ecclesiæ personam in se-

[m] Acts, iii. 26. [n] 1 Pet. ii. 24. [o] Lib. de Pudicit. c. 17.

metipsum suscipit infirmorum;' 'he takes upon him the person of the infirm,' that is, of the carnal, and says those words, which themselves, by way of excuse or apology, use to speak. But yet (says he) this person which St. Paul puts on, although Christ does not dwell in him, neither is his body the temple of the Holy Ghost, yet he is not wholly a stranger from good,—but by his will, and by his purpose, he begins to look after good things. But he cannot yet obtain to do them. For there is such an infirmity in those who begin to be converted (that is, whose mind is convinced, but their affections are not mastered), that when they would presently do all good, yet an effect did not follow their desires[p]."

St. Chrysostom hath a large commentary upon this chapter, and his sense is perfectly the same: "Propterea et subnexuit dicens, 'Ego verò carnalis sum,' hominem describens sub lege, et ante legem degentem:" "St. Paul describes not himself, but a man living under and before the law, and of such a one he says, 'But I am carnal.'" Who please to see more authorities to the same purpose, may find them in St. Basil[q], Theodoret[r], St. Cyril[s], Macarius[t], St. Ambrose[u], St. Jerome[x], and Theophylact[y]; the words of the Apostle, the very purpose and design, the whole economy and analogy, of the sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters, do so plainly manifest it, that the heaping up more testimonies cannot be useful in so clear a case. The results are these:

I. The state of men, under the law, was but a state of carnality and of nature better instructed, and soundly threatened, and set forward in some instances by the spirit of fear only, but not cured, but in many men made much worse accidentally.

II. That to be pleased in the inner man, that is, in the conscience to be convinced, and to consent to the excellency of virtue,—and yet by the flesh, that is, by the passions of the lower man, or the members of the body to serve sin, is the state of unregeneration.

[p] In cap. 7. ad Rom.

[q] Lib. 1. de Baptism. et in moral. sum. 23. c. 2. et quæst. 16. quæst. expl. compend.

[r] In hunc locum, et in cap. 8. ad Rom.

[s] Contra Julian. lib. 3. et de rectâ fide ad Regin. lib. 1. et in epist. prior. ad Successum.

[t] Homil. 1.

[u] In hunc locum.

[x] In cap. 9. Dan.

[y] In hunc locum.

III. To do the evil that I would not, and to omit the good that I fain would do, when it is in my hand to do, what is in my heart to think, is the property of a carnal, unregenerate man. And this is the state of men in nature, and was the state of men under the law. For to be under the law, and not to be led by the Spirit, are all one in St. Paul's account; "For if ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law," saith he[s]: and therefore to be under the law, being a state of not being under the Spirit, must be under the government of the flesh; that is, they were not then sanctified by the Spirit of grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ, they were not yet 'redeemed from their vain conversation.' Not that this was the state of all the sons of Israel, of them that lived before the law, or after; but that the law could do no more for them, or upon them; God's Spirit did in many of them work his own works, but this was by the grace of Jesus Christ, who was 'the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world:' this was not by the works of the law, but by the same instruments and grace, by which Abraham, and all they who are his children by promise, were justified. But this is the consequent of the third proposition which I was to consider.

27. III. From this state of evil we are redeemed by Christ, and by the Spirit of his grace. "Wretched man that I am, 'quis liberabit?' 'who shall deliver' me from the body of this death?" He answers, "I thank God, through Jesus Christ;" so St. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, St. Jerome, the Greek Scholiast, and the ordinary Greek copies, do commonly read the words; in which words there is an ἔλλειψις, and they are thus to be supplied, 'I thank God, through Jesus Christ we are delivered,' or 'there is a remedy found out for us.'—But Ireneæus, Origen, St. Ambrose, St. Austin, and St. Jerome himself, at another time, and the Vulgar Latin Bibles, instead of εὐχαριστῶ τῷ Θεῷ, read χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ, 'gratia Domini Jesu Christi,' 'the grace of God through Jesus Christ.' That is our remedy, he is our deliverer, from him comes our redemption. For he not only gave us a better law, but also the Spirit of grace, he hath pardoned all our old sins, and by his Spirit enables us for the future, that we may obey him in all sincerity, in heartiness of endeavour, and real events.

[s] Gal. v. 18.

From hence I draw this argument:—That state from which we are redeemed by Jesus Christ, and freed by the Spirit of his grace, is a state of carnality, of unregeneration, that is, of sin and death: but by Jesus Christ we are redeemed from that state in which we were in subjection to sin, commanded by the law of sin, and obeyed it against our reason, and against our conscience; therefore this state, which is indeed the state St. Paul here describes, is the state of carnality and unregeneration, and therefore not competent to the servants of Christ, to the elect people of God, to them who are redeemed and sanctified by the Spirit of Christ. The parts of this argument are the words of St. Paul, and proved in the foregoing periods. From hence I shall descend to something that is more immediately practical, and clothed with circumstances.

SECTION V.

How far an unregenerate Man may go in the Ways of Piety and Religion.

28. To this inquiry it is necessary that this be premised:—That between the regenerate and a wicked person, there is a middle state: so that it is not presently true, that if the man be not wicked, he is presently regenerate. Between the two states of so vast a distance, it is impossible but there should be many intermedial degrees; between the carnal and spiritual man there is a moral man; not that this man shall have a different event of things if he does abide there, but that he must pass from extreme to extreme by this middle state of participation. The first is a slave of sin; the second is a servant of righteousness; the third is such a one as liveth according to natural reason, so much of it as is left him, and is not abused; that is, lives a probable life, but is not renewed by the Spirit of grace: one that does something, but not all; not enough for the obtaining salvation. For a man may have gone many steps from his former baseness and degenerous practices, and yet not arrive at godliness, or the state of pardon; like the children of Israel, who were not presently in Canaan, as soon as they were out of Egypt, but abode

long in the wilderness: ἄρχονται παιδεύεσθαι, 'they begin to be instructed,' that is their state. "Thou art not far from the kingdom of heaven," said our blessed Saviour to a well-disposed person; but he was not arrived thither: he was not a subject of the kingdom. These are such whom our blessed Lord calls, 'the weary and the heavy laden,' that is, such, who groan under the heavy pressure of their sins, whom therefore he invites to come to him to be eased. Such are those whom St. Paul here describes to be 'under the law;' convinced of sin, pressed, vexed, troubled with it, complaining of it, desirous to be eased. These the Holy Scripture calls τεταγμένους εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, ordained, 'disposed to life eternal [a],' but these were not yet the 'fideles' or 'believers,' but, from that fair disposition, became believers upon the preaching of the apostles.

29. In this third state of men, I account those that sin and repent, and yet repent and sin again; for ever troubled when they have sinned, and yet for ever or most frequently sinning, when the temptation does return: ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐγκαλοῦσι, "They sin, and accuse, and hate themselves for sinning." Now because these men mean well, and fain would be quit of their sin at their own rate, and are not scandalous and impious, they flatter themselves, and think all is well with them,—that they are regenerate, and in the state of the divine favour,—and if they die so, their accounts are balanced, and they doubt not but they shall reign as kings for ever. To reprove this state of folly and danger, we are to observe, that there are a great many steps of this progression, which are to be passed through, and the end is not yet; the man is not yet arrived at the state of regeneration.

30. I. An unregenerate man may be convinced and clearly instructed in his duty, and approve the law, and confess the obligation, and consent that it ought to be done: which St. Paul calls 'a consenting to the law that it is good,' and a being 'delighted in it according to the inward man;' even the Gentiles which have not the law, yet "shew the work of the law written in their hearts: their thoughts in the meantime accusing or excusing one another [b]." The Jews did more; "they did rest in the law, and glory in God, knowing his will, and approving the things that are more excellent [c],"

[a] Acts, xiii. 48. [b] Rom. ii. 14. [c] Ver. 17.

And there are too many who, being called Christians, 'know their Master's will, and do it not:' and this consenting to the law and approving it, is so far from being a sign of regeneration, that the vilest and the basest of men are those who sin most against their knowledge, and against their consciences. In this world a man may have faith great enough to remove mountains, and yet be without charity: and in the world to come, some shall be rejected from the presence of God, though they shall allege for themselves, that they have prophesied in the name of Christ. This delight in the law which is in the unregenerate, is only in the understanding. The man considers what an excellent thing it is to be virtuous, the just proportions of duty, the fitness of being subordinate to God, the rectitude of the soul, the acquiescence and appendant peace: and this delight is just like that which is in finding out proportions in arithmetic and geometry, or the rest in discovering the secrets of a mysterious proposition: a man hath great pleasure in satisfactory notices, and the end of his disquisition. So also it is in moral things: a good man is beloved by every one; and there is a secret excellency and measure, a music and proportion, between a man's mind and wise counsels, which impious and profane persons cannot perceive, because they are so full of false measures, and weak discourses, and vile appetites, and a rude inconsideration of the reasonableness and wisdom of sobriety and severe courses. But

——— virtus laudatur et alget,

this is all that some men do, and there is in them nothing but a preparation of the understanding to the things of God, a faith seated in the rational part, a conviction of the mind; which as it was intended to lead on the will to action, and the other faculties to obedience, so now, that the effect is not acquired, it serves only to upbraid the man for a knowing and discerning criminal, he hath not now the excuse of ignorance. He that complies with a usurper out of fear and interest, in actions prejudicial to the lawful prince, and tells the honest party, that he is right in his heart, though he be forced to comply, helps the other with an argument to convince him that he is a false man. He that does it heartily, and according to a present conscience, hath some excuse; but he that confesses that he is right in his persuasion, and wrong in his

practice, is αὐτοκατάκριτος, 'condemned by himself,' and professes himself a guilty person, a man whom interest and not conscience governs. Better is it not to know at all, than not to pursue the good we know. They that know not God, are infinitely far from him; but they who know him, and yet do not obey him, are sometimes the nearer for their knowledge, sometimes the further off, but as yet they are not arrived whither it is intended they should go.

31. II. An unregenerate man may with his will delight in goodness, and desire it earnestly. For in an unregenerate man there is a double appetite, and there may be the apprehension of two amabilities. The things of the Spirit please his mind, and his will may consequently desire that this good were done, because it seems beauteous to the rational part, to his mind: but because he hath also relishes and gusts in the flesh, and they also seem sapid and delightful, he desires them also. So that this man fain would and he would not; and he does sin willingly and unwillingly at the same time. We see, by a sad experience, some men all their lifetime stand at gaze, and dare not enter upon that course of life, which themselves, by a constant sentence, judge to be the best, and of the most considerable advantage. But as the boy in the apologue listened to the disputes of Labour and Idleness, the one persuading him to rise, the other to lie in bed; but while he considered what to do, he still lay in bed and considered: so these men dispute and argue for virtue and the service of God, and stand beholding and admiring it, but they stand on the other side while they behold it. There is a strife between the law of the mind, and the law of the members. But this prevails over that. For the case is thus: there are in men three laws: 1. The law of the members. 2. The law of the mind. 3. The law of the Spirit. 1. The law of the members, that is, the habit and proneness to sin, the dominion of sin, giving a law to the lower man, and reigning there as in its proper seat. This law is also called by St. Paul, φρόνημα and νοῦς σαρκὸς, the 'mind of the flesh[d],' the wisdom, the relish, the gust and savour, of the flesh,—that is, that deliciousness and comport, that enticing and correspondences to the appetite by which it tempts and prevails; all its own principles and propositions which minister to sin

[d] Col. ii. 18. Rom. viii. 7.—Ab Hebr. נֶפֶשׁ anima sensitiva.

and folly. This subjects the man to the law of sin, or is that principle of evil by which sin does give us laws. 2. To this law of the flesh, the law of the mind [e] is opposed, and is in the regenerate and unregenerate indifferently: and it is nothing else but the conscience of good and evil, subject to the law of God, which the other cannot be. This accuses and convinces the unregenerate, it calls upon him to do his duty, it makes him unquiet when he does not; but this alone is so invalidated by the infirmity of the flesh, by the economy of the law, by the disadvantages of the world, that it cannot prevail, or free him from the captivity of sin. But, 3. The law of the Spirit, is the grace of Jesus Christ, and this frees the man from the 'law of the members [f],' from the captivity of sin, from the tenure of death. Here then are three combatants; the flesh, the conscience, the Spirit. The flesh endeavours to subject the man to the law of sin; the other two endeavour to subject him to the law of God. The flesh and the conscience or mind contend; but this contention is no sign of being regenerate, because the flesh prevails most commonly against the mind, where there is nothing else to help it: the man is still a captive to the law of sin. But the mind being worsted, God sends in the auxiliaries of the Spirit; and when that enters and possesses, that overcomes the flesh, it rules and gives laws. But as in the unregenerate the mind did strive though it was overpowered, yet still it contended but ineffectively for the most part: so now, when the Spirit rules, the flesh strives, but it prevails but seldom, it is overpowered by the Spirit. Now this contention is a sign of regeneration, when 'the flesh lusteth against the Spirit;' not when the 'flesh lusteth against the mind or conscience.' For the difference is very great, and highly to be remarked. And it is represented in two places of St. Paul's Epistles: the one is that which I have already explicated in this chapter; "I consent to the law of God according to the inner man: but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin that is in my members [g]:" where there is a redundancy in the words: but the Apostle plainly signifies, that the law of sin which is in his members, prevails; that is, sin rules the man in despite of all the contention and reluctancy of his

[e] Ἡγεμονικὸν Græc. Hebræis רוח [f] Rom. vii. 23. [g] Rom. vii. 22, 23.

conscience, or 'the law of his mind.' So that this strife of flesh and conscience is no sign of the regenerate, because the mind of a man is in subordination to the flesh of the man, sometimes willingly and perfectly, sometimes unwillingly and imperfectly.

32. I deny not but the mind is sometimes called 'spirit;' and by consequence, improperly it may be said, that even in these men 'their spirit lusteth against the flesh:' that is, the more rational faculties contend against the brute parts, reason against passion, law against sin. Thus the word spirit is taken for the ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, 'the inner man,' the whole mind together with its affections (Matt. xxvi. 4. Acts xix. 21.). But in this question, th e word [h] Spirit is distinguished from mind; and is taken for 'the mind renewed by the Spirit of God:' and as these words are distinguished, so must their several contentions be remarked. For when the mind or conscience, and the flesh, fight,—the flesh prevails; but when the Spirit and the flesh fight, the Spirit prevails. And by that we shall best know who are the litigants, that, like the two sons of Rebecca, strive within us. If the flesh prevails, then there was in us nothing but the law of the mind; nothing but the conscience of an unregenerate person: I mean, if the flesh prevails frequently or habitually. But if the Spirit of God did rule us, if that principle had possession of us, then the flesh is crucified, it is mortified, it is killed, and prevails not at all but when we will not use the force and arms of the Spirit, but it does not prevail habitually, or frequently or regularly, or by observation. This is clearly taught by those excellent words of St. Paul, which, as many other periods of his Epistles, have had the ill-luck to be very much misunderstood. "This I say then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh: for the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, so that ye cannot [that ye do not, or may not do, ἵνα μὴ ποιῆτε] the things that ye would. But if ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law[i]." The word in the Greek may either signify 'duty' or 'event.'—'Walk in the Spirit, and fulfil not (or, ye *shall not fulfil)* the lusts of the flesh.' If we understand it in the temperative sense, then it is exegetical of the former words: He that walks in the Spirit, 'hoc ipso,' does

[h] Rom. vii. 22, 23. viii. 5. 7. 9. [i] Gal. v. 16—18.

not fulfil the lusts of the flesh. To do one, is not to do the other; whoever fulfils the lusts of the flesh, and is ruled by that law, he is not ruled by the graceof Christ, he is not regenerate by the Spirit. But the other sense is the best reddition of the word; τελέσητε, as if he had said, 'Walk in the Spirit, and then the event will be, that the flesh shall not prevail over you, or give you laws; you shall not then fulfil the lusts thereof.' And this is best agreeable to the purpose of the Apostle. For having exhorted the Galatians, that they should not make 'their Christian liberty a pretence to the flesh[k],' as the best remedy against their enemy the flesh, he prescribes this 'walking in the Spirit,' which is a certain deletory and prevalency over the flesh. And the reason follows; "for the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would;" that is, though ye be inclined to, and desirous of, satisfying your carnal desires, yet being under the empire and conduct of the Spirit, ye cannot do those desires; the Spirit overrules you, and you must, you will, contradict your carnal appetites. For else this could not be (as the Apostle designs it) a reason of his exhortation. For if he had meant, that in this contention of flesh and Spirit, we could not do the good things that we would, then the reason had contradicted the proposition. For suppose it thus; "Walk in the Spirit, and fulfil not the lusts of the flesh. For the flesh and the Spirit lust against each other, so that ye cannot do the good ye would;"—this, I say, is not sense, for the latter part contradicts the former. For, this thing, 'that the flesh hinders us from doing the things of the Spirit,' is so far from being a reason why we should 'walk in the Spirit,' that it perfectly discourages that design; and it is to little purpose to 'walk in the Spirit,' if this will not secure us against the domineering and tyranny of the flesh. But the contrary is most clear and consequent: "'If ye walk in the Spirit, ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh;' for though 'the flesh lusteth against the Spirit,' and would fain prevail, yet it cannot; for 'the Spirit also lusteth against the flesh,' and is stronger, so that ye *may* not, or that ye *do* not, or that ye *can*not (for any of these readings, as it may properly render the words of ἵνα μὴ ποιῆτε, so are not against the design of the Apostle),

[k] Gal. v. 13.

do what ye otherwise would fain do; and therefore, if ye will walk in the Spirit, ye are secured against the flesh."

33. The result is this. 1. An impious, profane person, sins without any contention; that is, with a clear, ready, and a prepared will, he dies and disputes not. 2. An animal man, or a mere moral man, that is, one under the law, one instructed and convinced by the letter, but not sanctified by the Spirit, he sins willingly, because he considers and chooses it; but he also sins unwillingly, that is, his inclinations to vice, and his first choices, are abated, and the pleasures allayed, and his peace disturbed, and his sleeps broken; but for all that, he sins on when the next violent temptation comes. The contention in him is between reason and passion, the law of the mind and the law of the members, between conscience and sin, that weak, this prevailing. 3. But the regenerate hath the same contention within him; and the temptation is sometimes strong within him, yet he overcomes it, and seldom fails in any material and considerable instances: because the Spirit is the prevailing ingredient in the new creature, in the constitution of the regenerate, and will prevail. For "whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world; and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even your faith[l];" that is, by the faith of Jesus Christ, by him you shall have victory and redemption: and again; 'Resist the devil, and he will flee from you[m];' 'For he that is within you, is stronger than he that is in the world[n];' and, 'Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may stand against the snares of the devil, that ye may resist in the evil day, and having done all, to stand[o];' for, 'All things are possible to him that believes[p];' and 'Through Christ that strengthens me I can do all things[q];' and therefore 'in all these things we are more than conquerors:' for, 'God is able to do above all that we can ask or think[r];' he can keep us from all sin, and present us unblamable in the sight of his glory[s].' So that to deny the power of the Spirit, in breaking the tyranny and subduing the lusts of the flesh, besides that it contradicts all these and divers other scriptures, it denies the omnipotency of God, and of the Spirit of his grace, making sin to be

[l] 1 John, v. 4, 5. [m] Jam. iv. 7. [n] 1 John, iv. 4.
[o] Eph. vi. 11. 13. [p] Mark, ix. 23. [q] Phil. iv. 13.
[r] Eph. iii. 20. [s] Rom. viii. 13. v. 37. Jude, 24.

stronger than it,—and if grace abound, to make sin superabound: but to deny the willingness of the Spirit to redeem us from the captivity of sin, is to lessen the reputation of his goodness, and to destroy the possibility, and consequently the necessity, of living holily.

34. But how happens it then, that even the regenerate sins often, and the flesh prevails upon the ruin, or the declensions, of the Spirit? I answer, it is not because that holy principle which is in the regenerate, cannot or will not secure him, but because the man is either prepossessed with the temptation, and overcome before he begins to oppose the arms of the Spirit, that is, because he is surprised, or incogitant, or, it may be, careless; 'the good man is asleep,' and then the 'enemy' takes his advantage and 'sows tares;' for if he were awake, and considering, and would make use of the strengths of the Spirit, he would not be overcome by sin. For there are powers enough, that is, arguments and endearments, helps and sufficient motives, to enable us to resist the strongest temptation in the world; and this one alone, of resurrection to eternal life, which is revealed to us by Jesus Christ, and ministered in the Gospel, is an argument greater than all the promises and enticements of sin, if we will attend to its efficacy and consequence. But if we throw away our arms, and begin a fight in the Spirit, and end it in the flesh, the ill success of the day is to be imputed to us, not to the Spirit of God, to whom if we had attended, we should certainly have prevailed. The relics and remains of sin are in the regenerate; but that is a sign that sin is overcome, and the kingdom of it broken; and that is a demonstration, that whenever sin does prevail in any single instances, it is not for want of power, but of using that power; for since the Spirit hath prevailed upon the flesh in its strengths, and hath crucified it, there is no question but it can also prevail upon all its weaknesses.

35. For we must be curious to avoid a mistake here. The dominion of the Spirit, and the remains of the flesh, may consist together in the regenerate; as some remains of cold with the prevailing heat; but the dominions of one and the other are, in every degree, inconsistent; as both cold and heat cannot in any sense be both said to be the prevailing

ingredient. A man cannot be said to be both free from sin, and a slave to sin; if he hath prevailed in any degree upon sin, then he is not at all a servant of that portion from whence he is set free; but if he be a captive of any one sin, or regular degree of it, he is not God's freedman; for the Spirit prevails upon all as well as upon one; and that is not an infinite power that cannot redeem us from all our slavery: but to be a slave of sin, and at the same time to be a servant of righteousness, is not only against the analogy of Scripture, and the express signification of so many excellent periods, but against common sense; it is as if one should say, that a man hath more heat than cold in his hand, and yet that the cold should prevail upon, and be stronger than, the heat; that is, that the weaker should overcome the stronger, and the less should be greater, than that which is bigger than it.

36. But as the choice of virtue is abated, and (as the temptation grows more violent, and urges more vehemently) is made less pleasant in the regenerate person; so is the choice of vice in the moral, or animal man. The contention abates the pleasure in both their choices; but in the one it ends in sin, in the other it ends in victory. So that there is an unwillingness to sin in all but in the impious and profane person, in the far-distant stranger. But the unwillingness to sin, that is, in the animal, or moral man, is nothing else but a serving sin like a grumbling servant, or like the younger son of the farmer in the Gospel; he said he would not, but did it for all his angry words. And therefore, that the unregenerate man acts the sin against his mind, and after a long contention against it, does not in all cases lessen it: but sometimes increases it. 'Nec levat crimen eorum, magis verò auget, quod eos diù restitisse dixistis,' said Pope Pelagius[t]: 'To resist long, and then to consent, hath in it some aggravations of the crime,' as being a conviction of the man's baseness, a violence to reason, a breach of former resolutions, a recession from fair beginnings, and wholly without excuse. But if ever it comes to pass, that in the contention of flesh and spirit, the regenerate man does sin, he does it unwillingly, that is, by ignorance or inadvertency: the unregenerate sins unwillingly

[t] Caus. 24. q. 1. c. Schisma.

too, but it is by reason of the dominion and rule that sin bear over him: but still this difference distinguishes them in the event of things, that when it comes to the question whether sin shall be done or no, the one wills, and the other wills not, though it may happen that the consent or dissent respectively may be with the same unwillingness, by reason of the contention and strife from the adverse, though weaker party. The unregenerate man may be unwilling to obey sin, but he obeys it for all that; and the unwillingness is a sign of the greater slavery; but there can be no sign of his regeneration, but by not obeying the sin in the day of its own power and temptation. A servant is still a servant, whether he obeys with or against his will. 'His servants we are to whom we obey,' saith St. Paul; all therefore that is to be considered in the question of regeneration, is, whether the man obeys, or not obeys? for whether he be willing or unwilling, is not here considerable. Let no man therefore flatter himself that he is a regenerate person, because though he is a servant to sin, and acts at the command of his lust, and cannot resist in the evil day, or stand the shock of a temptation, yet he finds an unwillingness within him, and a strife against sin. Hugo de St. Victore, or else St. Austin in the book 'de Continentiâ,' gave beginning or countenance to this error. "Hanc pugnam non experiuntur in semetipsis nisi bellatores virtutum, debellatoresque vitiorum:" "This fight none find in themselves, but they that fight on virtue's side, and destroy vice."—Which words, though something crudely set down, and so not true, yet are explicable by the following period; "Non expugnat concupiscentiæ malum, nisi continentiæ bonum:" 'Only holy and continent persons do overcome their concupiscence;' and in that sense it is true: only the regenerate feel this fight which ends in victory. But he whose contention ends in sin, and after a brave onset, yields basely, frequently I mean, or habitually, every such person is a servant of sin, and therefore not a servant of the Spirit, but free from, that is, not ruled by, the law of righteousness. And this is so certain, that this unwillingness to sin, which ends in obeying it, is so far from being a note of a regenerate person, that it is evidently true, that no man can come from the servitude or slavery of sin,—but the first step of his going from it, is the sense and

hatred of his fetters, and then his desire of being freed: but therefore he is not free, because he complains of his bands, and finds them heavy and intolerable, and therefore seeks for remedy. For if an unregenerate person did always sin willingly, that is, without this reluctancy and strife within; and the regenerate did sin as infallibly, but yet sore against his will; then the regenerate person were the verier slave of the two: for he that obeys willingly, is less a slave, than he that obeys in spite of his heart.

——— Libertatis servaveris umbram,
Si, quicqnid jubeare, velis ———

He that delights in his fetters, hath at least the shadow, and some of the pleasure, of liberty; but he hath nothing of it who is kept fast, and groans because 'his feet are hurt in the stocks, and the iron entereth into his soul.' It was the sad state and complaint of the Romans, when, by the iniquity of war, and the evil success of their armies, they were forced to entertain their bondage.

——— tot rebus iniquis
Paruimus victi: venia est hoc sola puderis,
Degenerisque metus, nil jam potuisse negari[u].

It was a conquest that gave them laws; and their ineffective struggling, and daily murmurs, were but ill arguments of their liberty, which were so great demonstrations of their servitude.

37. III. An unregenerate man may not only will and desire to do natural or moral good things, but even spiritual and evangelical; that is, not only that good which he is taught by natural reason, or by civil factions, or by use and experience of things, but even that also which is only taught us by the Spirit of grace. For if he can desire the first, much more may he desire the latter, when he once comes to know it: because there is in spiritual good things much more amability; they are more perfective of our mind, and a greater advancer of our hopes, and a security to our greatest interest. Neither can this be prejudiced by those words of St. Paul; 'The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned[x].' For

[u] Lucan. iii. 146. Oudendorp. p. 187. [x] 1 Cor. ii. 14.

the natural man St. Paul speaks of, is one unconverted to Christianity, the Gentile philosophers, who relied upon such principles of nature as they understood; but studied not the prophets, knew not of the miracles of Christ and his apostles, nor of those excellent verifications of the things of the Spirit; and therefore these men could not arrive at spiritual notices, because they did not go that way which was the only competent and proper instrument of finding them.

> Scio incapacem te sacramenti, impie,
> Non posse cæcis mentibus mysterium
> Haurire nostrum ——— [7].

They that are impious, and they that go upon distinct principles, neither obeying the proposition, nor loving the commandment, they indeed, viz. remaining in that indisposition, cannot receive, that is, entertain him. And this is also the sense of the words of our blessed Saviour; 'The world cannot receive him[a]; that is, the unbelievers, such who will not be persuaded by arguments evangelical. But a man may be a spiritual man in his notices, and yet be carnal in his affections; and still under the bondage of sin. Such are they of whom St. Peter affirms, it is 'better they had never known the way of righteousness, than having known it to fall away[a]:' such are they of whom St. Paul says, 'They detain the truth in unrighteousness[b].' Now concerning this man, it is that I affirm, that upon the same account as any vicious man can commend virtue, this man also may commend holiness, and desire to be a holy man, and wishes it with all his heart, there being the same proportion between his mind, and the things of the Spirit, as between a Jew and the moral law, or a Gentile and moral virtue; that is, he may desire it with passion and great wishings. But here is the difference: a regenerate man does, what the unregenerate man does but desire.

38. IV. An unregenerate man may leave many sins which he is commanded to forsake. For it is not ordinarily possible, that so perfect a conviction as such men may have of the excellency of religion, should be, in all instances and periods, totally ineffective. Something they will give to reputation, something to fancy, something to fame, something to

[7] Prudent.
[a] 2 Pet. ii. 21.
[a] John, xiv. 17.
[b] Rom. i. 18.

peace, something to their own deception, that by quitting one or two lusts, they may have some kind of peace in all the rest, and think all is well. These men sometimes would fain obey the law, but they will not crucify the flesh; any thing that does not smart. Their temper and constitution will allow them easily to quit such superinduced follies, which out of a gay or an impertinent spirit they have contracted, or which came to them by company, or by chance, or confidence, or violence; but if they must mortify the flesh to quit a lust, that is too hard and beyond their powers, which are in captivity to the law of sin. Some men will commute a duty; and if you will allow them covetousness, they will quit their lust, or their intemperance, according as it happens. Herod did many things at the preaching of John the Baptist, and heard him gladly. Balaam did some things handsomely; though he was covetous and ambitious, yet he had a limit; he would obey the voice of the angel, and could not be tempted to speak a curse, when God spake a blessing. Ahab was an imperfect penitent; he did some things, but not enough. And if there be any root of bitterness, there is no regeneration; coloquintida, 'and death is in the pot.'

39. V. An unregenerate man may leave some sins, not only for temporal interest, but out of reverence of the divine law, out of fear and reverence. Under the law there were many such: and there is no peradventure but that many men, who like Felix, have trembled at a sermon, have with such a shaking-fit left off something, that was fit to be laid aside. To leave a sin out of fear of the divine judgment, is not sinful, or totally unacceptable. All that left sin in obedience and reverence to the law, did it in fear of punishment, because fear was the sanction of the law: and even under the Gospel, to obey out of fear of punishment, though it be less perfect, yet it is not criminal, nay, rather on the other side; the worse that men are, so much the less they are afraid of the divine anger and judgments. To abstain out of fear, is to abstain out of a very proper motive: and God, when he sends a judgment with a design of emendation, or threatens a criminal, or denounces woes and cursings, intends that fear should be the beginning of wisdom. "Knowing therefore the terrors of the Lord, we persuade men," saith St. Paul[c]. And

[c] 2 Cor. v. 11.

the whole design of delivering criminals over to Satan, was but a pursuance of this argument of fear; that by feeling something, they might fear a worse, and for the present be affrighted from their sin. And this was no other than the argument which our blessed Saviour used to the poor paralytic: 'Go and sin no more, lest a worse thing happen to thee.' But besides that this good fear may work much in an unregenerate person, or a man under the law, such a person may do some things in obedience to God, or thankfulness, and perfect, mere choice. So Jehu obeyed God a great way: but there was a turning, and a high stile, beyond which he would not go, and his principles could not carry him through. Few women can accuse themselves of adultery; in the great lines of chastity they choose to obey God, and the voice of honour; but can they say that their eye is not wanton, that they do not spend great portions of their time in vanity, that they are not idle, and useless, or busy-bodies, that they do not make it much of their employment to talk of fashions and trifles, or that they do make it their business to practise religion, to hear and attend to severe and sober counsels? If they be under the conduct of the Spirit, he hath certainly carried them into all the regions of duty. But to go a great way, and not to finish the journey, is the imperfection of the unregenerate. For in some persons, fear or love of God is not of itself strong enough to weigh down the scales; but there must be thrown in something from without, some generosity of spirit, or revenge, or gloriousness and bravery, or natural pity, or interest; and so far as these, or any of them, go along with the better principle, this will prevail; but when it must go alone, it is not strong enough. But this is a great way off from the state of sanctification or a new birth.

40. VI. An unregenerate man, besides the abstinence from much evil, may also do many good things for heaven, and yet never come thither. He may be sensible of his danger and sad condition, and pray to be delivered from it; and his prayers shall not be heard, because he does not reduce his prayers to action, and endeavour to be what he desires to be. Almost every man desires to be saved: but this desire is not with every one of that persuasion and effect as to make them willing to want the pleasures of the world for it, or to perform the labours of charity and repentance. A man

may strive and contend in or towards the ways of godliness, and yet fall short. Many men pray often, and fast much, and pay tithes, and do justice, and keep the commandments of the second table with great integrity; and so are good moral men, as the word is used in opposition to, or rather in destitution of, religion. Some are religious, and not just: some want sincerity in both: and of this, the Pharisees were a great example. But the words of our blessed Saviour are the greatest testimony in this article; 'Many shall strive to enter in, and shall not be able[d].' Either they shall contend too late like the five foolish virgins, and as they whom St. Paul, by way of caution, likens to Esau; or else they contend with incompetent and insufficient strengths: they strive, but put not force enough to the work. An unregenerate man hath not strength enough; that is, he wants the spirit, and activity, and perfectness, of resolution. Not that he wants such aids as are necessary and sufficient, but himself hath not purposes pertinacious, and resolutions strong enough. All that is necessary to his assistance from without, all that he hath or may have; but that which is necessary on his own part he hath not; but that is his own fault; that he might also have; and it is his duty, and therefore certainly in his power to have it. For a man is not capable of a law which he hath not powers sufficient to obey: he must be free and quit from all its contraries, from the power and dominion of them; or at least must be so free, that he may be quit of them if he please. For there can be no liberty, but where all the impediments are removed, or may be, if the man will.

41. VII. An unregenerate man may have received the Spirit of God, and yet be in a state of distance from God. For to have received the Holy Ghost, is not an inseparable propriety of the regenerate. The Spirit of God is an internal agent; that is, the effects and graces of the Spirit, by which we are assisted, are within us before they operate. For although all assistances from without are graces of God, the effects of Christ's passion, purchased for us by his blood and by his intercession; and all good company, wise counsels, apt notices, prevailing arguments, moving objects, and opportunities and endearments of virtue, 'are from above, from the Father of lights:' yet the Spirit of God does also

[d] Luke, xiii. 24.

work more inwardly, and creates in us aptnesses and inclinations, consentings, and the acts of conviction and adherence, 'working in us to will and to do according' to our desire, or according 'to God's good pleasure:' yet this Holy Spirit is oftentimes *grieved*, sometimes *provoked*, and at last *extinguished*; which, because it is done only by them who are enemies of the Spirit, and not the servants of God, it follows, that the Spirit of God, by his aids and assistances, is in them that are not so, with a design to make them so: and if the Holy Spirit were not in any degree or sense in the unregenerate, how could a man be born again by the Spirit? for since no man can be regenerate by his own strengths, his new birth must be wrought by the Spirit of God; and especially in the beginnings of our conversion, is his assistance necessary: which assistance, because it works within as well, and rather than without, must needs be in a man before he operates within. And therefore to have received the Holy Spirit, is not the propriety of the regenerate; but to be led by him, to be conducted by the Spirit in all our ways and counsels, to obey his motions, to entertain his doctrine, to do his pleasure: this is that which gives the distinction and denomination. And this is called by St. Paul, 'the inhabitation of the Spirit of God in us[e],' in opposition to the 'inhabitans peccatum,' 'the sin that dwelleth' in the unregenerate. The Spirit may be in us, calling and urging us to holiness; but unless the Spirit of God dwell in us, and abide in us, and love to do so, and rule, and give us laws, and be not grieved and cast out, but entertained, and cherished, and obeyed; unless, I say, the Spirit of God be thus in us, Christ is not in us; and if Christ be not in us, we are none of his.

SECTION VI.

The Character of the Regenerate Estate, or Person.

42. From hence it is not hard to describe what are the proper indications of the regenerate. 1. A regenerate person is convinced of the goodness of the law, and 'meditates in it,

[e] Rom. viii. 9.

day and night[f].' His delight is in God's law, not only with his mind approving, but with his will choosing, the duties and significations of the law.

II. The regenerate not only wishes that the good were done which God commands, but heartily sets about the doing of it.

III. He sometimes feels the rebellions of the flesh, but he fights against them always; and if he receive a fall, he rises instantly, and fights the more fiercely, and watches the more cautiously, and prays the more passionately, and arms himself more strongly, and prevails more prosperously. In a regenerate person there is flesh and spirit, but the spirit only rules. There is an outward and an inward man, but both of them are subject to the Spirit. There was 'a law of the members,' but it is abrogated and cancelled; the law is repealed, and does not any more enslave him 'to the law of sin.'—"Nunc quamdiu concupiscit caro adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem, sat est nobis non consentire malis quæ sentimus in nobis:" "Every good man shall always feel the flesh lusting against the Spirit; that contention he shall never be quit of, but it is enough for us if we never consent to the suggested evils[g]."

IV. A regenerate person does not only approve that which is best, and desire to do it, but he does it actually, and delights to do it; he continues and abides in it, which the Scripture calls 'a walking in the Spirit, and a living after it:' for he does his duty by the strengths of the Spirit; that is, upon considerations evangelical, in the love of God, in obedience to Christ, and by the aids he hath received from above beyond the powers of nature and education, and therefore he does his duty upon such considerations as are apt to make it integral and persevering. For,

V. A regenerate man does not only leave some sins but all, and willingly entertains none. He does not only quit a lust that is against his disposition, but that which he is most inclined to, he is most severe against, and most watchful to destroy it; he plucks out his right eye, and cuts off his right hand, and parts with his biggest interest, rather than keep a lust: and therefore consequently chooses virtue by the same method, by which he abstains from vice. "Nam

[f] Psal. i. 2. cxix. 77. 103.

[g] Aug. lib. de Contin. c. 2.

ipsa continentia cum frænat, cohibétque libidines, simul et appetit bonum, ad cujus immortalitatem tendimus: et respuit malum, cum quo in hâc mortalitate contendimus;" that is, "He pursues all virtue, as he refuses all vice; for he tends to the immortality of good, as he strives against evil in all the days of his mortality[h]."—And therefore he does not choose to exercise that virtue only that will do him reputation, or consist with his interest, or please his humour, but entertains all virtue, whether it be with him or against him, pleasing or displeasing; he chooses all that God hath commanded him, because he does it for that reason.

VI. A regenerate person doth not only contradict his appetite in single instances, but endeavours to destroy the whole body of sin; he does not only displease his fond appetite, but he mortifies it, and never entertains conditions of peace with it; for it is a dangerous mistake, if we shall presume all is well, because we do some acts of spite to our dearest lust, and sometimes cross the most pleasing temptation, and oppose ourselves in single instances against every sin. This is not it; the regenerate man endeavours to destroy the whole body of sin, and having had an opportunity to contest his sin, and to contradict it this day, is glad he hath done something of his duty, and does so again to-morrow and ever, till he hath quite killed it; and never entertains conditions of peace with it, nor ever is at rest till the flesh be quiet and obedient. For sometimes it comes to pass that the old man, being used to obey, at last obeys willingly, and takes the conditions of the Gibeonites; it is content to do drudgery and the inferior ministries, if it may be suffered to abide in the land.

43. So that here is a new account upon which the former proposition is verifiable; viz. It is not the propriety of the regenerate to feel a contention within him concerning doing good or bad. For it is not only true, that the unregenerate oftentimes feel the fight, and never see the triumph; but it is also true, that sometimes the regenerate do not feel this contention. They did once with great violence and trouble; but when they have gotten a clear victory, they have also great measures of peace. But this is but seldom, to few persons, and in them but in rare instances, in carnal

[h] S. Aug. ibid.

sins and temptations: for in spiritual, they will never have an entire rest till they come into their country. It is angelical perfection to have no flesh at all, but it is the perfection of a Christian to have the flesh obedient to the Spirit always, and in all things. But if this contention be not a sign of regeneration, but is common to good and bad, that which can only distinguish them, is victory, and perseverance; and those sins which are committed at the end of such contentions, are not sins of a pitiable and excusable infirmity; but the issues of death, and direct emanations from an unregenerate estate. Therefore,

44. VII. Lastly; the regenerate not only hath received the Spirit of God, but is wholly led by him, he attends his motions, he obeys his counsels, he delights in his commandments, and accepts his testimony, and consents to his truth, and rejoices in his comforts, and is nourished by his hopes up to a perfect man in Christ Jesus. This is the only condition of being the sons of God, and being saved. 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God[i]:' none else. And therefore, 'if ye live after the flesh ye shall die, but, if through the Spirit, ye do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live[k].' This is your characteristic note: Our obedience to the Spirit, our walking by his light, and by his conduct. 'This is the Spirit that witnesseth to our spirit, that we are the sons of God[l].' That is, if the Spirit be obeyed, if it reigns in us, if we live in it, if we walk after it, if it dwells in us, then we are sure that we are the sons of God. There is no other testimony to be expected, but the doing of our duty. All things else (unless an extra-regular light spring from heaven and tell us of it) are but fancies and deceptions, or uncertainties at the best.

SECTION VII.

What are properly and truly Sins of Infirmity, and how far they can consist with the Regenerate Estate.

45. We usually reckon ourselves too soon to be in God's favour. While the war lasts, it is hard telling who shall be the

[i] Rom. viii. 14. [k] Ver. 13. [l] Ver. 16.

prince. When one part hath fought prosperously, there are hopes of his side: and yet if the adversary hath reserves of a vigorous force, or can raise new, and not only pretends his title, but makes great inroads into the country, and forages, and does mischief, and fights often, and prevails sometimes, the inheritance is still doubtful as the success. But if the usurper be beaten, and driven out, and his forces quite broken, and the lawful prince is proclaimed, and rules, and gives laws, though the other rails in prison, or should by a sudden fury kill a single person, or plot an ineffective treason, no man then doubts concerning the present possession.

46. But men usually think their case is good, so long as they are fighting, so long as they are not quite conquered, and every step towards grace, they call it, 'pardon' and 'salvation' presently. As soon as ever a man begins heartily to mortify his sin, his hopes begin, and if he proceeds they are certain. But if in this fight he be overcome, he is not to ask, whether that ill day, and that deadly blow, can consist with the state of life? He that fights, and conquers not, but sins frequently, and to yield or be killed is the end of the long contentions, this man is not yet alive. But when he prevails regularly and daily over his sin, then he is in a state of regeneration; but let him take heed, for every voluntary or chosen sin is a mortal wound.

47. But because no man in this world hath so conquered but he may be smitten, and is sometimes struck at; and most good men have cause to complain of their calamity, that in their understandings there are doubtings, and strange mistakes, which because after a great confidence they are sometimes discovered, there is cause to suspect there are some there still which are not discovered; that there are in the will evil inclinations to forbidden instances; that in the appetite there are carnal desires; that in their natural actions there are sometimes too sensual applications; that in their good actions there are mighty imperfections;—it will be of use that we separate the certain from the uncertain, security from danger, the apology from the accusation, and the excuse from the crime, by describing what are, and what are not, sins of infirmity.

48. For most men are pleased to call their debaucheries sins of infirmity, if they be done against their reason, and the

actual murmur of their consciences, and against their trifling resolutions, and ineffective purposes to the contrary. Now although all sins are the effects of infirmity natural or moral, yet because I am to cure a popular mistake, I am also to understand the word as men do commonly, and by sins of infirmity to mean,

49. Such sins which, in the whole, and upon the matter, are unavoidable, and therefore excusable: such which can consist with the state of grace, that is, such which have so much irregularity in them as to be sins, and yet so much excuse and pity, as that by the covenant and mercies of the Gospel, they shall not be exacted in the worst of punishments, or punished with eternal pains, because they cannot, with the greatest moral diligence, wholly be avoided. Concerning these so described, we are to take accounts by the following measures.

50. I. Natural imperfections, and evil inclinations, when they are not consented to or delighted in, either are no sins at all, or if they be, they are but sins of infirmity. That in some things our nature is cross to the divine commandment, is not always imputable to us, because our natures were before the commandment; and God hath therefore commanded us to do violence to our nature, that by such preternatural contentions we should offer to God a service that costs us something. But that in some things we are inclined otherwise than we are suffered to act, is so far from offending God, that it is that opportunity of serving him, by which we can most endear him. To be inclined to that whither natute bends, is of itself indifferent; but to love, to entertain, to act our inclinations, when the commandment is put between, that is the sin; and therefore if we resist them, and master them, that is our obedience. For it is equally certain; no man can be esteemed spiritual for his good wishes and desires of holiness, but for his actual and habitual obedience: so no man is to be esteemed carnal or criminal for his natural inclinations to what is forbidden. But that good men complain of their strange propensities to sin, it is a declaration of their fears, of their natural weakness, of the needs of grace, and the aids of God's Spirit. But because these desires, even when they are much restrained, do yet sometimes insensibly go too far; therefore it is, that such are

sins of infirmity, because they are almost unavoidable. This remain is like the image of the ape which Theophilus, bishop of Alexandria, left after the breaking of the other idols; a testimony of their folly; but as that was left for no other purpose but to reprove them, so is this to humble us, that we may not rely upon flesh and blood, but make God to be our confidence.

51. II. Sins of infirmity are rather observed in the imperfection of our duty, than in the commission of any criminal action. For in this it was that our blessed Saviour instanced these words; "The spirit truly is willing, but the flesh is weak [m];" the body is weary, the eyes heavy, the fancy restless, diversions many, business perpetually intervenes, and all the powers of discourse and observation cannot hinder our mind from wandering in our prayers,

——— Odi artus, fragilemque hunc corporis usum
Desertorem animi ———

But this being, in the whole, unavoidable, is therefore, in many of its parts and instances, very excusable, if we do not indulge to it; if we pray and strive against it: that is, so long as it is a natural infirmity. For although we cannot avoid wandering thoughts, yet we can avoid delighting in them, or a careless and negligent increasing them. For if they once seize upon the will, they are sins of choice and malice, and not of infirmity. So that the great sense of sins of infirmity, is in omission of degrees and portions of that excellency of duty which is required of us. We are imperfect, and we do imperfectly, and if we strive towards perfection, God will pity our imperfection. There is no other help for us; but blessed be God, that is sufficient for our need, and proportionable to our present state.

52. III. But in actions and matters of commission, the case is different. For though a man may forget himself against his will, or sleep, or fall, yet without his will he cannot throw himself down, or rise again. Every action is more or less voluntary; but every omission is not. A thing may be let alone upon a dead stock, or a negative principle, or an unavoidable defect; but an action cannot be done without some command or action of the will; therefore, although sins

[m] Matt. xxvi. 41.

of defect are, in many cases, pitied and not exacted, yet sinful actions have not so easy a sentence: but they also have some abatements. Therefore,

53. IV. Imperfect actions, such which are incomplete in their whole capacity, are sins of infirmity, and ready and prepared for pity: of this sort are rash or ignorant actions, done by surprise; by inconsideration and inadvertency, by a sudden and great fear, in which the reason is in very many degrees made useless, and the action cannot be considered duly. In these there is some little mixture of choice, so much as to make the action imputable, if God should deal severely with us; but yet so little that it shall not be imputed under the mercies of the Gospel; although the man that does them, cannot pretend he is innocent, yet he can pretend that he does stand fair in the eye of mercy. A good man may sometimes be unwary; or he may speak, or be put to it to resolve or do, before he can well consider. If he does a thing rashly when he can consider and deliberate, he is not excused: but if he does it indiscreetly, when he must do it suddenly, it is his infirmity, and he shall be relieved at the chancery of the throne of grace. For it is remarkable that God's justice is in some cases ἀκριβὴς, 'exact,' full and severe: in other cases it is ἐπιεικὴς, 'full of equity,' gentleness, and wisdom, making abatement for infirmities, performing promises, interpreting things to the most equal and favourable purposes. So justice is taken in St. John; "If we confess our sins, he is righteous or just to forgive our sins;" that is, God's justice is such as to be content with what we can do, and not to exact all that is possible to be imposed. He is as just in forgiving the penitent, as in punishing the refractory; as just in abating reasonably, as in weighing scrupulously: such a justice it is, which in the same case David calls 'mercy:' "For thou, Lord, art merciful: for thou rewardest every man according to his works." And if this were not so, no man could be saved. "Mortalis enim conditio non patitur esse hominem ab omni maculâ purum," said Lactantius [n]. For 'in many things we offend all;' and our present state of imperfection will not suffer it to be otherwise: Χαλεπὸν γὰρ, ὥσπερ τοὺς δρομεῖς ἀρξαμένους ὁδοῦ, πρὸς εὐσέβειαν ἀπταίστως καὶ ἀπνευστὶ διευθῦναι τὸν δρόμον, ἐπεὶ μύρια ἐμποδὼν παντὶ τῷ γινο-

[n] Lib. 6. 13.

μένῳ, said Philo[s]. For as a runner of races, at his first setting forth, rides his way briskly, and in a breath measures out many spaces; but by and by his spirit is faint, and his body is breathless, and he stumbles at every thing that lies in his way: so is the course of a Christian; fierce in the beginnings of repentance, and active in his purposes; but in his progress, remiss and hindered, and starts at every accident, and stumbles at every scandal and stone of offence, and is sometimes listless, and without observation at other times; and a bird out of a bush that was not looked for, makes him to start aside, and decline from the path and method of his journey. But then if he that stumbles mends his pace, and runs more warily, and goes on vigorously, his error, or misfortune, shall not be imputed; for here God's justice is equity, it is the justice of the chancery; we are not judged by the covenant of works, that is, of exact measures, but by the covenant of faith and remission, or repentance. But if he that falls, lies down despairingly or wilfully, or if he rises, goes back, or goes aside;—not only his declination from his way, but every error or fall, every stumbling and startling in that way, shall be accounted for. For here God's justice is ἀκριβὴς, 'exact' and severe; it is the justice of the Law, because he refused the method and conditions of the Gospel.

54. V. Every sinful action that can pretend to pardon by being a sin of infirmity, must be in a small matter. The imperfect way of operating alone, is not sufficient for excuse and pardon, unless the matter also be little and contemptible; because if the matter be great, it cannot ordinarily be, but it must be considered and chosen. He that in a sudden anger strikes his friend to the heart, whom he had loved as passionately as now he smote him, is guilty of murder, and cannot pretend infirmity for his excuse; because, in an action of so great consequence and effect, it is supposed, he had time to deliberate all the foregoing parts of his life, whether such an action ought to be done or not; or the very horror of the action was enough to arrest his spirit, as a great danger, or falling into a river, will make a drunken man sober; and by all the laws of God and man, he was immured from the probability of all transports into such violences; and the man must needs be a slave of passion, who could by it

[s] De Agricultura.

be brought to go so far from reason, and to do so great evil. If a man in the careless time of the day, when his spirit is loose with a less severe employment, or his heart made more open with an innocent refreshment, spies a sudden beauty that unluckily strikes his fancy; it is possible that he may be too ready to entertain a wanton thought, and to suffer it to stand at the doors of his first consent; but if the sin passes no further, the man enters not into the regions of death; because the devil entered on a sudden, and is as suddenly cast forth. But if from the first arrest of concupiscence, he pass on to an imperfect consent,—from an imperfect consent, to a perfect and deliberate,—and from thence to an act,—and so to a habit,—he ends in death; because, long before it is come thus far, 'the salt water is taken in.' The first concupiscence is but like rain-water; it discolours the pure springs, but makes them not deadly. But when in the progression the will mingles with it, it is like the βόρβορος, or 'waters of brimstone;' and the current for ever after is unwholesome, and carries you forth into the Dead Sea, the lake of Sodom, "which is to suffer the vengeance of eternal fire:" but then the matter may be supposed little, till the will comes. For though a man may be surprised with a wanton eye, yet he cannot fight a duel against his knowledge, or commit adultery against his will. A man cannot, against his will, contrive the death of a man; but he may speak a rash word, or be suddenly angry, or triflingly peevish; and yet all this notwithstanding, be a good man still. These may be sins of infirmity, because they are imperfect actions in the whole; and such, in which as the man is for the present surprised, so they are such against which no watchfulness was a sufficient guard, as it ought to have been in any great matter, and might have been in sudden murders. A wise and a good man may easily be mistaken in a nice question, but can never suspect an article of his creed to be false: a good man may have many fears and doubtings in matters of smaller moment, but he never doubts of God's goodness, of his truth, of his mercy, or of any of his communicated perfections: he may fall into melancholy, and may suffer indefinite fears, of he knows not what himself; yet he can never explicitly doubt of any thing which God hath clearly revealed, and in which he is sufficiently instructed. A weak

eye may, at a distance, mistake a man for a tree; but he who, sailing in a storm, takes the sea for dry land, or a mushroom for an oak, is stark blind. And so is he who can think adultery to be excusable; or that treason can be duty; or that, by persecuting God's prophets, he does God good service; or that he propagates religion by making the ministers of the altar poor, and robbing the churches. A good man so remaining cannot suffer infirmity in the plain and legible lines of duty, where he can see, and reason, and consider.

I have now told which are sins of infirmity; and I have told all their measures. For as for those other false opinions by which men flatter themselves into hell, by a pretence of sins of infirmity, they are as unreasonable as they are dangerous; and they are easily reproved upon the stock of the former truths. Therefore,

55. VI. Although our mere natural inclination to things forbidden, be of itself a natural and unavoidable infirmity, and such which cannot be cured by all the precepts and endeavours of perfection; yet this very inclination, if it be heightened by carelessness or evil customs, is not a sin of infirmity. Tiberius, the emperor, being troubled with a fellow that wittily and boldly pretended himself to be a prince,—at last, when he could not by questions, he discovered him to be a mean person by the rusticity and hardness of his body: not by a callousness of his feet, or a wart upon a finger, but ὅλον τὸ σῶμα σκληρότερόν τε καὶ δουλοφανὲς καταμαθὼν, ἐνόησε πᾶν τὸ σύνταγμα, "his whole body was hard and servile, and so he was discovered."—The natural superfluities, and excrescences, that inevitably adhere to our natures, are not sufficient indications of a servile person, or a slave to sin; but when our natures are abused by choice and custom,—when the callousness is spread by evil and hard usages,—when the arms are brawny by the services of Egypt,—then it is no longer infirmity, but a superinduced viciousness, and a direct hostility. When nature rules, grace does not. When the flesh is in power, the Spirit is not. Therefore it matters not from what corner the blasting wind does come,—from whence soever it is, it is deadly. Most of our sins are from natural inclinations; and the negative precepts of God, are, for the

most part, restraints upon them. Therefore, to pretend nature, when ourselves have spoiled it, is no excuse, but that state of evil, from whence the Spirit of God is to rescue and redeem us.

56. VII. Yea, but although it be thus in nature, yet it is hoped by too many, that it shall be allowed to be infirmity, when the violence of our passions or desires overcomes our resolutions. Against this, I oppose this proposition:—when violence of desire or passion engages us in a sin, whither we see and observe ourselves entering, that violence or transportation is not our excuse, but our disease:—and that resolution is not accepted for innocence or repentance: but the not performing what we did resolve is our sin, and the violence of passion was the accursed principle.

57. For to resolve is a relative and imperfect duty, in order to something else. It had not been necessary to resolve, if it had not been necessary to do it: and if it be necessary to do it, it is not sufficient to resolve it. And for the understanding of this the better, we must observe, that to resolve, and to endeavour, are several things. To resolve, is to purpose to do what we may if we will; some way or other the thing is in our power; either we are able of ourselves, or we are helped. No man resolves to carry an elephant, or to be as wise as Solomon, or to destroy a vast army with his own hands. He may endeavour this; for, to endeavour sometimes supposes a state of excellency, beyond our power, but not beyond our aims. Thus we must endeavour to avoid all sin, and to master all our infirmities; because to do so is the nobleness of a Christian courage, and that design which is the proper effect of charity, which is the best of Christian graces. But we cannot resolve to do it, because it is beyond all our powers; but may endeavour it, and resolve to endeavour it, but that is all we can do. But if to resolve be a duty, then to perform it is a greater; and if a man cannot be the child of God without resolving against all the habits of sin, then neither can he be his child, unless he actually quit them all.

58. But then if from acting our resolution we be hindered by passion and violent desires, we are plainly in the state of immortification. Passion is the ruler: and as the first step

of victory is to keep those passions and appetites from doing any criminal action abroad: so the worst they can do, is to engage and force the man to sin, and that against his will, even whether he list or no. But concerning this article, we are entirely determined by the words of St. Paul; "He that is in Christ, hath crucified the flesh, with the affections and lusts [p];" that is, the passions and desires of the flesh are mortified in all the regenerate: and therefore a state of passion is a state of death. But whatever the principle be, yet we must be infinitely careful we do not mistake a broken resolution for an entire piety. He that perpetually resolves, and yet perpetually breaks his resolution, does, all the way, sin against his conscience, and against his reason, against his experience, and against his observation; and it will be a strange offer at an excuse, for a man to hope for, or to pretend to, pardon, because he sinned against his conscience.

59. There is in this article some little difference in the case of young persons, the violence of whose passions, as it transports them infallibly to evil, so it helps to excuse some of it; but this is upon a double account: 1. Because part of it is natural, 'naturale vitium ætatis,' 'the defect and inherent inclination of their age.' 2. And because their passions being ever strongest when their reason is weakest, the actions of young men are imperfect and incomplete. For deliberation being nothing else but an alternate succession of appetites, it is an unequal intercourse that a possessing, natural, promoted passion should contest against a weak, overborn, beginning, inexperienced, uninstructed reason: this alteration of appetites is like the dust of a balance weighing against a rock; the deliberation itself must needs be imperfect, because there is no equality. And therefore the Roman lawyers did not easily, upon a man under twenty-five years of age, inflict punishment, at least not extreme. They are the words of Tryphonius; "In delictis autem minor annis non xxv. meretur in integrum restitutionem, utique atrocioribus; nisi quatenus interdum miseratio ætatis ad mediocrem pœnam judicem produxerit [q]." This, I say, is only a lessening of their fault, not imputing it. God is ready to pity every thing that is pitiable; and, therefore, is apt to instruct them more, and to forbear them longer, and to ex-

[p] Gal. v. 24. [q] L. Auxil. sect. in delictis ff. de minoribus.

pect and to assist their return, and strikes them not so soon, nor so severely; but what other degrees of pardon God will allow to their infirmities, he hath no where told us. For as to the whole, it is true in all laws divine and human: "In criminibus quidem, ætatis suffragio minores non juvantur: etenim malorum mores infirmitas animi non excusat[r]:" "Infirmity of mind does not excuse evil manners: and therefore in criminal actions, young persons are not excused by their age."—"In delictis, ætate neminem excusari constat," said Diocletian and Maximianus. The age excuses not; well may it lessen, but it does not quite extinguish, the guilt.

60. VIII. The greatness or violence of a temptation does not excuse our sin, or reconcile it to the state of grace, and an actual consistence with God's favour. The man that is highly tempted, and so falls, cannot say, it was by an unavoidable infirmity. For God never suffers any man to be tempted above his strength; and therefore when he suffers him to fall into a great trial, he hath beforehand prepared him with great aids: and a temptation is not such a formidable thing to a considering Christian. All that it can say is nothing, but that sin is pleasant: and suppose that true; yet so is drink to an hydropic person, and salt meats to a fantastic stomach; and yet they that are concerned, do easily abstain from these temptations, and remember that it is a greater pleasure to be in health, than with a little cold water or a broiled fish to please their palate; and therefore a temptation which can be overcome by an argument from so small an interest, cannot stand the shock of a noble and a Christian resolution and discourse. But every temptation puts on its strength as the man is. Sometimes a full meal will not prejudice our health; and at another time half so much would be a surfeit: and some men take cold with leaving off a half-shirt, who at another time might leave off half their clothes. The indisposition is within: and if men did not love to be tempted, it would not prevail at all. Wine is no temptation to an abstemious man, nor all the beauties of Potiphar's wife to Joseph, the devil could not prevail with such trifles; but half such an offer would overthrow all the trifling purposes of the effeminate. To say, that such a temptation is great, is to say, that you love the sin too

[r] L. Unicâ Cod. si adversus delictum.

well to which you are tempted. For temptations prevail only by our passions and our appetites: leave to love the sin, and the temptation is answered; but if you love it, then complain of nothing but thyself, for thou makest the temptation great, by being in love with life and sin, by preferring vanity before eternal pleasures. In the apophthegms of the Egyptian Anachorets[a], I read of one who had an apparition in the likeness of Christ. A vain and a proud person would have hugged himself and entertained the illusion. But he, shutting his eyes, said, 'I shall see Christ in heaven; it is enough for me to hope and to believe, while I am on earth.' This or the like did and did not prevail by our weaknesses, not by their own strength: and to pretend the strength of a temptation, is to say, we are to be excused, because we love sin too well, and are too much delighted with baser objects, and we cannot help it, because we love to die.

61. IX. The smallest instance, if it be observed, ceases to be a sin of infirmity; because by being observed, it loses its pretence and excuse, for then it is done upon the account of the will. For here the rule is general, and it sums up this whole question.

62. X. A man's will hath no infirmity, but when it wants the grace of God; that is, whatsoever the will chooses, is imputed to it for good or bad. For the will can suffer no violence; it is subject to nothing, and to no person, but to God and his laws, and therefore whenever it does amiss, it sins directly against him. The will hath no necessity, but what God and herself impose; for it can choose in despite of all arguments and notices from the understanding. For if it can despise an argument from reason, it can also despise an argument from sense; if it can refuse a good argument, it can also refuse a foolish one: if it can choose and not yield to religion, it can also choose and not yield to interest. If it can reject profit, it can reject pleasure; if it can refuse every argument, it can refuse all, and will because it will; it can as well be malicious as do unreasonably: and there could be no sin at all, if the will never did amiss, but when it were deceived: and even when the will chooses pleasure before heaven, it is not because that seems better, but because it will choose against all reason, only upon its own ac-

[a] Bibl. PP. tom. 9. p. 286.

count. For it is certain, he that chooses any thing upon that which he knows is but a seeming and a fallacious reason, may, if he please, do it without all reason: and so the will can do, against reason, in despite of powers, and hopes, and interest, and threatening. And therefore whatsoever is voluntarily chosen, let it be taken care of, that it be good; for if it be not, there can no excuse come from thence.

63. The will is the only fountain and proper principle of sin, insomuch as the fact is no sin, if it be involuntary; but the willing is a sin, though no act follows. "Latro est etiam antequam inquinet manus," said Seneca; "Fecit enim quisquam, quantum voluit." If he hath willed it, he hath done it before God. To this purpose is that saying of Tertullian: "Voluntas facti origo est, quæ ne tunc quidem liberatur, cum aliqua difficultas perpetrationem ejus intercepit. Ipsa enim sibi imputatur, nec excusari poterit per illam perficiendi infelicitatem, operata quod suum fuerat." Want of power excuses every thing but the will, because this always hath power to do its own work; and what cannot be done besides, as it is nothing to the will, so it is nothing to its excuse. 'To will' is the formality of sin, and therefore whatever action had its commission from thence, is not a sin of infirmity. For nothing is a sin of infirmity, but what is in some sense, involuntary.

64. The sum is this. Sin puts on its excuse, and becomes a sin of infirmity upon no account, but upon the account of ignorance, or something analogical to it, such as are inadvertency, or surprise, which are to ignorance as acts are to habits. The 'weak brother,' in St. Paul's dialect[1], is 'he that hath no knowledge.' For since nothing leads the will but the understanding, unless it goes alone, and moves by its own act or principle; if the understanding be inculpably misled, the will may be in error, but not in sin; it is abused, but shall not be condemned. For no man can be tied to do more or better than he understands; for that would be to do more than he can. If the understanding abuse the will, there is evil in it, but no sin: but if the will abuse the understanding, then it is criminal. That is, where the man understands not, or cannot consider, or deliberate, all his actions, by being less human, are less imputable.

[1] Rom. xiv. 1. 10.

Δύναται γὰρ ἴσον τῷ δρᾷν τὸ νοεῖν[u]. But where there is no knowledge, there is no power, and no choice, and no sin. They increase and decrease by each other's measures. St. James's rule is the full measure of this discourse: "To him that knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is sin[x]." —The same with that of Philo. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ κρείττονος διαμαρτάνοντι συγγνώμη δίδοται· ὁ δ' ἐξ ἐπιστήμης ἀδικῶν ἀπολογίαν οὐκ ἔχει, προεαλωκὼς ἐν τῷ τοῦ συνειδότος δικαστηρίῳ. To him that sins ignorantly, pardon is given, that is, easily: but he who sins knowingly, hath no excuse. And therefore the Hebrews use to oppose רשע 'sin,' to שגגה 'ignorance;' that is, the issues of a wicked from the issues of a weak mind: according to that saying of our blessed Saviour; 'If ye were blind, ye should have no sin[y];" that is, no great or very unpardonable sin. Ignorance, where of itself it is no sin, keeps the action innocent; but as the principle is polluted, so also is the emanation.

SECTION VIII.

Practical Advices to be added to the foregoing Considerations.

65. I. Since our weak nature is the original of our imperfections and sinful infirmities, it is of great concernment that we treat our natures so, as to make them aptly to minister to religion but not to vice. Nature must be preserved as a servant, but not indulged to as a mistress; for she is apt to be petulant, and after the manner of women,

——— quæ faciunt graviora coactæ
Imperio sexus ———[z],

She will insult impotently, and rule tyrannically. Nature's provisions of meat and drink are to be retrenched and moderate, that she may not be luxuriant and irregular; but she ought to be refreshed so as to be useful, and healthful, and cheerful, even in the days of expiation and sorrow. For he that fasts to kill his lust, and by fasting grows peevish, which to very many men is a natural effect of fasting, and was

[u] Comœd. vet. Gr.
[x] James, iv. 17.
[y] John, x. 41.
[z] Juv. 6. 135. Ruperti.

sadly experimented in St. Jerome, hath only altered the signification of his evil: and it is not easily known, whether the beast that is wanton, or the beast that is cursed, be aptest to gore; and if in such cases the first evil should be cured, yet the man is not.

66. But there are in nature some things, which are the instruments of virtue and vice too: some things, which, of themselves indeed, are culpable, but yet such which do minister to glorious events, and such, which as they are not easily corrigible, so they are not safe to be done away. "Dabo maximæ famæ viros, et inter admiranda propositos, quos si quis corrigit delet. Sic enim vitia virtutibus immixta sunt, ut illas secum tractura sint[a]." If the natural anger of some men be taken off, you will also extinguish their courage, or make them unfit for government. Vice and virtue sometimes go together: in these cases, that which we call vicious, is, in many degrees of it, a natural infirmity, and must be tempered as well as it can: but it neither can, nor indeed ought to be, extinguished: and therefore, as we must take care, that nature run not into extravagances; so, for the unalterable portions of infirmity, they ought to be the matter of humility and watchfulness, but not of scruple and vexation. However, we must be careful, that nature be not God's enemy; for if a vice be incorporated into our nature, that is, if our natural imperfections be changed into evil customs; it is a threefold cord, that is not easily broken; it is a legion of devils, and not to be cast out without a mighty labour, and all the arts and contentions of the Spirit of God.

67. II. In prosecution of this, propound to thyself, as the great business of thy life, to fight against thy passions. We see that sin is almost unavoidable to young men, because passion seizes upon their first years. The days of our youth is the reign of passion; and sin rides in triumph upon the wheels of desire, which run infinitely, when the boy drives the chariot. But the religion of a Christian is an open war against passion; and by the grace of meekness, if we list to study and to acquire that, hath placed us in the regions of safety.

68. III. Be not uncertain in thy resolutions, or in choos-

[a] A. Gellius 19. 12. et 17. 15.

ing thy state of life: because all uncertainties of mind, and vagabond resolutions, leave a man in the tyranny of all his follies and infirmities: every thing can transport him, and he can be forced by every temptation; and every fancy, or new accident, can ruin him. He that is not resolved and constant, is yet in a state of deliberation; and that supposes contrary appetites to be yet in the balance, and sin to be as strong as grace. But besides this, there are, in every state of life, many little things to be overcome, and objections to be mastered, and proper infirmities adherent, which are to be cured in the progression and growth of a man, and after experiment had of that state of life in which we are engaged; but therefore it is necessary that we begin speedily, lest we have no time to begin that work, which ought, in some measure, to be finished before we die.

Dum, quid sis, dubitas, jam potes esse nihil[b].

He that is uncertain what to do, shall never do any thing well; and there is no infirmity greater, than that a man shall not be able to determine himself what he ought to do.

69. IV. In contentions against sin and infirmities, let your force and your care be applied to that part of the wall that is weakest, and where it is most likely the enemy will assault thee,—and if he does, that he will prevail. If a lustful person should bend all his prayers and his observations against envy, he hath cured nothing of his nature and infirmity. Some lusts our temper or our interest will part withal; but our infirmities are in those desires, which are hardest to be mastered: that is, when after a long dispute, and perpetual contention, still there will abide some pertinacious string of an evil root; when the lust will be apt upon all occasions to revert, when every thing can give fire to it, and every heat can make it stir; that is the scene of our danger, and ought to be of greatest warfare and observation.

70. V. He that fights against that lust, which is the evil spring of his proper infirmities, must not do it by single instances, but by a constant and universal, mortal fight. He that does single spites to a lust; as he that opposes now and then a fasting day against carnality, or some few alms against oppression or covetousness, will find that these sin-

[b] Martial. 2. 64.

gle acts, if nothing else be done, can do nothing but cosen him: they are apt to persuade easy people, that they have done what is in them to cure their infirmity, and that their condition is good; but it will not do any thing of that work, whither they are designed. We must remember that infirmities are but the relics and remains of an old lust, and are not cured but at the end of a lasting war. They abide even after the conquest, after their main body is broken, and therefore cannot at all be cured by those light velitations and pickerings of single actions of hostility.

71. VI. When a violent temptation assaults thee, remember that this violence is not without, but within. Thou art weak, and that makes the burden great. Therefore whatever advices thou art pleased to follow in opposition to the temptation without, be sure that thou place the strongest guards within, and take care of thyself. And if thou dost die, or fall foully, seek not an excuse from the greatness of the temptation; for that accuses thee most of all: the bigger the temptation is, it is true that oftentimes thou art the more to blame; but at the best, it is a reproof of thy imperfect piety. He whose religion is greater than the temptation of a hundred pounds, and yet falls in the temptation of a thousand, sets a price upon God and upon heaven; and though he will not sell heaven for a hundred pounds,—yet a thousand, he thinks, is a worthy purchase.

72. VII. Never think that a temptation is too strong for thee, if thou givest over fighting against it: for as long as thou didst continue thy contention, so long it prevailed not: but when thou yieldedst basely, or threwest away thy arms, then it foraged, and did mischief, and slew thee, or wounded thee dangerously. No man knows, but if he had stood one assault more, the temptation would have left him. Be not therefore pusillanimous in a great trial: it is certain thou canst do all that which God requires of thee, if thou wilt but do all that thou canst do.

73. VIII. Contend every day against that, which troubles thee every day. For there is no peace in this war; and there are not many infirmities, or principles of failing, greater than weariness of well-doing; for besides that it proclaims the weakness of thy resolution, and the infancy of thy piety, and thy undervaluing religion, and thy want of love, it is

also a direct yielding to the enemy: for since the greatest scene of infirmities lies in the manner of our piety, he that is religious only by uncertain periods, and is weary of his duty, is not arrived so far as to plead the infirmities of willing people; for he is in the state of death and enmity.

74. IX. He that would master his infirmities, must do it at God's rate, and not at his own: he must not start back when the burden pinches him; not refuse his repentances because they smart, nor omit his alms because they are expensive: for it is vain to propound to ourselves any end, and yet to decline the use of those means, and instruments, without which it is not to be obtained. He that will buy, must take it at the seller's price; and if God will not give thee safety or immunity, but upon the exchange of labour, and contradictions, fierce contentions, and mortification of our appetites; we must go to the cost, or quit the purchase.

75. X. He that will be strong in grace, and triumph in good measures over his infirmities, must attempt his remedy by an active prayer. For prayer without labour is like faith without charity, dead and ineffective. A working faith, and a working prayer, are the great instruments, and the great exercise, and the great demonstration, of holiness and Christian perfection. Children can sit down in a storm, or in a danger, and weep and die: but men can labour against it, and struggle with the danger, and labour for that blessing which they beg. Thou dost not desire it, unless thou wilt labour for it. He that sits still and wishes, had rather have that thing than be without it; but if he will not use the means, he had rather lose his desire than lose his ease. That is scarce worth having, that is not worth labouring.

76. XI. In all contentions against sin and infirmity, remember that what was done yesterday, may be done to-day; and by the same instruments by which then you were conqueror, you may also be so in every day of temptation. The Italian general that quitted his vanity and his employment, upon the sight of one that died suddenly, might, upon the same consideration, actually applied and fitted to the fancy, at any time resist his lust. And therefore Epictetus gives it in rule; *Θάνατος πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστω σοι καθ' ἡμέραν· καὶ οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσῃ, οὔτε ἄγαν ἐπιθυμήσεις τινός.*

"Let death be always before thy eyes, and then thou shalt never desire any base or low thing, nor desire any thing too much [c]:"—that is, the perpetual application of so great a consideration as is death, is certainly the greatest endearment of holiness and severity. And certain it is, that at some time or other, the greatest part of Christians have had some horrible apprehensions of hell, of death, and consequent damnation; and it hath put into them holy thoughts, and resolutions of piety: and if ever they were in a severe sickness, and did really fear death, they may remember with how great a regret they did then look upon their sins; and then they thought heaven a considerable interest, and hell a formidable state, and would not then have committed a sin for the purchase of the world. Now every man hath always the same arguments and endearments of piety and religion: heaven and hell are always the same considerable things; and the truth is the same still: but then they are considered most, and therefore they prevail most; and this is a demonstration that the arguments themselves are sufficient, and would always do the work of grace for us, if we were not wanting to ourselves. It is impossible that any man can be moved by any argument in the world, or any interest, any hope or any fear, who cannot be moved by the consideration of heaven and hell. But that which I observe is this; that the argument that wisely and reasonably prevailed yesterday, can prevail to-day, unless thou thyself beest foolish and unreasonable.

77. XII. If a wicked man sins, it is never by a pitiable or pardonable infirmity, but from a state of death that it proceeds, or will be so imputed, and it is all one as if it did. But if a good man sins, he hath the least reason to pretend infirmity for his excuse, because he hath the strengths of the Spirit, and did master sin in its strengths, and in despite of all its vigorousness and habit; and therefore certainly can do so much rather, when sin is weak and grace is strong. The result of which consideration is this, that no man should please himself in his sin, because it is a sin of infirmity. He that is pleased with it, because he thinks it is indulged to him, sins with pleasure, and therefore not of infirmity; for that is ever against our will, and besides our observation. No

[c] Enchir. c. 21. Heyne. p. 60.

sin is a sin of infirmity, unless we hate it, and strive against it. He that hath gotten some strength, may pretend some infirmity: but he that hath none, is dead.

78. XIII. Let no man think, that the proper evil of his age or state, or of his nation, is, in the latitude and nature of it, a sin of a pardonable infirmity. The lusts of youth, and the covetousness or pride of old age, and the peevishness of the afflicted, are states of evil, not sins of infirmity: for it is highly considerable, that sins of infirmity are but single ones. There is no such thing as a state of a pardonable infirmity. If by distemper of the body, or the vanity of years, or the evil customs of a nation, a vice does creep upon, and seize on, the man, it is that against which the man ought to watch, and pray, and labour; it is a state of danger and temptation. But that must not be called infirmity, which corrupts nations and states of life; but that only, which, in single instances, surprises even a watchful person, when his guards are most remiss.

79. XIV. Whatsoever sin comes regularly, or by observation, is not to be excused upon the pretence of infirmity; but is the indication of an evil habit. Therefore, never admit a sin upon hopes of excuse; for, it is certain, no evil that a man chooses, is excusable. No man sins with a pardon about his neck. But if the sin comes at a certain time, it comes from a certain cause; and then it cannot be infirmity: for all sins of infirmity, are sins of chance, irregular and accidental.

80. XV. Be curious to avoid all proverbs and propositions, or odd sayings, by which evil life is encouraged, and the hands of the spirit weakened. It is strange to consider what a prejudice to a man's understanding of things is a contrary proverb. "Can any good thing come out of Galilee?" And "when Christ cometh, no man knoweth whence he is." —Two or three proverbs did, in despite of all the miracles, and holy doctrines, and rare examples, of Christ, hinder many of the Jews from believing in him. The words of St. Paul, misunderstood and worse applied, have been so often abused to evil purposes, that they have almost passed into a proverbial excuse; "The evil that I would not, that I do." Such sayings as these, are to be tried by the severest measures; and all such senses of them, which are enemies to holiness

of life, are to be rejected, because they are against the whole economy and design of the Gospel, of the life and death of Christ. But a proverb, being used by every man, is supposed to contain the opinion and belief, or experience, of mankind: and then that evil sense that we are pleased to put to them, will be thought to be of the same authority. I have heard of divers persons, who have been strangely enticed on to finish their revellings, and drunken conventicles, by a catch, or a piece of a song, by a humour, and a word, by a bold saying, or a common proverb: and whoever take any measures of good or evil, but the severest discourses of reason and religion, will be like a ship turned every way by a little piece of wood; by chance, and by half a sentence, because they dwell upon the water, and a wave of the sea is their foundation.

81. XVI. Let every man take heed of a servile will, and a commanding lust: for he that is so miserable, is in a state of infirmity and death; and will have a perpetual need of something to hide his folly, or to excuse it, but shall find nothing. He shall be forced to break his resolution, to sin against his conscience, to do after the manner of fools, who promise and pay not, who resolve and do not, who speak and remember not, who are fierce in their pretences and designs, but act them as dead men do their own wills. They make their will, but die and do nothing themselves.

82. XVII. Endeavour to do what can never be done: that is, to cure all thy infirmities. For this is thy victory, for ever to contend: and although God will leave a remnant of Canaanites in the land to be thy daily exercise, and endearment of care and of devotion; yet you must not let them alone, or entertain a treaty of peace with them. But when you have done something, go on to finish it: it is infinite pity that any good thing should be spent or thrown away upon a lust: but if we sincerely endeavour to be masters of every action, we shall be of most of them; and for the rest, they shall trouble thee, but do thee no other mischief. We must keep the banks, that the sea break not in upon us; but no man can be secure against the drops of rain, that fall upon the heads of all mankind: but yet every man must get as good shelter as he can.

The Prayer.

I.

O ALMIGHTY God, the Father of mercy and holiness, thou art the fountain of grace and strength, and thou blessest the sons of men by turning them from their iniquities; shew the mightiness of thy power and the glories of thy grace, by giving me strength against all my enemies, and victory in all temptations, and watchfulness against all dangers, and caution in all difficulties, and hope in all my fears, and recollection of mind in all distractions of spirit and fancy; that I may not be a servant of chance or violence, of interest or passion, of fear or desire, but that my will may rule the lower man, and my understanding may guide my will, and thy Holy Spirit may conduct my understanding; that in all contentions thy Spirit may prevail, and in all doubts I may choose the better part, and in the midst of all contradictions, and temptations, and infelicities, I may be thy servant infallibly and unalterably. Amen.

II.

Blessed Jesu, thou art our high-priest, and encompassed with infirmities, but always without sin; relieve and pity me, O my gracious Lord, who am encompassed with infirmities, but seldom or never without sin. O my God, my ignorances are many, my passions violent, my temptations ensnaring and deceitful, my observation little, my inadvertencies innumerable, my resolutions weak, my dangers round about me, my duty and obligations full of variety, and the instances very numerous; O be thou unto me wisdom and righteousness, sanctification and redemption. Thou hast promised thy Holy Spirit to them that ask him; let thy Spirit help my infirmities, give to me his strengths, instruct me with his notices, encourage me with his promises, affright me with his terrors, confirm me with his courage, that I, being readily prepared and furnished for every good work, may grow with the increase of God to the full measure of the stature and fulness of thee my Saviour; that 'though my outward man decay and decrease, yet my inner man may be renewed day by day;' that my infirmities may be weaker, and thy grace stronger, and at last may triumph over the de-

cays of the old man. O be thou pleased to pity my infirmities, and pardon all those actions which proceed from weak principles; that when I do what I can, I may be accepted; and when I fail of that, I may be pitied and pardoned; and in all my fights and necessities may be defended and secured, prospered and conducted to the regions of victory and triumph, of strength and glory, through the mercies of God, and the grace of our Lord Jesus, and the blessed communication of the Spirit of God and our Lord Jesus. Amen.

CHAP. IX.

OF THE EFFECT OF REPENTANCE, VIZ. REMISSION OF SINS.

SECTION I.

1. THE law written in the heart of man is a law of obedience; which because we prevaricated, we are taught another, which, St. Austin says, is written 'in the heart of angels:' "Ut nulla sit iniquitas impunita, nisi quam sanguis Mediatoris expiaverit[d]." For God the Father spares no sinner, but while he looks upon the face of his Son: but that in him our sins should be pardoned, and our persons spared, is as necessary a consideration as any. "Nemo enim potest benè agere pœnitentiam, nisi qui speraverit indulgentiam[e]." To what purpose does God call us to repentance, if, at the same time, he does not invite us to pardon? It is the state and misery of the damned, to repent without hope; and if this also could be the state of the penitent in this life, the sermons of repentance were useless and comfortless, God's mercies were none at all to sinners, the institution and office of preaching and reconciling penitents were impertinent, and man should die by the laws of angels, who never were enabled to live by their strength and measures; and consequently, all mankind were infinitely and eternally miserable, lost irrecoverably, perishing without a Saviour, tied to a law

[d] Lib. 6. contr. Julian. c. 9. [e] S. Ambr. de Pœnit. lib. 1. c. 2.

too hard for him, and condemned by unequal and intolerable sentences.

2. Tertullian, considering that God threatens all impenitent sinners, argues demonstratively: "Neque enim comminaretur non pœnitenti, si non ignosceret delinquenti[f]." If men repent not, God will be severely angry; it will be infinitely the worse for us if we do not; and shall it be so too if we do repent? God forbid. "Frustra mortuus est Christus, si aliquos vivificare non potest. Mentitur Johannes Baptista, et digito Christum et voce demonstrans, 'Ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi,' si sunt adhuc in sæculo quorum Christus peccata non tulerit."—"In vain did Christ die, if he cannot give life to all. And the Baptist deceived us when he pointed out Christ unto us, saying, 'Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world,' if there were any in the world, whose sins Christ hath not borne[g]."

3. But God by the old prophets called upon them, who were under the covenant of works in open appearance, that they also should repent, and by antedating the mercies of the Gospel, promised pardon to the penitent; he promised mercy by Moses and the prophets; he proclaimed his name to be mercy and forgiveness; he did solemnly swear he did 'not desire the death of a sinner, but that he should repent and live;' and the Holy Spirit of God hath respersed every book of Holy Scripture with great and legible lines of mercy, and sermons of repentance. In short, it was the sum of all the sermons, which were made by those whom God sent with his word in their mouths, that they should live innocently, or, when they had sinned, they should repent and be saved from their calamity[h].

4. But when Christ came into the world, he opened the fountains of mercy, and broke down all the banks of restraint; he preached repentance, offered health, gave life, called all wearied and burdened persons to come to him for ease and remedy, he glorified his Father's mercies, and himself became the great instrument and channel of its emanation. He preached and commanded mercy by the example of God;

[f] Lib. 2. de Pœnit. [g] S. Hierom. Epist. ad Ocean.

[h] Exod. xxxiv. 6. Psal. ciii. per totum cxxviii. Isa. lv. 7, 8. Jer. xviii. 7, 8. Ezek. xviii. 21, 22. xxxiii. 11. Dan. iv. 27. Mal. iii. 7. Joel, ii. 13. Jonah, iv. 2. iii. 9.

he made his religion that he taught, to be wholly made up of doing and receiving good; this by faith, that by charity. He commanded an indefinite and unlimited forgiveness of our brother, repenting after injuries done to us seventy times seven times: and though there could be little question of that, yet he was pleased to signify to us, that as we needed more, so we should have, and find, more mercy at the hands of God. And therefore, he hath appointed a whole order of men, whom he maintains at his own charges, and furnishes with especial commissions[i], and endues with a lasting power, and employs on his own errand, and instructs with his own Spirit; whose business is 'to remit and retain,' to 'exhort and to restore,' sinners by the means of repentance, and 'the word of their proper ministry.' 'Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted;' that is their authority: and their office is, 'to pray all men, in Christ's stead, to be reconciled to God.' And, after all this, Christ himself labours to bring it to effect; not only assisting his ministers with the gifts of an excellent Spirit, and exacting of them 'the account of souls;' but, that it may be prosperous and effectual, himself intercedes in heaven before the throne of grace, doing for sinners the office of an advocate and a reconciler. "If any man sins, we have an Advocate with the Father; and he is the propitiation for all our sins, and for the sins of the whole world[k]:" and therefore it is not only the matter of our hopes, but an article of our creed, that we may have forgiveness of our sins by the blood of Jesus. "Qui nullum excepit, in Christo donavit omnia:" "God hath excepted none, and therefore in Christ pardons all."

5. For there is not in Scripture any catalogue of sins set down, for which Christ died, and others excluded from that state of mercy. All that believe and repent shall be pardoned, if they 'go and sin no more.'—"Deus distinctionem non facit, qui misericordiam suam promisit omnibus, et relaxandi licentiam sacerdotibus suis sine ullâ exceptione concessit," said St. Ambrose: "God excepts none, but hath given power to his ministers to release all, absolutely all[l]."—And St. Bernard argues this article upon the account of

[i] Matt. xviii. 15, 16. John, xx. 23. 2 Cor. vii. 10. Gal. vi. 1. Jam. i. 15, 16. 19, 20. 1 John, ii. i. 9. 11. Rev. ii. 5. iii. 1—3. 19, 20.
[k] 1 John, ii. 2, 3. [l] Lib. 1. de Pœnit. c. 2.

those excellent examples, which the Spirit of God hath consigned to us in Holy Scripture. "If Peter, after so great a fall, did arrive to such an eminence of sanctity, hereafter who shall despair, provided that he will depart from his sins[m]?" For that God is ready to forgive the greatest criminals if they repent, appears in the instances of Ahab and Manasses, of Mary Magdalen and St. Paul, of the thief on the cross and the deprehended adulteress, and of the Jews themselves, —who, after they had crucified the Lord of life, were by messengers of his own invited, passionately invited to repent, and be purified with that blood, which they had sacrilegiously and impiously spilt. But, concerning this, who please may read St. Austin discoursing upon those words; 'Mittet crystallum suum sicut buccellas;' which, saith he, mystically represent the readiness of God to break and make contrite even the hearts of them, that have been hardened in impiety. "Quo loco consistent pœnitentiam agentes, ibi justi non poterunt stare," said the doctors of the Jews: "The just and innocent persons shall not be able to stand in the same place, where the penitent shall be[n]."—"Pacem, pacem remoto et propinquo, ait Dominus, ut sanem eum:" "Peace to him that is afar off, and to him that is near, saith the Lord, that I may heal him."—'Præponit remotum:' that is their observation; 'He that is afar off is set before the other;'—that is, he that is at great distance from God, as if God did use the greater earnestness to reduce him. Upon which place their gloss adds; "Magna est virtus eorum qui pœnitentiam agunt, ita ut nulla creatura in septo illorum consistere queat:" "So great is the virtue of them that are true penitents, that no creature can stand within their enclosure." And all this is far better expressed by those excellent words of our blessed Saviour; "There is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety-nine just persons, that need no repentance[o]."

6. I have been the longer in establishing and declaring the proper foundation of this article, upon which every one can declaim, but every one cannot believe it in the day of temptation; because I guess what an intolerable evil it is to despair of pardon, by having felt the trouble of some very

[m] In solemni Petri et Pauli, ser. 3. [n] Gemara de Synedrio, c. 11.
[o] Luke, xv. 7.

great fears. And this were the less necessary, but that it is too commonly true, that they who repent least are most confident of their pardon, or rather, least consider any reasons against their security: but when a man truly apprehends the vileness of his sin, he ought also to consider the state of his danger, which is wholly upon the stock of what is past; that is, his danger is this, that he knows not when, or whether, or upon what terms, God will pardon him in particular. But of this I shall have a more apt occasion to speak in the following periods. For the present, the article in general is established upon the testimonies of the greatest certainty.

SECTION II.

Of Pardon of Sins committed after Baptism.

7. But, it may be, our easiness of life, and want of discipline, and our desires to reconcile our pleasures and temporal satisfactions with the hopes of heaven, hath made us apt to swallow all that seems to favour our hopes. But it is certain, that some Christian doctors have taught the doctrine of repentance with greater severity, than is intimated in the premises. For all the examples of pardon, consigned to us in the Old Testament, are nothing to us, who live under the New, and are to be judged by other measures. And as for those instances which are recorded in the New Testament, and all the promises and affirmations of pardon,—they are sufficiently verified in that pardon of sins, which is first given to us in baptism, and at our first conversion to Christianity. Thus when St. Stephen prayed for his persecutors,—and our blessed Lord himself, on his uneasy death-bed of the cross, prayed for them that crucified him,—it can only prove, that these great sins are pardonable in our first access to Christ, because they, for whom Christ and his martyr St. Stephen prayed, were not yet converted,—and so were to be saved by baptismal repentance. Then the power of the keys is exercised, and the gates of the kingdom are opened; then we enter into the covenant of mercy and pardon, and promise faith and perpetual obedience to the laws of Jesus;

and upon that condition, forgiveness is promised and exhibited, offered and consigned, but never after: for it is in Christianity for all great sins, as in the civil law for theft. "Qui eâ mente alienum quid contrectavit ut lucrifaceret, tametsi, mutato consilio, id Domino postea reddidit, fur est: nemo enim, tali peccato, pœnitentiâ suâ nocens esse desinit," said Ulpian and Gaius[p]. Repentance does not here take off the punishment, nor the stain. And so it seems to be in Christianity, in which every baptized person, having stipulated for obedience, is upon those terms admitted to pardon, and consequently, if he fails of his duty, he shall fail of the grace.

8. But that this objection may proceed no further, it is certain that it is an infinite lessening of the mercy of God in Jesus Christ, to confine pardon of sins only to the font. For that even lapsed Christians may be restored by repentance, and be pardoned, appears in the story of the 'incestuous Corinthian,' and the precept of St. Paul to the spiritual man, or the curate of souls. "If any man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual, restore such a man in the spirit of meekness, considering thyself lest thou also be tempted[q]." The Christian might fall, and the Corinthian did so,—and the minister himself, he who had the ministry of restitution and reconciliation, was also in danger: and yet they all might be restored. To the same sense is that of St. James; "Is any man sick among you? Let him send for the presbyters of the church, and let them pray over him. Κἂν ἁμαρτίας ᾖν πεποιηκὼς, 'Although he was a doer of sins,' they shall be forgiven him[r]." For there is an ἀδικία, 'a sin' that is not unto death. And therefore when St. Austin, in his first book 'de Sermone Dei,' had said that there is some sin so great that it cannot be remitted, he retracts his words with this clause; "addendum fuit," &c. "I should have added, if in so great perverseness of mind he ends his life. For we must not despair of the worst sinner, we may not despair of any, since we ought to pray for all."

9. For it is beyond exception or doubt, that it was the great work of the apostles, and of the whole New Testament, to engage men in a perpetual repentance. For since all men

p L. 65. D. de furtis, et l. 1. D. de Ædilitio edicto.
q Gal. vi. 1. r James, v. 15.

do sin, all men must repent, or all men must perish. And very many periods of Scripture are directed to lapsed Christians, baptized persons falling into grievous crimes, calling them to repentance. So Simon Peter to Simon Magus: Μετανόησον ἀπὸ κακίας, 'Repent of thy wickedness[s];' and to the Corinthian Christians St. Paul urges the purpose of his legation; 'We pray in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God.' The Spirit of God reproved some of the Asian churches for foul misdemeanours, and even some of the 'angels, the Asian bishops,' calling upon them to 'return to their first love,' and 'to repent and to do their first works;' and to the very Gnostics, and filthiest heretics he gave 'space to repent,' and threatened extermination to them, if they did not do it 'speedily[t].' For,

10. Baptism is εἰς μετάνοιαν, the admission of us to the covenant of faith and repentance; or as Mark the Anchoret called it, προόφασίς ἐστι τῆς μετανοίας, 'the introduction to repentance,' or that state of life that is full of labour and care, and 'amendment of our faults;' for that is the best life that any man can live: and therefore repentance hath its progress after baptism, as it hath its beginning before: for first 'repentance is unto baptism,' and then 'baptism unto repentance.' And if it were otherwise, the church had but ill provided for the state of her sons and daughters by commanding the baptism of infants. For if repentance were not allowed after, then their early baptism would take from them all hopes of repentance, and destroy the mercies of the Gospel, and make it now to all Christendom a law of works in the greater instances; because since in our infancy we neither need, nor can perform, repentance,—if to them that sin after baptism, repentance be denied, it is in the whole denied to them for ever to repent[u]. But "God hath provided better things for us, and such which accompany salvation."

11. For besides those many things which have been already considered, our admission to the holy sacrament of the Lord's supper, is a perpetual entertainment of our hopes: because then and there is really exhibited to us the body that was broken, and the blood that was 'shed for remission of

[s] Acts, viii. 22. [t] Apocal. ii. 16. 5. 21.
[u] Vide Great Exemplar, part 1. disc. of Baptism, p. 175, &c.

sins:' still it is applied, and that application could not be necessary to be done anew, if there were not new necessities; and still we are invited to do actions of repentance, 'to examine ourselves, and so to eat:' all which, as things are ordered, would be infinitely useless to mankind, if it did not mean pardon to Christians falling into foul sins even after baptism.

12. I shall add no more but the words of St. Paul to the Corinthians; "Lest when I come again, my God will humble me among you, and that I shall bewail many who have sinned already, and have not repented of the uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness, which they have committed [z]." Here is a fierce accusation of some of them, for the foulest and the basest crimes; and a reproof of their not repenting, and a threatening them with censures ecclesiastical I suppose this article to be sufficiently concluded from the premises. The necessity of which proof they only will best believe, who are severely penitent, and full of apprehension and fear of the divine anger, because they have highly deserved it. However, I have served my own needs in it, and the need of those whose consciences have been, or shall be, so timorous as mine hath deserved to be. But against the universality of this doctrine there are two grand objections; the one is the severer practice and doctrine of the primitive church, denying repentance to some kind of sinners after baptism:—the other, the usual discourses and opinions concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost. Of these I shall give account in the two following sections.

SECTION III.

Of the Difficulty of obtaining Pardon: the Doctrine and Practice of the Primitive Church in this Article.

13. NOVATIANUS and Novatus said, that the church had not power to minister pardon of sins, except only in baptism; which proposition, when they had well digested and considered, they did thus explicate. That there are some capital

[z] 2 Cor. xii. 21.

sins, crying and clamorous, into which if a Christian did fall after baptism, the church hath nothing to do with him, she could not absolve him.

14. This opinion of theirs, was a branch of the elder heresy of Montanus, which had abused Tertullian, who fiercely declaims against the decree of Pope Zephyrinus [y], because, against the custom of his decessors, he admitted adulterers to repentance, while at the same time he refused idolaters and murderers. And this their severity did not seem to be put upon the account of a present necessity, or their own zeal, or for the avoiding scandal, or their love of holiness; but upon the nature of the thing itself, and the sentences of Scripture. An old man, of whom Irenæus [z] makes mention, said; "Non debemus superbi esse, neque reprehendere veteres, ne fortè, post agnitionem Dei, agentes aliquid quod non placet Deo, remissionem non habeamus ultrà delictorum, et excludamur à regno ejus:" "We must not be proud and reprove our fathers, lest, after the knowledge of God, we, doing something that does not please God, we may no more have remission of our sins, but be excluded from his kingdom." To the same purpose is that canon made by the Gallic bishops against the false accusers of their brethren; 'ut ad exitum ne communicent:' 'that they should not be admitted to the communion or peace of the church, no, not at their death.'—And Pacianus, bishop of Barcinona, gives a severe account of the doctrine of the Spanish churches even in his time, and of their refusing to admit idolaters, murderers, and adulterers to repentance. "Other sins may be cured by the exercise of good works; but these three kill like the breath of a basilisk, and are to be feared like a deadly arrow. They that were guilty of such crimes, did despair. What have I done to you? Was it not in your power to have let it alone? Did no man admonish you? Did none foretell the event? Was the church silent? Did the Gospels say nothing? Did the apostles threaten nothing? Did the priest entreat nothing of you? Why do you seek for late comforts? Then you might have sought for them, when they were to be had. But they that pronounce such men happy, do but abuse you [a]."

15. This opinion, and the consequent practice, had its fate in several places to live longer or die sooner. And in

[y] De Pudic. c. 5. 9. [z] Lib. 4. c. 45. [a] Paræn. ad Pœnit.

Africa[b] the decree of Zephyrinus, for the admission of penitent adulterers, was not admitted even by the orthodox and catholics; but they dissented placidly and modestly, and governed their own churches by the old severity. For there was then no thought of any necessity that other churches should obey the sanctions of the Pope, or the decrees of Rome, but they retained the old discipline. But yet the piety and the reasonableness of the decree of Zephyrinus prevailed by little and little, and adulterers were admitted; but the severity stuck longer upon idolaters or apostates: for they were not to be admitted to the peace of the church, although they should afterward suffer martyrdom for the name of Christ: and for this they pretended the words of St. Paul; "Non possunt admitti, secundum Apostolum[c]," as St. Cyprian expressly affirms[d]; and the same is the sentence of the first canon of the council of Eliberis.

16. When they began to remit of this rigour, which they did in or about St. Cyprian's time, they did admit these great criminals to repentance: *once*, but *no more;* as appears in Tertullian[e], the council of[f] Eliberis, the synod at Syde in Pamphylia against the Messalians[g], St. Ambrose[h], St. Austin, and Macedonius[i]; which makes it suspicious that the words of Origen are interpolated, saying, "In gravioribus criminibus, semel tantùm vel rarò, pœnitentiæ conceditur locus." But *once* or *but seldom;* so the words are now; but the practice of that age was not so remiss, for they gave *once* and *no more:* as appears in the foregoing authors, and in the eleventh canon of the third council of Toledo. For as St. Clemens of Alexandria affirms; "Apparet, sed non est, pœnitentia, sæpe petere de iis, quæ sæpe peccantur:" "It is but a seeming repentance, that falls often after a frequent return[k]."

17. But this gentleness (for it was the greatest they then had) they ministered to such only as desired it in their health, and in the days in which they could live the lives of penitents, and make amends for their folly. For if men had lived wickedly, and on their death-beds desired to be admitted to repentance and pardon, they refused them utterly; as appears

[b] St. Cyprian. ep. 52.
[c] Heb. vi. 4—6.
[d] Ubi supra.
[e] De Pœnit.
[f] Can. 7.
[g] Lib. 2. de Pœnit. c. 10.
[h] Ep. 54.
[i] Ep. 53. Hom. 15. in 25. cap. Levit.
[k] Stromat. lib. 2.

in that excellent epistle[l] of St. Cyprian to Antonianus: "Prohibendos omnino censuimus à spe communionis et pacis, si in infirmitate atque periculo cœperint deprecari;" "At no hand are those to be admitted to church-communion, who repent only in their danger and weakness," because "not repentance of their fault, but the hasty warning of instant or approaching death compelled them: neither is he worthy in death to receive the comfort, who did not think he was to die." And consequently to this severity, in his sermon 'de Lapsis,' he advises that "every man should confess his sin, while his confession can be admitted, while his satisfaction may be acceptable, and his pardon ratified by God."—The same was decreed by the fathers in the synod of Arles[m].

18. This was severe, if we judge of it by the manners and propositions of the present age. But iniquity did so abound, and was so far from being cured by this severe discipline, that it made this discipline to be intolerable and useless. And therefore even from this also they did quickly retire. For in the time of Innocentius[n] and St. Austin, they began not only to impose penances on dying penitents, but even after a wicked life to reconcile them. They then first began to do it: but as it usually happens in first attempts, and insolent actions, they were fearful, and knew not the event, and would warrant nothing. "To hinder them that are in peril of death, from the use of the last remedy, is hard and impious; but to promise any thing in so late a cure is temerarious:" so Salvian:—and St. Chrysostom to Theodorus would not have such persons despaired, so neither nourished up by hope: only it is better, 'nihil inexpertum relinquere quàm morientem nolle curare," "to try every way, rather than that the dying penitent should fail for want of help." But Isidore said plainly, "He who living wickedly, repents in the time of his death, as his damnation is uncertain, so his pardon is doubtful."

19. This was the most dangerous indulgence, and easiness of doctrine, that had as yet entered into the church; but now it was tumbling, and therefore could not stop here, but presently, down went all severity. All sinners, and at all times, and as often as they would, might be admitted to repentance and pardon, whether they could or could not per-

[l] Epist. 52. [m] Arelat. 1. c. 23. [n] Innocent. epist. ad Exuper.

form the stations and injunctions of the penitents; and this took off the edge of public and ecclesiastical repentance; and to this succeeded private repentance, where none but God and the priest were witnesses; and because this was a recession from the old discipline, and of itself an abuse, or but the relics of discipline at the best, and therefore not necessary because it was but an imperfect supply of something that was better,—this also is in some places, laid aside; in others, too much abused. But of that in its place.

20. But now that I may give an account concerning the first severity: concerning their not admitting those three sorts of criminals to repentance, but denying it to none else, I consider, 1. That there is no place of Scripture, that was pretended to exclude those three capital sins from hopes of pardon. For one of them there was, of which I shall give account in the following periods[o]: but for murder and adultery there were very many authorities of Scripture to prove them pardonable, but none to prove them unpardonable. 2. What can be pretended why idolatry, murder, and adultery, should be less pardonable, if repented of, than incest, treason, heresy, sodomy, or sacrilege? These were not denied; and yet some of them are greater criminals than some that were: but the value is set upon crimes as men please. 3. That, even in these three cases, the church did allow repentance in the very beginning, appears beyond exception in Irenæus[p], who writes concerning the women seduced by the heretic Mark, and so guilty of both adulteries, carnal and spiritual, that they were admitted to repentance. 4. St. Clemens of Alexandria affirms indefinitely, concerning all persons lapsed after baptism, that they may be restored and pardoned. Ἰστέον μέν τοι τοὺς μετὰ τὸ λουτρὸν τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι περιπίπτοντας, τούτους εἶναι τοὺς παιδευομένους· τὰ μὲν γὰρ προενεργηθέντα ἀφείθη, τὰ δὲ ἐπιγινόμενα ἐκκαθαίρεται. "They that fall into sins after baptism, must be chastened: for those things which were committed before baptism, are pardoned, but they which are committed afterward, are to be purged[q]." For it is certain, that God did not shut up the fountain, which he opened in baptism: then he smote the

[o] Sect. 4.

[p] Lib. 1. c. 9. Hæ sæpissime, conversæ ad ecclesiam Dei, confessæ sunt, et secundum corpus exterminatas se ab eo, velut cupidine, &c.

[q] Strom. 4.

rock, and the stream flowed out, and it became a river, and ran in dry places. 5. It is more than probable, that, in Egypt, it was very ordinary to admit lapsed persons, and even idolaters, to repentance, because of the strange levity of the nation,—and that even the bishops did, at the coming of Adrianus the emperor, devote themselves to Serapis. "Illi qui Serapim colunt, Christiani sunt: et devoti sunt Serapi, qui se Christi episcopos dicunt:" so the Emperor testifies in his letters to Servianus[r]. For it is not to be supposed that it was part of their persuasion that they might lawfully do it, or that it was solemn and usual so to do; but that, to avoid persecution, they did choose rather to seem inconstant and changeable than to be killed,—especially in that nation, which was 'tota levis et pendula, et ad omnia famæ momenta volans' (as these letters say), 'light and inconstant, tossed about with every noise of fame and variety.' These bishops, after the departure of Cæsar, without peradventure, did, many of them, return to their charges, and they and their priests pardoned each other; just as the 'Libellatici' and the 'Thurificati' did, in Carthage and all Africa, as St. Cyprian relates. 6. In Ephrem Syrus there is a form of confession and of prayer for the pardon of foul sins: *Σπλαγχνίσθητι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις μου, ταῖς ἀδικίαις, ταῖς πλεονεξίαις, ταῖς καταλαλίαις, ταῖς αἰσχρολογίαις*: "Have mercy on my sins, my injustices, my covetousness (which some render *unnatural lusts*), my adulteries and fornications, my idle and filthy speakings." —If these after baptism are pardonable, 'Quid non speremus?' the former severity must be understood not to be their doctrine but their discipline.

21. And the same is to be said concerning their giving repentance but to those, whom they did admit after baptism; —we find it expressly affirmed by the next ages, that the purpose of their fathers was only for discipline and caution. So St. Austin: "The church did cautiously and healthfully provide, that penitents should but once be admitted, lest a frequent remedy should become contemptible; yet who dares say, Why do ye again spare this man, who, after his first repentance, is again entangled in the snares of sin[s]?"

22. So that whereas some of them use to say of certain sins, that 'after baptism, or after the first relapse, they are

[r] Apud Spartian. [s] Epist. 54.

unpardonable,'—we must know, that in the style of the church, 'unpardonable' signified such, to which, by the discipline and customs of the church, pardon was not ministered. They were called 'unpardonable,' not because God would not pardon them, but because he alone could: this we learn from those words of Tertullian, "Salvâ illâ pœnitentiæ specie post fidem, quæ aut levioribus delictis veniam ab episcopo consequi poterit, aut majoribus et irremissibilibus à Deo solo." The lighter or lesser sins might obtain pardon from the ministry of the bishop;

Hoc satis est; ipsi cætera mando Deo;

The greatest and the unpardonable could obtain it of God alone: so that when they did deny to absolve some certain criminals after baptism, or after a relapse, they did not affirm the sins to be unpardonable, as we understand the word. Novatus himself did not; for, as Socrates[t] reports, he wrote to all the churches every where, that they should not admit them, that had sacrificed, to the mysteries; *ἀλλὰ προτρέπειν μὲν αὐτοὺς εἰς μετάνοιαν, τὴν δὲ συγχώρησιν ἐπιτρέπειν θεῷ τῷ δυναμένῳ καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντι συγχωρεῖν ἁμαρτήματα,* 'but to exhort them to repentance, and yet to leave their pardon and absolution to him who is able, and hath authority, to forgive sins.'—And the same also was the doctrine of Acesius, his great disciple; for which Constantine in Eusebius reproved him. Some single men have despaired, but there was never any sect of men that sealed up the divine mercy by the locks and bars of despair, much less did any good Christians ever do it.

23. And this we find expressly verified by the French bishops in a synod there held about the time of Pope Zephyrinus. "Pœnitentia ab his, qui dæmonibus [u] *sanctificant*, agenda ad diem mortis, non sine spe tamen remissionis, quam ab eo planè sperare debebunt, qui ejus largitatem et solus obtinet, et tam dives misericordiæ est ut nemo desperet:" "Although the criminal must do penance to his dying day (that is, the church will not absolve, or admit him to her communion), yet he must not be without hope of pardon, which yet is not to be hoped for from the church, but from him, who is so rich in mercy, that no man may despair:" and not

[t] Lib. 4. cap. 14.

[u] Sacrificant, potiùs legend.

long after this, St. Cyprian said, "Though we leave them in their separation from us, yet we have and do exhort them to repent, if by any means they can receive indulgence from him who can perform it[x]."

24. Now if it be inquired, what real effect this had upon the persons or souls of the offending, relapsing persons;—the consideration is weighty and material. For to say the church could not absolve such persons, in plain speaking seems to mean, that since the church ministers nothing of her own, but is the minister of the divine mercy,—she had no commission to promise pardon to such persons. If God had promised pardon to such criminals, it is certain the church was bound to preach it; but if she could not declare, preach, or exhibit, any such promise,—then there was no such promise; and therefore their sending them to God was but a put-off, or a civil answer, saying, that God might do it if he please, but he had not signified his pleasure concerning them, and whether they who sinned so foully after baptism, were pardonable, was no where revealed;—and therefore, all the ministers of religion were bound to say, they were unpardonable,—that is, God never said he would pardon them,—which is the full sense of the word 'unpardonable.' For he that says, any sin is 'unpardonable,' does not mean, that God cannot pardon it, but that he will not,—or that he hath not said, he will.

25. And upon the same account it seemed unreasonable to St. Ambrose, that the church should impose penances, and not release the penitents. He complained of the Novatians for so doing; "Cum utique, veniam negando, incentivum auferant pœnitentiæ[y]." The penitents could have little encouragement to perform the injunctions of their confessors, when, after they had done them, they should not be admitted to the church's communion. And indeed the case was hard, when it should be remembered, that whatsoever the church did bind on earth was bound in heaven, and if they retained them below, God would do so above; and therefore we find in Scripture that δοῦναι μετάνοιαν, 'to give repentance'—(being the purpose of Christ's coming, and the grace of the Gospel), does mean, 'to give the effect of repentance,'—that is, par-

x Epist. 31. Quos separatos à nobis derelinquimus, &c.
y Lib. 1. de Pœnit. c. 2.

don. And since God's method is such (for by giving the grace, and admitting us to do the duty, he consequently brings us to that mercy, which is the end of that duty), it is fit, that such should also be the method of the church.

26. For the balancing of this consideration, we are further to consider, that though the church had power to pardon in all things, where God had declared he would, yet because in some sins the malice was so great, the scandal so intolerable, the effect so mischievous, the nature of them so contradictory to the excellent laws of Christianity, the church many times could not give a competent judgment, whether any man, that had committed great sins, had made his amends, and done a sufficient penance: and the church, not knowing whether their repentance was worthy and acceptable to God, she could not pronounce their pardon, that is, she could not tell them, whether upon those terms God had or would pardon them, in the present disposition.

27. For after great crimes, the state of a sinner is very deplorable by reason of his uncertain pardon; not that it is uncertain, whether God will pardon the truly penitent, but that it is uncertain who is so; and all the ingredients into the judgment that is to be made, are such things which men cannot well discern; they cannot tell in what measures God will exact the repentance, what sorrow is sufficient, what fruits acceptable, what is expiatory, and what rejected; according to the saying of Solomon, "Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin[s]?" They cannot tell how long God will forbear, at what time his anger is final, and when he will refuse to hear, or what aggravations of the crime God looks on; nor can they make an estimate which is greater, the example of the sin, or the example of the punishment. And therefore, in such great cases, the church had reason to refuse to give pardon, which she could minister neither certainly, nor prudently, nor (as the case then stood) safely, or piously.

28. But yet she enjoined penances, that is, all the solemnities of repentance, and to them the sinners stood bound in earth, and consequently in heaven (according to the words of our blessed Saviour), but she bound them no further. She intended charity and relief to them, not ruin and death eternal.

[s] Prov. xx. 9.

On this she had no direct power; and if the penitents were obedient to her discipline, then neither could they be prejudiced by her indirect power, she sent them to God for pardon, and made them to prepare themselves accordingly. Her injunction of penances was medicinal, and her refusing to admit them to the communion, was an act of caution fitted to the present necessities of the church. "Nonnulli ideò poscunt pœnitentiam, ut statim sibi reddi communionem velint. Hi non tam se solvere cupiunt, quàm sacerdotem ligare:" "Some demand penances, that they may have speedy communion. These do not so much desire themselves to be loosed, as to have the priest bound[a];" that is, such hasty proceedings do not any good to the penitent, but much hurt to him that ministers. This the primitive church avoided; and this was the whole effect, which that discipline had upon the souls of the penitents. But for their doctrine St. Austin is a sufficient witness: "Sed neque de ipsis criminibus quamlibet magnis remittendis, in sanctâ ecclesiâ Dei desperanda est misericordia agentibus pœnitentiam secundum modum sui cujusque peccati:" "They ought not to despair of God's mercy, even to the greatest sinners, if they be the greatest penitents, that is, if they repent according to the measure of their sins[b]." Only in the making their judgments concerning the measures of repentance, they differed from our practices. Ecclesiastical repentance and absolution, were not only an exercise of the duty, and an assisting of the penitent in his return, but it was also a warranting or ensuring the pardon; which because in many cases, the church could not so well do, she did better in not undertaking it; that is, in not pronouncing absolution.

29. For the pardon of sins committed after baptism, not being described in full measures; and though it be sufficiently signified, that any sin may be pardoned, yet not being told upon what conditions this or that great one shall, —the church did well and warily not to be too forward: for as St. Paul said, "I am conscious to myself in nothing, yet I am not hereby justified;" so we may say in repentance, "I have repented, and do so, but I am not hereby justified;" because that is a secret, which until the day of judgment, we shall not understand: for every repenting is not sufficient.

[a] St. Ambros. lib. 2. de Pœnit. c. 9. [b] Enchir. 6.

He that repents worthily, let his sin be what it will, shall certainly be pardoned; but after great crimes who does repent worthily, is a matter of harder judgment than the manners of the present age will allow us to make; and so secret, that they thought it not amiss very often to be backward in pronouncing the criminal absolved.

30. But then, all this whole affair must needs be a mighty arrest to the gaieties of this sinful age. For although Christ's blood can expiate all sins, and his Spirit can sanctify all sinners, and his church can restore all that are capable;—yet, if we consider that the particulars of every naughty man's case are infinitely uncertain; that there are no minute-measures of repentance set down after baptism, that there are some states of sinners which God does reject; that the arrival to this state is by parts, and undetermined steps of progression; that no man can tell, when any sin begins to be unpardonable to such a person; and that if we be careless of ourselves, and easy in our judgments, and comply with the false measures of any age, we may be in before we are aware, and cannot come out so soon as we expect; and lastly, if we consider that the primitive and apostolical churches,—who best knew how to estimate the mercies of the Gospel, and the requisites of repentance, and the malignity and dangers of sin,—did not promise pardon so easily, so readily, so quickly, as we do, we may think it fit to be more afraid and more contrite, more watchful and more severe.

31. I end this with the words of St. Jerome[c]; "Cum beatus Daniel, præscius futurorum, de sententia Dei dubitet, rem temerariam faciunt, qui audacter peccatoribus indulgentiam pollicentur;" "Though Daniel could foretell future things, yet he durst not pronounce concerning the king, whether God would pardon him or no; it is therefore a great rashness, boldly to promise pardon to them that have sinned." That is, it is not to be done suddenly; according to the caution which St. Paul[d] gave to the bishop of Ephesus: "Lay hands suddenly on no man;"—that is, absolve him not without great trial, and just dispositions.

32. For though this be not at all to be wrested to a suspicion, that the sins in their kind are not pardonable,

[c] Ad Dan. [d] 1 Tim. v. 22.

yet thus far I shall make use of it; that God who only hath the power, he only can make the judgment, whether the sinner be a worthy penitent or not. For there being no express stipulation made concerning the degrees of repentance, no 'taxa pœnitentiaria,' 'penitential tables' and canons consigned by God, it cannot be told by man, when, after great sins and a long iniquity, the unhappy man shall be restored, because it wholly depends upon the divine acceptance.

33. In smaller offences, and the seldom returns of sin intervening in a good or a probable life, the curates of souls may make safe and prudent judgments. But when the case is high, and the sin is clamorous, or scandalous, or habitual, they ought not to be too easy in speaking peace to such persons, to whom God hath so fiercely threatened death eternal. But to hold their hands, may possibly increase the sorrow, and contrition, and fear, of the penitent and returning man, and by that means make him the surer of it. But it is too great a confidence and presumption to dispense God's pardon, or the king's, upon easy terms, and without their commission.

34. For since all the rule and measures of dispensing it, is by analogies and proportions, by some reason, and much conjecture; it were better, by being restrained in the ministries of favour, to produce fears and watchfulness, carefulness and godly sorrow, than by an open hand to make sinners bold and many, confident and easy. Those holy and wise men, who were our fathers in Christ, did well weigh the dangers, into which a sinning man had entered, and did dreadfully fear the issues of the divine anger; and therefore, although they openly taught, that God hath set open the gates of mercy to all worthy penitents, yet concerning repentance they had other thoughts than we have; and that, in the pardon of sinners there are many more things to be considered, besides the possibility of having the sin pardoned.

SECTION IV.

Of the Sin against the Holy Ghost; and in what Sense it is or may be unpardonable.

35. UPON what account the primitive church did refuse to admit certain criminals to repentance, I have already discoursed; but because there are some places of Scripture, which seem to have encouraged such severity by denying repentance also to some sinners, it is necessary that they be considered also, lest by being misunderstood, some persons, in the days of their sorrow, be tempted to despair.

36. The Novatians denying repentance to lapsed Christians, pretended for their warrant those words of St. Paul[e];" "It is impossible for those, who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they shall fall away, —to renew them again unto repentance, seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to open shame;" and parallel to this are those other words. "For if we sin wilfully, after we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking-for of judgment, and a fiery indignation, which shall consume the adversaries[f]." The sense of which words will be clear upon the explicating what is meant by παραπεσόντες, what by ἀνακαινίζειν, and what by ἀδύνατον.

37. "If they shall fall away[g]," viz. from that state of excellent things in which they had received all the present endearments of the Gospel, a full conviction, pardon of sins, the earnest of the Spirit, the comfort of the promises, an antepast of heaven itself; if these men shall fall away from all this, it cannot be by infirmity, by ignorance, by surprise; this is that which St. Paul calls ἑκουσίως ἁμαρτάνειν, "'to sin wilfully' after they have received the knowledge of the truth:" malicious sinners these are, who sin against the Holy Spirit, whose influences they throw away, whose counsels they despise, whose comforts they refuse, whose doctrine they scorn, and from thence fall, not only into one single wasting

[e] Heb. vi. 4—6. [f] Heb. x. 26, 27. [g] Παραπεσόντας.

sin, but παραπίπτουσι, they 'fall away' into a contrary state; into heathenism, or the heresy of the Gnostics, or to any state of despising and hating Christ; expressed here by "crucifying the Son of God afresh, and putting him to an open shame;" these are they here meant; such who after they had worshipped Jesus, and given up their names to him, and had been blessed by him, and felt it, and acknowledged it, and rejoiced in it,—these men afterward, without cause or excuse, without error or infirmity, choosingly, willingly, knowingly, called Christ an impostor, and would have crucified him again if he had been alive, that is, they consented to his death, by believing that he suffered justly. This is the case here described, and cannot be drawn to any thing else but its parallel, that is, a malicious renouncing charity, or holy life, as these men did the faith, to both which they had made their solemn vows in baptism; but this can no way be drawn to the condemnation and final excision of such persons, who, after baptism, fall into any great sin, of which they are willing to repent.

38. There is also something peculiar in ἀνακαινίζειν, "renewing such men to repentance:" that is, these men are not to be redintegrate, and put into the former condition; they cannot be restored to any other gracious covenant of repentance, since they have despised this. Other persons who 'hold fast their profession,' and 'forget not that they were cleansed in baptism,' they, in case they do fall into sin, may proceed in the same method, in their first renovation to repentance, that is, in their being solemnly admitted to the method and state of repentance for all sins known and unknown. But when this renovation is renounced, when they despise the whole economy; when they reject this grace, and throw away the covenant, there is 'nothing left' for such 'but a fearful looking-for of judgment:' for these persons are incapable of the mercies of the Gospel, they are out of the way. For there being but one way of salvation, viz. by Jesus Christ, whom they renounce,—neither Moses, nor nature, nor any other name, can restore them. And, 2. Their case is so bad, and they so impious and malicious, that no man hath power to persuade such men to accept of pardon by those means, which they so disown. For there is no means of salvation but this one, and this one they hate, and

will not have; they will not return to the old, and there is none left, by which they can be ἀνακαινιζόμενοι, 'renewed;' and therefore their condition is desperate.

39. But the word ἀδύνατον, or 'impossible,' is also of special importance and consideration: "It is impossible to renew such." For 'impossible' is not to be understood in the natural sense, but in the legal and moral. There are degrees of impossibility, and therefore they are not all absolute and supreme. So when the law hath condemned a criminal, we usually say it is impossible for him to escape, meaning, that the law is clearly against him.

> Magnus ab infernis revocetur Tullius umbris,
> Et te defendat Regulus ipse licèt:
> Non potes absolvi:——[h]

That is, your cause is lost, you are inexcusable, there is no apology, no pleading for you: and that the same is here meant, we understand by those parallel words, οὐκ ἔτι ἀπολείπεται θυσία, 'there is left no sacrifice for him;' alluding to Moses's law, in which for them that sinned ἐν χειρὶ ὑπερηφανίας, 'with a high hand,' for 'them that despised Moses's law,' there was no sacrifice appointed[1]; which Ben Maimon expounds, saying, that for apostates there was no sacrifice in the law. So that 'it is impossible to renew such,' means, that it is ordinarily impossible, we have in the discipline of the church no door of reconciliation; if he repents of this, he is not the same man; but if he remains so, the church hath no promise to be heard, if she prays for him; which is the last thing that the church can do. 'To absolve him,' is 'to warrant him;' that in this case is absolutely impossible: but 'to pray for him' is 'to put him into some hopes,' and for that she hath in this case no commission. For this is 'the sin unto death,' of which St. John speaks, and gives no encouragement to pray. So that impossible does signify 'in sensu forensi,' a state of sin, which is sentenced by the law to be capital and damning; but here it signifies the highest degree of that deadliness and impossibility, as there are degrees of malignity and desperation in mortal diseases: for of all evils, this state here described is the worst. And therefore here is an impossibility.

[h] Mart. Ep. l. 4. ep. 16. [1] Heb. x. 26.

40. But besides all other senses of this word, it is certain, by the whole frame of the place, and the very analogy of the Gospel, that this impossibility here mentioned, is not an impossibility of the thing, but only relative to the person. It is impossible to restore him, whose state of evil is contrary to pardon and restitution, as being a renouncing the Gospel, that is, the whole covenant of pardon and repentance. Such is that parallel expression used by St. John: "He that is born of God, sinneth not; neither indeed *can he*[k];" that is, it is impossible; he 'cannot sin,' 'for the seed of God remaineth in him.' Now this does not signify, that a good man cannot possibly sin, if he would; that is, it does not signify a natural, or an absolute impossibility; but such as relates to the present state and condition of the person, being contrary to sin: the same with that of St. Paul; "Be ye led by the Spirit; for the Spirit lusteth against the flesh; so that ye cannot do the things which you would[l]," viz. which the flesh would fain tempt you to. A good man cannot sin, that is, very hardly can he be brought to choose or to delight in it; he cannot sin without a horrible trouble and uneasiness to himself: so on the other side, such apostates as the Apostle speaks of, "cannot be renewed;" that is, without extreme difficulty, and a perfect contradiction to that state, in which they are, for the present, lost. But if this man will repent with a repentance proportioned to that evil, which he hath committed, that he ought not to despair of pardon in the court of heaven, we have the affirmation of Justin Martyr. Τοὺς δὲ ὁμολογήσαντας καὶ ἐπιγνόντας τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν, καὶ ᾑτινοῦν αἰτίᾳ μεταβάντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἔννομον πολίτειαν, ἀρνησαμένους ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς, καὶ πρὶν τελευτῆς μὴ μεταγνόντας, οὐδόλως σωθήσεσθαι ἀποφαίνομαι. "They that confess and acknowledge him to be Christ, and for whatsoever cause go from him to the secular conversation," (viz. to heathenism or Judaism, &c.) "denying that he is Christ, and not confessing him again before their death, they can never be saved[m]." So that this impossibility concerns not those, that return and do confess him; but those that wilfully and maliciously reject this only way of salvation as false and deceitful, and never return to the confession of it

[k] 1 John, iii. 9. [l] Gal. v. 17.
[m] Dial. contr. Tryph.

again; which is the greatest sin against the Holy Ghost, of which I am, in the next place, to give a more particular account.

SECTION V.

41. "He that speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall never be forgiven him in this world, nor in the world to come;" so said our blessed Saviour[n].—Origen, and the Novatians after him,—when the scholars of Novatus, to justify their master's schism from the church, had changed the good old discipline into a new and evil doctrine,—said, that all the sins of Christians committed after baptism, are sins against the Holy Ghost, by whom in baptism they have been illuminated, and by him they were taught in the Gospel, and by him they were consigned in confirmation, and promoted in all the assistances and conduct of grace: and they gave this reason for it,—Because the Father is in all creatures; the Son only in the reasonable, and the Holy Spirit in Christians; against which if they prevaricate, they shall not be pardoned; while the sins of heathens, as being only against the Son, are easily pardoned in baptism.—I shall not need to refute this fond opinion, as being already done by St. Athanasius, in a book purposely written on this subject; and it falls alone; for that to sin against the Holy Ghost is not proper to Christians, appears in this, that Christ charged it upon the Pharisees: and that every sin of Christians is not this sin against the Holy Ghost, appears, because Christians are perpetually called upon to repent: for to what purpose should any man be called from his sin, if by returning he shall not escape damnation? or if he shall, then that sin is not against the Holy Ghost, or if it be, that sin is not unpardonable; either of which destroys their fond affirmative.

42. St. Austin makes final impenitence to be it: against which opinion though many things may be opposed, yet it is openly confuted in being charged upon the Pharisees, who were not then guilty of final impenitence. But the instance clears the article. The Pharisees saw the light of God's Spirit manifestly shining in the miracles which Christ did, and

[n] Matt. xii. 32.

they did not only despise his person and persecute it, which is 'speaking against the Son of man,' that is, sinning against him, for 'speaking against,' is 'sinning' or 'doing against' it, in the Jews' manner of expression; but they also spitefully and maliciously blasphemed that Spirit, and that power of God, by which they were convinced, and by which such miracles were done. And this was that ῥῆμα ἀργὸν, that 'idle and unprofitable word' spoken of in the following verses, by which Christ said they should be judged at the last day[o]; such which whosoever should speak, he should give account thereof in that day.

43. Now this was ever esteemed a high and an intolerable crime; for it was not new, but an old crime; only it was manifested by an appellative relating to a power and a name now more used than formerly. This was the sin, for which Corah and his company died, who did despise and reproach the works of God, his power and the mightiness of his hand manifested in his servant: it is called 'sinning with a high hand,' that is, with a hand lift up on high against God. Corah and his company committed the sin against the Holy Spirit, for they spake against that Spirit and power, which God had put into Moses, and proved by the demonstration of mighty effects: it is a denying that great argument of credibility, by which God goes about to verify any mission of his, to prove, by mighty effects of God's Spirit, that God hath sent such a man. When God manifests his Holy Spirit by signs and wonders extraordinary,—not to revere this good Spirit, not to confess him, but to revile him, or to reproach the power, is that which God ever did highly punish.

44. Thus it happened to Pharaoh; he also sinned against the Holy Ghost, the good Spirit of God: for when his magicians told him, that the finger of God was there, yet he hardened his heart against it, and then God went on to harden it more, till he overthrew him; for then his sin became unpardonable in the sense I shall hereafter explicate. And this passed into a law to the children of Israel, and they were warned of it with the highest threatening, that is, of a capital punishment; "The soul that doth aught presumptuously," or with a high hand, "the same reproacheth the Lord; that soul shall be cut off from among his people[p]:" and this is trans-

[o] Matt. xii. 36. [p] Numb. xv. 30.

lated into the New Testament, "They that do despite to the Spirit of grace, shall fall into the hands of the living God." That is the sin against the Holy Ghost.

45. Now this sin must, in all reason, be very much greater under the Gospel than under the Law. For when Christ came, he did such miracles, which never any man did, and preached a better law, and with mighty demonstrations of the Spirit, that is, of the power and Spirit of God, proved himself to have come from God, and therefore men were more convinced; and he that was so, and yet would oppose the Spirit, that is, defy all his proofs, and hear none of his words, and obey none of his laws, and at last revile him too, he had done the great sin; for this is to do the worst thing we can,—we dishonour God in that, in which he intended most to glorify himself.

46. Two instances of this we find in the New Testament, though not of the highest degree; yet because done directly against the Spirit of God, that is, in despite or in disparagement of that Spirit, by which so great things were wrought, it grew intolerable. Ananias did not revere the Spirit of God, so mightily appearing in St. Peter and the other apostles, and he was smitten and died. Simon Magus took the Spirit of God for a vendible commodity, for a thing less than money, and fit to serve secular ends; and he instantly fell into the gall of bitterness, that is, a sad bitter calamity: and St. Peter knew not, whether God would forgive him or no.

47. But it is remarkable, that the Holy Scriptures note various degrees of this malignity; 'grieving the Holy Spirit,' 'resisting' him, 'quenching' him, 'doing despite' to him: all sin against the Holy Ghost, but yet they that had done so, were all called to repentance. St. Stephen's sermon was an instance of it; and so was St. Peter's; and so was the prayer of Christ upon the cross, for the malicious Jews, the Pharisees, 'his betrayers and murderers.'—But the sin itself is of an indefinite progression, and hath not physical limits and a certain constitution, as is observable in carnal crimes, theft, murder, or adultery: for though even these are increased by circumstances, and an inward consent and degrees of love and adhesion; yet of the crime itself we can say,—this is murder, and this is adultery,—and therefore the punishment is proper and certain. But since there are so many degrees of the sin

against the Holy Ghost, and it consists not in an indivisible point: but according to the nature of internal and spiritual sins, it is like time or numbers, of a moveable being, of a flux, unstable, immense constitution, and may be always growing, not only by the repetition of acts, but by its proper essential increment; and since, in the particular case, the measures are uncertain, the nature secret, the definition disputable, and so many sins are like it, or reducible to it, apt to produce despair in timorous consciences, and to discourage repentance in lapsed persons, it will be an intolerable proposition, that affirms the sin against the Holy Ghost to be absolutely unpardonable.

48. That the sin against the Holy Ghost is pardonable, appears in the instance of the Pharisees: to whom, even after they had committed the sin, God was pleased to afford preaching, signs and miracles, and Christ upon the cross prayed for them; but in what sense also it was unpardonable, appears in that case; for they were so far gone, that they would not return; and God did not, and at last would not, pardon them. For this appellative is not properly subjected, nor attributed to the sin itself, but it is according as the man is. The sin may be, and is at some time, unpardonable, yet not in all its measures of progression; as appears in the case of Pharaoh, who, all the way, from the first miracle to the tenth, sinned against the Holy Ghost; but at last he was so bad, that God would not pardon him. Some men are come to the greatness of the sin, or to that state and grandeur of impiety, that their estate is desperate;—that is, though the nature of their sins is such, as God is extremely angry with them, and would destroy them utterly, were he not restrained by an infinite mercy, yet it shall not be thus for ever; for, in some state of circumstances and degrees, God is finally angry with the man, and will never return to him.

49. Until things be come to this height, whatsoever the sin be, it is pardonable. For if there were any one sin distinguishable in its whole nature and instance from others, which, in every of its periods, were unpardonable, it is most certain it would have been described in Scripture with clear characters and cautions, that a man might know, when he is in and when he is out. 'Speaking a word against the Holy Spirit,' is by our blessed Saviour called this great sin; but it is cer-

tain, that every word spoken against him is not unpardonable. Simon Magus spoke a foul word against him, but St. Peter did not say it was unpardonable; but when he bid him pray, he consequently bid him hope; but because he would not warrant him, that is, durst not absolve him, he sufficiently declared, that this sin is of an indefinite nature, and by growth would arrive at the unpardonable state; the state and fulness of it are unpardonable, that is, God will, to some men, and in some times and stages of their evil life, be so angry, that he will give them over, and leave them, in their reprobate mind. But no man knows, when that time is; God only knows, and the event must declare it.

50. But for the thing itself, that it is pardonable is very certain, because it may be pardoned in baptism: the Novatians denied not to baptism a power of pardoning any sin; and in this sense it is without doubt true, what Zosimus, by way of reproach, objected to Christian religion, it is δόξα πάσης ἁμαρτάδος ἀναιρετική, 'a deletory and purgative for every sin whatsoever.'—And since the unconverted Pharisees were guilty of this sin, and it was a sin forbidden, and punished capitally in the law of Moses, either to these Christ could not have been preached, and for them Christ did not die,—or else, it is certain that the sin against the Holy Spirit of God is pardonable.

51. Now whereas our blessed Lord affirmed of this sin, 'it shall not be pardoned in this world, nor in the world to come;' we may best understand the meaning of it by the parallel words of old Eli to his sons: "If a man sin against another, the judge shall judge him [q];" "placari ei potest Deus," so the vulgar Latin reads it, 'God may be appeased,' that is, "it shall be forgiven him;" that is, a word spoken against the Son of man, which relates to Christ only upon the account of his human nature, that may be forgiven him,—it shall,—that is, upon easier terms, as upon a temporal judgment, called in this place, 'a being judged by the judge.'—"But if a man sin against the Lord, who shall entreat for him?" that is, "if he sin with a high hand, presumptuously, against the Lord, against his power, and his Spirit, who shall entreat for him? it shall never be pardoned;" never so as the other, never upon a temporal judgment: that cannot

[q] 1 Sam. ii. 15.

expiate this great sin, as it could take off a sin against a man, or the Son of man; for though it be punished here, it shall be punished hereafter. But,

52. II. "It shall not be pardoned in this world, nor in the world to come:" that is, neither to the Jews nor to the gentiles. For 'sæculum hoc,' 'this world,' in Scripture, is the period of the Jews' synagogue, and μέλλων αἴων, 'the world to come,' is taken for the Gospel, or the age of the Messias, frequently among the Jews: and it is not unlikely Christ might mean it in that sense, which was used amongst them, by whom he would be understood: but because the word was also as commonly used in that sense, in which it is understood at this day, viz. for the world after this life; I shall therefore propound another exposition, which seems to me more probable. Though remission of sins is more plentiful in the Gospel than under the Law, yet because the sin is bigger under the Gospel, there is not here any ordinary way of pardoning it, no ministry established to warrant or absolve such sinners, but it must be referred to God himself; and yet that is not all. For if a man perseveres in this sin, he shall neither be forgiven here, nor hereafter; that is, neither can he be absolved in this world, by the ministry of the church; nor in the world to come, by the sentence of Christ: and this I take to be the full meaning of this so difficult place.

53. For 'in this world,' properly so speaking, there is no forgiveness of sins but what is by the ministry of the church. For then a sin is forgiven, when it is pardoned in the day of sentence, or execution; that is, when those evils are removed, which are usually inflicted, or which are proper to that day. Now then for the final punishment, that is not till the day of judgment; and if God then gives us a 'mercy in that day,' then is the day of our pardon from him; in the meantime, if he be gracious to us here, he either forbears to smite us, or smites us to bring us to repentance, and all the way continues to us the use of the word and sacraments; that is, if he does in any sense pardon us here, if he does not give us over to a 'reprobate mind,' he continues us under the means of salvation, which is the ministry of the church, for that is the way of pardon 'in this world[r],' as the blessed sentence of

[r] Vide infra, numb. 66.

the right hand is the way of pardon in the 'world to come.' —So that when our great Lord and Master threatens to this sin, "it shall not be pardoned in this world, nor in the world to come," he means, that neither shall the ministers of the church pronounce his pardon, or comfort his sorrows, or restore him after his fall, or warrant his condition, or pray for him publicly, or give him the peace and communion of the church: neither will God pardon him in the day of judgment.

54. But all this fearful denunciation of the divine judgment, is only upon supposition the man does not repent. Οὐκ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς βλασφημοῦντι καὶ μετανοήσαντι, Οὐκ ἀφεθήσεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ βλασφημοῦντι, ἤγουν τῷ ἐν τῇ βλασφημίᾳ ἐπιμένοντι, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁμαρτία ἀσυγχώρητος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐν τοῖς ὁσίως καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν μετάνοιαν μετανοοῦσιν, said St. Athanasius. "God did not say to him that blasphemes and repents, 'it shall not be forgiven,' but to him that blasphemes and remains in his blasphemy: for there is no sin, which God will not pardon to them, that holily and worthily repent[s];" Οὐτ ὸ τρωθῆναι οὕτω δεινὸν ὡς τὸ τρωθέντα μὴ βούλεσθαι θεραπεύεσθαι. "To be wounded is not so grievous; but it is intolerable, when the wounded man refuses to be cured[t]."—For it is considerable,

55. Whoever can repent, may hope for pardon; else he could not be invited to repentance. I do not say, whoever can be sorrowful, may hope for pardon: for there is a sorrow too late, then commencing when there is no time left to begin, much less to finish ὁσίως καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν μετάνοιαν, as Athanasius calls it, 'a holy and a worthy repentance;' and of such Philo[u] affirmed, Πολλαῖς γὰρ ψυχαῖς μετανοίᾳ χρῆσθαι βουληθείσαις οὐκ ἐπέτρεψεν ὁ θεὸς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀπὸ παλιῤῥοίας εἰς τοὔμπαλιν ἀνεχώρησαν, "Some unhappy souls would fain be admitted to repentance, but God permits them not," that is, their time is past: and either they die, before they can perform it,—or if they live, they return to their old impieties, like water from a rock. But whoever can repent worthily, and leave their sin, and mortify it, and make such amends as is required, these men ought not to despair of pardon: they may hope for mercy: and "if they may hope, they must hope;" for not to do it, were the greatest crime of despair. For 'despair is no sin, but where to hope is a duty.'

[s] Quæst. 71. 102. [t] St. Chrysost. in 1 Cor. hom. 8. [u] In allegor.

56. But if this be all, then the sin against the Holy Ghost hath no more said against it than any other sin; for if we repent not of theft, or adultery, it shall neither be forgiven us in this world, nor in the world to come; and if we do repent of 'the sin against the Holy Ghost,' it shall not be exacted of us, but shall be pardoned: so that to say, it is unpardonable without repentance, is to say nothing peculiar of this.

57. To this I answer, that pardonable and unpardonable have no definite signification, but have a latitude, and increment, and a various sense; but seldom signify in the absolute supreme sense. Sins of infirmity; such I mean, which, in any sense, can properly be called sins, must, in some sense or other, be repented of; and they are unpardonable without repentance, that is, without such a repentance as does disallow them and contend against them. But these are also pardonable without repentance, by some degrees of pardon; that is, God pities our sins of ignorance and winks at them, and, upon the only account of his own pity, does bring such persons to better notices of things. And they are pardonable without repentance, if, by repentance, we mean an absolute dereliction of them,—for we shall never be able to leave them quite; and therefore either they shall never be pardoned, or else they are pardoned without such a repentance, as signifies dereliction or entire mastery over them.

58. But sins which are wilfully and knowingly committed, as theft, adultery, murder, are unpardonable without repentance, that is, without such a repentance as forsakes them actually and entirely, and produces such acts of grace as are proper for their expiation: but yet even these sins require not such a repentance, as sins against the Holy Ghost do: these must have a greater sorrow, and a greater shame, and a more severe amends, and a more passionate lasting prayer, and a bigger fear, and a more public amends, and a sharper infliction, and greater excellency of grace, than is necessary in lesser sins. But, in this difference of sins, it is usual to promise pardon to the less and not to the greater, when the meaning is, that the smaller sins are only pardoned upon easier terms; an example of this we have in Clemens Alexandrinus: Τὰ μὲν γὰρ προενεργηθέντα ἀφείθη, τὰ δὲ επιγι-

νόμενα ἐκκαθαίρεται: "Sins committed before baptism are pardoned, but sins after it must be purged," that is, by a severe repentance, which the others needed not; and yet without repentance, baptism would nothing avail vicious persons[x]. So we say concerning those sins which we have forgotten, they may be pardoned without repentance, meaning, without a special repentance, but yet not without a general. Thus we find it in the imperial law, that they that had fallen into heresy or strange superstitions, they were to be pardoned, if they did repent: but if they did relapse, they should not be pardoned; but they mean, "Venia eodem modo præstari non potest:" so Gratian, Valens, and Valentinian, expressed it[y]. So that, by denying pardon, they only mean, that it shall be harder with such persons; their pardon shall not be so easily obtained; but as they repeat their sins, so their punishment shall increase; and at last, if no warning will serve, it shall destroy them.

59. For it is remarkable, that, in Scripture, pardonable and unpardonable signify no more than mortal and venial in the writings of the church; of which I have given accounts in its proper place. But when a sin is declared deadly, or killing,—and damnation threatened to such persons,—we are not therefore, if we have committed any such, to lie down under the load, and die; but with the more earnestness depart from it, lest that which is of a killing, damning nature, prove so to us in the event. For the sin of adultery is a damning sin, and murder is a killing sin, and the sin against the Holy Ghost is worse; and they are all unpardonable, that is, condemning; they are such in their cause, or in themselves; but if they prove so to us in the event, or effect, it is because we will not repent. "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself[z];" that is as high an expression as any; and yet there are several degrees and kinds of eating and drinking unworthily, and some are more unpardonable than others; but yet the Corinthians, who did eat unworthily, some of them coming to the holy supper drunk, and others schismatically, were by St. Paul admitted to repentance. Some sins are like deadly potions, they kill the man, unless

[x] Vid. etiam Cæsar. Arelat. hom. 42. quædam ad hanc rem spectantia.
[y] L. 4. Cod. Theod. ne Sacrum Baptisma iteretur. [z] 1 Cor. xi. 27.

he speedily take an antidote; or unless, by strength of nature, he work out the poison and overcome it; and others are like a desperate disease, or a deadly wound, the iliack passions,—the physicians give him over; it is a 'Miserere mei, Deus;' of which though men despair, yet some have been cured. Thus also in the cápital and great sins, many of them are such, which the church will not absolve, or dare not promise cure.

> Non est in medico semper relevetur ut æger;
> Interdum doctâ plus valet arte malum.

But then these persons are sent to God, and are bid to hope for favour from thence, and may find it. But others there are, whom the church will not meddle withal, and sends them to God; and God will not absolve them, that is, they shall be pardoned neither by God nor the church, "neither in this world nor in the world to come." But the reason is not, because their sin is, in all its periods, of an unpardonable nature,—but because they have persisted in it too long, and God in the secret economy of his mercies hath shut the everlasting doors; the olive doors of mercy shall not be opened to them. And this is the case of too many miserable persons. They who repent timely, and holily, are not in this number, whatsoever sins they be, which they have committed. But this is the case of them, whom God hath given over to a reprobate mind,—and of them who sin against God's Holy Spirit, when their sin is grown to its full measure: so we find it expressed in the Proverbs [a]; "Turn ye at my reproof, I will pour out my Spirit unto you:" and then it follows, "Because I have called and ye refused, I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh."—But this is not in all the periods of our refusing to hear God calling by his Spirit; but when the sin of the Amalekites is full, then it is unpardonable, not in the thing, but to that man, at that time. And besides all the promises, this is highly verified in the words of our blessed Saviour taken out of the prophet Isaiah; where it is affirmed, that when people are so obstinate and wilfully blind, that God then leaves to give them clearer testimony and a mighty grace, lest they should hear and see and understand; it follows, "and should be converted, and I

[a] Prov. i. 23. 26. 28.

should heal them [b];" plainly telling us, that if even then they should repent, God could not but forgive them; and therefore, because he hath now no love left to them by reason of their former obstinacy, yet wherever you can suppose repentance, there you may more than suppose a pardon. But if a man cannot, or will not repent, then it is another consideration: in the meantime, nothing hinders but that every sin is pardonable to him that repents.

60. But thus we find that the style of Scripture, and the expressions of the holy persons, is otherwise in the threatening and the edict, otherwise in the accidents of persons and practice. It is necessary that it be severe, when duty is demanded; but of lapsed persons it uses not to be exacted in the same dialect. It is as all laws are. In the general they are decretory, in the use and application they are easier. In the sanction they are absolute and infinite, but yet capable of interpretations, of dispensations and relaxation in particular cases. And so it is in the present article; 'impossible,' and 'unpardonable,' and 'damnation,' and 'shall be cut off,' and 'nothing remains but fearful expectation of judgment,' are exterminating words and phrases in the law, but they do not effect all that they there signify, to any but the impenitent; according to the saying of Mark the hermit: Οὐδεὶς κατεκρίθη εἰ μὴ μετανοίας κατεφρόνησε, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐδικαιώθη εἰ μὴ ταύτης ἐπιμελῇ. "No man is ever justified but he that carefully repents; and no man is condemned, but he that despises repentance."—Φιλάνθρωπον βλέμμα προσίουσαν αἰδεῖται μετάνοιαν, said St. Basil. "The eye of God, who is so great a lover of souls, cannot deny the intercessions and litanies of repentance."

SECTION VI.

The former Doctrines reduced to Practice.

61. Although the doors of repentance open to them, that sin after baptism, and to them that sin after repentance; yet every relapse does increase the danger, and make the sin to be less pardonable than before. For,

[b] Matt. xii. xv.

62. I. A good man, falling into sin, does it without all necessity; he hath assistances great enough to make him conqueror,—he hath reason enough to dissuade him,—he hath sharp senses of the filthiness of sin,—his spirit is tender, and is crushed with the uneasy load,—he sighs and wakes, and is troubled and distracted; and if he sins, he sins with pain and shame and smart; and the less of mistake there is in his case, the more of malice is ingredient, and a greater anger is like to be his portion.

63. II. It is a particular unthankfulness, when a man that was once pardoned, shall relapse. And when obliged persons prove enemies, they are ever the most malicious; as having nothing to protect or cover their shame, but impudence.

Ἀντ' εὐεργεσιῶν Ἀγαμέμνονα τίσαν Ἀχαιοί.

So did the Greeks treat Agamemnon ill, because he used them but too well. Such persons are like travellers, who, in a storm, running to a fig-tree, when the storm is over, they beat the branches and pluck the fruit; and having run to an altar for sanctuary, they steal the chalice from the holy place, and rob the temple that secured them. And God does more resent it, that the lambs which he feeds at his own table, which are so many sons and daughters to him, that daily suck plenty from his two breasts of mercy and providence, that they should in his own house make a mutiny, and put on the fierceness of wolves, and rise up against their Lord and Shepherd.

64. III. Every relapse after repentance, is, directly and in its proper principle, a greater sin. Our first faults are pitiable, and we do 'pati humanum,' 'we do after the manner of men;' but when we are recovered, and then die again, we do 'facere diabolicum,' we 'do after the manner of devils.'—For from ignorance to sin, from passion and youthful appetites to sin, from violent temptations and little strengths, to fall into sin, is no very great change: it is from a corrupted nature to corrupted manners: but from grace to return to sin, from knowledge and experience, and delight in goodness and wise notices, from God and his Christ, to return to sin, to foolish actions, and nonsense-principles, is a change great as was the fall of the morning stars, when they descended cheaply and foolishly into darkness; well therefore may it

be pitied in a child to choose a bright dagger before a warm coat; but when he hath been refreshed by this and smarted by that, if he chooses again, he will choose better. But men that have tried both states, that have rejoiced for their deliverance from temptation, men that have given thanks to God for their safety and innocence, men that have been wearied and ashamed of the follies of sin,—that have weighed both sides and have given wise sentence for God and for religion,—if they shall choose again, and choose amiss, it must be by something, by which Lucifer did, in the face of God, choose to defy him, and desire to turn devil, and be miserable and wicked for ever and ever.

65. IV. If a man repents of his repentances and returns to his sins, all his intermedial repentance shall stand for nothing: the sins which were marked for pardon, shall break out in guilt, and be exacted of him in fearful punishments, as if he never had repented. For if good works, crucified by sins, are made alive by repentance,—by the same reason, those sins also will live again, if the repentance dies: it being equally just, that if the man repents of his repentance, God also should repent of his pardon.

66. I. For we must observe carefully, that there is a pardon of sins proper to this life, and another proper to the world to come. "Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted; and what ye bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven [c]." That is, there are two remissions, one here, the other hereafter; that here is wrought by the ministry of the word and sacraments, by faith and obedience, by mortal instruments and the divine grace; all which are divisible and gradual, and grow or diminish, ebb or flow, change or persist and consequently grow on to effect, or else fail of the grace of God, that final grace, which alone is effective of that benefit, which we here contend for. Here, in proper speaking, our pardon is but a disposition towards the great and final pardon; a possibility and ability to pursue that interest, to contend for that absolution: and accordingly, it is wrought by parts, and is signified and promoted by every act of grace, that puts us in order to heaven, or the state of final pardon:-God gives us one degree of pardon, when he forbears to kill us in the act of sin, when he admits, when he calls, when he smites us into repentance,

[c] Vide supra, num. 53.

when he invites us by mercies and promises, when he abates or defers his anger, when he sweetly engages us in the ways of holiness, these are several parts and steps of pardon: for if God were extremely angry with us as we deserve, nothing of all this would be done unto us: and still God's favours increase, and the degrees of pardon multiply, as our endeavours are prosperous, as we apply ourselves to religion and holiness, and make use of the benefits of the church, the ministry of the word and sacraments, and as our resolutions pass into acts and habits of virtue. But then, in this world, we are to expect no other pardon, but a fluctuating, alterable, uncertain pardon, as our duty is uncertain. Hereafter it shall be finished, if here we persevere in the parts and progressions of our repentance: but as yet it is an embryo, in a state of conduct and imperfection; here we always pray for it, always hope it, always labour for it: but we are not fully and finally absolved till the day of sentence and judgment; until that day we hope and labour. The purpose of this discourse is to represent in what state of things our pardon stands here; and that it is not only conditional, but of itself a mutable effect, a disposition towards the great pardon; and, therefore, if it be not nursed and maintained by the proper instruments of its progression, it dies like an abortive conception, and shall not have that immortality whither it was designed.

Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο μάταιον ἔπος μερόπων τινὶ λέχθη,
Ῥήγνυσθαι σοφίης τόξον ἀνιέμενον.

'For it was not ill said of old, He that remits of his severity, and interrupts his course, does also break it;' and then he breaks his hopes, and dissolves the golden chain, which reached up to the foot of the throne of grace.

67. II. Here therefore the advice is reasonable and necessary: he that would ensure his pardon, must persevere in duty; and to that purpose must make a full and perfect work in his mortifications, and fights against sin; he must not suffer any thing to remain behind, which may ever spring up and bear the apples of Sodom. It is the advice of Dion Prusæensis, "He that goes to cleanse his soul from lusts, like a wild desert from beasts of prey, unless he do it thoroughly, in a short time will be destroyed by the remaining portions of his concupiscence:" for as a fever, whose violence

is abated, and the malignity lessened, and the man returns to temper and reason, to quiet nights, and cheerful days, if yet there remains any of the unconquered humour, it is apt to be set on work again by every cold, or little violence of chance, and the same disease returns with a bigger violence and danger: so it is in the eradication of our sins; that which remains behind, is of too great power to effect all the purposes of our death, and to make us to have fought in vain, and lose all our labours and all our hopes, and, the intermedial piety being lost, will exasperate us the more, and kill us more certainly than our former vices; as cold water, taken to cool the body, inflames it more, and makes cold to be the kindler of a greater fire.

68. III. Let no man be too forward in saying his sin is pardoned, for our present persuasions are too gay and confident; and that which is not repentance sufficient for a lustful thought, or one single act of uncleanness, or intemperance, we usually reckon to be the very porch of heaven, and expiatory of the vilest and most habitual crimes: it were well if the spiritual and the curates of souls, were not the authors or encouragers of this looseness of confidence and credulity. To confess and to absolve is all the method of our modern repentance, even when it is the most severe. Indeed, in the church of England, I cannot so easily blame that proceeding; because there are so few that use the proper and secret ministry of a spiritual guide, that it is to be supposed he that does so, hath long repented and done some violence to himself and more to his sins, before he can master himself so much as to bring himself to submit to that ministry. But there where the practice is common, and the shame is taken off, and the duty returns at certain festivals, and is frequently performed,—to absolve as soon as the sinner confesses, and leave him to amend afterward if he please, is to give him confidence and carelessness, but not absolution [d].

69. IV. Do not judge of the pardon of thy sins by light and trifling significations, but by long, lasting, and material events. If God continues to call thee to repentance, there is hopes that he is ready to pardon thee; and if thou dost obey the heavenly calling, and dost not defer to begin, nor stop in thy course, nor retire to thy vain conversation, thou art in

[d] Vide Cyprian. lib. 3. ep. 14. et lib. 3. ep. 15. et 16. et de Lapsis.

the sure way of pardon, and mayest also finish it. But if thou dost believe that thy sins are pardoned, remember the words of our Lord concerning Mary Magdalene; 'Much is forgiven her, and she loved much.' If thou fearest thy sins are not pardoned, pray the more earnestly, and mortify thy sin with the more severity; and be no more troubled concerning the event of it, but let thy whole care and applications be concerning thy duty. I have read of one that was much afflicted with fear concerning his final state; and not knowing whether he should persevere in grace, and obtain a glorious pardon at last, cried out, 'O si scirem,' &c. 'Would to God I might but know, whether I should persevere or no!' he was answered, 'What wouldest thou do, if thou wert sure? Wouldst thou be careless, or more curious of thy duty? If that knowledge would make thee careless, desire it not; but if it would improve thy diligence, then what thou wouldest do in case thou didst know, do that now thou dost not know; and whatever thy notice or persuasion be, the thing in itself will be more secure, and thou shalt find it in the end.'—But if any man is curious of the event, and would fain know of the event of his soul, let him reveal the state of his soul to a godly and a prudent spiritual guide; and he, when he hath searched diligently, and observed him curiously, can tell him all that is to be told, and give him all the assurance that is to be given, and warrant him, as much as himself hath received a warrant to do it. Unless God be pleased to draw the curtains of his sanctuary, and open the secrets of his eternal counsel, there is no other certainty of an actual pardon, but what the church does minister, and what can be prudently derived from ourselves. For to every such curious person, this only is to be said, 'Do you believe the promises,—that if we confess our sins and forsake them, if we believe and obey, we shall be pardoned and saved?—If so, then inquire whether or no thou dost perform the conditions of thy pardon.'—'How shall I know?'—'Examine thyself, try thy own spirit, and use the help of a holy and a wise guide. He will teach thee to know thyself. If after all this, thou answerest, that thou canst not tell whether thy heart be right, and thy duty acceptable; then sit down, and hope the best, and work in as much light and hope as thou hast; but never inquire after the secret of God, when thou

dost not so much as know thyself; and how canst thou hope to espy the most private counsels of heaven, when thou canst not certainly perceive what is in thy own hand and heart. But if thou canst know thyself, you need not inquire any further. If thy duty be performed, you may be secure of all that is on God's part.'—

70. V. Whenever repentance begins, know that from thenceforward the sinner begins to live; but then never let that repentance die. Do not at any time say, 'I have repented of such a sin, and am at peace for that;' for a man ought never to be at peace with sin, nor think that any thing we can do, is too much: our repentance for sin is never to be at an end, till faith itself shall be no more; for faith and repentance are but the same covenant; and so long as the just does live by faith in the Son of God, so long he lives by repentance; for by that faith in him our sins are pardoned, that is, by becoming his disciples we enter into the covenant of repentance. And he undervalues his sin, and overvalues his sorrow, who at any time fears he shall do too much, or make his pardon too secure,—and therefore sits him down and says, 'Now I have repented.'

71. VI. Let no man ever say he hath committed the sin against the Holy Ghost, or the unpardonable sin; for there are but few that do that; and he can best confute himself, if he can but tell that he is sorrowful for it, and begs for pardon, and hopes for it, and desires to make amends; this man hath already obtained some degrees of pardon: and St. Paul's argument in this case also is a demonstration; "If when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life[e]." That is, if God to enemies gives the first grace, much more will he give the second, if they make use of the first. For from none to a little, is an infinite distance; but from a little to a great deal, is not so much. And therefore, since God hath given us means of pardon and the grace of repentance, we may certainly expect the fruit of pardon: for it is a greater thing to give repentance to a sinner, than to give pardon to the penitent. Whoever repents, hath not committed the great sin, the unpardonable. For it is long of the man, not of the sin, that any sin is unpardonable.

[e] Rom. v. 10.

72. VII. Let every man be careful of entering into any great states of sin, lest he be unawares guilty of the great offence: every resisting of a holy motion calling us from sin, every act against a clear reason or revelation, every confident progression in sin, every resolution to commit a sin in despite of conscience, is an access towards the great sin or state of evil. Therefore concerning such a man, let others fear since he will not, and save him with fear, plucking him out of the fire; but when he begins to return, that great fear is over in many degrees; for even in Moses's law there were expiations appointed not only for error, but for presumptuous sins.

The Prayer.

I.

O ETERNAL God, gracious and merciful, I adore the immensity and deepest abyss of thy mercy and wisdom, that thou dost pity our infirmities, instruct our ignorances, pass by thousands of our follies, invitest us to repentance, and dost offer pardon, because we are miserable, and because we need it, and because thou art good, and delightest in shewing mercy. Blessed be thy holy name, and blessed be that infinite mercy, which issues forth from the fountains of our Saviour, to refresh our weariness, and to water our stony hearts, and to cleanse our polluted souls. O cause that these thy mercies may not run in vain, but may redeem my lost soul, and recover thy own inheritance, and sanctify thy portion, the heart of thy servant and all my faculties.

II.

Blessed Jesus, thou becamest a little lower than the angels, but thou didst make us greater, doing that for us which thou didst not do for them. Thou didst not pay for them one drop of blood, nor endure one stripe to recover the fallen stars, nor give one groan to snatch the accursed spirits from their fearful prisons; but thou didst empty all thy veins for me, and gavest thy heart to redeem me from innumerable sins and an intolerable calamity. O my God, let all this heap of excellences and glorious mercies be effective upon thy servant, and work in me a sorrow for my sins, and a perfect hatred of them, a watchfulness against temptations, severe

and holy resolutions, active and effective of my duty. O let me never fall from sin to sin, nor persevere in any, nor love any thing which thou hatest; but give me thy Holy Spirit, to conduct and rule me for ever; and make me obedient to thy good Spirit, never to grieve him, never to resist him, never to quench him. Keep me, O Lord, with thy mighty power, from falling into presumptuous sins, lest they get the dominion over me: so shall I be innocent from the great offence. Let me never despair of thy mercies by reason of my sins, nor neglect my repentance by reason of thy infinite loving-kindness; but let thy goodness bring me and all sinners to repentance, and thy mercies give us pardon, and thy Holy Spirit give us perseverance, and thy infinite favour bring us to glory, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

CHAP. X.

OF ECCLESIASTICAL PENANCE; OR THE FRUITS OF REPENTANCE.

SECTION I.

The fruits of repentance are the actions of spiritual life; and signify properly, all that piety and obedience which we pay to God in the days of our return, after we have begun to follow sober counsels. For since all the duty of a Christian is a state of repentance, that is, of contention against sin, and the parts and proper periods of victory; and repentance, which includes the faith of a Christian, is but another word to express the same grace, or mercies of the evangelical covenant; it follows, that whatsoever is the duty of a Christian, and a means to possess that grace, is, in some sense or other, a repentance, or the fruits of God's mercy and our endeavours. And in this sense St. John the Baptist means it, saying, "Bring forth therefore fruits meet for repentance;" that is, "Since now the great expectation of the world is to be satisfied, and the Lord's Christ will open the gates of mercy, and give repentance to the world, see that ye live accordingly, in the faith and obedience of God through Jesus

Christ."—That did, in the event of things, prove to be the effect of that sermon.

2. But although all the parts of holy life are fruits of repentance, when it is taken for the state of favour published by the Gospel; yet when repentance is a particular duty or virtue,—the integral parts of holy life are also constituent parts of repentance; and then, by the fruits of repentance, must be meant, the less necessary, but very useful, effects and ministries of repentance, which are significations and exercises of the main duty. And these are sorrow for sins, commonly called contrition, confession of them, and satisfactions; by which ought to be meant, an opposing a contrary act of virtue to the precedent act of sin, and a punishing of ourselves out of sorrow and indignation for our folly. And this is best done by all those acts of religion by which God is properly appeased, and sin is destroyed,—that is, by those acts which signify our love to God, and our hatred to sin, such as are prayer, and alms, and forgiving injuries, and punishing ourselves, that is, a forgiving every one but ourselves.

3. Many of these, I say, are not essential parts of repentance, without the actual exercise of which no man in any case can be said to be truly penitent; for the constituent parts of repentance, are nothing but the essential parts of obedience to the commandments of God, that is, direct abstinence from evil, and doing what is in the precept. But they are fruits and significations, exercises and blessed productions, of repentance, useful to excellent purposes of it, and such from which a man cannot be excused, but by great accidents and rare contingencies. To visit prisoners, and to redeem captives, and to instruct the ignorant, are acts of charity; but he that does not act these special instances, is not always to be condemned for want of charity, because by other acts of grace he may signify and exercise his duty: he only that refuses any instances, because the grace is not operative, he only is the uncharitable; but to the particulars he can be determined only by something from without, but it is sufficient to the grace itself, that it works where it can, or where it is prudently chosen. So it is in these fruits of repentance. He that out of hatred to sin abstains from it, and out of love to God endeavours to keep his commandments, he is a true penitent, though he never lie upon the

ground, or spend whole nights in prayer, or make himself sick with fasting; but he that in all circumstances refuses any or all of these, and hath not hatred enough against his sin to punish it in himself, when to do so may accidentally be necessary or enjoined, he hath cause to suspect himself not to be a true penitent.

4. No one of these is necessary in the special instance, except those which are, distinctly and upon their own accounts, under another precept, as prayer, and forgiving injuries, and self-affliction in general, and confession. But those which are only apt ministries to the grace, which can be ministered unto equally by other instances, those are left to the choice of every one, or to be determined or bound upon us by accidents and by the church. But every one of the particulars hath in it something of special consideration.

SECTION II.

Of Contrition, or godly Sorrow.

5. In all repentances it is necessary, that we understand some sorrow ingredient, or appendant, or beginning. To repent, is to leave a sin; which because it must have a cause to effect it, can begin no where but where the sin is, for some reason or other, disliked, that is, because it does a mischief. It is enough to leave it, that we know it will ruin us if we abide in it; but that is not enough to make us grieve for it, when it is past and quitted. For if we believe that as soon as ever we repent of it, we shall be accepted to pardon, and that infallibly, and that being once forsaken it does not, and shall not, prejudice us,—he that considers this, and remembers it was pleasant to him, will scarce find cause enough to be sorrowful for it. Neither is it enough to say, he must grieve for it, or else it will do him mischief: for this is not true; for how can sorrow prevent the mischief, when the sorrow of itself is not an essential duty? Or if it were so in itself, yet by accident it becomes not to be so; for, by being unreasonable and impossible, it becomes also not necessary, not a duty. To be sorrowful is not always in our power, any

more than to be merry; and both of them are the natural products of their own objects, and of nothing else; and then if sin does us pleasure at first, and at last no mischief to the penitent, to bid them be sorrowful lest it should do mischief, is as improper a remedy, as if we were commanded to be hungry to prevent being beaten. He that felt nothing but the pleasure of sin, and is now told he shall feel none of its evils, and that it can no more hurt him when it is forsaken, than a bee when the sting is out,—if he be commanded to grieve, may justly return in answer, that as yet he perceives no cause.

6. If it be told him, it is cause enough to grieve that he hath offended God, who can punish him with sad, insufferable, and eternal torments:—This is very true:—But if God be not angry with him, and he be told that God will not punish him for the sin he repents of, then to grieve for having offended God, is so metaphysical and abstracted a speculation, that there must be something else in it, before a sinner can be tied to it. For to have displeased God is a great evil; but what is it to me, if it will bring no evil to me? It is a metaphysical and a moral evil; but unless it be also naturally and sensibly so, it is not the object of a natural and proper grief. It follows therefore, that the state of a repenting person must have in it some more causes of sorrow than are usually taught, or else in vain can they be called upon to weep and mourn for their sins. Well may they wring their faces and their hands, and put on black, those disguises of passion and curtains of joy, those ceremonies and shadows of rich widows and richer heirs, by which they decently hide their secret smiles: well may they 'rend their garments,' but upon this account they can never 'rend their hearts.'

7. For the stating of this article it is considerable, that there are several parts or periods of sorrow, which are effected by several principles. In the beginning of our repentance, sometimes we feel cause enough to grieve. For God smites many into repentance; either a sharp sickness does awaken us, or a calamity upon our house, or the death of our dearest relative; and they that find sin so heavily incumbent, and to press their persons or fortunes with feet of lead, will feel cause enough, and need not to be disputed into a penitential sorrow. They feel God's anger, and the evil effects of sin, and that it brings sorrow; and then the sorrow is

justly great, because we have done that evil which brings so sad a judgment.

8. And in the same proportion, there is always a natural cause of sorrow, where there is a real cause of fear; and so it is ever in the beginning of repentance; and for aught we know, it is for ever so; and albeit the causes of fear lessen as the repentance does proceed, yet it will never go quite off, till hope itself be gone and passed into charity, or at least, into a πεποίθησις καὶ παῤῥησία, into 'that fulness of confidence,' which is given to few as the reward of a lasting and conspicuous holiness. And the reason is plain. For though it be certain in religion, that whoever repents shall be pardoned, yet it is a long time, before any man hath repented worthily; and it is as uncertain in what manner, and in what measures, and in what time, God will give us pardon. It is as easy to tell the very day, in which a man first comes to the use of reason, as to tell the very time, in which we are accepted to final pardon; the progressions of one being as divisible as the other, and less discernible. For reason gives many fair indications of itself; whereas God keeps the secrets of this mercy in his sanctuary, and draws not the curtain till the day of death or judgment.

9. Add to this, that our very repentances have many allays and imperfections, and so hath our pardon.

And every one that sins, hath so displeased God, that he is become the subject of the divine anger. "Death is the wages;" what death God may please, and therefore what evil soever God will inflict, or his mortality can suffer: and he that knows this, hath cause to fear; and he that fears, hath cause to be grieved that he is fallen from that state of divine favour, in which he stood secured with the guards of angels, and covered with heaven itself as with a shield, in which he was beloved of God and heir of all his glories.

10. But they,—that describe repentance in short and obscure characters, and make repentance and pardon to be the children of a minute, and born and grown up quickly as a fly, or a mushroom, with the dew of a night, or the tears of a morning, making the labours of the one, and the want of the other, to expire sooner than the pleasures of a transient sin,—are so insensible of the sting of sin, that indeed, upon their grounds, it will be impossible to have a real godly sor-

row. For though they have done evil, yet by this doctrine they feel none; and nothing remains as a cause of grief, unless they will be sorrowful for that they have been pleased formerly, and are now secured; nothing remains before them or behind, but the pleasure that they had and the present confidence and impunity: and that is no good instrument of sorrow. "Securitas delicti etiam libido est ejus." Sin takes occasion by the law itself, if there be nó penalty annexed.

11. But the first inlet of a godly sorrow, which is the beginning of repentance, is upon the stock of their present danger and state of evil, into which by their sin they are fallen,—viz. when their guilt is manifest, they see that they are become sons of death, exposed to the wrath of a provoked Deity, whose anger will express itself when and how it please, and, for aught the man knows, it may be the greatest, and it may be intolerable: and though his danger is imminent and certain, yet his pardon is a great way off; it may be yea, it may be no; it must be hoped for, but it may be missed,—for it is upon conditions; and they are, or will seem, very hard.

Sed, ut valeas, multa dolenda feres:

So that in the sum of affairs, however that the greatest sinner and the smallest penitent, are very apt, and are taught by strange doctrines, to flatter themselves into confidence and presumption,—yet he will have reason to mourn and weep, when he shall consider that he is in so sad a condition, that because his life is uncertain, it is also uncertain, whether or no he shall not be condemned to an eternal prison of flames: so that every sinner hath the same reason to be sorrowful, as he hath, who, from a great state of blessings and confidence, is fallen into great fears and great dangers, and a certain guilt and liableness of losing all he hath, and suffering all that is insufferable. They who state repentance otherwise, cannot make it reasonable, that a penitent should shed a tear. And therefore it is no wonder, that we so easily observe a great dulness and indifferency, so many dry eyes and merry hearts, in persons that pretend repentance, it cannot more reasonably be attributed to any cause, than to those trifling and easy propositions of men, that destroy the causes of sorrow, by lessening and taking off the

opinion of danger. But now, that they are observed and reproved, I hope the evil will be lessened. But to proceed.

12. Having now stated the reasonableness and causes of penitential sorrow; the next inquiry is into the nature and constitution of that sorrow. For it is to be observed, that penitential sorrow is not seated in the affections directly, but in the understanding: and is rather 'odium' than 'dolor;' it is 'hatred' of sin, and detestation of it, a nolition, a renouncing and disclaiming it, whose expression is a resolution never to sin,—and a pursuance of that resolution, by abstaining from the occasions, by praying for the divine aid, by using the proper remedies for its mortification. This is essential to repentance, and must be, in every man, in the highest kind. For he that does not hate sin, so as rather to choose to suffer any evil, than to do any,—loves himself more than he loves God; because he fears to displease himself rather than to displease him, and therefore is not a true penitent.

13. But although this be not grief, or sorrow properly, but hatred,—yet in hatred there is ever a sorrow, if we have done or suffered what we hate; and whether it be sorrow or no, is but a speculation of philosophy, but no ingredient of duty. It is that which will destroy sin, and bring us to God; and that is the purpose of repentance.

14. For it is remarkable, that sorrow is indeed an excellent instrument of repentance, apt to set forward many of its ministries, and without which men ordinarily will not leave their sins; but if the thing be done, though wholly upon the discourses of reason, upon intuition of the danger, upon contemplation of the unworthiness of sin, or only upon the principle of hope, or fear,—it matters not which is the beginning of repentance. For we find 'fear' reckoned to be 'the beginning of wisdom,' that is, of repentance, of wise and sober counsels, by Solomon. We find 'sorrow' to be reckoned as the beginning of repentance by St. Paul; "Godly sorrow worketh repentance not to be repented of."—So many ways as there are, by which God works repentance in those whom he will bring unto salvation, to all the kinds of these there are proper apportioned passions: and as in all good things

there is pleasure, so in all evil there is pain, some way or other: and therefore to love and hatred, or, which is all one, to pleasure and displeasure, all passions are reducible, as all colours are to black and white. So that though, in all repentances, there is not in every person felt that sharpness of sensitive compunction and sorrow, that is usual in sad accidents of the world,—yet if the sorrow be upon the intellectual account, though it be not much perceived by inward sharpnesses, but chiefly by dereliction and leaving of the sin, it is that sorrow which is possible, and in our power, and that which is necessary to repentance.

15. For in all inquiries concerning penitential sorrow, if we will avoid scruple and vexatious fancies, we must be careful not to account of our sorrow by the measures of sense, but of religion. David grieved more for the sickness of his child, and the rebellion of his son, so far as appears in the story: and the prophet Jeremy, in behalf of the Jews, for the death of their glorious prince Josiah; and St. Paula Romana, at the death of her children,—were more passionate and sensibly afflicted, than for their sins against God: that is, they felt more sensitive trouble in that than this, and yet their repentances were not to be reproved; because our penitential sorrow is from another cause, and seated in other faculties, and fixed upon differing objects, and works in other manners, and hath a diverse signification, and is fitted to other purposes; and therefore is wholly of another nature. It is a displeasure against sin,—which must be expressed by praying against it, and fighting against it; but all other expressions are extrinsical to it, and accidental, and are no parts of it,—because they cannot be under a command, as all the parts and necessary actions of repentance are most certainly.

16. Indeed, some persons can command their tears; so Gellia, in the epigram;

Si quis adest, jussæ prosiliant lacrimæ [f];

"she could cry, when company was there to observe her weeping for her father;" and so can some orators, and many hypocrites: and there are some that can suppress their tears by art, and resolution; so Ulysses [g] did, when he saw his wife weep; he pitied her, but

[f] Mart. 1. 34. [g] Od. τ. 211.

Intra palpebras, ceu cornu, immotas tenebat
Lumina, vel ferrum, lacrimas astuque premebat;

"he kept his tears within his eyelids," as if they had been a phial, which he could pour forth or keep shut at his pleasure. But although some can do this at pleasure, yet all cannot. And therefore St. John Climacus speaks of certain penitents, οἱ δὲ ἀπορούντες δακρύων ἑαυτοὺς κατέκοπτον, "who, because they could not weep, expressed their repentance by beating their breasts:" and yet if all men could weep when they list, yet they may weep and not be sorrowful; and though they can command tears, yet sorrow is no more to be commanded than hunger,—and therefore is not a part or necessary duty of repentance, when sorrow is taken for a sensitive trouble.

17. But yet there is something of this also to be added to our duty. If our constitution be such as to be apt to weep, and sensitively troubled upon other intellectual apprehensions of differing objects; unless also they find the same effect in their repentances, there will be some cause to suspect, that their hatred of sin, and value of obedience and its rewards, are not so great as they ought to be. The masters of spiritual life give this rule: "Sciat se culpabiliter durum, qui deflet damna temporis vel mortem amici,—dolorem verò pro peccatis lacrimis non ostendit:" "He that weeps for temporal losses, and does not in the same manner express his sorrow for his sins, is culpably obdurate:"—which proposition, though piously intended, is not true. For tears are emanations of a sensitive trouble or motion of the heart, and not properly subject to the understanding; and therefore a man may innocently weep for the death of his friend, and yet shed no tears when he hath told a lie, and still be in that state of sorrow and displeasure, that he had rather die himself, than choose to tell another lie. Therefore, the rule only hath some proportions of probability, in the effect of several intellectual apprehensions. As he that is apt to weep when he hath done an unhandsome action to his friend, who yet will never punish him; and is not apt to express his sorrow in the same manner, when he hath offended God: I say, he may suspect his sorrow not to be so great or so real; but yet abstractedly from this circumstance, to weep or not to weep is nothing to the duty of repentance, save only that it is that

ordinary sign, by which some men express some sort of sorrow. And therefore I understand not the meaning of that prayer of St. Austin; "Domine, da gratiam lacrimarum;" "Lord, give me the grace of tears;" for tears are no duty, and the greatest sorrow oftentimes is the driest; and excepting that there is some sweetness and ease in shedding tears, and that they accompany a soft and a contemplative person, an easy and a good nature, and such as is apt for religious impressions,—I know no use of them, but to signify, in an apt and a disposed nature, what kind of apprehensions and trouble there is within. For weeping upon the presence of secular troubles, is more ready and easy, because it is an effect symbolical, and of the same nature with its proper cause. But when there is a spiritual cause, although its proper effect may be greater and more effective of better purposes; yet unless, by the intermixture of some material and natural cause, it be more apportioned to a material and natural product, it is not to be charged with it, or expected from it. Sin is a spiritual evil; and tears are the sign of a natural or physical sorrow. Smart, and sickness, and labour, are natural or physical evils; and hatred and nolition are a spiritual or intellectual effect. Now as every labour and every smart is not to be hated or rejected, but sometimes chosen by the understanding, when it is mingled with a good that pleases the understanding, and is eligible upon the accounts of reason: so neither can every sin, which is the intellectual evil, be productive of tears or sensitive sorrow, unless it be mingled with something which the sense and affections, that is, which the lower man hates, and which will properly afflict him; such as are, fear, or pain, or danger, or disgrace, or loss. The sensitive sorrow, therefore, which is usually seen in new penitents, is upon the account of those horrible apprehensions, which are declared in Holy Scriptures to be the consequent of sins; but if we shall also preach repentance, as to warrant a freedom and a perfect escape instantly from all significations of the wrath of God, and all dangers for the future upon the past and present account, I know not upon what reckoning he, that truly leaves his sin, can be commanded to be sorrowful; and if he were commanded, how he can possibly obey.

18. But when repentance hath had its growth and pro-

gression, and is increased into a habit of piety,—sorrow and sensitive trouble may come in upon another account; for great and permanent changes of the mind make great impressions upon the lower man. When we love an object intensely, our very body receives comfort in the presence of it: and there are friendly spirits which have a natural kindness and cognation to each other, and refresh one another, passing from eye to eye, from friend to friend: and the prophet David felt it in the matter of religion; "My flesh and my heart rejoice in the living Lord." For if a grief of mind is a consumption of the flesh, and a cheerful spirit is a conservatory of health,—it is certain that every great impression, that is made upon the mind and dwells there, hath its effect upon the body, and the lower affections. And therefore all those excellent penitents who consider the baseness of sin,—their own danger, though now past in some degrees,—the offence of God,—the secret counsels of his mercy,—his various manners of dispensing them,—the fearful judgments which God unexpectedly sends upon some men,—the dangers of our own confidence,—the weakness of our repentance,—the remains of our sin,—the aptnesses and combustible nature of our concupiscence,—the presence of temptation, and the perils of relapsing,—the evil state of things which our former sins leave us in,—our difficulty in obeying, and our longings to return to Egypt,—and the fearful anger of God, which will, with greater fierceness, descend if we chance to fall back:—those penitents, I say, who consider these things frequently and prudently, will find their whole man so wrought upon, that every faculty shall have an enmity against sin; and therefore even the affections of the lower man must, in their way, contribute to its mortification, and that is, by a real and effective sorrow.

19. But in this whole affair the whole matter of question will be in the manner of operation, or signification of the dislike. For the duty is done, if the sin be accounted an enemy; that is, whether the dislike be only in the intellectual and rational appetite, or also in the sensitive. For although men use so to speak, and distinguish superior from inferior appetites; yet it will be hard in nature to find any real distinct faculties, in which those passions are subjected, and from which they have emanation. The intellectual de-

sire, and the sensual desire, are both founded in the same faculty; they are not distinguished by their subjects, but by their objects only: they are but several motions of the will to or from several objects. When a man desires that which is most reasonable, and perfective, or consonant to the understanding, that we call an intellectual, or rational appetite; but if he desires a thing that will do him hurt in his soul, or to his best interest, and yet he desires it because it pleases him,—this is fit to be called a sensitive appetite, because the object is sensitive, and it is chosen for a sensual reason. But it is rather 'appetitio' than 'appetitus,' that is, 'an act' rather than 'a principle of action.' The case is plainer, if we take two objects of several interests, both of which are proportioned to the understanding. St. Anthony in the desert, and St. Bernard in the pulpit, were tempted by the spirit of pride: they resisted and overcame it, because pride was unreasonable and foolish as to themselves, and displeasing to God. If they had listened to the whispers of that spirit, it had been upon the accounts of pleasure,—because pride is that deliciousness of spirit which entertains a vain man, making him to delight in his own images and reflections; and therefore is a work of the flesh, but yet plainly founded in the understanding. And therefore, here it is plain, that when the flesh and the spirit fight, it is not a fight between two faculties of the soul, but a contest in the soul concerning the election of two objects. It is no otherwise in this than in every deliberation, when arguments from several interests contest each other. Every passion of the man is nothing else but a proper manner of being affected with an object, and consequently a tendency to or an aversion from it, that is, a willing or a nilling of it; which willing and nilling, when they produce several permanent impressions upon the mind and body, receive the names of 'divers passions:' the object itself, first striking the fancy or lower apprehensions by its proper energy, makes the first passion or tendency to the will, that is, the inclination or first concupiscence; but when the will upon that impression is set on work, and chooses the sensual object, that makes the abiding passion, the quality. As if the object be displeasing, and yet not present, it effects fear or hatred; if good and not present, it is called desire; but all these diversifications are

merely natural effects; as to be warm is before the fire, and cannot be in our choice directly and immediately. That which is the prime and proper action of the will, that only is subject to a command; that is, to choose or refuse the sin. The 'passion,' that is, the proper effect or impress upon the fancy or body, that is natural, and is determined to the particular by the mixture of something natural with the act of the will; as if an apprehension of future evils be mingled with the refusing sin, that is, if it be the cause of it: then fear is the passion that is effected by it. If the feeling some evil be the cause of the nolition, then sorrow is the effect; and fear also may produce sorrow. So that the passion, that is, the natural impress upon the man, cannot be the effect of a commandment, but the principle of that passion is; we are commanded to refuse sin, 'to eschew evil,'—that is the word of the Scripture: but because we usually do feel the evils of sin, and we have reason to fear worse, and sorrow is the natural effect of such a feeling, and such a fear,—therefore the Scripture calling us to repentance, that is, a new life, a dying unto sin, and a living unto righteousness, expresses it by sorrow, and mourning, and weeping; but these are not the duty, but the expressions, or the instruments of that which is a duty. So that if any man who hates sin and leaves it, cannot yet find the sharpness of such a sorrow as he feels in other sad accidents, there can nothing be said to it, but that the duty itself is not clothed with those circumstances, which are apt to produce that passion; it is not an eschewing of sin upon considerations of a present or a feared trouble, but upon some other principle; or that the consideration is not deep and pressing, or that the person is of an unapt disposition to those sensible effects. The Italian and his wife, who by chance espied a serpent under the shade of their vines, were both equal haters of the little beast; but the wife only cried out,—and the man killed it, but with as great a regret and horror at the sight of it as his wife, though he did not so express it. But when a little after they espied a lizard, and she cried again, he told her, that he perceived her trouble was not always derived from reasonable apprehensions, and that what could spring only from images of things and fancies of persons, was not considerable by a just value. This is the case of our sorrowing. Some express it

by tears, some by penances and corporal inflictions, some by more effective and material mortifications of it: but he that kills it, is the greatest enemy. But those persons who can be sorrowful and violently moved for a trifling interest, and upon the arrests of fancy,—if they find these easy meltings and sensitive afflictions upon the accounts of their sins, are not to please themselves at all, unless, when they have cried out, they also kill the serpent.

20. I cannot therefore at all suspect that man's repentance, who hates sin, and chooses righteousness, and walks in it, though he do not weep, or feel the troubles of a mother mourning over the hearse of her only son; but yet such a sensitive grief is of great use to these purposes.

I. If it do not proceed from the present sense of the divine judgment, yet it supplies that, and feels an evil from its own apprehension, which is not yet felt from the divine infliction.

II. It prevents God's anger, by being a punishment of ourselves, a condemnation of the sinner, and a taking vengeance of ourselves, for our having offended God. And therefore it is, consequently to this, agreed on all hands, that the greater the sorrow is, the less necessity there is of any outward affliction;

Ut possit lacrimis æquare labores[h].

According to the old rule of the penitentiaries.

Sitque modus culpæ justæ moderatio pœnæ,
Quæ tanto levior, quanto contritio major.

Which general measure of repentances, as it is of use in the particular of which I am now discoursing, so it effects this persuasion, that external mortifications and austerities are not any part of original and essential duty, but significations of the inward repentance unto men; and suppletories of it before God; that when we cannot feel the trouble of mind, we may at least hate sin upon another account, even upon the superinduced evils upon our bodies; for all affliction is nothing but sorrow; "Gravis animi pœna est, quem post factum pœnitet," said Publius: "To repent is a grievous punishment;" and the old man in the comedy calls it so.

Cur meam senectutem hujus sollicito amentiâ? an
Pro hujus ego ut peccatis supplicium sufferam?

[h] Virg. Æn. 2. 362.

"Why do I grieve my old age for his madness, that I should suffer punishment for his sins[1]?" Grieving was his punishment.

III. This sensitive sorrow is very apt to extinguish sin, it being of a symbolical nature to the design of God, when he strikes a sinner for his amendment: it makes sin to be uneasy to him; and not only to be displeasing to his Spirit, but to his sense, and consequently, that it hath no port to enter any more.

IV. It is a great satisfaction to an inquisitive conscience, to whom it is not sufficient that he does repent, unless he be able to prove it by signs and proper indications.

21. The sum is this. 1. No man can, in any sense, be said to be a true penitent, unless he wishes he had never done the sin. 2. But he that is told that his sin is presently pardoned upon repentance, that is, upon leaving it, and asking forgiveness; and that the former pleasure shall not now hurt him, he hath no reason to wish that he had never done it. 3. But, to make it reasonable to wish that the sin had never been done, there must be the feeling or fear of some evil.

Conscia mens ut cuique sua est, ita concipit, intrà
Pectora, pro meritis spemque metumque suis.

4. According as is the nature of that evil feared or felt, so is the passion effected, of hatred, or sorrow. 5. Whatever the passion be, it must be totally exclusive of all affection to sin, and produce enmity and fighting against it, until it be mortified. 6. In the whole progression of this mortification, it is more than probable that some degrees of sensitive trouble will come in at some angle or other. 7. Though the duty of penitential sorrow itself be completed 'in nolitione peccati,' in the hating of sin, and ourselves for doing it,—yet the more penal that hate is, the more it ministers to many excellent purposes of repentance.

22. But because some persons do not feel this sensitive sorrow, they begin to suspect their repentance, and therefore they are taught to supply this want by a reflex act, that is, to be sorrowful because they are not sorrowful. This I must needs say is a fine device, where it can be made to signify something that is material. But I fear, it will not often. For

[1] Terent. Andr. v. 3. 16. Schmieder.

how can a man be sorrowful for not being sorrowful? For either he hath reason at first to be sorrowful, or he hath not. If he hath not, why should he be sorrowful for not doing an unreasonable act? If he hath reason, and knows it, it is certain he will be as sorrowful as that cause so apprehended can effect: but he can be no more, and so much he cannot choose but be. But if there be cause to be sorrowful, and the man knows it not, then he cannot yet grieve for that; for he knows no cause, and that is all one as if he had none. But if there be indeed a cause which he hath not considered, then let him be called upon to consider that, and then he will be directly and truly sorrowful, when he hath considered it; and hath reason to be sorrowful because he had not considered it before, that is, because he had not repented sooner; but to be sorrowful because he is not sorrowful, can have no other good meaning but this: we are to endeavour to be displeased at sin, and to use all the means we can to hate it; that is, when we find not any sensitive sorrow or pungency of spirit, let us contend to make our intellectual sorrow as great as we can. And if we perceive or suspect we have not true repentance, let us beg of God to give it; and let us use the proper means of obtaining the grace; and if we are uncertain concerning the actions of our own heart, let us supply them by prayer, and holy desires; that if we cannot perceive the grace in the proper shape, and by its own symptoms and indications, we may be made, in some measure, humbly confident by other images and reflections, by seeing the grace in another shape: so David; "Concupivi desiderare justificationes tuas;" "I have desired to desire thy justifications;" that is, either I have prayed for that grace, or I have seen that I have that desire, not by a direct observation, but by some other signification. But it is certain, no man can be sorrowful for not being sorrowful, if he means the same kind and manner of sorrow; as there cannot be two, where there is not one; and there cannot be a reflex ray, where there was not a direct.

23. But if there be such difficulty in the questions of our own sorrow, it were very well, that even this part of repentance should be conducted, as all the other ought,—by the ministry of a spiritual man; that it may be better instructed, and prudently managed, and better discerned, and

led on to its proper effects. But when it is so helped forward, it is more than contrition,—it is confession also; of which I am yet to give in special accounts.

SECTION III.

Of the Natures and Difference of Attrition and Contrition.

24. All the passions of the irascible faculty are that sorrow, in some sense or other, which will produce repentance. Repentance cannot kill sin, but by withdrawing the will from it: and the will is not to be withdrawn, but by complying with the contrary affection to that, which before did accompany it in evil. Now whatever that affection was, pleasure was the product, it was that which nursed or begot the sin: now as this pleasure might proceed from hope, from possession, from sense, from fancy, from desire, and all the passions of the concupiscible appetite; so when there is a displeasure conceived, it will help to destroy sin, from what passion soever, of what faculty soever, that displeasure can be produced.

25. If the displeasure at sin proceeds from any passion of the irascible faculty, it is that which those divines, who understand the meaning of their own words of art, commonly call 'attrition,' that is,—a resolving against sin, the resolution proceeding from any principle, that is troublesome and dolorous:—and in what degree of good that is (as appears in the stating of this question), it is acceptable to God; not an acceptable repentance, for it is not so much; but it is a good beginning of it, an acceptable introduction to it; and must, in its very nature, suppose a sorrow, or displeasure,—in which although according to the quality of the motives of attrition, or the disposition of the penitent, there is more or less sensitive trouble respectively, yet in all there must be so much sorrow or displeasure, as to cause a dereliction of the sin, or a resolution, at least, to leave it.

26. But there are some natures so ingenuous, and there are some periods of repentance so perfect, and some penitents have so far proceeded in the methods of holiness, and pardon,—that they are fallen out with sin upon the stock of

some principles proceeding from the concupiscible appetite; such are love and hope; and if these have for their object God or the divine promises, it is that noblest principle of repentance or holy life, which divines call 'contrition.' For hope cannot be without love of that which is hoped for; if therefore this hope have for its object temporal purchases, it is or may be a sufficient cause of leaving sin, according as the power and efficacy of the hope shall be; but it will not be sufficient towards pardon, unless, in its progression, it join with some better principle of a spiritual grace. Temporal hope and temporal fear may begin God's work upon our spirits; but till it be gone further, we are not in the first step of an actual state of grace. But as attrition proceeds from the motives of those displeasing objects, which are threatened by God to be the evil consequents of sin, relating to eternity; so contrition proceeds from objects and motives of desire, which are promises and benefits, received already, or to be received hereafter. But these must also be more than temporal good things: for hopes and fears relating to things (though promised or threatened in Holy Scripture), are not sufficient incentives of a holy and acceptable repentance; which, because it is not a transient act but a state of holiness, cannot be supported by a transitory and deficient cause, but must wholly rely upon expectation and love of things, that are eternal and cannot pass away. Attrition begins with fear; contrition hath hope and love in it. The first is a good beginning, but it is no more; before a man can say he is pardoned, he must be gone beyond the first, and arrived at this. The reason is plain; because although in the beginnings of repentance there is a great fear, yet the causes of this fear wear away and lessen, according as the repentance goes on, and are quite extinguished, when the penitent hath mortified his sin, and hath received the spirit of adoption, the πληροφορία, 'the confidence' of the sons of God; but because repentance must be perfect, and must be perpetual during this life, it must also be maintained, and supported by something that is lasting, and will not wear off, and that is hope and love; according to that of St. Austin[k], "Pœnitentiam certam non facit, nisi odium peccati et amor Dei:" "Hatred of sin, and the love of God, make repentance

[k] Serm. 7. de Tempor.

firm and sure;" nothing else can do it: but this is a work of time; but such a work, that without it be done, our pardon is not perfect.

27. Now of this contrition, relying upon motives of pleasure and objects of amability, being the noblest principle of action, and made up of the love of God, and holy things, and holy expectations,—the product is quite differing from that of attrition, or the imperfect repentance; for that commencing upon fear or displeasure, is only apt to produce a dereliction or quitting of our sin, and all the servile affections of frighted or displeased persons. But this would not effect a universal obedience; which only can be effected by the love and the affection of sons; which is also the product of those objects, which are the incentives of the divine love, and is called contrition: that is, a hatred against sin, as being an enemy to God, and all our hopes of enjoying God; whom because this repenting man loves and delights in, he also hates whatsoever God hates,—and is really grieved, for ever having offended so good a God, and for having endangered his hopes of dwelling with him whom he so loves; and therefore, now does the quite contrary.

28. Now this is not usually the beginning of repentance, but is a great progression in it; and it contains in it obedience. He that is attrite, leaves his sin; but he that is contrite, obeys God, and pursues the interests and acquists of virtue: so that contrition is not only a sorrow for having offended God, whom the penitent loves; that is but one act or effect of contrition; but contrition loves God, and hates sin; it leaves this, and adheres to him; abstains from evil, and does good; dies to sin, and lives to righteousness; and is a state of pardon and acceptable services.

29. But then there is a sorrow also proper to it; for as this grace comes from the noblest passions and apprehensions, so it does operate in the best manner, and to the noblest purposes. It hates sin upon higher contemplations, than he that hates it upon the stock of fear: he hates sin as being against God, and religion, and right reason; that is, he is gone further from him: he hates it for itself.

Pœnitet, ô si quid miserorum creditur ulli,
Pœnitet, et facto torqueor ipse meo.
Cumque sit exilium, magis est mihi culpa dolori;
Estque pati pœnam quàm meruisse minus.

That is, not only the evil effect to himself, but the irregularity and the displeasure to Almighty God, are the incentives of his displeasure against sin; and because in all these passions and effective motions of the mind, there is a sorrow under some shape or other, this sorrow or displeasure is that, which is a very acceptable signification, and act of repentance; and yet it is not to be judged of by sense, but by reason, by the caution and enmity against sin: to which this also is to be added:

30. That if any man inquires, whether or no his hatred against sin proceed from the love of God or no; that is, whether it be attrition or contrition,—he is only to observe whether he does endeavour heartily and constantly to please God by obedience; for 'this is love, that we keep his commandments:' and although sometimes we may tell concerning our love as well as concerning our fear; yet when the direct principle is not so evident, our only way left to try, is by the event: that is contrition which makes us to exterminate and mortify sin, and endeavour to keep the commandments of God. For that is sorrow proceeding from love.

31. And now it is no wonder, if to contrition pardon be so constantly annexed, in all the discourses of divines: but unless contrition be thus understood, and if a single act of something like it, be mistaken for the whole state of this grace, we shall be deceived by applying false promises to a real need, or true promises to an incompetent and incapable state of things. But when it is thus meant, all the sorrows that can come from this principle are the signs of life.

His lacrimis vitam damus, et miserescimus ultro.

No man can deny pardon to such penitents, nor cease to joy in such tears.

32. The sum of the present inquiry is this: contrition is sometimes used for a part of repentance, sometimes taken for the whole duty. As it is a part, so it is that displeasure at sin, and hatred of it, which is commonly expressed in sorrow, but for ever in the leaving of it. It is sometimes begun with fear, sometimes with shame, and sometimes with kindness, with thankfulness and love; but love and obedience are ever at the latter end of it, though it were not at the beginning: and till then it is called attrition. But when it is

taken for the whole duty itself, as it is always when it is effective of pardon,—then the elements of it, or parts of the constitution, are 'fides futuri sæculi et judicii, fides in promissis et passionibus Christi, timor Divinæ majestatis, amor misericordiæ, dolor pro peccatis, spes veniæ, petitio pro gratiâ,' 'faith in the promises and sufferings of Christ, an assent to the article of the day of judgment, and the world to come; with all the consequent persuasions and practices effected on the spirit, fear of the divine majesty, love of his mercy, grief for our sins, begging for grace, hope of pardon;' and in this sense it is true, 'Cor contritum Deus non despiciet,' 'God will never refuse to accept of a heart so contrite.'

SECTION IV.

Of Confession.

33. THE modern schoolmen make contrition to include in it a resolution to submit to the keys of the church; that is, that confession to a priest is a part of contrition, as contrition is taken for a part of repentance; for it is incomplete till the church hath taken notice of it,—but by submission to the church-tribunal, it is made complete; and not only so, but that which was but attrition, is now turned into contrition, or perfect repentance. In the examining of this, I shall, because it is reasonable so to do, change their manner of speaking, that the inquiry may be more material and intelligible. That contrition does include in it a resolution to submit to the church-tribunal, must either mean, that godly sorrow does in its nature include a desire of confession to a priest, and then the very word confutes the thing; or else by contrition they meaning so much of repentance, as is sufficient to pardon, mean also, that to submit to the keys, or to confess to a priest, is a necessary or integral part of that repentance, and therefore of contrition. Concerning the other part of their affirmative, that attrition is, by the keys, changed into contrition; this being turned into words fit for men to speak,—such men, I mean, that would be understood,—signifies plainly this: that the most imperfect repentance towards God is sufficient, if it be brought before the church; that is,

a little on the penitent man's part, and a little on the priest's part, is disposition enough to the receiving of a pardon: so that, provided you do all that the church commands you, you may make the bolder to leave out something of God's command, which otherwise you might not do. The priest may do half the work for you. These thus represented, I shall consider apart.

34. I. Confession is an act of repentance highly requisite to its perfection: and in that regard, particularly called upon in Holy Scripture. But concerning this, and all the other great exercises, actions, or general significations, of repentance, every word singly is used indefinitely for the whole duty of repentance. Thus contrition is used by David; "A broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou shalt not despise;" that is, a penitent heart God will not reject. The same also is the usage of confession by St. John: "If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness[l];" that is, if we repent, God hath promised us pardon and his Holy Spirit, that he will justify us, and that he will sanctify us. And in pursuance of this, the church called ecclesiastical repentance by the name of 'exomologesis,' which though it was Greek word, yet both Greeks and Latins used it. 'Exomologesis est humiliandi hominis disciplina;' so Tertullian: 'Confession is the discipline of humiliation for a man for his sins:' and St. Ambrose calls confession 'pœnarum compendium,' 'the sum or abbreviature of penance[m].' And this word was sometimes changed, and called 'satisfaction:' which although the Latin church, in the later ages, use only for corporal austerities, which by way of appropriation they are pleased also to call penances, yet it was anciently used for the whole course and offices of ecclesiastical repentance; as appears in the council of [n] Paris, of [o] Agatho, and the [p] third council of Toledo. The result and effect of this observation are, that no more be put upon one part or action of repentance than upon another, to serve ends. For pardon of sins is promised to the penitent under single words; under contrition, under sorrow, under alms, under judging ourselves, under confession; but no one of these alone is sufficient for par-

[l] 1 John, i. 9. [m] De Abel et Cain, l. 2. c. 9.
[n] Lib. 1. c. ult. [o] Cap. 57. [p] Cap. 11.

don: and when pardon is promised to any one, they must mean the whole duty; for when the whole effect is ascribed to a part, that part stands for the whole, and means more than a part.

35. II. But concerning confession as it is a special act of repentance, the first thing that is to be said of it, is, that it is due only to God; for he is the person injured; sin is the prevarication of his laws; he is our judge, and he only can pardon, as he only can punish eternally. "Non tibi dico, ut tua peccata, tanquam in pompam, in publicum proferas, neque ut te accuses, sed ut pareas Prophetæ[q] dicenti, Revela Domino viam tuam. Apud Deum ea confitere, apud Judicem confitere peccata tua, orans si non linguâ, saltem memoriâ, et ita roga ut tui misereatur." "I do not enjoin thee to betray thyself to the public ear, bringing thy sins as into a theatre, but obey the Prophet, saying, Reveal thy way unto the Lord. Confess to God, confess to thy judge; praying if not with thy tongue, yet at least with thy mind, and pray so that thou mayest be heard:" so St. Chrysostom.—And upon those words of St. Paul, "Let a man examine himself," he saith, "Non revelavit ulcus, non in commune theatrum accusationem produxit," &c. "He did not reveal his ulcer, he did not bring his accusation into the common theatre; he made none witness of his sins, but in his conscience, none standing by, God only excepted, who sees all things[r]."—And again, upon that of the psalm; 'My sin is always against me;'—"If thou art ashamed to speak it to any one, say them daily in thy mind: I do not say, that thou confess them to thy fellow-servant who may upbraid thee; say them to God. 'Ἀμάρτυρον ἔστω τὸ δικαστήριον, Θεὸς ὁρώτω μόνος ἐξομολογούμενον. 'Let this judicatory be without assessors or witnesses, let God alone see thy confession.'"—"Quod si, verecundiâ retrahente, revelare ea coram hominibus erubescis, illi, quem latere non possunt, confiteri ea jugi supplicatione non desinas, ac dicere, 'Iniquitatem meam agnosco,' &c. qui et absque ullâ verecundiæ publicatione curare, et sine improperio peccata donare consuevit[s];" so Cassian in the imitation of St. Ambrose: "If bashfulness call thee back, and thou art ashamed to reveal them before men, cease not, by a con-

[q] Psal. xxxvi. 5. [r] In Ep. ad Heb. hom. 31.
[s] Collat. 20. c. 8. In Lucæ, cap. 22. et serm. 46.

tinual supplication, to confess them to him from whom they cannot be concealed; who, without any pressing upon our modesty, is wont to cure, and without upbraiding, to forgive us our sins." And the fathers of the council of Cabaillon advanced this duty by divers sentences of Scripture;—"Ita duntaxat ut et Deo, qui remissor est peccatorum, confiteamur peccata nostra, et cum David dicamus, Delictum meum cognitum tibi feci, et injustitiam meam non abscondi: Dixi, confitebor injustitias meas Domino, et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei," &c. "God is the pardoner of sins, and therefore let us confess to him, and say with David, 'I have made my sin known unto thee, and mine unrighteousness have I not hid; I said, I will confess mine iniquity unto the Lord, and thou forgavest the wickedness of my sin[t].'" But this thing is pressed most earnestly by Laurentius Novarriensis, who because he was a father of the fifth age, his words are of more use, by being a testimony that the ecclesiastical repentance, which we find to be now pressed by some as simply necessary, was not the doctrine of those times. "From that day in which thou goest out of the font, thou becomest to thyself a continual font, and a daily remission. There is no *absolute* necessity of the priest's right hand; from thenceforward God hath appointed thee to be thy own judge, thy own arbiter, and hath given thee knowledge whereby of thyself thou mayest discern good and evil; and because while thou remainest in the body, thou canst not be free from sin, God hath, after baptism, placed thy remedy within thyself; he hath placed pardon within thy own choice, so that thou art not, in the day of thy necessity, indispensably tied to seek a priest; but thou thyself, as if thou wert a most skilful doctor and master, mayest amend thy error within thee, and wash away thy sin by repentance. The fountain is never dry, the water is within thee; absolution is in thy choice, sanctification is in thy diligence, pardon is within the dew of thine own tears. Do not thou therefore look either for John or Jordan; be thou thy own baptist, viz. in the baptism of repentance. Thou art defiled after thou art washed, thy bowels are defiled, thy soul is polluted; plunge thyself in the waters of repentance, cleanse thyself by abundance of tears, let compunction be plentifully in thy

[t] Cap. 33. et habetur de Pœnit, dist. 1. cap. 90.

bowels,—and the Lord himself shall baptize thee with the Holy Ghost and with fire, and shall heap the fruits of repentance, and lay them up like wheat; but the chaff of thy sins he shall burn with unquenchable fire[u]." Many testimonies out of antiquity to the same purpose, are to be seen ready collected by Gratian, under the title 'De Pœnitentiâ.'

36. Now if any one shall inquire, to what purpose it is that we should confess our sins to God, who already knows them all, especially since to do so can be no part of mortification to the man's spirit: for if I steal in the presence of my brother, afterward to tell him who saw me, that I did that which he saw me do, is no confusion of face:—that which will be an answer to this, and make it appear necessary to confess to God, will also make it appear, not to be necessary to confess to men, in respect, I say, of any absolute necessity of the thing, or essential obligation of the person.

37. I answer, that confession of sins, as it is simply taken for enumeration of the actions and kinds of sin, can signify nothing as to God, for the reasons now mentioned in the inquiry. But when we are commanded to confess our sins, it is nothing else but another expression or word for the commandment of repentance. For, 'Confess your sins,' means, acknowledge that you have done amiss, that you were in the wrong way, that you were a miserable person, wandering out of the paths of God, and the methods of heaven and happiness, that you ought not to have done so, that you have sinned against God, and broken his holy laws, and therefore are liable and exposed to all that wrath of God which he will inflict upon you, or which he threatened. Confession of sins is a justification of God, and a sentencing of ourselves.—This is not only certain in the nature of the thing itself; but apparent also in the words of David; "Against thee only have I done this evil; 'ut tu justificeris,' 'that thou mightest be justified' in thy saying, and clear when thou art judged[x]:" that is, if I be a sinner, then art thou righteous and just in all the evils thou inflictest.—So that confession of sins is like confession of faith, nothing but a signification of our conviction; it is a publication of our dislike of sin, and a submission to the law of God, and a deprecation of the con-

[u] De Pœnit. hom. 1. Biblioth. pp. tom. 2. [x] Psal. li. 4.

sequent evil. "Confessio erroris, professio est desinendi," said St. Hilary[7]: "A confession of our sin, is a profession that we will leave it;" and again; "Confessio peccati ea est, ut id quod à te gestum est, per confessionem peccati confitearis esse peccatum." That is confession of sins, not that we enumerate the particulars, and tell the matter of fact to him that remembers them better than we can, but it is a condemning of the sin itself, an acknowledging that we have done foolishly, a bringing it forth to be crucified and killed. This is apparent also in the case of Achan, who was sufficiently convict of the matter of fact by the divine disposing of lots, which was one of the ways by which God answered the secret inquiries of the Jews; but when he was brought forth to punishment, 'Joshua said unto him, My son, give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto him;' that is, acknowledge the answer of God to be true, and his judgment upon us not to be causeless. To this answers that part of Achan's reply; 'Indeed I have sinned against the Lord God of Israel.' There God was justified, and the glory was given to him, that is, the glory of his truth and his justice; but then Joshua adds, 'And tell me now what thou hast done; hide it not from me.' Here it was fit he should make a particular enumeration of the fact; and so he did to Joshua, saying, 'Thus and thus have I done[8].' For to confess to man, is another thing than to confess to God. Men need to be informed, God needs it not; but God is to be justified and glorified in the sentence and condemnation of the sin or the sinner: and in order to it, we must confess our sin, that is, condemn it, confess it to be a sin, and ourselves guilty, and standing at God's mercy. St. Chrysostom upon those words of St. Paul, 'If we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged,' hath these words; "He saith not, if we would chastise ourselves, if we would punish ourselves; but only, if we would acknowledge our sins, if we would condemn ourselves, if we would give sentence against our sins, we should be freed from that punishment which is due both here and there. For he that hath condemned himself, appeases God upon a double account, both because he hath acknowledged the sins past, and is more careful for the future[9]." To this confession of sins is opposed, the denying

[7] In Psal. cxxxv. [8] Joshua, vii. 19, 20. [9] In 1 Cor. hom. 28.

our sin, our hiding it from God as Adam did, that is, either by proceeding in it, or by not considering it, or by excusing it, or by justifying it, or by glorying in it: all these are high provocations of God's anger: but this anger is taken off by confession. 'Præveniamus faciem ejus in confessione,' said the Psalmist[b]: 'Let us come before His presence with thanksgiving;' so we read it; 'Let us prevent his anger;' or, 'Let us go before his face with confession;' so the old Latin Bibles: which is a doing as the prodigal did; 'I will go unto my father, and say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and against thee:' and this is the first act of exterior repentance: but it is of that repentance that is indispensably necessary to salvation; this is 'repentance towards God,' which the Apostle[c] preached in the first publication of Christianity.

38. But then, besides this, there is a repentance towards men, and a confession in order to it. If I have sinned against my brother, I must ask his pardon and confess my error; that is, I must repent or confess to him; for he that is the injured person, hath a right over me; I am his debtor, and obliged; and he can forgive me if he please, and he may choose: that is, I must pay him the debt I owe him, unless he will be pleased to remit it. For God, in his infinite wisdom, and goodness, and justice, hath taken care to secure every man's interest; and he that takes any thing from me, is bound by God's law to restore it, and to restore me to that state of good things, from whence he forced me. Now because for the injury which I have already suffered, he cannot make me equal amends, because whatever he does to me for the future, still it is true that I did suffer evil from him formerly;—therefore, it is necessary that I do what I can, to the reparation of that; but because what is done and past, cannot be undone, I must make it up as well as I can; that is, I must confess my sin, and be sorry for it, and submit to the judgment of the offended party, and he is bound to forgive me the sin; and I am bound to make just and prudent amends according to my power; for here every one is bound to do his share. If the offending person hath done his part of duty, the offended must do his; that is, he must forgive him that wronged him; if he will not, God will untie the

[b] Psal. xcv. 2. [c] Acts, xx. 21.

penitent man, and with the same chain fast bind him that is uncharitable.

39. But my brother may be hurt by me, though I have taken nothing from him, nor intended him injury. He may be scandalized by my sin, that is, tempted to sin, encouraged in his vileness, or discontented and made sorrowful for my unworthiness and transgression. In all these cases it is necessary that we repent to them also; that is, that we make amends, not only by confession to God, but to our brethren also. For when we acknowledge our folly, we affright them from it; and by repentance we give them caution, that they may not descend into the same state of infelicity. And upon this account all public criminals were tied to a public 'exomologesis,' or repentance in the church, who, by confession of their sins, acknowledged their error, and entered into the state of repentance; and by their being separate from the participation and communion of the mysteries, were declared unworthy of a communion with Christ, and a participation of his promises,—till by repentance and the fruits worthy of it, they were adjudged capable of God's pardon.

40. At the first, this was as the nature of the thing exacted it, in case of public and notorious crimes, such which had done injury, and wrought public scandal: and so far was necessary, that the church should be repaired, if she have been injured: if public satisfaction be demanded, it must be done; if private be required only, then that is sufficient; though in case of notorious crimes it were very well, if the penitent would make his repentance as exemplary, as modesty and his own and the public circumstances can permit.

41. In pursuance of this in the primitive church, the bishop and whom he deputed, did minister to these public satisfactions and amends; which custom of theirs admitted of variety and change, according as new scandals or new necessities did arise. For though, by the nature of the thing, they only could be necessarily and essentially obliged, who had done public and notorious offences; yet some observing the advantages of that way of repentance, the prayers of the church, the tears of the bishop, the compassion of the faithful, the joy of absolution and reconciliation, did come in vo-

luntarily, and to do that by choice, which the notorious criminals were to do of necessity.

Then the priests which the penitents had chosen, did publish or enjoin them to publish their sins in the face of the church; but this grew intolerable, and was left off, because it grew to be a matter of accusation before the criminal judge, and of upbraiding in private conversation, and of confidence to them that sought for occasion and hardness of heart and face; and therefore they appointed one only priest to hear the cases, and receive the addresses of the penitents; and he did publish the sins of them that came, only in general, and by the publication of their penances, and their separation from the mysteries; and this also changed into the more private; and by several steps of progression dwindled away into private repentance towards men, that is, confession to a priest in private, and private satisfactions, or amends and fruits of repentance: and now, 'auricular confession' is nothing less but the public 'exomologesis,' or repentance ecclesiastical reduced to ashes; it is the relics of that excellent discipline, which was in some cases necessary, as I have declared, and in very many cases useful, until, by the dissolution of manners and the extinction of charity, it became insufferable, and a bigger scandal than those which it did intend to remedy. The result is this. That to enumerate our sins before the holy man that ministers in holy things, that is, confession to a priest, is not virtually included in the duty of contrition; for it not being necessary by the nature of the thing, nor the Divine commandment, is not necessary, absolutely and properly, in order to pardon; and therefore is no part of contrition, which without this may be a sufficient disposition towards pardon, unless by accident, as in the case of scandal, the criminal come to be obliged. Only this one advantage is to be made of their doctrine, who speak otherwise in this article. The divines in the council of Trent[d] affirm, that they that are contrite, are reconciled to God before they receive the sacrament of penance (as they use to speak), that is, before priestly absolution.—If then a man can be contrite before the priest absolves him, as their saying supposes, and as it is certain they may,—and if the desire of absolution be, as they

[d] Sess. 14. c. 4.

say, included in contrition, and consequently that nothing is wanting to obtain pardon to the penitent even before the priest absolves him;—it follows, that the priest's absolution, following this perfect disposition and this actual pardon, can effect nothing really; the man is pardoned beforehand, and therefore his absolution is only declarative. God pardons the man; and the priest by his office is to tell him so, when he sees cause for it, and observes the conditions completed. Indeed, if absolution by the minister of the church were necessary, then to desire it also would be necessary, and an act of duty and obedience; but then if the desire, in case it were necessary to desire it, would make contrition to be complete and perfect, and if perfect contrition does actually procure a pardon,—then the priestly absolution is only a solemn and legal publication of God's pardon already actually passed in the court of heaven. For an effect cannot proceed from causes, which are not yet in being; and therefore the pardon of the sins for which the penitent is contrite, cannot come from the priest's ministration,—which is not in some cases to be obtained, but desired only,—and afterward, when it can be obtained, comes when the work is done. God, it may be, accepts the desire; but the priest's ministry afterward is not, cannot be, the cause, why God did accept of that desire; because the desire is accepted, before the absotion is in being.

42. But now, although this cannot be a necessary duty for the reasons before reckoned, because the priest is not the injured person, and therefore cannot have the power of giving pardon properly, and sufficiently, and effectively; and confession is not an amends to him, and the duty itself of confession is not an enumeration of particulars, but a condemnation of the sin, which is an humiliation before the offended party; yet confession to a priest, the minister of pardon and reconciliation, the curate of souls, and the guide of consciences, is of so great use and benefit, to all that are heavy laden with their sins, that they who carelessly and causelessly neglect it, are neither lovers of the peace of consciences, nor are careful for the advantages of their souls.

43. For the publication of our sins to the minister of holy things, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἔχει ἡ ἐπίδειξις τῶν

σωματικῶν παθῶν, said Basil*, "is just like the manifestation of the diseases of our body to the physician;" for God hath appointed them as spiritual physicians; ἁμαρτωλοὺς ἰᾶσθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῖς τῆς μετανοίας φαρμάκοις, 'to heal sinners by the antidote of repentance,' said the fathers in the first Roman council under Simplicius. Their office is 'to comfort the comfortless, to instruct the ignorant, to reduce the wanderers, to restore them that are overtaken in a fault, to reconcile the penitent, to strengthen the weak, and to encourage their labours, to advise remedies against sins, and to separate the vile from the precious, to drive scandals far from the church, and, as much as may be, to secure the innocent lambs from the pollutions of the infected.'—Now in all these regards, the penitent may have advantages from the ecclesiastical ministrations. There are many cases of conscience, which the penitent cannot determine, many necessities which he does not perceive, many duties which he omits, many abatements of duty which he ignorantly or presumptuously does make; much partiality in the determination of his own interests; and to build up a soul requires so much wisdom, so much severity, so many arts, such caution and observance, such variety of notices, great learning, great prudence, great piety; that as all ministers are not worthy of that charge, and secret employment, and conduct of others in the more mysterious and difficult parts of religion; so it is certain, there are not many of the people that can worthily and sufficiently do it themselves: and therefore, although we are not to tell a lie for a good end, and that it cannot be said that God hath by an express law required it, or that it is necessary in the nature of things; yet to some persons it hath put on so many degrees of charity and prudence, and is so apt to minister to their superinduced needs; that although to do it is not a necessary obedience, yet it is a necessary charity; it is not necessary in respect of a positive express commandment, yet it is in order to certain ends, which cannot be so well provided for by any other instrument: it hath not in it an absolute, but it may have a relative and a superinduced necessity.

Cœlestique viro, quis te deceperit error,
Dicite; pro culpa ne sceleris esse putet†.

* Regul. Brev. 229. † Ovid. lib. 2. Trist. eleg. 3. 37. Harles.

Now here a particular enumeration is the confession that is proper to this ministry; because the minister must be instructed first in the particulars: which also points out to us the manner of his assistances, and of our obligation; it is that we may receive helps by his office and abilities, which can be better applied, by how much more minute and particular the enumeration or confession is; and of this circumstance there can be no other consideration: excepting that the enumeration of shames and follies before a holy man, is a very great restraint to the gaieties of a confident, or of a tempted person: for though a man dares sin in the presence of God, yet he dares not let his friend or his enemy see him do a foul act:

> Tam facile et pronum est superos contemnere testes,
> Si mortalis idem nemo sciat ——— [s].

And therefore, that a reverend man shall see his shame, and with a severe and a broad eye look and stare upon his dishonour, must needs be a great part of God's restraining grace, and of great use to the mortification and prevention of sin.

44. One thing more there is, which is highly considerable in this part or ministry of repentance; it is a great part of that preparation, which is necessary for him who needs, and for him who desires, absolution ecclesiastical. Some do need, and some do desire it; and it is of advantage to both. They that need it, and are bound to seek it, are such, who, being publicly noted by the church, are bound by her censures and discipline: that is, such who because they have given evil example to all, and encouragement in evil to some, to them that are easy and apt to take; are tied by the publication of their repentance, their open return, and public amends, to restore the church, so far as they can, to that state of good things, from whence their sin did or was apt to draw her. This indeed is necessary, and can in no regard be excused, if particular persons do not submit themselves to it, unless the church herself will not demand it, or advise it; and then if there be an error, or a possibility to have it otherwise, the governors of the church are only answerable. And in this sense are those decretory sayings, and earnest advices of the ancient doctors, to be understood. "Laicus si peccet,

s Juven. 13. 75. Reperti.

ipse suum non potest auferre peccatum, sed indiget sacerdote, ut possit remissionem peccatorum accipere," said Origen: "If any of the people sin, himself cannot take away his own sin, but must shew himself to the priest, that he may obtain pardon[h]."—"For they who are spotted with sins, unless they be cured with the priestly authority, cannot be in the bosom of the church," said Fabianus Martyr.—And as express are those words of St. Basil; Δεῖ τῶν τεταγμένων ἕκαστον μηδὲν μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα ἀπόκρυφον φυλάσσειν, ἀλλ' ἀπογυμνοῦν τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς καρδίας τοῖς πιστευομένοις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἀσθενουντων. And, Ἀναγκαῖον ἐξομολογεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τοῖς πεπιστευμένοις τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν μυστηρίων τοῦ Θεοῦ. "It behoveth every one that is under authority, to keep no motion of their hearts secret, but to lay the secrets of their heart naked before them, who are intrusted to take care of them that are weak or sick[i]." That is, the τεταγμένοι, the public penitents,' who are placed in 'the station of the mourners,' must not do their business imperfectly, but make a perfect narrative of their whole case to the penitentiary minister: and such persons who are under discipline, or under notorious sins, 'must make their exomologesis, that is, do ecclesiastical repentance before them who are the trustees and stewards of the mysteries of God:' "qua sine nullus remissione potietur," said a father to St. John de Gradibus: "without which exomologesis, or public ecclesiastical confession, or amends, no man shall obtain pardon:" meaning, the peace of the church. For to this sense we are to understand the doctrine of the holy fathers, and we learn it from St. Austin: "Rectè constituuntur ab iis, qui ecclesiæ præsunt, tempora pœnitentiæ; ut fiat etiam satis ecclesiæ, in quâ remittuntur ipsa peccata: extra eam quippe non remittuntur:" "The times of penance are, with great reason, appointed by ecclesiastical governors, that the church, in whose communion sins are forgiven, may be satisfied: for out of her, there is no forgiveness[k]."

45. For in this case, the church hath a power of binding and retaining sins and sinners; that is, a denying to them the privileges of the faithful, till they, by public repentance and satisfaction, have given testimony of their return to God's

[h] Hom. 10. in Numb.

[i] Regul. fus. explic. et Regul. Brev. 228.

[k] Eachirid. c. 65.

favour and service. The church may deny to pray publicly for some persons, and refuse to admit them into the society of those that do pray, and refuse till she is satisfied concerning them, by such signs and indications as she will appoint and choose. For it appears in both Testaments, that those, who are appointed to pray for others, to stand between God and the people,—had it left in their choice sometimes, and sometimes were forbidden to pray for certain criminals. Thus God gave to the Prophet charge concerning Ephraim: "Pray not thou for this people, neither lift up cry nor prayer for them, neither make intercession for them, for I will not hear thee[1]." Like to this was that of St. John: "There is a sin unto death. I say not that ye pray for him, that sins unto death;" that is, do not admit such persons to the communion of prayers and holy offices;—at least the church may choose, whether she will or no.

46. The church in her government and discipline had two ends,—and her power was, accordingly, apt to minister to these ends; 1. By condemning and punishing the sin, she was to do what she could to save the criminal; that is, by bringing him to repentance and a holy life, to bring him to pardon: 2. And if she could, or if she could not, effect this, yet she was to remove the scandal, and secure the flock from infection; this was all that was needful, this was all that was possible to be done. In order to the first the apostles had some powers extraordinary, which were indeed necessary at the beginning of the religion, not only for this, but for other ministrations. The apostles had power to 'bind sinners;' that is, 'to deliver them over to Satan,' and to sad diseases, or death itself: and they had 'power to loose sinners,' that is, to cure their diseases, to 'unloose Satan's bands,' to restore them to God's favour and pardon.

47. This manner of speaking was used by our blessed Saviour in this very case of sickness and infirmity: "Ought not this woman, a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo these eighteen years, be loosed from this band on the sabbath-day?" The apostles had this power of binding and loosing: and that this is the power of remitting and retaining sins, appears without exception, in the words of our blessed Saviour to the Jews, who best understood the power

[1] Jer. vii. 16.

of forgiving sins, by seeing the evil, which sin brought on the guilty person, taken away. "That ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins; he saith to the man sick of the palsy, Arise, take up thy bed and walk." For there is a power in heaven, and a power on earth, to forgive sins. The power that is in heaven, is the public absolution of a sinner at the day of judgment. The power on earth to forgive sins, is a taking off those intermedial evils which are inflicted in the way; sicknesses, temporal death, loss of the divine grace, and of the privileges of the faithful. These Christ could take off when he was upon earth, and his heavenly Father sent him to do all this, to heal all sicknesses, and to cure all infirmities, and to take away our sins, and to preach glad tidings to the poor, and comfort to the afflicted, and rest to the weary and heavy laden. The other judgment is to be performed by Christ at his second coming.

48. Now as God the Father sent his Son, so his holy Son sent his apostles with the same power on earth, to bind and loose sinners, to pardon sins by taking away the material evil effects, which sin should superinduce; or to retain sinners by binding them in sad and hard bands, to bring them to reason, or to make others afraid. Thus St. Peter sentenced Ananias and Sapphira to a temporal death: and St. Paul struck Elymas with blindness, and delivered over the incestuous Corinthians to be beaten by an evil spirit; and so also he did to Hymenæus and Alexander.

49. But this was an extraordinary power, and not to descend upon the succeeding ages of the church: but it was in this as in all other ministries; something miraculous and extraordinary was for ever to consign a lasting truth and ministry in ordinary. The preaching of the Gospel, that is, faith itself, at first was proved by miracles; and the Holy Ghost was given by signs and wonders, and sins were pardoned by the gifts of healing; and sins were retained by the hands of an angel, and the very visitation of the sick was blessed with sensible and strange recoveries; and every thing was accompanied with a miracle, excepting the two sacraments, in the administration of which we do not find any mention of any thing visibly miraculous in the records of Holy Scripture; and the reason is plain, because these two sacraments were to be for ever the ordinary ministries of those

graces, which at first were consigned by signs and wonders extraordinary. For in all ages of the church, reckoning exclusively from the days of the apostles,—all the graces of the Gospel, all the promises of God, were conveyed, or consigned, or fully ministered, by these sacraments, and by nothing else but what was in order to them. These were the inlets and doors by which all the faithful were admitted into the outer courts of the Lord's temple, or into the secrets of the kingdom; and the solemnities themselves were the keys of these doors; and they that had the power of ministration of them, they had the power of the keys.

50. These then being the whole ecclesiastical power, and the sum of their ministrations, were to be dispensed according to the necessities and differing capacities of the sons and daughters of the church. The Thessalonians, who were not furnished with a competent number of ecclesiastical governors, were commanded to "abstain from the company of the brethren that walked disorderly." St. John wrote to the 'elect lady,' that she should not entertain in her house false apostles: and when the former way did expire of itself, and by the change of things, and the second advice was not practicable and prudent, they were reduced to the only ordinary ministry of remitting and retaining sins, by a direct admitting, or refusing and deferring to admit, criminals to their ministries of pardon, which were now only left in the church, as their ordinary power and administration. For since in this world all our sins are pardoned by those ways and instruments, which God hath constituted in the church; and there are no other external rites appointed by Christ but the sacraments, it follows, that as they are worthily communicated or justly denied, so that pardon is or is not ministered.

And, therefore, when the church did bind any sinner by the bands of discipline, she did remove him from the mysteries, and sometimes enjoined external or internal acts of repentance, to testify and to exercise the grace, and so to dispose them to pardon; and when the penitents had given such testimonies which the church demanded, then they were absolved, that is, they were admitted to the mysteries. For in the primitive records of the church, there was no form of absolution judicial, nothing but giving them the holy com-

munion, admitting them to the peace of the church, to the society and privileges of the faithful. For this was giving them pardon, by virtue of those words of Christ, "Whose sins ye remit, they are remitted;" that is, if ye who are the stewards of my family, shall admit any one to the kingdom of Christ on earth, they shall be admitted to the participation of Christ's kingdom in heaven; and what ye bind here, shall be bound there; that is, if they be unworthy to partake of Christ here, they shall be accounted unworthy to partake of Christ hereafter; if they separate from Christ's members, they also shall be separate from the head; and this is the full sense of the power given by Christ to his church concerning sins and sinners, called by St. Paul, 'the word of reconciliation.'

51. For as for the other later and superinduced ministry of pardon in judicial forms of absolution; that is wholly upon other accounts, of good use indeed, to all them that desire it, by reason of their present persuasions and scruples, fears and jealousies, concerning the event of things. For sometimes it happens what one said of old; 'Mens nostra difficillimè sedatur; Deus facilius:' 'God is sooner at peace with us, than we are at peace with our own minds:' and because our repentances are always imperfect; and he who repents most excellently, and hates his sin with the greatest detestation, may, possibly, by his sense of the foulness of his sin, undervalue his repentance, and suspect his sorrow,—and because every thing is too little to deserve pardon, he may think it is too little to obtain it;—and the man may be melancholy, and melancholy is fearful, and fear is scrupulous, and scruples are not to be satisfied at home, and not very easily abroad;—in the midst of these and many other disadvantages, it will be necessary that he whose office it is to separate the vile from the precious, and to judge of leprosy, should be made able to judge of the state of this man's repentance, and, upon notice of particulars, to speak comfort to him or something for institution. For then if the minister of holy things shall think fit to pronounce absolution, that is, to declare that he believes him to be a true penitent and in the state of grace, it must needs add much comfort to him and hope of pardon, not only upon the confidence of his wisdom and spiritual learning, but even from the prayers

of the holy man, and the solemnity of his ministration; to pronounce absolution in this case, is to warrant him so far as his case is warrantable: that is, to speak comfort to him that is in need: to give sentence in a case which is laid before him; in which the party interested either hath no skill, or no confidence, or no comfort. Now in this case, to dispute whether the priest's power be judicial, or optative, or declarative, is so wholly to no purpose; that this sentence is no part of any power at all; but it is his office to do it, and is an effect of wisdom, not of power; it is like the answering of a question, which indeed ought to be asked of him; as every man prudently is to inquire in every matter of concernment, from him who is skilled, and experienced, and professed, in the faculty. But the priest's proper power of absolving, that is, of pardoning (which is, in no case, communicable to any man, who is not consecrated to the ministry), is a giving the penitent the means of eternal pardon, the admitting him to the sacraments of the church, and the peace and communion of the faithful; because that is the only way really to obtain pardon of God; there being, in ordinary, no way to heaven but by serving God in the way, which he hath commanded us by his Son, that is, in the way of the church, which is his body, whereof he is prince and head. The priest is the minister of holy things; he does that by his ministry, which God effects by real dispensation; and as he gives the Spirit, not by authority and proper efflux, but by assisting and dispensing those rites, and promoting those graces, which are certain dispositions to the receiving of him: just so he gives pardon; not as a king does it; nor yet as a messenger; that is, not by way of authority and real donation; nor yet only by declaration: but as a physician gives health; that is, he gives the remedy which God appoints; and if he does so, and if God blesses the medicines, the person recovers, and God gives the health.

52. For it is certain that the holy man, who ministers in repentance, hath no other proper power of giving pardon, than what is now described. Because he cannot pardon them, who are not truly penitent; and if the sinner be, God will pardon him, whether the priest does or no; and what can be the effect of these things, but this; that the priest does only minister to the pardon, as he ministers to repentance? He

tells us upon what conditions God does pardon, and judges best when the conditions are performed, and sets forward those conditions by his proper ministry; and ministers to us the instruments of grace; but first takes accounts of our souls; and helps us, who are otherwise too partial, to judge severe and righteous judgment concerning our eternal interest, and he judges for us, and does exhort or reprove, admonish or correct, comfort or humble, loose or bind. So the minister of God is the minister of reconciliation: that is, he is the minister of the Gospel; for that is the 'word of reconciliation,' which St. Paul affirms to be intrusted to him: in every office by which the holy man ministers to the Gospel, in every of them he is the minister of pardon.

53. But concerning that which we call absolution, that is, a pronouncing the person to be absolved; it is certain that the forms of the present use, were not used for many ages of the church: in the Greek church, they were never used; and for the Latin church, in Thomas Aquinas's time, they were so new, that he put it into one of his 'questiones disputatæ,' whether form were more fit, the optative or the judicial; whether it were better to say, 'God of his mercy pardon thee,' or 'By his authority committed to me, I absolve thee;' and in Peter Lombard's days, when it was esteemed an innocent doctrine to say, that the priest's power was only declarative, it is likely the form of absolution would be according to the power believed; which not being then universally believed to be judicial, the judicial form could not be of universal use; and in the Pontifical there is no judicial form at all; but only optative, or by way of prayer. But in this affair, besides what is already mentioned; I have two great things to say, which are a sufficient determination of this whole article.

54. The first is, that, in the primitive church, there was no such thing, as a judicial absolution of sins, used in any liturgy, or church, so far as can appear; but all the absolution of penitents which is recorded, was the mere admitting them to the mysteries and society of the faithful in religious offices, the sum and perfection of which were the holy sacrament of the Lord's supper. So the fourth council of Carthage[m] makes provision for a penitent that is near death;

[m] Can. 76.

'Reconcilietur per manus impositionem, et infundatur ori ejus eucharistia:' 'Let him be reconciled by the imposition of hands, and let the eucharist be poured into his mouth:' that was all the solemnity: even when there was the greatest need of the church's ministry; that is, before their penances and satisfactions were completed, the priest or bishop laid his hands upon him, and prayed, and gave him the communion. For that this was the whole purpose of imposition of hands, we are taught expressly by St. Austin, who being to prove that imposition of hands, viz. in repentance, might be repeated, though baptism might not, uses this for an argument; 'Quid enim est aliud nisi oratio super hominem?' 'It is nothing else but a prayer said over the man[n].'—And indeed this is evident and notorious in matter of fact; for in the beginning and in the progression, in the several periods of public repentance, and in the consummation of it, the bishop or the priest did very often impose hands, that is, pray over the penitent; as appears in Is. Ling. from the authority of the Gallican councils: 'Omni tempore, jejuniis manus pœnitentibus à sacerdotibus imponantur[o]:' and again, 'Criminalia peccata multis jejuniis, et crebris manus sacerdotum impositionibus, eorumque supplicationibus, juxta canonum statuta, placuit purgari:' 'Criminal (that is, great) sins must, according to the canons, be purged with much fasting, and frequent impositions of the priests' hands, and their supplications. In every time or period of their fast, let the priests' hands be laid upon the penitents:' that is, let the priests frequently pray with him, and for him, or over him. The same with that which he also observes out of the Nicene council[p]; 'Vultu et capite humiliato, humilitèr et ex corde veniam postulent, et pro se orare exposcant:' that is the intent of imposition of hands; 'Let the penitent humbly ask pardon,' that is, desire that the holy man and all the church would pray for him: this, in every stage or period of repentance, was a degree of reconciliation: for as God pardons a sinner when he gives him time to repent; he pardons him in one degree, that is, he hath taken off that anger, which might justly and instantly crush him all in pieces; and God pardons him yet more when he exhorts him to repentance, and

[n] Lib. 3. de Baptism. cap. 16. [o] Tertio tomo Con. Gall. c. 8. 11.
[p] Cap. 16. 17.

yet more when he inclines him; and as he proceeds, so does God; but the pardon is not full and final till the repentance is so too; so does the minister of repentance and pardon: those only are in the unpardoned state, who are cut off from all intercourse in holy things, with holy persons, in holy offices; when they are admitted to do repentance, they are admitted to the state of pardon: and every time the bishop, or minister, prays for him, he still sets him forwarder towards the final pardon; but then the penitent is fully reconciled on earth, when having done his repentance towards men, that is, by the commands of the church, he is admitted to the holy communion: and if that be sincerely done on the penitent's part, and this be maturely and prudently done on the priest's part; as the repentance towards men was a repentance also towards God, so the absolution before men, is a certain indication of absolution before God. But as to the main question; then the church only did reconcile penitents, when she admitted them to the communion; and therefore, in the second council of Carthage[q], 'absolution' is called, 'reconciliari Divinis altaribus,' 'a being reconciled to the altar of God:' and in the council of Eliberis, 'communione reconciliari,' 'a being reconciled by receiving the communion,' opposite to which in the same canon[r] is, 'communionem non accipiat,' 'he may not receive the communion,' that is, he shall not be absolved. The same is to be seen in the eighth canon of the council of Ancyra, in the second canon of the council of Laodicea, in the eighty-fifth epistle of P. Leo; and the first epistle of P. Vigilius, and in the third council of Toledo[s], we find the whole process of binding and loosing described in these words: "Because we find, that, in certain churches of Spain, men do not according to the canons, but unworthily repent them of their sins, that so often as they please to sin, so often they desire of the priest to be reconciled: therefore, for the restraining so execrable a presumption, it is commanded by the holy council, that repentance should be given according to the form of the ancient canons; that is, that he who repents him of his doings, being first suspended from the communion, he should amongst the other penitents often run to the imposition of hands, that is, to the prayers of the bishop and the church): but when the time of his sa-

[q] Can. 4. [r] Can. 72. [s] Can. 11.

tisfaction is completed, according as the priest's prudence shall approve, let him restore him to the communion."—That is the absolution, as the rejecting him from it was the binding him, it was an excommunication; from which, when he was restored to the communion, he was loosed: and this was so known, so universal a practice, and process of ecclesiastical repentance, that without any alteration (as to the main inquiry) it continued so in the church to very many ages succeeding; and it was for a long while together the custom of penitent people in the beginning of Lent, to come voluntarily to receive injunctions of discipline and penitential offices from the priest, and to abstain from the holy communion till they had done their penances, and then by ceremonies and prayers to be restored to the communion at Easter; without any other form of judicial absolution, as is to be seen in Albinus and in the Roman Pontifical[t]. To which this consideration may be added; that the reconciling of penitents, in the primitive church, was not done by the bishop or priest only; but sometimes by deacons, as appears in St. Cyprian[u]; and sometimes by the people, as it was allowed by St. Paul in the case of the incestuous Corinthians[x]; and was frequently permitted to the confessors in the times of persecution; and may be done by an unbaptized catechumen, as St. Austin affirms[y]. The result of which is, that this absolution of penitents in the court Christian, was not an act of priestly power incommunicably; it was not a dispensation of the proper power of the keys, but to give, or not to give, the communion; that was an effect of the power of the keys; that was really, properly, and in effect, the ecclesiastical absolution; for that which the deacons or confessors, the laicks or catechumens did, was all that, and only that, which was of rite or ceremony before the giving the communion: therefore, that which was besides this giving the communion, was no proper absolution; it was not a priestly act indispensably; it might be done by them that were no priests: but the giving of the communion, that was a sacerdotal act, I mean the consecration of it; though the tradition of it was sometimes by deacons, sometimes by themselves at home: this therefore was the dispensation of the keys; this was the effect of

[t] De Divers. Offic. c. 13. 16.
[u] Lib. 3. ep. 17.
[x] 2 Cor. ii. 10.
[y] De Consecrat. dist. 4. cap. Sanctum.

the powers of binding and loosing, of remitting or retaining sins, according as the sense and practice of the church expounded her own power. The prayers of the priest, going before his ministration of the communion, were called absolution; that is, the beginning and one of the first portions of it; 'absolutio sacerdotalium precum;' so it was called in ancient councils [a]; the priest imposed hands, and prayed, and then gave the communion. This was the ordinary way. But there was an extraordinary.

55. For in some cases the imposition of hands was omitted; that is, when the bishop or priest was absent; and the deacon prayed, or the confessor: but this was, 1. by the leave of the bishop or priest, for to them it belonged in ordinary. And, 2. this was nothing else but a taking them from the station of the penitents, and a placing them amongst the faithful communicants; either by declaring that their penances were performed, or not to be exacted.

56. For by this we shall be clear of an objection, which might arise from the case of dying penitents; to whom the communion was given, and they restored to the peace of the church, that is, as they supposed, to God's mercy and the pardon of sins; for they would not choose to give the communion to such persons, whom they did not believe God had pardoned: but these persons, though communicated, 'non tamen se credant absolutos sine manus impositione, si supervixerint,' 'were not to suppose themselves absolved, if they recovered that sickness, without imposition of hands;' said the fathers of the fourth council of Carthage [b], by which it should seem, absolution was a thing distinct from giving the communion.

57. To this I answer, that the dying penitent was fully absolved, in case he had received the first imposition of hands for repentance; that is, if, in his health, he submitted himself to penance, and public amends, and was prevented from finishing the impositions, they supposed that desire and endeavour of the penitent man, was a worthy disposition to the receiving the holy communion, and both together sufficient for pardon: but because this was only to be in the case of such intervening necessity, and God will not accept of the will for the deed, but in such cases where the deed cannot be

[a] Isaac Lin. tit. 1. c. 16. [b] Can. 76.

accomplished,—therefore they bound such penitents to return to their first obligation, in case they should recover, since God had taken off their necessity, and restored them to their first capacity. And by this we understand the meaning of the third canon of the first Arausican council. "They who having received penance, depart from the body, it pleases that they shall be communicated 'sine reconciliatoriâ manus impositione,' 'without the reconciling imposition of hands;'" that is, because the penitential imposition of hands was imposed upon them, and they did what they could, though the last imposition was not, though the last hand was not, put on them, declaring that they had done their penances, and completed their satisfactions, yet they might be communicated, that is, absolved; "Quod morientis sufficit consolationi," "This is enough to the comfort of the dying man," according to the definition of the fathers, who, conveniently enough, called such a communion their 'viaticum,' their passport or 'provision for their way.' For there were two solemn impositions of hands in repentance; the first and greatest was in the first admission of them, and in the imposition of the discipline or manner of performing penances: and this was the bishop's office; and of great consideration amongst the holy primitives; and was never done but by the superior clergy, as is evident in ecclesiastical story. The second solemn imposition of hands, was immediately before their absolution or communion; and it was a holy prayer and publication that he was accepted and had finished that process: this was the less solemn, and was ordinarily done by the superior clergy; but sometimes by others, as I have remonstrated: other intermedial impositions there were, as appears by the 'creber recursus,' mentioned in the third council of Toledo above cited; the penitents were often to beg the bishop's pardon, or the priest's prayers, and the advocations and intercessions of the faithful; but the peace of the church, that is, that pardon which she could minister, and which she had a promise that God would confirm in heaven, was the ministry of pardon in the dispensation of the sacrament of that body, that was broken, and that blood that was poured forth, for the remission of our sins.

58. The result is; that the absolution of sins, which in the later forms and usages of the church is introduced, can

be nothing but declarative; the office of the preacher and the guide of souls; of great use to timorous persons, and to the greatest penitents, full of comfort, full of usefulness, and institution; and therefore, although this very declaration of pardon may truly, and according to the style of Scripture, be called 'pardon;' and the power and office of pronouncing the penitent's pardon is, in the sense of the Scripture and the church, a good sense and signification of power; as the Pharisees are said 'to justify God,' when they declare his justice; and as the preacher that 'converts a sinner,' is said σώζειν, 'to save a soul from death;' yet if we would speak properly, and as things are in their own nature and institution, this declarative absolution is only an act of preaching, or opening and reading the commission; an effect of the spirit of prudence and government entering upon the church; but the power of the keys is another thing; it is the dispensing all those rites and ministries by which heaven is opened: and that is, the word and baptism at the first, and ever after, the holy sacrament of the supper of the Lord, and all the parts of the bishops' and priests' advocation and intercession in holy prayers and offices.

59. But as for the declarative absolution, although it is rather an act of wisdom than of power, it being true, as St. Jerome said[b], that as the priests of the law could only discern, and neither cause nor remove leprosies; so the ministers of the Gospel, when they retain or remit sins, do but in the one, judge how long we continue guilty,—and in the other, declare when we are clear and free; yet this very declaration is of great use, and, in many cases, of great effect. For as God did, in the case of David, give to the prophet Nathan a particular, special, and extraordinary commission: so to the ministers of the Gospel he gives one, that is ordinary and perpetual. He had a prophetical evidence; but these have a certainty of faith as to one of the propositions, —and as to the other, some parts of human experience to assure them, 1. of God's gracious pardon to the penitent, and, 2. of the sincerity of their repentance: and therefore can with great effect minister to the comfort of sad and afflicted penitents: this does declare the pardon upon observation of the just grounds and dispositions: but the dispensation of

[b] In 16. Matt.

ecclesiastical sacraments does really minister to it, not only by consigning it; but as instruments, of the divine appointment, to convey proper mercies to worthily-disposed persons.

60. But the other great thing, which I was to say in this article, is this, that the judicial absolution of the priest does effect no material event or change in the penitent as to the giving the pardon, and therefore cannot be it which Christ intended in the giving those excellent powers of remitting and retaining sins. Now upon this will the whole issue depend. Does the priest absolve him whom God condemns? God is the supreme judge; and though we may minister to his judgment, yet we cannot contradict it;—or can the priest condemn him whom God absolves? That also is impossible, 'He is near that justifieth me, who will contend with me;' and 'If God be with us, who can be against us?' Or will not God pardon unless the priest absolves us? That may become a sad story: for he may be malicious, or ignorant, or interested, or covetous, and desirous to serve his own ends upon the ruin of my soul,—and therefore God dispenses his mercies by more regular, just, and equal measures, than the accidental sentences of unknowing or imprudent men: if then the priest ministers only to repentance, by saying, 'I absolve thee,' what is it that he effects? For since God's pardon does not go by his measures, his must go by God's measures; and the effect of that will be this, God works his own work in us; and when his minister observes the effects of the Divine grace, he can and ought to publish and declare, to all the purposes of comfort and institution, that the person is absolved; that is, he is in the state of grace and divine favour, in which if he perseveres, he shall be saved. But all this while the work is supposed to be done before; and if it be, the priest hath nothing left for him to do, but to approve, to warrant, and to publish.—And the case in short is this:

61. Either the sinner hath repented worthily, or he hath not. If he hath, then God hath pardoned him already, by virtue of all the promises evangelical: if he hath not repented worthily, the priest cannot, ought not to absolve him; and therefore can, by this absolution, effect no new thing. The work is done before the priestly absolution, and therefore cannot depend upon it. Against this, no sect of men op-

poses any thing that I know of, excepting only the Roman doctors; who yet confess the argument of value, if the penitent be contrite. But they add this, that there is an imperfect contrition, which by a distinct word they call 'attrition,' which is a natural grief, or a grief proceeding wholly from fear or smart, and hath in it nothing of love; and this, they say, does not justify the man, nor pardon the sin of itself. But if this man come to the priest, and confess and be absolved, that absolution makes this attrition to become contrition, or, which is all one, it pardons the man's sins; and though this imperfect penitent cannot hope for pardon upon the confidence of that indisposition, yet, by the sacrament of penance or priestly absolution, he may hope it, and shall not be deceived.

62. Indeed, if this were true, it were a great advantage to some persons, who need it mightily. But they are the worst sort of penitents, and such which though they have been very bad, yet now resolve not to be very good, if they can any other way escape it; and by this means the priest's power is highly advanced; and to submit to it, would be highly necessary to most men, and safest to all. But if this be not true, then to hope it, is a false confidence, and of danger to the event of souls; it is a nurse of carelessness, and gives boldness to imperfect penitents, and makes them to slacken their own piety, because they look for security upon confidence of that, which will be had without trouble, or mortification; even the priest's absolution. This therefore I am to examine, as being of very great concernment in the whole article of repentance, and promised to be considered in the beginning of this paragraph.

SECTION V.

Attrition, or the imperfect Repentance, though with Absolution, is not sufficient.

63. By attrition they mean the most imperfect repentance; that is, a sorrow proceeding from fear of hell, a sorrow not mingled with the love of God: this sorrow newly begun, they say, is sufficient for pardon, if the sins be confessed,

and the party absolved by the priest. This indeed is a short process, and very easy; but if it be not effectual and valid, the persons that rely upon it, are miserably undone. Here therefore I consider,

64. I. Attrition being a word of the schools, not of the Scripture, or of antiquity, means what they please to have it; and although they differ in assigning its definition, yet it being the least and the worst part of repentance, every action of any man, that can, in any sense, be said to repent upon consideration of any the most affrighting threatenings in the Gospel, cannot be denied to have attrition. Now such a person, who being scared, comes to confess his sin, may still retain his affections to it; for nothing but love to God can take away his love from evil; and if there be love in it, it is contrition, not attrition. From these premises it follows, that if the priest can absolve him that is attrite, he may pardon him who hath affections to sin still remaining; that is, one who fears hell, but does not love God. If it be said, that absolution changes fear into love, attrition into contrition, a Saul into a David, a Judas into a John, a Simon Magus into Simon Peter; then the greatest conversions and miracles of change may be wrought, in an instant, by an ordinary ministry; and when Simon Magus was affrighted by St. Peter about the horror of his sin, and told that he was in the gall of bitterness, and thereupon desired the Apostle to pray for him,—if St. Peter had but absolved him, which he certainly might upon that affright he put the sorcerer in,—he had made him a saint presently, and needed not to have spoken so uncertainly concerning him; 'Pray, if, *peradventure*, the thought of thy heart may be forgiven thee.' For without *peradventure* he might have made a quicker dispatch, and a surer work, by giving him absolution upon his present submission, and the desire of his prayers, and his visible apparent fear of being in the gall of bitterness;—all which must needs be as much or more than the Roman schools define attrition to be. But,

65. II. The priest pardons upon no other terms than those, upon which God pardons; for if he does, then he is not the minister of God, but the supreme lord, and must do it by his own measures, if he does it not by the measures of God. For God does never pardon him that is only attrite;

and this is confessed, in that they require the man to go to the priest, that he may be made contrite: which is all one, as if he were bidden to go to the priest to be made chaste or liberal, temperate or humble, in an instant.

66. III. And if it be said, that although God does not pardon him that is attrite, unless it be together with the keys, that is, unless the priest absolves him; but then, it being all that God requires in that case, the priest does no more than God warrants; it is done by God's measures; the attrition or imperfect repentance of the penitent, and the keys of the church, being all which God requires: this indeed, if it could be proved, were something, but there is no tittle of it in Scripture or antiquity; it being no where said, that attrition and absolution alone are sufficient, and is an unreasonable dream but of yesterday.

67. IV. For if attrition be good of itself, and a sufficient disposition to receive pardon from the church, then it is also sufficient to obtain pardon of God without the church, in case of necessity. For unless it be for him, in case of necessity, sufficient to desire absolution, then the outward act does more than the inward; and the ceremony were more than the grace; and the priest could do more than God would; for the priest would and could pardon him, whom God would not pardon without the priest; and the will could not be accepted for the deed, when the deed were impossible to be done; and God would require of us more than we have, more than he hath given us; and a man should live or die not by himself, but should be judged by the actions of others. All which contain in them impossible affirmatives, and therefore proceed from a false principle.

68. V. But then if attrition, in some cases, without the sacrament, were good, it is as good to all intents and purposes of pardon, as contrition; for contrition (say the Roman schools) is not sufficient of itself without the keys; that is, unless it contain in it a resolution to confess and beg absolution. Now this resolution is no resolution, unless it be reduced to act, when it can; it is a mockery, if it does not; and it is to be excused in no case, but in that of necessity. And just so it is in attrition, as I have proved. In vain therefore it is for any good man to persuade his penitent to heighten his repentance, and to be contrite; for he may, at

a cheaper rate, be assured of his pardon, if he makes the priest his friend: but as for contrition, by his doctrine, it is more than needs.

69. VI. But then it is strange, that attrition, which, of itself, is insufficient, shall yet do the work of pardon with the priest's absolution; and yet that which is sufficient (as contrition is affirmed to be in the council of Trent[c]), shall not do it without absolution, in act or desire; that is in act always, unless it be impossible: this encourages the imperfect, and discourages the perfect, tying them both to equal laws, whether they need it, or need it not.

70. VII. But I demand; can the priest hearing of a penitent man's confession, whom he, justly and without error, perceives only to be attrite, can he, I say, refuse to absolve him? can he retain his sins, till he perceives him to be contrite? Certainly in the primitive church, when they deferred to give him the peace for three, for seven, for ten, for thirteen years together, their purpose then was to work in him contrition, or the most excellent repentance. But however, if he can refuse to absolve such a man, then it is, because absolution will not work for him what is defective in him; it will not change it into contrition; for if it could, then to refuse to absolve him, were highly uncharitable and unreasonable. But if he cannot refuse to absolve such a person, it is because he is sufficiently disposed; he hath done all that God requires of him to dispose himself to it; and if so, then the sacrament, as they call it, that is, the priest's absolution, does nothing to the increasing his disposition; it is sufficient already. Add to this, if, in the case of attrition, the priest may not deny to absolve the imperfect penitent, then it is certain God will absolve him, in case the priest does not; for if the priest be bound and refuses to do it, this ought not, it cannot, prejudice the penitent, but himself only. He therefore shall not perish for want of the priest's absolution; and if it could be otherwise, then the parishioner might be damned for the curate's fault; which to affirm were certain blasphemy and heresy. What the priest is bound to do, God will do, if the priest will not. The result is this. That if this imperfect repentance, which they call attrition, be a sufficient disposition to absolution, then the priest's ministry is

[c] Sess. 14. c. 4.

not operative for the making it sufficient; and indeed it were strange it should, that absolution should make contrition, and yet contrition be necessary in order to absolution; that the form should make the matter, that one essential or integral part should make another; that what is to be before, must be made by that which comes after. But if this attrition be not a sufficient disposition to absolution, then the priest may not absolve such imperfect penitents. So that the priest cannot make it sufficient, if of itself it be insufficient; and if it be of itself sufficient, then his absolution does but declare it so, it effects it not.

71. VIII. And after all, it is certain that the words of absolution effect no more than they signify. If therefore they do pardon the sin, yet they do not naturally change the disposition or the real habit of the sinner. And if the words can effect more, they may be changed to signify what they do effect; for to signify is less than to effect. Can therefore the church use this form of absolution,—"I do, by the power committed unto me, change thy attrition into contrition." The answer to this is not yet made; for their pretence is so new, and so wholly unexamined, that they have not yet considered any thing of it. It will therefore suffice for our institution in this useful, material, and practical question, that no such words were instituted by Christ, nor any thing like them; no such were used by the primitive church, no such power pretended. And as this new doctrine of the Roman church contains in it huge estrangements and distances from the spirit of Christianity, and is another kind of thing than the doctrine and practice of the apostolical and succeeding ages of the church did publish or exercise; so it is a perfect destruction to the necessity of holy life, it is a device only to advance the priest's office, and to depress the necessity of holy dispositions; it is a trick to make the graces of God's Holy Spirit to be bought and sold; and that a man may, at a price, become holy in an instant; just as if a teacher of music should undertake to convey skill to his scholar, and sell the art and transmit it in an hour; it is a device to make dispositions by art, and in effect requires little or nothing of duty to God, so they pay regard to the priest. But I shall need to oppose no more against it, but those excellent words, and pious meditation of Salvian: "Non levi agendum est

contritione, ut debita illa redimantur, quibus mors æterna debetur; nec transitoriâ opus est satisfactione pro malis illis, propter quæ paratus est ignis æternus:" "It is not a light contrition, by which those debts can be redeemed to which eternal death is due; neither can a transitory satisfaction serve for those evils, for which God hath prepared the vengeance of eternal fire."

SECTION VI.

Of Penances, or Satisfactions.

72. In the primitive church, the word 'satisfaction,' was the whole word for all the parts and exercises of repentance; according to those words of Lactantius; "Pœnitentiam proposuit, ut, si peccata nostra confessi Deo satisfecerimus, veniam consequamur:" "He propounded repentance, that if we, confessing our sins to God, make amends or satisfaction, we may obtain pardon."—Where it is evident that 'satisfaction' does not signify in the modern sense of the word, a full payment to the divine justice; but, by the exercises of repentance, a deprecation of our fault, and a begging pardon. Satisfaction and pardon are not consistent, if satisfaction signify rigorously. When the whole debt is paid, there is nothing to be forgiven. The bishops and priests, in the primitive church, would never give pardon, till their satisfactions were performed. To confess their sins, to be sorrowful for them, to express their sorrow, to punish the guilty person, to do actions contrary to their former sins, this was their amends or satisfaction; and this ought to be ours. So we find the word used in best classic authors. So Plautus brings in Alcmena angry with Amphitruo.

> ——— Quin ego illum aut deseram,
> Aut satisfaciat mihi ille, atque adjuret insuper,
> Nolle esse dicta, quæ in me insontem protulit[d].

i. e. "I will leave him, unless he give me satisfaction, and swear that he wishes that to be unsaid, which he spake against my innocence:" for that was the form of giving satisfaction, to wish it undone, or unspoken,—and to add an oath that they

[d] Act. 3. scen. 2. 7. Schmieder. p. 53.

believe the person did not deserve that wrong: as we find it in Terence:

> Novi ego vestra hæc: nollem factum: jusjurandum dabitur, te esse
> Indignum injuriâ hâc [e].

Concerning which, who please to see more testimonies of the true sense and use of the word 'satisfactions,' may please to look upon Lambinus in 'Plauti Amphitr.' and Torrentius upon Suetonius 'in Julio.'

'Exomologesis,' or 'confession,' was the word which, as I noted formerly, was of most frequent use in the church. "Si de exomologesi retractas, gehennam in corde considera quam tibi exomologesis exstinguet:" "He that retracts his sins by confessing and condemning them, extinguishes the flames of hell:" so Tertullian [f].—The same with that of St. Cyprian: "Deo patri, et misericordi, precibus et operibus suis satisfacere possunt:" "They may satisfy God our Father and merciful, by prayers and good works:" that is, they may by these deprecate their fault, and obtain mercy and pardon for their sins; "peccatum suum satisfactione humili et simplici confitentes;" so Cyprian [g], "confessing their sins with humble and simple satisfaction:" plainly intimating, that 'confession' or 'exomologesis' was the same with that which they called 'satisfaction.'—And both of them were nothing but the public exercise of repentance, according to the present usages of their churches; as appears evidently in those words of Gennadius [h]: "Pœnitentiæ satisfactionem esse causas peccatorum exscindere, nec eorum suggestionibus aditum indulgere:" "To cut off the causes of sins, and no more to entertain their whispers and temptations, is the satisfaction of repentance:"—and like this is that of Lactantius: "Potest reduci et liberari, si eum pœniteat actorum, et ad meliora conversus satisfaciat Deo:" "The sinner may be brought back and freed, if he repents of what is done, and satisfies or makes amends to God by being turned to better courses."—And the whole process of this is well described by Tertullian [i]: "Exomologesis est, quâ delictum Domino nostrum confitemur, non quidem ut ignaro, sed quatenus satisfactio confessione disponitur, confessione pœnitentia nas-

[e] Adelph. 2. 1. 11. [f] De Pœnit. c. 12. [g] De Lapsis.
[h] L. de Dogm. Eccles. [i] De Pœnit. c. 9.

citur, pœnitentia Deus mitigatur:" "We must confess our sins to God, not as if he did not know them already, but because our satisfaction is disposed and ordered by confession; by confession our repentance hath birth and production, and by repentance God is appeased."

73. Things being thus, we need not immerge ourselves in the trifling controversies of our later schools, about the just value of every work,—and how much every penance weighs,—and whether God is so satisfied with our penal works,—that in justice he must take off so much as we put on, and is tied also to take our accounts. Certain it is, if God should weigh our sins with the same value as we weigh our own good works, all our actions and sufferings would be found infinitely too light in the balance. Therefore, it were better that we should do what we can, and humbly beg of God to weigh them both with vast allowances of mercy. All that we can do, is to be sorrowful for our sins, and to leave them, and to endeavour to obey God in the time to follow; and to take care, 'ut aliquo actu administretur pœnitentia,' 'that our repentance be exercised with certain acts proper to it[k].' Of which these are usually reckoned as the principal.

Sorrow and Mourning.

74. So St. Cyprian: "Satisfactionibus et lamentationibus peccata redimuntur:" "Our sins are redeemed or washed off by the satisfactions of just sorrow or mourning."—And Pacianus[m] gives the same advice: "Behold, I promise, that, if you return to your Father by a true satisfaction, wandering no more, adding nothing to your former sins, and saying something humble, and mournful—'We have sinned in thy sight, O Father, we are not worthy of the name of sons,'—presently the unclean beast shall depart from thee, and thou shalt no longer be fed with the filthy nourishment of husks."—And St. Maximus[n] calls this mourning and weeping of our sins, 'mœstam pœnitentiæ satisfactionem,' 'the sorrowful amends or satisfaction of repentance.' The meaning of this is; that when we are grieved for our sins and deplore them, we hate them, and go from them, and convert to God who only can give us remedy.

[k] Tertul. de Pœnit.
[l] Serm. de Lapsis.
[m] Paræn. ad Pœnit.
[n] Hom. in die Ciner.

Corporal Afflictions.

75. Such as are, fastings; watchings; hair-cloth upon our naked bodies; lyings upon the ground; journeys on foot; doing mean offices; serving sick and wounded persons; solitariness; silence; voluntary restraints of liberty; refusing lawful pleasure; choosing at certain times the less pleasing meats; laborious postures in prayer; saying many and devout prayers with our arms extended, in the fashion of Christ hanging on the cross; which indeed is a painful and afflictive posture, but safe and without detriment to our body: add to these the austerities used by some of the ancients in their ascetic devotions, who sometimes rolled themselves naked upon nettles, or thorns, shut themselves in tombs, bound themselves to pillars, endured heats and colds in great extremity, chastisements of the body, and all ways of subduing it to the empire of the soul. Of which, antiquity is infinitely full; and of which at last they grew so fond and enamoured, that the greatest part of their religion was self-affliction; but I choose to propound only such prudent severities, as were apt to signify a godly sorrow, to destroy sin, and to deprecate God's anger in such ways of which they had experience, or warrant express, or authentic precedents; their 'exomologesis' being, as Tertullian [o] describes it, a discipline of humbling and throwing a man down, 'conversationem injungens misericordiæ illicem,' 'enjoining a life that will allure to pity:' 'de ipso quoque habitu atque victu mandat, sacco et cineri incubare, corpus sordibus obscurare.' Penitential sorrow expresses itself in the very clothes and gestures of the body; that is, a great sorrow is apt to express itself in every thing, and infects every part of a man with its contact. "Ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum familiarem suum, vix à se manus abstinuit: tanta vis fuit pœnitendi:" "When Alexander had killed his friend Clytus, he scarce abstained from killing himself: so great are the effort and violence of repentance [p]:" and this is no other thing than what the Apostle said; "If one member of the body is afflicted, all the rest suffer with it:" and if the heart be troubled, he that is gay in any other part, goes about to lessen his trouble; and that takes off, it does not promote, repentance.

[o] De Pœnit. c. 9. [p] Cicero. Tuscul. 4. 37. Rath. p. 369.

76. But the use of this is material; it is a direct 'judging of ourselves,' and a perverting the wrath of God; not that these penances are a payment for the reserve of the temporal guilt, remaining after the sin is pardoned. That is but a dream; for the guilt and punishment are not to be distinguished in any material event: so long as a man is liable to punishment, so long he is guilty: and so long he is unpardoned, as he is obnoxious to the divine anger. God cannot, will not, punish him that is innocent; and he that is wholly pardoned, is in the place and state of a guiltless person. Indeed, God punishes as he pleases, and pardons as he pleases, by parts, and as he is appeased, or as he inclines to mercy; but our general measure is,—As our repentance is, so is our pardon;—and every action of repentance does something of help to us; and this of self-affliction, when it proceeds from a hearty detestation of sin, and indignation against ourselves for having provoked God, is a very good exercise of repentance; of itself it profits little, but as it is a fruit of repentance; in the virtue of it, it is accepted towards its part of expiation, and they that have refused this, have felt worse;

Et qui non tulerat verbera, tela tulit [q].

But when God sees us smite ourselves in indignation for our sins, because we have no better way to express and act our repentances, God hath accepted it, and hath himself forborne to smite us, and we have reason to believe he will do so again. For these expressions extinguish the delicacies of the flesh, from whence our sins have too often had their spring: and when the offending party accuses himself first, and smites first, and calls for pardon, there is nothing left to the offended person to do, but to pity and pardon. For we see that sometimes God smites a sinner with a temporal curse, and brings the man to repentance, and pardons all the rest; and therefore much rather will he do it, when we smite ourselves. For this is the highest process of confession. God is pleased that we are ashamed of our sin, that we justify God, and give sentence against ourselves, that we accuse ourselves, and acknowledge ourselves worthy of his severest wrath: if therefore we go on and punish the sinner too, it is all, it is the greatest thing, we can do: and although

[q] Mart. Spect. 10.

it be not necessary in any one instance to be done, unless where the authority of our superior does intervene; yet it is accepted in every instance, if the principle be good, that is, if it proceeds from our indignation against sin, and if it be not rested in as a thing of itself, and singly a service of God, which indeed he hath no where in particular required; and lastly, if it be done prudently and temperately. If these cautions be observed in all things else, it is true that the most laborious repentance, if other things be answerable, is the best, for it takes off the softness of flesh, and the tenderness of the lower man; it abates the love of the world, and enkindles the love of heaven; it is ever the best token of sincerity and an humble repentance; and does promote it too, still in better degrees effecting what it doth signify. As music in a banquet of wine, and caresses and indications of joy and festivity, are seasonable and proper expressions at a solemnity of joy: so are all the sad accidents, and circumstances, and effects, and instruments, of sorrow proper in a day of mourning. All nations weep not in the same manner, and have not the same interjections of sorrow: but as every one of us use to mourn in our greatest losses, and in the death of our dearest relatives, so it is fit we should mourn in the dangers and death of our souls; that they may, being refreshed by such salutary and medicinal showers, spring up to life eternal.

77. In the several ages of the church, they had several methods of these satisfactions; and they, requiring a longer proof of their repentance than we usually do, did also, by consequent, enjoin and expect greater and longer penitential severities: concerning which these two things are certain:—

78. The one is, that they did not believe them simply necessary to the procuring of pardon from God; which appears in this; that they did absolve persons in the article of death, though they had not done their satisfactions. They would absolve none that did not express his repentance some way or other; but they did absolve them, that could do no exterior penances; by which it is plain, that they made a separation of that, which was useful and profitable only, from that which is necessary.

79. The other thing which I was to say, is this. That though these corporal severities were not esteemed by them simply necessary, but such which might, in any and in every

instance, be omitted in ordinary cases, and commuted for others more fit and useful: yet they chose these austerities as the best signification of their repentance towards men; such in which there is the greatest likelihood of sincerity and a hearty sorrow, such which have in them the least objection; such in which a man hath the clearest power and the most frequent opportunity; such which every man can do, which have in them the least inlet to temptation, and the least powers to abuse a man; and they are such which do not only signify, but effect and promote, repentance. But yet they are acts of repentance, just as beating the breasts, or smiting the thigh, or sighing, or tears, or tearing the hair, or refusing our meat, are acts of sorrow: if God should command us to be sorrowful, this might be done (when it could be done at all), though none of these were in the expression and signification. The Jews did, in all great sorrows or trouble of mind, rend their garments. As we may be as much troubled as they, though we do not tear our clothes; so we may be as true penitents as were the holy primitives, though we do not use that σκληραγωγία, 'that hardship,' which was then the manner of their penitential solemnities. But then the repentance must be exercised by some other acts proper to the grace.

Prayers.

80. 'Preces undique et undecunque lucrum,' says one. Prayers are useful upon all occasions; but especially in repentances and afflictive duties or accidents. "Is any man afflicted? let him pray," saith St. James: and since nothing can deserve pardon, all the good works in the world, done by God's enemy, cannot reconcile him to God; but pardon of sins is as much a gift, as eternal life is; there is no way more proper to obtain pardon, than a devout, humble, persevering prayer. And this also is a part of repentance:

——— pœnæque genus vidisse precantem.

When we confess our sins, and when we pray for pardon, we concentre many acts of virtue together. There is the hatred of sin, and the shame for having committed it; there is the justification of God, and the humiliation of ourselves; there is confession of sins, and hope of pardon; there is fear an

love, sense of our infirmity, and confidence of the divine goodness, sorrow for the past, and holy purposes and desires and vows of living better in time to come. Unless all this be in it, the prayers are not worthy fruits of a holy repentance. But such prayers are a part of amends, it is a satisfaction to God in the true and modest sense of the word: so St. Cyprian affirms, speaking of the three children in the fiery furnace: "Domino satisfacere, nec inter ipsa gloriosa virtutum suarum martyria, destiterunt:" "They did not cease to satisfy the Lord, in the very midst of their glorious martyrdoms[r]." For so saith the Scripture. "Stans Azarias precatus est," "Azarias standing in the flames did pray," and made his 'exomologesis,' or penitential confession, to God with his two partners.—Thus also Tertullian describes the manner of the primitive repentance: "Animum mœroribus dejicere, illa quæ peccavit, tristi tractatione mutare, cæterum pastum et potum pura nosse, non ventris scil. sed animæ causa: plerumque verò jejuniis preces alere, ingemiscere, lacrimari, et mugire dies noctesque ad Dominum Deum suum: presbyteris advolvi et caris Dei adgeniculari; omnibus fratribus legationes deprecationis suæ injungere:" "To have our minds cast down with sorrow, to change our sins into severity, to take meat and drink without art, simple and pure, viz. bread and water, not for the belly's sake, but for the soul; to nourish our prayers most commonly with fasting, to sigh and cry, and roar to God our Lord day and night; to be prostrate before the ministers and priests, to kneel before all the servants of God, and to desire all the brethren to pray to God for them[s]."—"Oportet orare impensiùs et rogare;" so St. Cyprian: "We must pray and beg more earnestly;" and as Pacianus adds, according to the words of Tertullian before cited, 'multorum precibus adjuvare;' 'we must help our prayers with the assistance of others.'—"Pray to God," said Simon Peter to Simon Magus, "if, peradventure, the thought of thy heart may be forgiven thee:" "Pray for me," said Simon Magus to Simon Peter, "that the things which thou hast spoken, may not happen to me." And in this case, the prayers of the church, and of the holy men that minister to the church, as they are of great avail in themselves, so they were highly valued and earnest-

[r] Serm. de Lapsis. [s] De Pœnit. c. 9.

ly desired and obtained by the penitents in the first ages of the church.

Alms.

81. Alms and fasting are the wings of prayer, and make it pierce the clouds; that is, humility and charity are the best advantages and sanctification of our desires to God. This was the counsel of Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar; "Eleemosynis peccata tua redime[t];" "Redeem thy sin by alms," so the Vulgar Latin reads it; not that money can be the price of a soul, for 'we are not redeemed with silver and gold;' but that the charity of alms is that, which God delights in, and accepts as done to himself, and procures his pardon, according to the words of Solomon; "In veritate et misericordia expiatur iniquitas;" "In truth and mercy iniquity is pardoned[u]:" that is, in the confession and alms of a penitent there is pardon: "for water will quench a flaming fire; and alms maketh an atonement for sin[x];" this is that love, which, as St. Peter expresses it, "hideth a multitude of sins[y]."—"Alms deliver from death, and shall purge away every sin. Those that exercise alms and righteousness, shall be filled with life," said old Tobias[z]; which truly explicates the method of this repentance. To give alms for what is past, and to sin no more, but to work righteousness, is an excellent state and exercise of repentance; for he that sins and gives alms, spends his money upon sin, not upon God; and, like a man in a calenture, drinks deep of the vintage, even when he bleeds for cure.

82. But this command, and the affirmation of this effect of alms, we have best from our blessed Saviour. "Give alms, and all things are clean unto you:" repentance does καθαρίζειν τὸ ἐντὸς, 'it cleanses that which is within;' for to that purpose did our blessed Saviour speak that parable to the Pharisees of cleansing cups and platters. The parallel to it is here in St. Luke[a]. Alms do also cleanse the inside of a man; for it is an excellent act and exercise of repentance[b]. "Magna est misericordiæ merces, cui Deus pollicetur se omnia peccata remissurum:" "Great is the reward of mercy, to which God hath promised that he will forgive all sins[c]."

[t] Dan. iv. [u] Prov. xvi. 6. [x] Ecclus. iii. 30.
[y] 1 Pet. iv. 8. [z] Tob. xii. 9. [a] Luke, xi. 41.
[b] Vide Rule of Holy Dying, chap. 2. sect. 3. [c] Lact. lib. 6.

To this of alms is reduced all actions of piety, and a zealous kindness, κόπος ἀγάπης, 'the labour of love,' all studious endearing of others, and obliging them by kindness, a going about seeking to do good; such which are called in Scripture, 'opera justitiæ,' 'the works of righteousness,' that is, such works, in which a righteous and good man loves to be exercised and employed. But there is another instance of mercy besides alms, which is exceeding proper to the exercise of repentance; and that is,

Forgiving Injuries.

83. 'Ut absolvaris, ignosce;' 'Pardon thy brother, that God may pardon thee:' "Forgive, and thou shalt be forgiven:" so says the Gospel; and this Christ did press with many words and arguments, because there is a great mercy and a great effect consequent to it; he put a great emphasis and earnestness of commandment upon it. And there is in it a great necessity; for we all have need of pardon, and it is impudence to ask pardon, if we refuse to give pardon to them that ask it of us: and therefore the apostles, to whom Christ gave so large powers of forgiving or retaining sinners, were also qualified for such powers, by having given them a deep sense, and a lasting sorrow, and a perpetual repentance for, and detestation of, their sins; their repentance lasting even after their sin was dead. Therefore, St. Paul calls himself the chiefest or first of sinners; and in the epistle of St. Barnabas, the Apostle affirms, ὅτι ἐξελέξατο τοὺς ἰδίους Ἀποστόλους Ἰησοῦς ὄντας ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἀνομίαν ἀνομωτέρους, "that Jesus chose for his own apostles men more wicked than any wickedness;" and by such humility and apprehensions of their own needs of mercy, they were made sensible of the needs of others, and fitted to a merciful and prudent dispensation of pardon.

Restitution.

84. This is an act of repentance indispensably necessary; an integral part of it, if it be taken for a restitution of the simple or original theft or debt: for it is an abstinence from evil, or a leaving off to commit a sin: the crime of theft being injurious by a continual efflux and emanation; and therefore not repented of, till the progression of it be stopped. But then there is a restitution also, which is to be

reckoned amongst the fruits of repentance, or penances and satisfactions. Such as was that of Zaccheus; "If I have wronged any man by false accusation, I restore him fourfold." In the law of Moses, thieves convicted by law were tied to it; but if a thief, or an injurious person, did repent before his conviction, and made restitution of the wrong; he was tied only to the payment of one fifth part above the principal, by way of amends for the injury; and to do this, is an excellent fruit of repentance, and a part of self-judicature, 'a judging ourselves, that we be not judged of the Lord:' and if the injured person be satisfied with the simple restitution, then this fruit of repentance is to be gathered for the poor.

85. These are the fruits of repentance, which grow in Paradise, and will bring health to the nations, for these are a just deletory to the state of sin; they oppose a good against every evil; they make amends to our brother exactly; and to the church competently, and to God acceptably, through his mercy in Jesus Christ. These are all we can do in relation to what is past; some of them are parts of direct obedience, and consequently of return to God, and the others are parts, and exercises, and acts, of turning from the sin. Now although, so we turn from sin, it matters not by what instruments so excellent a conversion is effected; yet there must care be taken that in our return, there be, 1. hatred of sin; and, 2. love of God; and, 3. love of our brother. The first is served by all or any penal duty internal or external: but sin must be confessed, and it must be left. The second is served by future obedience, by prayer, and by hope of pardon; and the last by alms and forgiveness: and we have no liberty or choice but in the exercise of the penal or punitive part of repentance: but in that every man is left to himself, and hath no necessity upon him, unless where he hath first submitted to a spiritual guide; or is noted publicly by the church. But if our sorrow be so trifling, or our sins so slightly hated, or our flesh so tender, or our sensuality so unmortified, that we will endure nothing of exterior severity to mortify our sin, or to punish it, to prevent God's anger, or to allay it; we may chance to feel the load of our sins in temporal judgments, and have cause to suspect the sincerity of our repentance, and consequently to fear the

eternal. "We feel the bitter smart of this rod and scourge [of God]; because there is in us neither care to please him with our good deeds, nor to satisfy him, or make amends for our evil[d];" that is, we neither live innocently nor penitently. Let the delicate, and the effeminate, do their penances in scarlet, 'and Tyrian purple, and fine linen, and faring deliciously every day;' but he that passionately desires pardon, and with sad apprehensions fears the event of his sins and God's displeasure,—will not refuse to suffer any thing that may procure a mercy, and endear God's favour to him; no man is a true penitent, but he that, upon any terms, is willing to accept his pardon. I end this with the words of St. Austin: "It suffices not to change our life from worse to better, unless we make amends, and do our satisfactions for what is past[e]." That is, no man shall be pardoned but he that turns from sin, and mortifies it; that confesses it humbly, and forsakes it; that accuses himself, and justifies God; that prays for pardon, and pardons his offending brother: that will rather punish his flesh, than nurse his sin; that judges himself, that he may be acquitted by God: so these things be done, let every man choose his own instruments of mortification, and the instances and indications of his penitential sorrow.

SECTION VII.

The former Doctrine reduced to Practice.

86. I. He that will judge of his repentance by his sorrow, must not judge of his sorrow by his tears, or by any one manner of expression. For sorrow puts on divers shapes, according to the temper of the body, or the natural or accidental affections of the mind, or to the present consideration of things. Wise men and women do not very often grieve in the same manner, or signify the trouble of intellectual apprehensions by the same indications. But if sin does equally smart, it may be equally complained of in all persons, whose natures are alike querulous and complaining; that is, when men are forced into repentance, they are very apprehensive

[d] St. Cyprian. epist. 8. et epist. 26. [e] Homil. 50. c. 15.

of their present evils, and consequent dangers, and past follies; but if they repent more wisely, and upon higher considerations than the affrights of women and weak persons, they will put on such affections, as are the proper effects of those apprehensions by which they were moved. But although this be true in the nature, and secret, and proportioned causes, of things, yet there is no such simplicity and purity of apprehensions in any person, or any instance whatsoever, but there is something of sense mingled with every tittle of reason, and the consideration of ourselves mingles with our apprehensions of God; and when philosophy does something, our interest does more; and there are so few that leave their sins upon immaterial speculations, that even of them that pretend to do it, there is oftentimes no other reason inducing them to believe they do so, than because they do not know the secrets of their own hearts, and cannot discern their intentions: and therefore, when there is not a material, sensible grief in penitents, there is too often a just cause of suspecting their repentances; it does not always proceed from an innocent or a laudable cause, unless the penitent be indisposed, in all accidents, to such effects and impresses of passion.

87. II. He that cannot find any sensitive and pungent, material grief for his sins, may suspect himself, because so doing, he may serve some good ends: but on no wise may we suspect another upon that account: for we may be judges of ourselves, but not of others; and although we know enough of ourselves to suspect every thing of ourselves, yet we do not know so much of others, but that there may, for aught we know, be enough to excuse or acquit them in their inquiries after the worthiness of their repentance.

88. III. He that inquires after his own repentance, and finds no sharpnesses of grief or active, sensitive sorrow, is only so far to suspect his repentance, that he use all means to improve it; which is to be done by a long, serious, and lasting conversation with arguments of sorrow, which, like a continual dropping, will intenerate the spirit, and make it malleable to the first motives of repentance. No man repents but he that fears some evil to stand at the end of his evil course; and whoever feareth, unless he be abused by some collateral false persuasion, will be troubled for putting him-

self into so evil a condition and state of things: and not to be moved with sad apprehensions, is nothing else but not to have considered, or to have promised to himself pardon upon easier conditions than God hath promised. Therefore, let the penitent often meditate of the four last things, death and the day of judgment; the portion of the godly, and the sad, intolerable portion of accursed souls; of the greatness and extension of the duty of repentance, and the intention of its acts, or the spirit and manner of its performance; of the uncertainty of pardon in respect of his own secret, and sometimes undiscerned defects; the sad evils that God hath inflicted sometimes even upon penitent persons; the volatile nature of pleasure, and the shame of being a fool in the eyes of God and good men: the unworthy usages of ourselves, and evil returns to God for his great kindnesses; let him consider, that the last night's pleasure is not now at all, and how infinite a folly it is to die for that which hath no being; that one of the greatest torments of hell will be the very indignation at their own folly, for that foolish exchange which they have made; and there is nothing to allay the misery, or to support the spirit, of a man, who shall so extremely suffer, for so very a nothing: that it is an unspeakable horror, for a man eternally to be restless in the vexations of an everlasting fever, and that such a fever is as much short of the eternal anger of God, as a single sigh is of that fever; that a man cannot think what eternity is, nor suffer with patience, for one minute, the pains which are provided for that eternity; and to apply all this to himself, for aught every great sinner knows, this shall be in his lot; and if he dies before his sin is pardoned, he is too sure it shall be so: and whether his sin is pardoned or no, few men ever know till they be dead; but very many men presume; and they commonly, who have the least reason. He that often and long considers these things, will not have cause to complain of too merry a heart: but when men repent only in feasts, and company, and open house, and carelessness, and inconsideration, they will have cause to repent that they have not repented.

89. IV. Every true penitential sorrow is rather natural than solemn; that is, it is the product of our internal apprehensions, rather than outward order and command. He that

repents only by solemnity, at a certain period, by the expectation of to-morrow's sun, may indeed act a sorrow, but cannot be sure that he shall then be sorrowful. Other acts of repentance may be done in their proper period, by order, and command, upon set days, and indicted solemnities; such as is, fasting, and prayer, and alms, and confession, and disciplines, and all the instances of humiliation: but sorrow is not to be reckoned in this account, unless it dwells there before. When there is a natural abiding sorrow for our sins, any public day of humiliation can bring it forth, and put it into activity; but when a sinner is gay and intemperately merry upon Shrove-Tuesday, and resolves to mourn upon Ash-Wednesday; his sorrow hath in it more of the theatre than of the temple, and is not at all to be relied upon by him, that resolves to take severe accounts of himself.

90. V. In taking accounts of our penitential sorrow, we must be careful that we do not compare it with secular sorrow, and the passions effected by natural or sad accidents. For he that measures the passions of the mind by disproportionate objects, may as well compare music and a rose, and measure weights by the bushel, and think that every great man must have a great understanding, or that an ox hath a great courage, because he hath a great heart. He that finds fault with his repentance, because his sorrow is not so great in it, as in the saddest accidents of the world, should do well to make them equal if he can; if he can, or if he cannot, his work is done. If he can, let it be done, and then the inquiry and the scruple are at an end. If he cannot, let him not trouble himself; for what cannot be done, God never requires of us to do.

91. VI. Let no man overvalue a single act of sorrow, and call it repentance, or be at rest as soon as he hath wiped his eyes. For to be sorrowful (which is in the commandment) is something more than an act of sorrow; it is a permanent effect, and must abide as long as its cause is in being; not always actual and pungent, but habitual and ready, apt to pass into its symbolical expressions upon all just occasions, and it must always have this signification, viz.

92. VII. No man can be said ever truly to have grieved for his sins, if he, at any time after, does remember them with pleasure. Such a man might indeed have had an act of sor-

row, but he was not sorrowful, except only for that time; but there was no permanent effect, by which he became an enemy to sin; and when the act is past, the love to sin returns, at least in that degree, that the memory of it is pleasant. No man tells it as a merry story, that he once broke his leg; or laughs when he recounts the sad groans and intolerable sharpnesses of the stone. If there be pleasure in the telling it, there is still remaining too much kindness towards it, and then the sinner cannot justly pretend, that ever he was a hearty enemy to it: for the great effect of that is to hate it; to leave it, and to hate it. Indeed, when the penitent inquires concerning himself, and looks after a sign that he may discern, whether he be, as he thinks he is, really a hater of sin; the greatest and most infallible mark which we have to judge by, is the leaving it utterly. But yet in this thing there is some difference. For,

93. Some do leave sin, but do not hate it; they will not do it, but they wish it were lawful to do it; and this, although it hath in it a great imperfection, yet it is not always directly criminal; for it only supposes a love to the natural part of the action, and a hatred of the irregularity. The thing they love, but they hate the sin of it. But others are not so innocent in their leaving of sin; they leave it, because they dare not do it, or are restrained by some overruling accident; but like the heifers that drew the ark, they went lowing after their calves left in their stalls; so do these leave their heart behind; and if they still love the sin, their leaving it is but an imperfect and unacceptable service, a sacrifice without a heart. Therefore sin must be hated too, that is, it must be left out of hatred to it; and consequently must be used as naturally we do what we do really hate: that is, do evil to it, and always speak evil of it, and secretly have no kindness for it.

94. VIII. Let every penitent be careful, that his sorrow be a cure to his soul, but no disease to his body: an enemy to his sin, but not to his health.

——— Exigit autem
Interdum ille dolor plus, quàm lex ulla dolori
Concessit ———[f].

For although no sorrow is greater than our sin; yet some

[f] Juv. 10. 314. Ruperti.

greatness of sorrow may destroy those powers of serving God, which ought to be preserved to all the purposes of charity and religion. This caution was not to be omitted, although very few will have use of it: because if any should be transported into a pertinacious sorrow, by great considerations of their sin, and that sorrow meet with an ill temper of body, apt to sorrow and afflictive thoughts, it would make religion to be a burden, and all passions turn into sorrow, and the service of God to consist but of one duty, and would naturally tend to very evil consequents. For whoever, upon the conditions of the Gospel, can hope for pardon, he cannot maintain a too great actual sorrow long upon the stock of his sins. It will be allayed with hope, and change into new shapes, and be a sorrow in other faculties than where it first began, and to other purposes than those to which it did then minister. But if his sorrow be too great, it is because the man hath little or no hope.

95. IX. But if it happens that any man falls into an excessive sorrow, his cure must be attempted, not directly, but collaterally; not by lessening the consideration of his sins, nor yet by comparing them with the greater sins of others; like the grave man in the satire.

> Si nullum in terris tam detestabile factum
> Ostendis, taceo; nec pugnis cædere pectus
> Te veto, nec planâ faciem contundere palmâ:
> Quandoquidem accepto claudenda est janua damno[5].

For this is but an instance of the other, this lessens the sin indirectly: but let it be done by heightening the consideration of the divine mercy and clemency; for even yet this will far exceed, and this is highly to be taken heed of. For, besides that there is no need of taking off his opinion from the greatness of the sin; it is dangerous to teach a man to despise a sin at any hand. For if, after his great sorrow, he can be brought to think his sin little, he will be the sooner brought to commit it again, and think it none at all: and when he shall think his sorrow to have been unreasonable, he will not so soon be brought to an excellent repentance another time. But the Prophet's great comfort may safely be applied: "Misericordia Dei prævalitura est super omnem malitiam hominis;" "God's mercy is greater than all the malice of men,

[5] Juv. 13. 126. Raperti.

and will prevail over it." But this is to be applied so as to cure only the wounds of a conscience that ought to be healed, that is, so as to advance the reputation and glories of the divine mercy: but, at no hand, to create confidences in persons incompetent. If the man be worthy, and capable, and yet tempted to a prevailing and excessive sorrow; to him, in this case, and so far, the application is to be made. In other cases there is no need, but some danger.

96. X. Although sorrow for sin must be constant and habitual, yet to particular acts of sin, when a special sorrow is apportioned, it cannot be expected to be of the same manner and continuance, as it ought to be in general repentances, for our many sins, and our evil habits. For every single folly of swearing rashly, or vainly, or falsely, there ought to be a particular sorrow, and a special deprecation; but, it may be, another will intervene, and a third will steal in upon you, or you are surprised in another instance; or you are angry with yourself for doing so, and that anger transports you to some indecent expression; and as a wave follows a wave, we shall find instances of folly crowd in upon us. If we observe strictly, we shall prevent some, but we shall observe too many to press us; if we observe not, they will multiply without notice and without number. But, in either case, it will be impossible to attend to every one of them with a special, lasting sorrow: and yet one act of sorrow is too little for any one chosen sin, as I have proved formerly. In this case, when we have prayed for pardon of each, confessed it, acknowledged the folly of it, deprecated the punishment, suffered the shame, and endured the sorrow, and begged for aids against it, and renewed our force; it will fall into the heap of the state and generality of repentance; that is, it will be added to the portentous number of follies, for which, in general and indefinite comprehensions, we must beg for pardon, humbly and earnestly, all the days of our life. And I have no caution to be added here, but this only: viz. That we be not too hasty to put it into the general heap, but according to the greatness, or the danger, or its mischief, or its approach towards a habit, so it is to be kept in fetters by itself alone. For he that quickly passes it into the general heap, either cares too little for it, or is too soon surprised by

a new one; which would not so easily have happened, if he had been more severe to the first.

97. XI. It is a great matter, that, in our inquiries concerning our penitential sorrow, we be able to discern what is the present motive and incentive of it: whether fear or love, whether it be attrition or contrition. For by this we can tell best, in what state or period of pardon we stand. I do not say, we are to inquire what motive began our sorrow: for fear begins most commonly; but we are to regard what is the present inducement, which continues the hatred; that is, whither our first fears have borne us? If fear only be the agent, at the best it is still imperfect; and our pardon a great way off from being finished; and our repentance, or state of reformation, nothing promoted. But of these things I have, in the former doctrine, given accounts. To which I only add this, as being an advice or caution flowing from the former discourses.

98. XII. He that, upon any pretence whatsoever, puts off his repentance to the last or the worst of his days, hath just reason to suspect, that even when he doth repent, he hath not the grace of contrition, that is, that he repents for fear, not for love: and that his affections to sin remain. The reason is, because what proceeds from an intolerable and a violent cause, as repentance in sickness and danger of death, or in the day of our calamity, does,— is, of itself for the present, defective in a main part, and cannot arrive at pardon, till the love of God be in it: so Christ said of Mary Magdalen; "Much hath been forgiven her, because she loved much;" but from a great fear to pass into love is a work of time, the effect of a long progression in repentance, and is not easy to be done in those straitnesses of time and grace, which is part of the evil portion of dying sinners. Therefore, besides those many and great considerations, which I have before represented,—upon this account alone, repentance must not be put off to our death-bed, because our fear must pass into love, before our sins are taken off by pardon.

——— proponimus illuc
Ire, fatigatas ubi Dædalus exuit alas[h].

We have a great way to go, a huge progression to make, a

[h] Juv. 3, 25.

mighty work to be done, to which time is as necessary as labour and observation; and therefore we must not put it off, till what begins in fear, cannot pass into love, and therefore it is too likely to end in sorrow; their fears overtake such men; it is too much to be feared, that what they fear, will happen to them.

99. XIII. And after all, it is to be remembered, that sorrow for sins is not repentance, but a sign, an instrument of it, an inlet to it; without which, indeed, repentance cannot be supposed; as manhood must suppose childhood; perfect supposes that it was imperfect: but repentance is after sin, of the same extent of signification, and contains more duties and labour to the perfection of its parts, than innocence. Repentance is like the sun, which enlightens not only the tops of the eastern hills, or warms the wall-fruits of Italy; it makes the little balsam-tree to weep precious tears, with staring upon its beauties; it produces rich spices in Arabia, and warms the cold hermit in his grot, and calls the religious man from his dorter in all the parts of the world where holy religion dwells; at the same time it digests the American gold, and melts the snows from the Riphæan mountains, because he darts his rays in every portion of the air; and the smallest atom that dances in the air, is tied to a little thread of light, which by equal emanations fills all the capacities of every region: so is repentance; it scatters its beams and holy influences; it kills the lust of the eyes, and mortifies the pride of life; it crucifies the desires of the flesh, and brings the understanding to the obedience of Jesus; the fear of it bids war against the sin, and the sorrow breaks the heart of it: the hope that is mingled with contrition, enkindles our desires to return; and the love that is in it, procures our pardon; and the confidence of that pardon does increase our love, and that love is obedience, and that obedience is sanctification, and that sanctification supposes the man to be justified before; and he that is justified, must be justified still; and thus repentance is a holy life. But the little drops of a beginning sorrow, and the pert resolution to live better, never passing into act and habit; the quick and rash vows of the newly-returning man, and the confusion of face espied in the convicted sinner;—if they proceed no further, are but like the sudden fires of the night, which glare for awhile within a little

continent of air big enough to make a fire-ball, or the revolution of a minute's walk. These when they are alone, and do not actually and with effect minister to the wise counsels and firm progressions of a holy life, are as far from procuring pardon, as they are from a life of piety and holiness.

SECTION VIII.

100. XIV. In the making confession of our sins, let us be most careful to do it so, as may most glorify God, and advance the reputation of his wisdom, his justice, and his mercy. For if we consider it, in all judicatories of the world, and in all the arts and violences of men which have been used to extort confessions, their purposes have been, that justice should be done, that the public wisdom and authority should not be dishonoured; that public criminals should not be defended or assisted by public pity, or the voice of the people sharpened against the public rods and axes, by supposing they have smitten the innocent. Confession of the crime prevents all these evils, and does well serve all these good ends.

> Gnosius hæc Rhadamanthus habet durissima regna,
> Castigatque auditque dolos; subigitque fateri[1]:

So the heathens did suppose was done in the lower regions. 'The judge did examine and hear their crimes and crafts, and even there compelled them to confess,' that the eternal justice may be publicly acknowledged; for all the honour that we can do to the divine attributes, is publicly to confess them, and make others so to do; for so God is pleased to receive honour from us. Therefore, repentance being a return to God, a ceasing to dishonour him any more, and a restoring him, so far as we can, to the honour we deprived him of;—it ought to be done with as much humility and sorrow, with as clear glorifications of God and condemnations of ourselves, as we can. To which purpose,

101. XV. He that confesseth his sins, must do it with all sincerity and simplicity of spirit, not to serve ends, or to make religion the minister of design; but to destroy our

[1] Æn. 6. 566. Heyne.

sin, to shame and punish ourselves, to obtain pardon and institution; always telling our sad story just as it was in its acting, excepting where the manner of it, and its nature or circumstances, require a veil; and then the sin must not be concealed, nor yet so represented as to keep the first immodesty alive in him that acted it, or to become a new temptation in him that hears it. But this last caution is only of use in our confessions to the minister of holy things; for our confession to God, as it is to other purposes, so must be in other manners: but I have already given accounts of this. I only add, that,

102. XVI. All our confessions must be accusations of ourselves, and not of others. For if we confess to God, then to accuse another may spoil our own duty, but it can serve no end; for God already knows all that we can say to lessen, or to aggravate the sin: if we confess to men,—then to name another, or by any way to signify or reveal him, is a direct defamation; and unless the naming of the sin do, of itself, declare the assisting party, it is at no hand to be done, or to be inquired into: but if a man hath committed incest, and there is but one person in the world with whom he could commit it; in this case, the confessing his sin does accuse another; but then such a guide of souls is to be chosen, to whom that person is not known; but if, by this or some other expedient, the fame of others be not secured, it is best to confess that thing to God only; and so much of the sin as may aggravate it to an equal height with its own kind in special, may be communicated to him, of whom we ask comfort, and counsel, and institution. If to confess to a priest were a divine commandment, this caution would have in it some difficulty, and much variety; but since the practice is recommended to us wholly upon the stock of prudence, and great charity; the doing it ought not, in any sense, to be uncharitable to others.

103. XVII. He that hath injured his neighbour, must confess to him; and he that hath sinned against the church, must make amends and confess to the church, when she declares herself to be offended. For when a fact is done which cannot naturally be undone, the only duty that can remain, is to rescind it morally, and make it not to be any longer or any more. For as our conservation is a continual creation,

so is the perpetuating of a sin a continuation of its being and actings; and therefore, to cease from it, is the death of the sin for the present and for the future; but to confess it, to hate it, to wish it had never been done, is all the possibility that is left to annihilate the act, which naturally can never be undone; and therefore to all persons that are injured, to confess the sin, must needs be a duty, because it is the firs t part of amends, and sometimes all that is left; but it is that which God and man require, before they are willing to pardon the offender. For until the erring man confesses, it does not appear who is innocent, and who is guilty, or whether the offended person have any thing to forgive. And this is the meaning of these preceptive words of St. James; "Confess your sins one to another[k];" that is, to the church who are scandalized, and who can forgive and pray for the repenting sinner; and confess to him that is injured, that you may do him right, that so you may cease to do wrong, that you may make your way for pardon, and offer amends. This only, and all of this, is the meaning of the precept. *Δεῖ πάντα πιστὸν λέγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτίας, καὶ ἀποτάττεσθαι, διὰ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν διαλέγχειν, τοῦ ἔτι μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ, κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· Λέγε συ τὰς ἁμαρτίας σου πρῶτος, ἵνα δικαιωθῇς· καὶ τὸ, Δίκαιος ἑαυτοῦ κατήγορος ἐν πρωτολογίᾳ*, say the Greek commentaries upon Acts xix. 18. "Every faithful man must declare or confess his sins, and must stand in separation, that he may be reproved, and that he may promise he will not do the same again, according to that which was said, Do thou first declare thy sins, that thou mayest be justified; (and again), A just man in the beginning of his speech is an accuser of himself." No man is a true penitent, if he refuses or neglects to confess his sins to God in all cases, or to his brother if he have injured him, or to the church if she be offended, or where she requires it; for wheresoever a man is bound to repent, there he is bound to confession; which is an acknowledgment of the injury, and the first instance and publication of repentance. In other cases, confession may be of great advantage; in these it is duty.

104. XVIII. Let no man think it a shame to confess his sin; or if he does, yet let not that shame deter him from it. There is indeed a shame in confession, because nakedness is

[k] Jam. v. 16.

discovered; but there is also a glory in it, because there is a cure too: there is repentance and amendment. This advice is like that, which is given to persons giving their lives in a good cause, requiring them not to be afraid; that is, not to suffer such a fear, as to be hindered from dying. For if they suffer a great natural fear, and yet, in despite of that fear, die constantly and patiently, that fear, as it increases their suffering, may also accidentally increase their glory, provided that the fear be not criminal in its cause, nor effective of any unworthy comportment. So is the shame in confession; a great mortification of the man, and highly punitive of the sin; and such that, unless it hinders the duty, is not to be directly reproved: but it must be taken care of, that it be a shame only for the sin, which by how much greater it is, by so much the more earnestly the man ought to fly to all the means of remedy and instruments of expiation: and then the greater the shame is, which the sinner suffers,—the more excellent is the repentance, which suffers so much for the extinction of his sin. But, at no hand, let the shame affright the duty; but let it be remembered, that this confession is but the memory of the shame, which began, when the sin was acted,—and abode but as a handmaid of the guilt, and goes away with it: confession of sins opens them to man, but draws a veil before them, that God will the less behold them. And it is a material consideration, that, if a man be impatient of the shame here, when it is revealed but to one man, who is also, by all the ties of religion, and by common honesty, obliged to conceal them; or if he account it intolerable that a sin, public in the scandal and the infamy, should be made public by solemnity to punish and to extinguish it, the man will be no gainer by refusing to confess, when he shall remember, that sins unconfessed are most commonly unpardoned; and unpardoned sins will be made public before all angels, and all the wise and good men of the world, when their shame shall have nothing to make it tolerable.

105. XIX. When a penitent confesses his sin, the holy man that ministers to his repentance, and hears his confession, must not, without great cause, lessen the shame of the repenting man; he must directly encourage the duty, but not add confidence to the sinner. For whatsoever directly

lessens the shame, lessens also the hatred of sin, and his future caution, and the reward of his repentance; and takes off that which was an excellent defensative against the sin. But with the shame, the minister of religion is to do as he is to do with the man's sorrow: so long as it is a good instrument of repentance, so long it is to be permitted and assisted, but when it becomes irregular, or disposed to evil events, it is to be taken off. And so must the shame of the penitent man, when there is danger, lest the man be swallowed up by too much sorrow and shame, or when it is perceived, that the shame alone is a hinderance to the duty. In these cases, if the penitent man can be persuaded, directly and by choice, for ends of piety and religion, to suffer the shame,—then let his spirit be supported by other means; but if he cannot, let there be such a confidence wrought in him, which is derived from the circumstances of the person, or the universal calamity and iniquity of man, or the example of great sinners like himself, that have willingly undergone the yoke of the Lord, or from consideration of the divine mercies, or from the easiness and advantages of the duty; but let nothing be offered to lessen the hatred or the greatness of the sin; lest a temptation to sin hereafter be sowed in the furrows of the present repentance.

106. XX. He that confesseth his sins to the minister of religion, must be sure to express all the great lines of his folly and calamity; that is, all that by which he may make a competent judgment of the state of his soul. Now if the man be of a good life, and yet in his tendency to perfection, is willing to pass under the method and discipline of greater sinners, there is no advice to be given to him, but that he do not curiously tell those lesser irregularities, which vex his peace, rather than discompose his conscience: but what is most remarkable in his infirmities, or the whole state, and the greatest marks and instances, and returns of them, he ought to signify; for else he can serve no prudent end in his confession.

107. But, secondly; if the man have committed a great sin, it is a high prudence, and an excellent instance of his repentance, that he confess it,—declaring the kind of it, if it be of that nature, that the spiritual man may conceal it. But if, upon any other account, he be bound to reveal every

notice of the fact, let him transact that affair wholly between God and his own soul. And this of declaring a single action, as it is of great use in the repentance of every man, so it puts on some degrees of necessity, if the man be of a sad, amazed, and an afflicted conscience. For there are some unfortunate persons, who have committed some secret facts of shame and horror, at the remembrance of which they are amazed, of the pardon of which they have no sign, for the expiation of which they use no instrument,—and they walk up and down like distracted persons, to whom reason is useless, and company is unpleasant;—and their sorrow is not holy, but very great; and they know not what to do, because they will not ask. I have observed some such: and the only remedy that was fit to be prescribed to such persons, was to reveal their sin to a spiritual man, and by him to be put into such a state of remedy and comfort, as is proper for their condition. It is certain, that many persons have perished for want of counsel and comfort, which were ready for them, if they would have confessed their sin; for he that concealeth his sin, 'non dirigetur,' saith Solomon, 'he shall not be' counselled or 'directed.'

108. And it is a very great fault amongst a very great part of Christians, that, in their inquiries of religion, even the best of them ordinarily ask but these two questions: 'Is it lawful? Is it necessary?' If they find it lawful, they will do it without scruple or restraint; and then they suffer imperfection, or receive the reward of folly. For it may be lawful, and yet not fit to be done. It may be, it is not expedient. And he that will do all that he can do lawfully, would, if he durst, do something that is not lawful. And as great an error is, on the other hand, in the other question. He that too strictly inquires of an action, whether it be necessary or no, would do well to ask also whether it be good? Whether it be of advantage to the interest of his soul? For if a Christian man or woman,—that is, a redeemed, blessed, obliged person, a great beneficiary, endeared to God beyond all the comprehensions of a man's imagination, one that is less than the least of all God's mercies, and yet hath received many great ones, and hopes for more,—if he should do nothing but what is necessary, that is, nothing but what he is compelled to; then he hath the obligations of a son, and

the affections of a slave,—which is the greatest indecency of the world in the accounts of Christianity. If a Christian will do no more than what is necessary, he will quickly be tempted to omit something of that also. And it is highly considerable, that, in the matter of souls, necessity is a divisible word, and that which, in disputation, is not necessary, may be necessary, in practice: it may be but charity to one and duty to another; that is, when it is not a necessary duty, it may be a necessary charity. And therefore, it were much the better, if every man, without further inquiry, would, in the accounts of his soul, consult a spiritual guide, —and whether it be necessary or no, yet let him do it because it is good; and even they who will not, for God's sake, do that which is simply the best, yet for their own sakes, they will, or ought to, do that which is profitable, and of great advantage. Let men do that which is best to themselves; for it is all one to God, save only that he is pleased to take such instances of duty and forwardness of obedience, as the best significations of the best love. And of this nature is confession of sins to a minister of religion, it is one of the most charitable works in the world to ourselves; and in this sense, we may use the words of David; "If thou doest well unto thyself, men [and God] will speak good of thee," and do good to thee. He that will do every thing that is lawful, and nothing but what is necessary, will be an enemy, when he dares,—and a friend, when he cannot help it.

109. But if the penitent person hath been an habitual sinner, in his confessions he is to take care, that the minister of religion understand the degrees of his wickedness, the time of his abode in sin, the greatness of his desires, the frequency of his acting them, not told by numbers, but by general significations of the time, and particular significations of the earnestness of his choice. For this transaction being wholly in order to the benefit and conduct of his soul, the good man that ministers, must have as perfect moral accounts as he can; but he is not to be reckoned withal by natural numbers and measures, save only so far as they may declare the violence of desires, and the pleasures and choice of the sin. The purpose of this advice is this; that since the transaction of this affair is for counsel and comfort, in order to pardon, and the perfections of repentance,—there should be no scruple

in the particular circumstances of it, but that it be done heartily and wisely; that is, so as may best serve the ends to which it is designed: and that no man do it in despite of himself, or against his will; for the thing itself is not a direct service of God immediately enjoined, but is a service to ourselves to enable us to do our duty to God, and to receive a more ready and easy and certain pardon from him. They indeed, who pretend it as a necessary duty, have, by affixing rules and measures to it of their own, made that, which they call necessary, to be intolerable and impossible. Indeed it is certain, that when God hath appointed a duty, he also will describe the measures, or else leave us to the conduct of our own choice and reason in it. But where God hath not described the measures, we are to do that, which is most agreeable to the analogy of the commandment, or the principal duty, in case it be under a command: but if it be not, then we are only to choose the particulars so as may best minister to the end, which is designed in the whole ministration.

110. XXI. It is a very pious preparation to the holy sacrament, that we confess our sins to the minister of religion: for since it is necessary, that a man be examined, and a self-examination was prescribed to the Corinthians in the time of their lapsed discipline, that though there were divisions amongst them, and no established governors, yet from this duty they were not to be excused; and they must, in destitution of a public minister, do it themselves (but this is in case only of such necessity); the other is better; that is, it is of better order and more advantage, that this part of repentance and holy preparation be performed under the conduct of a spiritual guide. And the reason is pressing. For since it is life or death, that is there administered, and the great dispensation of the keys is in that ministry,—it were very well, if he that ministers, did know whether the person presented were fit to communicate or no: and if he be not, it is charity to reject him, and charity to assist him that he may be fitted. There are many sad contingencies in the constitution of ecclesiastical affairs, in which every man that needs this help, and would fain make use of it, cannot; but when he can meet with the blessing, it were well, it were more frequently used, and more readily entertained. I

end these advices with the words of Origen: "Extra veniam est, qui peccatum cognovit, nec cognitum confitetur. Confitendum autem semper est, non quod peccatum supersit, ut semper sit confitendum; sed quia peccati veteris et antiqui utilis sit indefessa confessio:" "He shall have no pardon, who knows his sin and confesses it not: but we must confess always, not that the sin always remains, but that of an old sin an unwearied confession is useful and profitable[1]." But this is to be understood of a general accusation, or of a confession to God. For in confessions to men, there is no other usefulness of repeating our confessions, excepting where such repetition does aggravate the fault of relapsing and ingratitude, in case the man returns to those sins, for which, he hoped, that, before, he did receive a pardon.

SECTION IX.

But because, in all repentances, there is something penal, it is not amiss that there be some inquiries after the measures and rules of acting that part of repentance, which consists in corporal austerities, and are commonly called penances.

111. I. He that hath a great sorrow, need neither be invited nor instructed in the matter of his austerities. For a great sorrow and its own natural expressions and significations, such as are fastings, and abstinence, and tears, and indignation, and restlessness of mind, and prayers for pardon, and mortification of the sin, are all that, which will perfect this part of repentance. Only, sometime, they need caution for the degrees. Therefore,

112. II. Let the penitent be careful, that he do not injure his health, or oppress his spirit, by the zeal of this part of repentance. "Sic enim peccata compescenda sunt, ut supersint quos peccasse pœniteat." For all such fierce proceedings are either superstitious, or desperate, or indiscreet; or the effect of a false persuasion concerning them, that they are a direct service of God, that they are simply necessary, and severely enjoined. All which are to be rescinded; or

[1] In Psal. 36. Hom. 1.

else the penances will be of more hurt than usefulness. Those actions are to minister to repentance; and therefore if they contradict any duty, they destroy what they pretend to serve. For penances, as they relate to the sin that is committed, are just to be measured as penitential sorrow is, of which it is a signification and expression. When the sorrow is natural, sensitive, pungent, and material, the penances will be so too. A great sorrow refuses to eat, to sleep, to be cheerful, to be in company, according as the degree is, and as the circumstances of the persons are. But sometimes sorrow is to be chosen, and invited by arts, and ministered to by external instruments, and arguments of invitation; and just so are the penances, they are then to be chosen, so as may make the person a sorrowful mourner, to make him take no delight in sin, but to conceive, and to feel a just displeasure: for if men feel no smart, no real sorrow or pain for their sins, they will be too much in love with it: impunity is ἀφορμὴ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, 'the occasion and opportunity of sin,' as the Apostle intimates: and they use to proceed in finishing the methods of sin and death, who

Non unquam reputant, quanti sibi gaudia constent[m],

reckon their pleasures, but never put any smart, or danger, or fears, or sorrows, into the balance. But the injunction or susception of penances is a good instrument of repentance, because a little evil takes off the pleasure of the biggest sin in many instances, and we are too apprehensive of the present, that this also becomes a great advantage to this ministry: we refuse great and infinite pleasures hereafter, so we may enjoy little, and few, and inconsiderable ones, at present; and we fear not the horrible pains of hell, so we may avoid a little trouble in our persons, or our interest. Therefore, it is to be supposed, that this way of undertaking a present punishment and smart for our sins (unless every thing, when it becomes religious, is despoiled of all its powers which it had in nature,—and what is reason here, is not reason there), will be of great effect and power against sin, and be an excellent instrument of repentance. But it must be so much, and it must be no more; for penances are like fire and water, good so long as they are made to serve our needs; but when they go be-

[m] Juv. 6. 365. Ruperti.

yond that, they are not to be endured. For since God, in the severest of his anger, does not punish one sin with another, let not us do worse to ourselves than the greatest wrath of God in this world will inflict upon us. A sin cannot be a punishment from God. For then it would be, that God should be the author of sin; for he is, of punishment. If then any punishment be a sin, that sin was unavoidable, derived from God; and indeed it would be a contradiction to the nature of things to say, that the same thing can, in the same formality, be a punishment and a sin,—that is, an action, and a passion,—voluntary, as every sin is, and involuntary as every punishment is; that it should be done by us, and yet against us, by us and by another, and by both entirely: and since punishment is the compensation or the expiation of sin, not the aggravation of the divine anger; it were very strange, if God, by punishing us, should more provoke himself, and, instead of satisfying his justice or curing the man, make his own anger infinite, and the patient much the worse[n]. Indeed, it may happen that one sin may cause or procure another, not by the efficiency of God, or any direct action of his: but, 1. By withdrawing those assistances, which would have restrained a sinful progression. 2. By suffering him to fall into evil temptation, which is too hard for him, consisting in his present voluntary indisposition. 3. By the nature of sin itself, which may either (1.) effect a sin by accident; as a great anger may, by the withdrawing God's restraining grace, be permitted to pass to an act of murder; or (2.) it may dispose to others of like nature, as one degree of lust brings in another; or (3.) it may minister matter of fuel to another sin, as intemperance to uncleanness; or (4.) one sin may be the end of another, as covetousness may be the servant of luxury. In all these ways, one sin may be effected by another; but in all these, God is only conniving, or at most, takes off some of those helps, which the man hath forfeited, and God was not obliged to continue. Thus God hardened Pharaoh's heart, even by way of object and occasion; God hardened him, by shewing him a mercy, by taking off his fears when he removed the judgment; and God ministered to him some hope, that it be so still. But God does not inflict the sin: the man's own impious hands do that, not because he cannot

[n] Vide chap. 6. n. 42.

help it, but because he chooses and delights in it. Now if God, in justice to us, will not punish one sin directly by another: let not us, in our penitential inflictions, commit a sin in indignation against our sin; for that is just as if a man, out of impatience of pain in his side, should dash his head against a wall.

113. III. But if God pleases to inflict a punishment, let us be careful to exchange it into a penance, by kissing the rod, and entertaining the issues of the divine justice by approbation of God's proceeding, and confession of our demerit and justification of God. It was a pretty accident and mixture of providence and penance, that happened to the three accusers of Narcissus, bishop of Jerusalem [o]; they accused him falsely of some horrid crimes, but in verification of their indictment, bound themselves by a curse: the first, that if his accusation were false, he might be burned to death: the second, that he might die of the king's evil: the third, that he might be blind. God in his anger found out the two first, and their curse happened to them that delighted in cursing and lies. The first was burnt alive in his own house: and the second perished by the loathsome disease: which when the third espied, and found God's anger so hasty and so heavy, so pressing and so certain, he ran out to meet the rod of God; and repented of his sin so deeply, and wept so bitterly, so continually, that he became blind with weeping: and the anger of God became an instance of repentance; the judgment was sanctified, and so passed into mercy and a pardon: he did indeed meet with his curse, but by the arts of repentance the curse became a blessing. And so it may be to us: "Præveniamus faciem ejus, in confessione:" "Let us prevent his anger by sentencing ourselves:" or if we do not, let us follow the sad accents of the angry voice of God, and imitate his justice, by condemning that which God condemns, and suffering willingly what he imposes; and turning his judgments into voluntary executions, by applying the suffering to our sins, and praying it may be sanctified. For since God smites us that we may repent,—if we repent then, we serve the end of the divine judgment: and when we perceive God smites our sin, if we submit to it, and are pleased that our sin is smitten, we

[o] Euseb. lib. 6. c. 7.

are enemies to it, after the example of God; and that is a good act of repentance.

114. IV. For the quality or kind of penances, this is the best measure; those are the best, which serve most ends; not those which most vex us, but such which will most please God. If they be only actions punitive and vindictive, they do indeed punish the man, and help, so far as they can, to destroy the sin; but of these alone, St. Paul said well, 'Bodily exercise profiteth but little;' but of the latter sort, he added, 'but godliness is profitable to all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and that which is to come:' and this indeed is our exactest measure. Fastings alone, lyings upon the ground, disciplines and direct chastisements of the body, which have nothing in them but toleration and revenge, are of some use; they vex the body, and crucify the sinner, but the sin lives for all them: but if we add prayer, or any action symbolical, as meditation, reading, solitariness, silence, there is much more done towards the extinction of the sin. But he that adds alms, or something that not only is an act contrary to a former state of sin, but such which is apt to deprecate the fault, to obey God, and to do good to men, 'he hath chosen the better part, which will not easily be taken from him.' Fasting, prayer, and alms together, are the best penances or acts of exterior repentance in the world. If they be single, fasting is of the least force; and alms, done in obedience and the love of God, is the best.

115. V. For the quantity of penances, the old rule is the best that I know, but that it is too general and indefinite. It is St. Cyprian's: "Quàm magna deliquimus, tam graditer defleamus:" "If our sins were great, so must our sorrow or penances be."—As one is, so must be the other. For sorrow and penances I reckon as the same thing in this question; save only, that, in some instances of corporal inflictions, the sin is opposed in its proper matter; as intemperance is, by fasting; effeminacy, by suffering hardships; whereas sorrow opposes it only in general; and, in some other instances of penances, there is a duty distinctly and directly served, as in prayer and alms. But although this rule be indefinite and unlimited, we find it made more minute by Hugo de St. Victore. "Si in correctione minor est afflictio quam in culpâ fuit delectatio, non est dignus pœnitentiæ tuæ fructus:"

"Our sorrow, either in the direct passion, or in its voluntary expressions, distinctly or conjunctly, must at least equal the pleasure we took in the committing of a sin." And this rule is indeed very good, if we use it with these cautions. First: that this be understood principally in our repentances for single sins; for in these only the rule can be properly and without scruple applied, where the measures can be best observed. For in habitual and long courses of sin, there is no other measures but to do very much, and very long, and until we die, and never think ourselves safe, but while we are doing our repentances. Secondly: that this measure be not thought equal commutation for the sin, but be only used as an act of deprecation and repentance, of the hatred of sin, and opposition to it; for he that sets a value upon his punitive actions of repentance, and rests in them, will be hasty in finishing the repentance, and leaving it off, even while the sin is alive: for in these cases it is to be regarded, that penances, or the punitive actions of repentance, are not for the extinction of the punishment immediately, but for the guilt. That is, there are no remains of punishment, after the whole guilt is taken off: but the guilt itself goes away by parts, and these external actions of repentance have the same effect, in their proportion, which is wrought by the internal. Therefore, as no man can say, that he hath sufficiently repented of his sins by an inward sorrow and hatred; so neither can he be secure, that he hath made compensation by the suffering penances; for if one sin deserves an eternal hell, it is well, if, upon the account of any actions and any sufferings, we be at last accepted and acquitted.

116. VI. In the performing the punitive parts of external repentance, it is prudent, that we rather extend them than intend them: that is, let us rather do many single acts of several instances, than dwell upon one with such intension of spirit as may be apt to produce any violent effects upon the body or the spirit. In all these cases, prudence and proportion to the end are our best measures. For these outward significations of repentance, are not, in any kind or instance, necessary to the constitution of repentance; but apt and excellent expressions and significations, exercises and ministries, of repentance. Prayer and alms are of themselves distinct duties, and therefore come not in their whole

nature to this reckoning: but the precise acts of corporal punishment are here intended. And that these were not necessary parts of repentance, the primitive church believed, and declared, by absolving dying persons, though they did not survive the beginnings of their public repentance. But that she enjoined them to suffer such severities in case they did recover, she declared that these were useful, and proper exercises and ministries of the grace itself. And, although inward repentance did expiate all sins, even in the Mosaical covenant, yet they had also a time and manner of its solemnity, their day of expiation; and so must we have many. But if any man will refuse this way of repentance, I shall only say to him the words of St. Paul to them, who rejected the ecclesiastical customs and usages: "We have no such custom, neither the churches of God." But let him be sure, that he perform his internal repentance with the more exactness; as he had need look to his own strengths, that refuses the assistance of auxiliaries. But it is not good to be too nice and inquisitive, when the whole article is matter of practice. For what doth God demand of us but inward sincerity of a returning, penitent, obedient heart, and that this be exercised and ministered unto by fit and convenient offices to that purpose? This is all, and from this we are to make no abatements.

The Prayer.

O ETERNAL God, gracious and merciful, the fountain of pardon and holiness, hear the cries, and regard the supplications, of thy servant. I have gone astray all my days, and I will for ever pray unto thee, and cry mightily for pardon. Work in thy servant such a sorrow, that may be deadly unto the whole body of sin, but the parent of an excellent repentance. O suffer me not any more to do an act of shame; nor to undergo the shame and confusion of face, which are the portion of the impenitent and persevering sinners, at the day of sad accounts. I humbly confess my sins to thee, do thou hide them from all the world; and while I mourn for them, let the angels rejoice; and while I am killing them by the aids of thy Spirit, let me be written in the book of life, and my sins be blotted out of the black registers of death, that, my sins being covered and cured, dead and buried in the

grave of Jesus, I may live to thee my God a life of righteousness, and grow in it, till I shall arrive at a state of glory.

II.

I have often begun to return to thee; but I turned short again, and looked back upon Sodom, and loved to dwell in the neighbourhood of the horrible regions. Now, O my God, hear; now let me finish the work of a holy repentance. Let thy grace be present with me, that this day I may repent acceptably, and to-morrow, and all my days; not weeping over my returning sins, nor deploring new instances; but weeping bitterly for the old; loathing them infinitely, denouncing war against them hastily, prosecuting that war vigorously; resisting them every hour, crucifying them every day, praying perpetually, watching assiduously, consulting spiritual guides and helps frequently, obeying humbly, and crying mightily, I may do every thing, by which I can please thee; that I may be rescued from the powers of darkness, and the sad portions of eternity, which I have deserved.

III.

O give unto thy servant intentions so real, a resolution so strong, a repentance so holy, a sorrow so deep, a hope so pure, a charity so sublime, that no temptation or time, no health or sickness, no accident or interest, may be able, in any circumstance of things or persons, to tempt me from thee and prevail. Work in me a holy and an irreprovable faith, whereby I may overcome the world, and crucify the flesh, and quench the fiery darts of the devil; and let this faith produce charity, and my sorrow cause amendment, and my fear produce caution, and that caution beget a holy hope: let my repentance be perfect and acceptable, and my affliction bring forth joy, and the pleasant fruit of righteousness. Let my hatred of sin pass into the love of God, and this love be obedience, and this obedience be universal, and that universality be lasting and perpetual; that I may rejoice in my recovery, and may live in health, and proceed in holiness, and abide in thy favour, and die with a blessing, the death of the righteous, and may rest in the arms of the Lord Jesus; and, at the day of judgment, may have my por-

tion in the resurrection of the just; and may enter into the joy of my Lord, to reap from the mercies of God in the harvest of a blessed eternity, what is here sown in tears and penitential sorrow, being pardoned and accepted, and saved by the mercies of God in our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Amen. Amen. Amen.

Σωτηρία τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν καὶ τῷ Ἀμνῷ.

DEUS JUSTIFICATUS;

OR,

A VINDICATION

OF THE

GLORY OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES,

IN THE QUESTION OF

ORIGINAL SIN:

AGAINST

THE PRESBYTERIAN WAY OF UNDERSTANDING IT.

IN A LETTER TO A PERSON OF QUALITY.

Sed neque tam facilis res ulla est, quin ea primum
Difficilis magis ad credendum constet ———
LUCRET. II. 1027. Eichstadt, p. 89.

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

AND RELIGIOUS LADY,

THE LADY CHRISTIAN,

COUNTESS DOWAGER OF

DEVONSHIRE.

MADAM,

When I reflect upon the infinite disputes, which have troubled the public meetings of Christendom concerning original sin, and how impatient and vexed some men lately have been, when I offered to them my endeavours and conjectures concerning that question, with purposes very differing from what were seen in the face of other men's designs, and had handled it so, that God might be glorified in the article, and men might be instructed and edified in order to good life; I could not but think that wise heathen said rarely well in his little adagy, relating to the present subject; Εἰς παραδοξίαν ἔφυμεν. 'Mankind was born to be a riddle,' and our nativity is in the dark; for men have taken the liberty to think what they please, and to say what they think; and they affirm many things, and can prove but few things; and take the sayings of men for the oracles of God, and

bold affirmatives for convincing arguments; and St. Paul's text must be understood by St. Austin's commentary, and St. Austin shall be heard in all, because he spake against such men who in some things were not to be heard; and after all, because his doctrine was taken for granted by ignorant ages, and being received so long, was incorporated into the resolved doctrine of the church, with so great a firmness; it became almost a shame to examine what the world believed so unsuspectingly; and he that shall first attempt it, must resolve to give up a great portion of his reputation to be torn in pieces by the ignorant and by the zealous, by some of the learned, and by all the envious; and they who love to teach in quiet, being at rest in their chairs and pulpits, will be froward when they are awakened; and rather than they will be suspected to have taught amiss, will justify an error by the reproaching of him that tells them truth, which they are pleased to call new.

If any man differs from me in opinion, I am not troubled at it, but tell him that truth is in the understanding, and charity is in the will, and is or ought to be there, before either his or my opinion in these controversies can enter, and therefore that we ought to love alike, though we do not understand alike; but when I find that men are angry at my ingenuity and openness of discourse, and endeavour to hinder the event of my labours in the ministry of souls, and are impatient of contradiction or variety of explication, and understanding of questions, I think myself

concerned to defend the truth which I have published, to acquit it from the suspicion of evil appendages, to demonstrate not only the truth but the piety of it, and the necessity, and those great advantages which by this doctrine so understood may be reaped, if men will be quiet and patient, void of prejudice, and not void of charity.

This, Madam, is reason sufficient why I offer so many justifications of my doctrine, before any man appears in public against it; but because there are many who do enter into the houses of the rich and the honourable, and whisper secret oppositions and accusations rather than arguments against my doctrine; the good women that are zealous for religion, and make up in the passions of one faculty what is not so visible in the actions and operations of another, are sure to be affrighted before they be instructed, and men enter caveats in that court before they try the cause: but that is not all; for I have found, that some men, to whom I gave and designed my labours, and for whose sake I was willing to suffer the persecution of a suspected truth, have been so unjust to me, and so unserviceable to yourself, Madam, and to some other excellent and rare personages, as to tell stories, and give names to my proposition, and by secret murmurs hinder you from receiving that good which your wisdom and your piety would have discerned there, if they had not affrighted you with telling, that a snake lay under the plantain, and that this doctrine, which is as whole-

some as the fruits of Paradise, was enwrapped with the infoldings of a serpent, subtile and fallacious.

Madam, I know the arts of these men; and they often put me in mind of what was told me by Mr. Sackville, the late Earl of Dorset's uncle; that the cunning sects of the world (he named the Jesuits and the Presbyterians) did more prevail by whispering to ladies, than all the church of England and the more sober Protestants could do by fine force and strength of argument. For they, by prejudice or fears, terrible things and zealous nothings, confident sayings and little stories, governing the ladies' consciences, who can persuade their lords, their lords will convert their tenants, and so the world is all their own. I should wish them all good of their profits and purchases, if the case were otherwise than it is: but because they are questions of souls, of their interest and advantages; I cannot wish they may prevail with the more religious and zealous personages: and therefore, Madam, I have taken the boldness to write this tedious letter to you, that I may give you a right understanding and an easy explication of this great question; as conceiving myself the more bound to do it to your satisfaction, not only because you are zealous for the religion of this church, and are a person as well of reason as of religion, but also because you have passed divers obligations upon me, for which all my services are too little a return.

A

VINDICATION

OF THE

GLORY OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES,

IN THE QUESTION OF

ORIGINAL SIN.

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1. In order to which, I will plainly describe the great lines of difference and danger, which are in the errors and mistakes about this question.

2. I will prove the truth and necessity of my own, together with the usefulness and reasonableness of it.

3. I will answer those little murmurs, by which (so far as I can yet learn) these men seek to invade the understandings of those, who have not leisure or will to examine the thing itself, in my own words and arguments.

4. And if any thing else falls in by and by, in which I can give satisfaction to a person of your great worthiness, I will not omit it, as being desirous to have this doctrine stand as fair in your eyes, as it is in all its own colours and proportions.

But first, Madam, be pleased to remember, that the question is not, whether there be any such thing as original sin; for it is certain, and confessed on all hands almost. For my part, I cannot but confess that to be, which I feel, and groan under, and by which all the world is miserable.

Adam turned his back upon the sun, and dwelt in the dark and the shadow; he sinned, and fell into God's displeasure, and was made naked of all his supernatural endowments, and was ashamed, and sentenced to death, and deprived of the means of long life, and of the sacrament and instrument of immortality, I mean the tree of life; he then fell under the evils of a sickly body, and a passionate, ignorant, uninstructed soul; his sin made him sickly, his sickness made him

peevish, his sin left him ignorant, his ignorance made him foolish and unreasonable: his sin left him to his nature; and by his nature, whoever was to be born at all, was to be born a child, and to do before he could understand, and be bred under laws, to which he was always bound, but which could not always be exacted; and he was to choose, when he could not reason,—and had passions most strong, when he had his understanding most weak,—and was to ride a wild horse without a bridle,—and the more need he had of a curb, the less strength he had to use it; and this being the case of all the world, what was every man's evil, became all men's greater evil; and though alone it was very bad, yet when they came together, it was made much worse; like ships in a storm, every one alone hath enough to do to outride it; but when they meet, besides the evils of the storm, they find the intolerable calamity of their mutual concussion, and every ship that is ready to be oppressed with the tempest, is a worse tempest to every vessel, against which it is violently dashed. So it is in mankind, every man hath evil enough of his own; and it is hard for a man to live soberly, temperately, and religiously; but when he hath parents and children, brothers and sisters, friends and enemies, buyers and sellers, lawyers and physicians, a family and a neighbourhood, a king over him, or tenants under him, a bishop to rule in matters of government spiritual, and a people to be ruled by him in the affairs of their souls; then it is that every man dashes against another, and one relation requires what another denies; and when one speaks, another will contradict him; and that which is well spoken, is sometimes innocently mistaken, and that upon a good cause produces an evil effect; and by these, and ten thousand other concurrent causes, man is made more than most miserable.

But the main thing is this; when God was angry with Adam, the man fell from the state of grace; for God withdrew his grace, and we returned to the state of mere nature, of our prime creation. And although I am not of Petrus Diaconus's mind, who said, 'that when we all fell in Adam, we fell into the dirt, and not only so, but we fell also upon a heap of stones; so that we not only were made naked, but defiled also, and broken all in pieces;' yet this I believe to be certain,—that we, by his fall, received evil enough to undo us, and ruin us

all; but yet the evil did so descend upon us, that we were left in powers and capacities to serve and glorify God: God's service was made much harder, but not impossible; mankind were made miserable, but not desperate: we contracted an actual mortality, but we were redeemable from the power of death; sin was easy and ready at the door, but it was resistible; our will was abused, but yet not destroyed; our understanding was cozened, but yet still capable of the best instructions; and though the devil had wounded us, yet God sent his Son, who, like the good Samaritan, poured oil and wine into our wounds,—and we were cured before we felt the hurt, that might have ruined us upon that occasion. It is sad enough, but not altogether so intolerable, and decretory, as some would make it, which the Sibylline oracle describes to be the effect of Adam's sin.

> Ἄνθρωπος ἐπέπλαστο θεοῦ παλαμαῖς ἐνὶ αὐταῖς,
> Ὃν τε ἐπλάνησεν ὄφις δόλιος ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἀνιλθεῖν
> Τοῦ θανατοῦ, γνῶσιν τε λαβεῖν ἀγαθοῦ τε κακοῦ τε.
>
> Man was the work of God, fram'd by his hands,
> Him did the serpent cheat, that to death's bands
> He was subjected for his sin: for this was all,
> He tasted good and evil by his fall.

But to this we may superadd that, which Plutarch found to be experimentally true, "Mirum, quod pedes moverunt ad nutum rationis,—nullo autem fræno passiones:" "The foot moves at the command of the will and by the empire of reason, but the passions are stiff even then when the knee bends, and no bridle can make the passions regular and temperate." And indeed, Madam, this is, in a manner, the sum total of the evil of our abused and corrupted nature; our soul is in the body as in a prison; it is there 'tanquam in alienâ domo,' 'it is a sojourner,' and lives by the body's measures, and loves and hates by the body's interests and inclinations; that which is pleasing and nourishing to the body, the soul chooses and delights in: that which is vexatious and troublesome, it abhors, and hath motions accordingly; for passions are nothing else but acts of the will, carried to or from material objects, and effects and impresses upon the man, made by such acts; consequent motions and productions from the will. It is a useless and a groundless proposition in philosophy, to make the passions to be the emanations of

distinct faculties, and seated in a differing region; for as the reasonable soul is both sensitive and vegetative, so is the will elective and passionate, the region both of choice and passions, that is, when the object is immaterial, or the motives such, the act of the will is so merely intellectual, that it is then spiritual, and the acts are proper and symbolical, and the act of it we call election or volition; but if the object is material or corporal, the acts of the will are passion, that is, adhesion and aversation, and these it receives by the needs and inclinations of the body; an object can diversify an act, but never distinguish faculties: and if we make it one faculty that chooses a reasonable object, and another that chooses the sensual; we may as well assign a third faculty for the supernatural and religious; and when to choose a sensual object is always either reasonable or unreasonable, and every adherence to pleasure, and mortification or refusing of it, is subject to a command and the matter of duty, it will follow, that even the passions also are the issues of the will: by 'passions' meaning the actions of prosecution or refusal of sensitive objects, the acts of the concupiscible and irascible appetite, not the impresses made by these upon the body, as trembling, redness, paleness, heaviness, and the like: and therefore to say, the passions rule the will, is an improper saying; but it hath no truth in its meaning but this; that the will is more passionate than wise; it is more delighted with bodily pleasures than spiritual: but as the understanding considers both, and the disputation about them is in that faculty alone; so the choice of both is in the will alone: now because many of the body's needs are naturally necessary, and the rest are made so by being thought needs, and by being so naturally pleasant, and that this is the body's day, and it rules here in its own place and time,—therefore it is that the will is so great a scene of passion, and we so great servants of our bodies.

This was the great effect of Adam's sin, which became therefore to us a punishment, because of the appendant infirmity, that went along with it; for Adam being spoiled of all the rectitudes and supernatural heights of grace, and thrust back to the form of nature, and left to derive grace to himself by a new economy, or to be without it; and his posterity left just so as he was left himself;—he was permitted

to the power of his enemy that betrayed him, and put under the power of his body, whose appetites would govern him; and when they would grow irregular, could not be mastered by any thing that was about him, or born with him; so that his case was miserable and naked, and his state of things was imperfect, and would be disordered.

But now, Madam, things, being thus bad, are made worse by the superinduced doctrines of men, which when I have represented to your Ladyship, and told upon what accounts I have reproved them, you will find that I have reason.

There are one sort of Calvin's scholars, whom we for distinction's sake call Supralapsarians, who are so fierce in their sentences of predestination and reprobation, that they say God looked upon mankind, only as his creation and his slaves, over whom he having absolute power, was very gracious, that he was pleased to take some few, and save them absolutely; and to the other greater part he did no wrong, though he was pleased to damn them eternally, only because he pleased; for they were his own; and 'Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam,' says the law of reason; 'Every one may do what he please with his own.' But this bloody and horrible opinion is held but by a few; as tending directly to the dishonour of God, charging on him alone, that he is the cause of men's sins on earth, and of men's eternal torments in hell; it makes God to be powerful, but his power not to be good; it makes him more cruel to men, than good men can be to dogs and sheep; it makes him give the final sentence of hell without any pretence or colour of justice; it represents him to be that which all the world must naturally fear, and naturally hate, as being a God delighting in the death of innocents; for so they are, when he resolves to damn them: and then most tyrannically cruel, and unreasonable; for it says, that to make a postnate pretence of justice, it decrees that men inevitably shall sin, that they may inevitably, but justly, be damned; like the Roman lictors, who because they could not put to death Sejanus's daughters as being virgins, deflowered them after sentence, that, by that barbarity, they might be capable of the utmost cruelty; it makes God to be all that for which any other thing or person is or can be hated; for it makes him neither to be good, nor just, nor reasonable; but a mighty enemy to the biggest part

of mankind; it makes him to hate what himself hath made, and to punish that in another, which, in himself, he decreed should not be avoided: it charges the wisdom of God with folly, as having no means to glorify his justice, but by doing unjustly, by bringing in that which himself hates, that he might do what himself loves: doing as Tiberius did to Brutus and Nero the sons of Germanicus: "variâ fraude induxit ut et concitarentur ad convicia, et concitati proderentur;" 'provoking them to rail, that he might punish their reproachings[p].' This opinion reproaches the words of the Spirit of Scripture; it charges God with hypocrisy and want of mercy, making him a father of cruelties, not of mercy; and is a perfect overthrow of all religion, and all laws, and all government; it destroys the very being and nature of all election, thrusting a man down to the lowest form of beasts and birds, to whom a spontaneity of doing certain actions is given by God; but it is in them so natural, that it is unavoidable. Now, concerning this horrid opinion, I, for my part, shall say nothing but this; that he that says there was no such man as Alexander, would tell a horrible lie, and be injurious to all story, and to the memory and fame of that great prince; but he that should say, It is true there was such a man as Alexander, but he was a tyrant, and a bloodsucker, cruel and injurious, false and dissembling, an enemy of mankind, and for all the reasons of the world to be hated and reproached, would certainly dishonour Alexander more, and be his greatest enemy: so I think in this, that the Atheists who deny there is a God, do not so impiously against God, as they that charge him with foul appellatives, or maintain such sentences: which if they were true, God could not be true. But these men, Madam, have nothing to do in the question of original sin, save only, that they say that God did decree that Adam should fall, and all the sins that he sinned, and all the world after him, are no effects of choice, but of predestination, that is, they were the actions of God, rather than man.

But because these men, even to their brethren, seem to speak evil things of God, therefore the more wary and temperate of the Calvinists bring down the order of reprobation lower; affirming, that God looked upon all mankind in Adam

[p] Sueton. in Vita Tiber. c. 54. B. Crusii. vol. 1. p. 452.

as fallen into his displeasure, hated by God, truly guilty of his sin, liable to eternal damnation; and they being all equally condemned, he was pleased to separate some, the smaller number far, and irresistibly bring them to heaven; but the far greater number he passed over, leaving them to be damned for the sin of Adam; and so they think they salve God's justice; and this was the design and device of the synod of Dort.

Now to bring this to pass, they teach concerning original sin,

1. That, by this sin, our first parents fell from their original righteousness and communion with God; and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.

2. That whatsoever death was due to our first parents for their sin, they being the root of all mankind, and the guilt of this sin being imputed, the same is conveyed to all their posterity by ordinary generation.

3. That by this original corruption we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil; and that from hence proceed all actual transgressions.

4. This corruption of nature remains in the regenerate, and although it be, through Christ, pardoned and mortified, yet both itself and all the motions thereof, are truly and properly sin.

5. Original sin, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal. These are the sayings of the late assembly at Westminster.

Against this heap of errors and dangerous propositions, I have made my former discoursings, and statings of the question of original sin. These are the doctrines of the Presbyterian, whose face is towards us, but it is over-against us in this and many other questions of great concernment.

Nemo est tam prope, tam proculque nobis [q].

'He is nearest to us and furthest from us:' but because I

[q] Martial. 1. 87. 10.

have as great a love to their persons, as I have a dislike to some of their doctrines; I shall endeavour to serve truth and them, by reproving those propositions, which make truth and them to stand at distance.

Now I shall, first, speak to the thing in general, and its designs; then I shall make some observations upon the particulars.

1. This device of our Presbyterians, and of the synod of Dort, is but an artifice to save their propositions harmless, and to stop the outcries of Scripture and reason, and of all the world, against them. But this way of stating the article of reprobation, is as horrid in the effect as the other. For,

Is it by a natural consequent, that we are guilty of Adam's sin,—or is it by the decree of God? Naturally it cannot be; for then the sins of all our forefathers, who are to their posterity the same that Adam was to his, must be ours; and not only Adam's first sin, but his others are ours upon the same account. But if it be by the decree of God, by his choice and constitution, that it should be so, as Mr. Calvin and Dr. Twisse (that I may name no more for that side) do expressly teach, it follows, that God is the author of our sin; so that I may use Mr. Calvin's words; "How is it, that so many nations with their children should be involved in the fall without remedy, but because God would have it so[r]?" And if that be the matter, then to God, as to the cause, must that sin, and that damnation, be accounted.

And let it then be considered, whether this be not as bad as the worst; for the Supralapsarians say, God did decree that the greatest part of mankind should perish only because he would:—the Sublapsarians say, that God made it by his decree necessary, that all we, who were born of Adam, should be born guilty of original sin,—and he it was who decreed to damn whom he pleased for that sin, in which he decreed they should be born; and both these he did for no other consideration, but because he would. Is it not therefore evident, that he absolutely decreed damnation to these persons? For he that decrees the end, and he that decrees the only necessary and effective means to the end, and decrees that it shall be the end of that means, does decree absolutely alike; though by several dispensations: and then all the

[r] Instit. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 7. Vind. Grat. l. 1. p. digres. 4. c. 3.

evil consequents, which I reckoned before to be the monstrous productions of the first way, are all daughters of the other; and if Solomon were here, he could not tell which were the truer mother.

Now that the case is equal between them, some of their own chiefest do confess; so Dr. Twisse. If God may ordain men to hell for Adam's sin, which is derived unto them by God's only constitution; he may as well do it absolutely without any such constitutions: the same also is affirmed by Maccovius, and by Mr. Calvin[s]: and the reason is plain; for he that does a thing for a reason which himself makes, may as well do it without a reason; or he may make his own will to be the reason, because the thing, and the motive of the thing, come in both cases, equally from the same principle, and from that alone.

Now, Madam, be pleased to say, whether I had not reason and necessity for what I have taught: you are a happy mother of a fair and hopeful posterity, your children and nephews are dear to you as your right eye, and yet you cannot love them so well as God loves them, and it is possible that a mother should forget her children, yet God even then will not, cannot; but if our father and mother forsake us, God taketh us up: now, Madam, consider, could you have found in your heart, when the nurses and midwives had bound up the heads of any of your children, when you had borne them with pain and joy upon your knees, could you have been tempted to give command, that murderers should be brought to flay them alive, to put them to exquisite tortures, and then, in the midst of their saddest groans, throw any one of them into the flames of a fierce fire, for no other reason, but because he was born at London,—or upon a Friday,—when the moon was in her prime,—or for what other reason you had made, and they could never avoid? Could you have been delighted in their horrid shrieks and outcries, or have taken pleasure in their unavoidable and their intolerable calamity? Could you have smiled, if the hangman had snatched your eldest son from his nurse's breasts, and dashed his brains out against the pavement; and would you not have wondered, that any father or mother could espy the innocence and pretty smiles of your sweet babes, and yet tear

[s] Disp. 18. Inst. lib. 3. cap. 23. sect. 23.

their limbs in pieces, or devise devilish artifices to make them roar with intolerable convulsions? Could you desire to be thought good, and yet have delighted in such cruelty? I know, I may answer for you; you would first have died yourself. And yet I say again, God loves mankind better than we can love one another; and he is essentially just; and he is infinitely merciful; and he is all goodness; and therefore, though we might possibly do evil things, yet he cannot; and yet this doctrine of the Presbyterian reprobation says, he both can and does things, the very apprehension of which, hath caused many in despair to drown or hang themselves.

Now if the doctrine of absolute reprobation be so horrid, so intolerable a proposition, so unjust and blasphemous to God, so injurious and cruel to men, and that there is no colour or pretence to justify it, but by pretending our guilt of Adam's sin, and damnation to be the punishment:—then because from truth nothing but truth can issue, that must needs be a lie, from which such horrid consequences do proceed. For the case, in short, is this; If it be just for God to damn any one of Adam's posterity for Adam's sin, then it is just in him to damn all; for all his children are equally guilty; and then if he spares any, it is mercy: and the rest who perish, have no cause to complain. But if all these fearful consequences, which reason and religion so much abhor, do so certainly follow from such doctrines of reprobation, and these doctrines wholly rely upon this pretence,—it follows, that the pretence is infinitely false and intolerable; and that (so far as we understand the rules and measures of justice) it cannot be just for God to damn us for being in a state of calamity; to which state we entered no way, but by his constitution and decree.

You see, Madam, I had reason to reprove that doctrine, which said, 'It was just in God to damn us for the sin of Adam.'

Though this be the main error; yet there are some other collateral things, which I can by no means approve; such is that, 1. That, by the sin of Adam, our parents became wholly defiled in all the faculties and powers of their souls and bodies. And, 2. That by this we also are disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil. And,

3. That from hence proceed all actual transgressions. And, 4. That our natural corruption in the regenerate still remains, though it be pardoned, and mortified, and is still properly a sin.

Against this, I opposed these propositions; that the effect of Adam's sin was in himself bad enough; for it divested him of that state of grace and favour, where God placed him; it threw him from Paradise, and all the advantages of that place; it left him in the state of nature; but yet his nature was not spoiled by that sin; he was not wholly inclined to all evil, neither was he disabled and made opposite to all good; only his good was imperfect, it was natural and fell short of heaven; for till his nature was invested with a new nature, he could go no further than the design of his first nature,—that is, without Christ, without the spirit of Christ, he could never arrive at heaven, which is his supernatural condition; but, 1. There still remained in him a natural freedom of doing good or evil. 2. In every one that was born, there are great inclinations to some good. 3. Where our nature was averse to good, it is not the direct sin of nature, but the imperfection of it; the reason being, because God superinduced laws against our natural inclination, and yet there was, in nature, nothing sufficient to make us contradict our nature in obedience to God; all that being to come from a supernatural and divine principle. These I shall prove together, for one depends upon another.

And first, That the liberty of will did not perish to mankind by the fall of Adam, is so evident, that St. Austin, who is an adversary in some parts of this question, but not yet, by way of question and confidence asks, "Quis autem nostrûm dicat, quod, primi hominis peccato, perierit liberum arbitrium de humano genere?" "Which of us can say, that the liberty of our will did perish by the sin of the first man[t]?" And he adds a rare reason; for it is so certain, that it did not perish in a sinner, that this thing only is it by which they do sin, especially when they delight in their sin, and by the love of sin, that thing is pleasing to them which they list to do. And therefore, when we are charged with sin, it is worthy of inquiry, whence it is that we are sinners? Is it by the necessity of nature, or by the liberty of our will? If

[t] Lib. 1. ad Bonifac. c. 2.

by nature and not choice, then it is good and not evil; for whatsoever is our nature, is of God's making, and consequently is good; but if we are sinners by choice and liberty of will, whence had we this liberty? If from Adam, then we have not lost it; but if we had it not from him, then from him we do not derive all our sin; for by this liberty alone we sin.

If it be replied, that we are free to sin, but not to good; it is such a foolery, and the cause of the mistake so evident, and so ignorant, that I wonder any man of learning or common sense should own it. For if I be free to evil, then I can choose evil, or refuse it; if I can refuse it, then I can do good; for to refuse that evil is good, and it is in the commandment, 'Eschew evil;' but if I cannot choose or refuse it, how am I free to evil? For 'voluntas and libertas,' 'will and liberty,' in philosophy, are not the same: I may will it, when I cannot will the contrary; as the saints in heaven, and God himself wills good; they cannot will evil; because to do so is imperfection, and contrary to felicity; but here is no liberty: for liberty is with power, to do or not to do; to do this or the contrary; and if this liberty be not in us, we are not in the state of obedience, or of disobedience; which is the state of all them who are alive, who are neither in hell nor heaven. For it is to many purposes useful, that we consider, that in natural things to be determined shews a narrowness of being; and therefore, liberty of action is better, because it approaches nearer to infinity. But in moral things, liberty is a direct imperfection, a state of weakness, and supposes weakness of reason and weakness of love; the imperfection of the agent, or the unworthiness of the object; liberty of will is like the motion of a magnetic needle towards the north, full of trepidation, till it be fixed where it would fain dwell for ever. Either the object is but good in one regard, or we have but an uncertain apprehension, or but a beginning-love to it, or it could never be, that we could be free to choose, that is, to love it or not to love it. And therefore, it is so far from being true, that by the fall of Adam, we lost our liberty,—that it is more likely to be the consequent of it; as being a state of imperfection,—proper indeed to them who are to live under laws, and to such who are to work for a reward, and may fail of it; but

cannot go away, till we either lose all hopes of good by descending into hell, or are past all fear or possibility of evil by going to heaven. But that this is our case, if I had no other argument in the world, and were never so prejudicate and obstinate a person, I think I should be perfectly convinced by those words of St. Paul: the Apostle speaks of a good act tending not only to the keeping of a precept, but to a counsel of perfection; and concerning that, he hath these words; "Nevertheless, he that standeth steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath so decreed in his heart that he will keep his virgin, doth well[u];" the words are plain, and need no explication. If this be not a plain liberty of choice, and a power of will, those words mean nothing, and we can never hope to understand one another's meaning. But if sin be avoidable, then we have liberty of choice. If it be unavoidable, it is not imputable by the measures of laws and justice; what it is by empire and tyranny, let the adversaries inquire and prove: but since all theology, all schools of learning consent in this, that an invincible or unavoidable ignorance does wholly excuse from sin; why an invincible and an unavoidable necessity shall not also excuse, I confess I have not yet been taught.

But if, by Adam's sin, we be so utterly indisposed, disabled, and opposite to all good, wholly inclined to evil, and from hence come all actual sins,—that is, that by Adam we are brought to that pass, that we cannot choose but sin: it is a strange severity, that this should descend upon persons otherwise most innocent, this which is the most grievous of all evils; for "Prima et maxima peccantium pœna est peccâsse," said Seneca. To be given over to sin, is the worst calamity, the most extreme anger,—never inflicted directly at all for any sin, as I have otherwhere proved[x], and not indirectly, but upon the extremest anger; which cannot be supposed, unless God be more angry with us for being born men, than for choosing to be sinners.

The consequent of these arguments is this; that our faculties are not so wholly spoiled by Adam's fall, but that we can choose good or evil: that our nature is not wholly disabled and made opposite to all good: but to nature are left

[u] 1 Cor. vii. 37. [x] Doctr. and Pract. of Repent.

and given as much as to the handmaid Agar; nature hath nothing to do with the inheritance, but she and her sons have gifts given them; and by nature we have laws of virtue, and inclinations to virtue,—and naturally we love God, and worship him, and speak good things of him,—and love our parents,—and abstain from incestuous mixtures,—and are pleased when we do well, and affrighted within when we sin in horrid instances against God; all this is in nature, and much good comes from nature; "Neque enim quasi lassa et effœta natura est, ut nihil jam laudabile pariat[y];" "Nature is not so old, so obsolete and dried a trunk, as to bring no good fruits upon its own stock:" and the Frenchmen have a good proverb; "Bonus sanguis non mentitur," "A good blood never lies:" and some men are naturally chaste, and some are abstemious, and many are just, and friendly, and noble, and charitable: and therefore, all actual sins do not proceed from this sin of Adam; for if the sin of Adam left us in liberty to sin, and that this liberty was before Adam's fall; then it is not long of Adam's fall that we sin; by his fall it should rather be, according to their principles, that we cannot choose but do this or that, and then it is no sin: but to say, that our actual sins should any more proceed from Adam's fall, than Adam's fall should proceed from itself, is not to be imagined; for what made Adam sin when he fell? If a fatal decree made him sin, then he was nothing to blame.

Fati ista culpa est, nemo fit fato nocens.

No guilt upon mankind can lie
For what's the fault of destiny[z].

And Adam might, with just reason, lay the blame from himself, and say, as Agamemnon did in Homer[a],

——— Ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι,
Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς, καὶ Μοῖρα, καὶ ἠερόφοιτις Ἐρινύς.

'It was not I that sinned, but it was fate or a fury, it was God and not I;' it was not my act, but the effect of the divine decree; and then the same decree may make us sin, and not the sin of Adam be the cause of it. But if a liberty of will made Adam sin, then, this liberty to sin being still left us, this liberty, and not Adam's sin, is the cause of all our actual sin.

[y] Plinius Ep. 6. 21. 1. Gierig. vol. 2. p. 71.
[z] Sen. Œdip. 1019. Schroeder. p. 383.
[a] Il. τ. 86.

Concerning the other clause in the Presbyterian article, that our natural corruption in the regenerate still remains, and is still a sin, and properly a sin; I have, I confess, heartily opposed it; and shall, besides my arguments, confute it with my blood if God shall call me; for it is so great a reproach to the spirit and power of Christ, and to the effects of baptism, to Scripture and to right reason, that all good people are bound in conscience to be zealous against it.

For when Christ came to reconcile us to his Father, he came to take away our sins, not only to pardon them; but to destroy them; and if the regenerate, in whom the spirit of Christ rules, and in whom all their habitual sins are dead, are still under the servitude and in the stocks of original sin,—then it follows, not only that our guilt of Adam's sin is greater than our own actual,—the sin that we never consented to, is of a deeper grain than that which we have chosen and delighted in; and God was more angry with Cain that he was born of Adam, than that he killed his brother; and Judas, by descent from the first Adam, contracted that sin which he could never be quit of, but he might have been quit of his betraying the second Adam, if he would not have despaired;—I say, not only these horrid consequences do follow, but this also will follow; that Adam's sin hath done some mischief, that the grace of Christ can never cure; and generation stains so much, that regeneration cannot wash it clean. Besides all this, if the natural corruption remains in the regenerate, and be properly a sin, then either God hates the regenerate, or loves the sinner; and when he dies, he must enter into heaven with that sin, which he cannot lay down but in the grave: as the vilest sinner lays down every sin: and then an unclean thing can go to heaven, or else no man can: And lastly, to say that this natural corruption, though it be pardoned and mortified, yet still remains, and is still a sin, is perfect nonsense; for if it be mortified, it is not, it hath no being; if it is pardoned, it was indeed, but now is no sin; for till a man can be guilty of sin without obligation to punishment, a sin cannot be a sin that is pardoned; that is, if the obligation to punishment or the guilt be taken away, a man is not guilty. Thus far, Madam, I hope you will think I had reason.

One thing more I did and do reprove in their Westmin-

ster articles; and that is, that original sin, meaning our sin derived from Adam, is contrary to the law of God, and doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner; binding him over to God's wrath, &c. that is, that the sin of Adam imputed to us, is properly, formally, and inherently, a sin. If it were properly a sin in us, our sin,—it might indeed be damnable; for every transgression of the divine commandment is so: but because I have proved it cannot bring eternal damnation, I can as well argue thus: This sin cannot justly bring us to damnation, therefore it is not properly a sin: as to say, This is properly a sin, therefore it can bring us to damnation. Either of them both follow well: but because they cannot prove it to be a sin properly, or any other ways but by a limited imputation to certain purposes; they cannot say it infers damnation. But because I have proved, it cannot infer damnation, I can safely conclude, it is not formally, properly, and inherently, a sin in us.

> *Nec* placet, ô superi, cum vobis vertere cuncta
> Propositum, nostris erroribus addere crimen.
>
> Nor did it please our God, when that our state
> Was chang'd, to add a crime unto our fate[b].

I have now, Madam, though much to your trouble, quitted myself of my Presbyterian opponents, so far as I can judge fitting for the present: but my friends also take some exceptions; and there are some objections made, and blows given me, as it happened to our blessed Saviour,—'in domo illorum qui diligebant me;' 'in the house of my mother and in the societies of some of my dearest brethren.' For the case is this.

They join with me in all this that I have said; viz. That original sin is ours only by imputation; that it leaves us still in our natural liberty, and though it hath divested us of our supernaturals, yet that our nature is almost the same, and, by the grace of Jesus, as capable of heaven as it could ever be, by derivation of original righteousness from Adam. In the conduct and in the description of this question, being usually esteemed to be only scholastical, I confess they, as all men else, do usually differ; for it was long ago observed, that there are sixteen several famous opinions in this one

[b] Lucan. 7. 58. Oudendorp. p. 511.

question of original sin. But my brethren are willing to confess, that for Adam's sin alone, no man did or shall ever perish: and that it is rather to be called a stain than a sin. If they were all of one mind and one voice in this article, though but thus far, I would not move a stone to disturb it, but some draw one way and some another; and they that are aptest to understand the whole secret, do put fetters and bars upon their own understanding by an importune regard to the great names of some dead men, who are called 'masters upon earth,' and whose authority is as apt to mislead us into some propositions, as their learning is useful to guide us in others: but so it happens, that because all are not of a mind, I cannot give account of every disagreeing man; but of that which is most material, I shall. Some learned persons are content I should say, no man is damned for the sin of Adam alone; but yet that we stand guilty in Adam, and redeemed from this damnation by Christ; and if that the article were so stated, it would not intrench upon the justice or the goodness of God; for his justice would be sufficiently declared, because no man can complain of wrong done him, when the evil that he fell into by Adam, is taken off by Christ; and his goodness is manifest in making a new census for us, taxing and numbering us in Christ, and giving us free redemption by the blood of Jesus: but yet that we ought to confess, that we are liable to damnation by Adam, and saved from thence by Christ; that God's justice may be glorified in that, and his goodness in this, but that we are still real sinners, till washed in the blood of the Lamb; and without God, and without hopes of heaven, till then: and that if this article be thus handled, the Presbyterian fancy will disappear; for they can be confuted without denying Adam's sin to be damnable; by saying it is pardoned in Christ, and in Christ all men are restored, and he is the head of the predestination; for in him God looked upon us, when he designed us to our final state; and this, say they, is much for the honour of Christ's redemption.

To these things, Madam, I have much to say; something I will trouble your Ladyship withal at this time, that you, and all that consider the particulars, may see I could not do the work of God and truth, if I had proceeded in that method. For,

1. It is observable, that those wiser persons, who will by no means admit, that any one is or ever shall be damned for original sin, do, by this means, hope to salve the justice of God; by which they plainly imply, that to damn us for this, is hard and intolerable; and therefore, they suppose they have declared a remedy. But then this also is to be considered,—if it be intolerable to damn children for the sin of Adam, then it is intolerable to say it is damnable; if that be not just or reasonable, then this is also unjust and unreasonable; for the sentence and the execution of the sentence, are the same emanation and issue of justice, and are to be equally accounted of. For,

2. I demand, Had it been just in God to damn all mankind to the eternal pains of hell for Adam's sin, committed before they had a being, or could consent to it, or know of it? If it could be just, then any thing in the world can be just; and it is no matter who is innocent, or who is criminal, directly and by choice, since they may turn devils in their mothers' bellies; and it matters not whether there be any laws or no, since it is all one that there be no law; and that we do not know, whether there be or no: and it matters not, whether there be any judicial process; for we may as well be damned without judgment, as be guilty without action: and besides, all those arguments will press here, which I urged in my first discourse. Now if it had been unjust actually to damn us all for the sin of one, it was unjust to sentence us to it; for if he did give sentence against us justly, he could justly have executed the sentence; and this is just, if that be. But,

3. God did put this sentence in execution; for if that be true, which these learned men suppose, that, by Adam's sin, we fell into a damnable condition, but, by Christ, we are rescued from an actual damnation for it;—then it will follow, that when he sent the holy Jesus into the world, to die for us and to redeem us, he satisfied his Father's anger for original sin as well as for actual; he paid for our share as well as for Adam's; for our share of that sin which he committed, as well as for those which we committed, and not he; he paid all the price of that as well as of this damnation; and the horrible sentence was bought off: and God was so satisfied, that his justice had full measure for the damnation,

to which we stood liable. God, I say, had full measure for all; for so all men say, who speak the voice of the church in the matter of Christ's satisfaction: so that now, although there was the goodness of God in taking the evil from us; yet how to reconcile this process with his justice, viz. That, for the sin of another, God should sentence all the world to the portion of devils to eternal ages, and that he would not be reconciled to us, or take off this horrible sentence, without a full price to be paid to his justice by the Saviour of the world, this, this is it that I require, may be reconciled to that notion, which we have of the divine justice.

4. If no man shall ever be damned for the sin of Adam alone, then I demand, whether are they born quit from the guilt? or when are they quitted? If they be born free, I agree to it: but then they were never charged with it, so far as to make them liable to damnation. If they be not born free, when are they quitted? By baptism, before or after? He that says before or after, must speak wholly by chance, and without pretence of Scripture or tradition, or any sufficient warrant; and he cannot guess when it is. If in baptism he is quitted, then he that dies before baptism, is still under the sentence, and what shall become of him? If it be answered, that God will pardon him some way or other, at some time or other, I reply, yea, but who said so? For if the Scriptures have said, that we are all, in Adam, guilty of sin and damnation, and the Scriptures have told us no ways of being quit of it, but by baptism and faith in Christ; is it not plainly consequent, that, till we believe in Christ, or at least till, in the faith of others, we are baptized into Christ, we are reckoned still in Adam, not in Christ; that is, still we are under damnation, and not heirs of heaven, but of wrath only?

5. How can any one bring himself into a belief, that none can be damned for original sin, if he be of this persuasion, that it makes us liable to damnation; for if you say as I say, that it is against God's justice to damn us for the fault of another, then it is also against his justice to sentence us to that suffering, which to inflict is injustice. If you say, it is believed upon this account, because Christ was promised to all mankind; I reply, that yet all mankind shall not be saved; and there are conditions required on our part; and

no man can be saved but by Christ, and he must come to him, or be brought to him; or it is not told us, how any one can have a part in him, and therefore that will not give us the confidence which is looked for. If it be at last said, that we hope in God's goodness, that he will take care of innocents, and that they shall not perish; I answer, that if they be innocents, we need not appeal to his goodness, for his justice will secure them. If they be guilty and not innocents, then it is but vain to run to God's goodness, which, in this particular, is not revealed; when to condemn them is not against his justice which is revealed: and to hope God will save them whom he hates, who are gone from him in Adam, who are born heirs of his wrath, slaves of the devil, servants of sin (for these epithets are given to all the children of Adam, by the opponents in this question), is to hope for that, against which his justice visibly is engaged, and for which hope there is no ground, unless this instance of divine goodness were expressed in revelation; for so even wicked persons on their death-bed are bidden to hope without rule, and without reason, or sufficient grounds of trust. But besides, that we hope in God's goodness in this case is not ill, but I ask, is it against God's goodness that any one should perish for original sin? If it be against God's goodness, it is also against his justice; for nothing is just that is not also good. God's goodness may cause his justice to forbear a sentence, but whatsoever is against God's goodness, is against God, and therefore against his justice also; because every attribute in God is God himself: for it is not always true to say, 'This is against God's goodness,' because 'the contradictory' is 'agreeable to God's goodness.' Neither is it always false to say, that two contradictories may both be agreeable to God's goodness: God's goodness is of such a latitude that it may take in both parts of the contradiction: contradictories cannot both be against God's goodness, but they may both be in with it: whatsoever is against the goodness of God, is essentially evil: but a thing may be agreeable to God's goodness, and yet the other part not be against it. For example, it is against the goodness of God to hate fools and ideots: and therefore he can never hate them. But it is agreeable to God's goodness to give heaven to them and the joys beatifical: and if he does not give them so much, yet if

he does no evil to them hereafter, it is also agreeable to his goodness: to give them heaven, or not to give them heaven, though they be contradictories, yet both are agreeable to his goodness. But in contraries the case is otherwise: for though not to give them heaven is consistent with the divine goodness, yet to send them to hell is not. The reason of the difference is this. Because to do contrary things must come from contrary principles, and whatsoever is contrary to the divine goodness is essentially evil. But to do or not to do, supposes but one positive principle; and the other negative, not having a contrary cause, may be wholly innocent, as proceeding from a negative. But to speak more plain; is it against God's goodness, that infants should be damned for original sin? then it could never have been done; it was essentially evil, and therefore could never have been decreed or sentenced. But if it be not against God's goodness, that they should perish in hell,—then it may consist with God's goodness; and then to hope that God's goodness will rescue them from his justice, when the thing may agree with both, is to hope without ground; God may be good, though they perish for Adam's sin; and if so, and that he can be just too,—upon the account of what attribute shall these innocents be rescued, and we hope for mercy for them?

6. If Adam's posterity be only liable to damnation, but shall never be damned for Adam's sin, then all the children of heathens, dying in their infancy, shall escape as well as baptized Christian children: which if any of my disagreeing brethren shall affirm, he will indeed seem to magnify God's goodness, but he must fall out with some great doctors of the church, whom he would pretend to follow; and besides, he will be hard put to it, to tell what advantage Christian children have over heathens, supposing them all to die young: for being bred up in the Christian religion is accidental, and may happen to the children of unbelievers, or may not happen to the children of believers; and if baptism adds nothing to their present state, there is no reason infants should be baptized; but if it does add to their present capacity (as most certainly it does very much), then that heathen infants should be in a condition of being rescued from the wrath of God, as well as Christian infants, is a strange unlooked-for affirmative, and can no way be justified or made probable,

but by affirming it to be against the justice of God to condemn any for Adam's sin. Indeed, if it be unjust (as I have proved it is), then it will follow, that none shall suffer damnation by it. But if the hopes of the salvation of heathen infants be to be derived only from God's goodness, though God's goodness cannot fail, yet our argument may fail; for it will not follow, because God is good, therefore heathen infants shall be saved; for it might as well follow, God is good, therefore heathens shall be no heathens, but all turn Christians; these things do not follow affirmatively, but negatively they do. For if it were against God's goodness that they should be reckoned in Adam unto eternal death, then it is also against his justice, and against God all the way; and then they who affirm they were so reckoned, must shew some revelation to assure us, that although it be just in God to damn all heathens, yet that he is so good that he will not. For so long as there is no revelation of any such goodness, there is this principle to contest against it, I mean, their affirming that they are in Adam justly liable to damnation; and therefore, without disparagement to the infinite goodness of God, heathen infants may perish: for it is never against God's goodness to throw a sinner into hell.

7. But to come yet closer to the question, some good men and wise suppose, that the Sublapsarian Presbyterians can be confuted in their pretended grounds of absolute reprobation, although we grant that Adam's sin is damnable to his posterity, provided we say, that though it was damnable, yet it shall never damn us. Now though I wish it could be done, that they and I might not differ so much as in a circumstance, yet first it is certain that the men they speak of, can never be confuted upon the stock of God's justice, because as the one says, 'It is just that God should actually damn all for the sin of Adam:' so the other says, 'It is just that God should actually sentence all to damnation;' and so there the case is equal: secondly, they cannot be confuted upon the stock of God's goodness; because the emanations of that are wholly arbitrary, and though there are negative measures of it, as there are of God's infinity, and we know God's goodness to be inconsistent with some things, yet there are no positive measures of this goodness; and no man can tell how much it will do for us: and therefore with-

out a revelation, things may be sometimes hoped, which yet may not be presumed; and therefore, here also they are not to be confuted: and as for the particular scriptures, unless we have the advantage of essential reason taken from the divine attributes, they will oppose scripture to scripture, and have as much advantage to expound the opposite places, as the Jews have in their questions of the Messias; and therefore, 'si meos ipse corymbos necterem,' if I might make mine own arguments in their society, and with their leave; I would, upon that very account, suspect the usual discourses of the effects and economy of original sin.

8. For where will they reckon the beginning of predestination? Will they reckon it in Adam after the fall, or in Christ immediately promised? If in Adam, then they return to the Presbyterian way, and run upon all the rocks before reckoned, enough to break all the world in pieces. If in Christ they reckon it (and so they do), then I argue thus. If we are all reckoned in Christ before we were born, then how can we be reckoned in Adam when we are born (I speak as to the matter of predestination to salvation or damnation)? For as for the intermedial temporal evils, and dangers spiritual, and sad infirmities, they are our nature; and might, with justice, have been all the portion God had given to Adam; and therefore, may be so to us, and consequently not at all to be reckoned in this inquiry: but certainly as to the main.

9. If God looks upon us all in Christ, then by him we are rescued from Adam; so much is done for us before we were born. For if this is not to be reckoned till after we were born, then Adam's sin prevailed really in some periods, and to some effects, for which God in Christ had provided no remedy: for it gave no remedy to children till after they were born, but irremediably they were born children of wrath; but if a remedy were given to children before they were born, then they are born in Christ, not in Adam: but if this remedy was not given to children before they were born, then it follows, that we were not at first looked upon in Christ, but in Adam, and consequently he was 'caput prædestinationis,' 'the head of predestination,' or else there were two, the one before we were born, the other after. So that 'hæret letalis arundo,' 'the arrow sticks fast,' and it cannot be pulled out, unless by other instruments than are

commonly in fashion. However it be, yet, methinks, this is a very good probable argument.

As Adam sinned before any child was born, so was Christ promised before; and that our Redeemer shall not have more force upon children, that they should be born beloved and quitted from wrath, than Adam our progenitor shall have to cause that we be born hated and in a damnable condition,—wants so many degrees of probability, that it seems to dishonour the mercy of God, and the reputation of his goodness, and the power of his redemption.

For this serves as an antidote and antinomy of their great objection pretended by these learned persons: for whereas they say, they the rather affirm this, because it is an honour to the redemption which our Saviour wrought for us, that it rescued us from the sentence of damnation, which we had incurred. To this I say, that the honour of our blessed Saviour does no way depend upon our imaginations and weak propositions: and neither can the reputation and honour of the Divine goodness borrow aids and artificial supports from the dishonour of his justice; and it is no reputation to a physician to say, he hath cured us of an evil which we never had: and shall we accuse the Father of mercies to have wounded us for no other reason, but that the Son may have the honour to have cured us? I understand not that. He that makes a necessity that he may find a remedy, is like the Roman whom Cato found fault withal; he would commit a fault that he might beg a pardon; he had rather write bad Greek, that he might make an apology, than write good Latin, and need none. But however, Christ hath done enough for us, even all that we did need; and since it is all the reason in the world we should pay him all honour, we may remember, that it is a greater favour to us, that by the benefit of our blessed Saviour, who was the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world, we were reckoned in Christ, and born in the accounts of the divine favour; I say, it is a greater favour, that we were born under the redemption of Christ, than under the sentence and damnation of Adam; and to prevent an evil is a greater favour than to cure it; so that, if to do honour to God's goodness and to the graces of our Redeemer, we will suppose a need, we may do him more honour to suppose, that the promised

seed of the woman did do us as early a good, as the sin of Adam could do us mischief; and therefore, that in Christ we are born quitted from any such supposed sentence; and not that we bring it upon our shoulders into the world with us. But this thing relies only upon their suppositions.

For if we will speak of what is really true and plainly revealed; from all the sins of all mankind Christ came to redeem us; he came to give us a supernatural birth; to tell us all his Father's will; to reveal to us those glorious promises, upon the expectation of which we might be enabled to do every thing that is required: he came to bring us grace, and life, and spirit; to strengthen us against all the powers of hell and earth; to sanctify our afflictions, which from Adam by natural generation descended on us; to take out the sting of death, to make it an entrance to immortal life; to assure us of resurrection, to intercede for us, and to be an advocate for us, when we by infirmity commit sin; to pardon us when we repent. Nothing of which could be derived to us from Adam by our natural generation; mankind, now taken in his whole constitution and design, are like the birds of Paradise, which travellers tell us of in the Moluccas Islands; born without legs; but by a celestial power they have a recompense made to them for that defect; and they always hover in the air, and feed on the dew of heaven: so are we birds of Paradise, but cast out from thence, and born without legs, without strength to walk in the laws of God, or to go to heaven; but by a power from above, we are adopted in our new birth to a celestial conversation, we feed on the dew of heaven; 'the just does live by faith,' and breathes in this new life by the Spirit of God. For from the first Adam nothing descended to us but an infirm body, and a naked soul, evil example, and a body of death, ignorance and passion, hard labour and a cursed field, a captive soul and an imprisoned body, that is, a soul naturally apt to comply with the appetites of the body, and its desires, whether reasonable or excessive; and though these things were not direct sins to us in their natural abode and first principle, yet they are proper inherent miseries and principles of sin to us in their emanation. But from this state Christ came to redeem us all by his grace and by his Spirit, by his life and by his death, by his doctrine and by his sacraments, by his

promises and by his revelations, by his resurrection and by his ascension, by his interceding for us and judging of us; and if this be not a conjugation of glorious things, great enough to amaze us, and to merit from us all our services, and all our love, and all the glorifications of God, I am sure nothing can be added to it by any supposed need, of which we have no revelation: there is as much done for us as we could need, and more than we could ask,

> Nempe quod optanti Divûm promittere nemo
> Auderet, volvenda dies, en, attulit ultro [c]!
> Vivite felices animæ, quibus est fortuna peracta
> Jam sua ——— [d].

The meaning of which words I render, or at least recompense, with the verse of a psalm:

> To thee, O Lord, I'll pay my vow,
> My knees in thanks to thee shall bow,
> For thou my life keep'st from the grave,
> And dost my feet from falling save,
> That with the living in thy sight
> I may enjoy eternal light [e].

For thus what Ahasuerus said to Esther, 'Veteres literas muta,' 'Change the old letters,'—is done by the birth of our blessed Saviour. *Eva* is changed into *Ave;* and although it be true what Ben Sirach said, 'From the woman is the beginning of sin, and by her we all die,' yet it is now changed by the birth of our Redeemer; 'from a woman is the beginning of our restitution, and in him we all live;' thus are all the four quarters of the world renewed by the second Adam; ἀνατολὴ, δύσις, ἄρκτος, μεσημβρία, 'the east, west, north, and south,' are represented in the second Adam as well as the first, and rather, and to better purposes; because if sin did abound, grace shall superabound.

I have now, Madam, given to you such accounts, as, I hope, being added to my other papers, may satisfy not only your Ladyship, but those to whom this account may be communicated. I shall only now beg your patience, since you have been troubled with questions, and inquiries, and objections, and little murmurs, to hear my answers to such of them as have been brought to me.

1. I am complained of, that I would trouble the world

[c] Æn. 9. 6. [d] Æn. 3. 493. [e] Psal. lvi. by Bp. King.

with a new thing; which, let it be never so true, yet unless it were very useful, will hardly make recompense for the trouble I put the world to, in this inquiry.

I answer, that for the newness of it, I have already given accounts, that the opinions which I impugn, as they are no direct parts of the article of original sin, so they are newer than the truth which I have asserted. But let what I say seem as new as the Reformation did, when Luther first preached against indulgences, the pretence of novelty did not, and we say ought not, to have affrighted him; and therefore, I ought also to look to what I say, that it be true, and the truth will prove its age. But to speak freely, Madam, though I have a great reverence for antiquity, yet it is the prime antiquity of the church; the ages of martyrs and holiness, that I mean; and I am sure that in them my opinion hath much more warrant than the contrary; but for the descending ages, I give that veneration to the great names of them that went before us, which themselves gave to their predecessors; I honour their memory, I read their books, I imitate their piety, I examine their arguments; for therefore they did write them, and where the reasons of the moderns and theirs seem equal, I turn the balance on the elder side, and follow them; but where a scruple or a grain of reason is evidently in the other balance, I must follow that; 'Nempe qui ante nos ista moverunt, non domini nostri, sed duces sunt[f];' 'They that taught of this article before me, are good guides, but no lords and masters;' for I must acknowledge none upon earth; for so am I commanded by my Master that is in heaven; and I remember what we were taught in Palingenius, when we were boys.

Quicquid Aristoteles, vel quivis dicat eorum,
Dicta nihil moror, à vero cum fortè recedunt:
Sæpe graves magnosque viros, famâque verendos
Errare et labi contingit; plurima secum
Ingenia in tenebras consueti nominis alti
Auctores, ubi connivent, deducere easdem.

If Aristotle be deceiv'd, and say that's true,
What nor himself, nor others ever knew,
I leave his text, and let his scholars talk
Till they be hoarse or weary in their walk:
When wise men err, though their fame ring like bells,
I scape a danger when I leave their spells.

[f] Sen. Ep. 33. Ruhkopf. vol. 2. p. 156.

For although they that are dead some ages before we were born, have a reverence due to them, yet more is due to truth that shall never die; and God is not wanting to our industry any more than to theirs; but blesses every age with the understanding of his truths. "Ætatibus omnibus, omnibus hominibus, communis sapientia est; nec illam, ceu peculium, licet antiquitati gratulari;" "All ages, and all men, have their advantages in their inquiries after truth; neither is wisdom appropriate to our fathers." And because even wise men may be deceived, and therefore that when I find it, or suppose it so (for that is all one as to me and my duty), I must go after truth wherever it is; certainly it will be less expected from me to follow the popular noises and the voices of the people, who are not to teach us, but to be taught by us: and I believe myself to have reason to complain, when men are angry at a doctrine, because it is not commonly taught; that is, when they are impatient to be taught a truth, because most men do already believe a lie; "Recti apud nos locum tenet error, ubi publicus factus est," so Seneca[s] complained in his time: it is a strange title to truth which error can pretend, "for its being public;" and we refuse to follow an unusual truth, 'Quasi honestius sit, quia frequentius;' and indeed it were well to do so in those propositions, which have no truth in them but what they borrow from men's opinions, and are for nothing tolerable, but that they are usual.

Object. 2. But what necessity is there in my publication of this doctrine, supposing it were true? for all truths are not to be spoken at all times; and if a truth gives offence, it is better to let men alone, than to disturb the peace.

I answer with the labouring man's proverb, 'A pennyworth of ease is worth a penny at any time;' and a little truth is worth a little peace, every day of the week: and 'cæteris paribus,' truth is to be preferred before peace; not every trifling truth to a considerable peace: but if the truth be material, it makes recompense, though it brings a great noise along with it; and if the breach of peace be nothing but that men talk in private, or declaim a little in public; truly, Madam, it is a very pitiful little proposition, the discovery of which in truth will not make recompense for the prattling of

[s] Ep. 123. Rubkopf. vol. 3. p. 426.

disagreeing persons. Truth and peace make an excellent yoke, but the truth of God is always to be preferred before the peace of men, and therefore our blessed Saviour came 'not to send peace, but a sword;' that is, he knew his doctrine would cause great divisions of heart, but yet he came to persuade us to peace and unity. Indeed, if the truth be clear, and yet of no great effect in the lives of men, in government, or in the honour of God, then it ought not to break the peace: that is, it may not run out of its retirement, to disquiet them, to whom their rest is better than that knowledge. But if it be brought out already, it must not be deserted positively, though peace goes away in its stead. So that peace is rather to be deserted, than any truth should be renounced or denied: but peace is rather to be procured or continued, than some truth offered. This is my sense, Madam, when the case is otherwise than I suppose it to be at present. For as for the present case, there must be two, when there is a falling out, or a peace broken; and therefore, I will secure it now: for let any man dissent from me in this article, I will not be troubled at him; he may do it with liberty, and with my charity. If any man is of my opinion, I confess I love him the better; but if he refuses it, I will not love him less after than I did before: but he that dissents, and reviles me, must expect from me no other kindness but that I forgive him, and pray for him, and offer to reclaim him, and that I resolve nothing shall ever make me either hate him, or reproach him: and that still, in the greatest of his difference, I refuse not to give him the communion of a brother; I believe I shall be chidden by some or other for my easiness, and want of fierceness, which they call zeal, but it is a fault of my nature; a part of my original sin:

> Unicuique dedit vitium natura creato,
> Mi natura aliquid semper amare dedit [h].

> Some weakness to each man by birth descends,
> To me too great a kindness nature lends.

But if the peace can be broken no more than thus; I suppose the truth which I publish, will do more than make recompense for the noise, that in clubs and conventicles is made over and above. So long as I am thus resolved

[h] Propert. 2. 22. 17. Kuinoel. vol. 1. p. 146.

there may be injury done to me; but there can be no duel, or loss of peace abroad. For a single anger, or a displeasure on one side, is not a breach of peace on both; and a war cannot be made by fewer, than a bargain can; in which always there must be two at least.

Object. 3. But as to the thing, if it be inquired, Τίς λόγος εἰς οἰκοδομίαν χρείας; 'What profit, what use, what edification, is there, what good to souls, what honour to God,' by this new explication of the article? I answer; that the usual doctrines of original sin are made the great foundation of the horrible proposition concerning absolute reprobation; the consequences of it reproach God with injustice, they charge God foolishly, and deny his goodness and his wisdom in many instances: and whatsoever can, upon the account of the divine attributes, be objected against the fierce way of absolute decrees; all that can be brought for the reproof of their usual propositions concerning original sin. For the consequences are plain; and by them the necessity of my doctrine, and its usefulness, may be understood.

For, 1. If God decrees us to be born sinners; then he makes us be sinners, and then where is his goodness?

2. If God does damn any for that, he damns us for what we could not help, and for what himself did: and then where is his justice?

3. If God sentence us to that damnation, which he cannot in justice inflict, where is his wisdom?

4. If God, for the sin of Adam, brings upon us a necessity of sinning; where is our liberty? where is our nature? what is become of all laws, and of all virtue and vice? How can men be distinguished from beasts? or the virtuous from the vicious?

5. If, by the fall of Adam, we are so wholly ruined in our faculties, that we cannot do any good, but must do evil; how shall any man take care of his ways? or how can it be supposed he should strive against all vice, when he can excuse so much upon his nature? or indeed how shall he strive at all? For if all actual sins are derived from the original, and which is unavoidable, and yet an irresistible cause, then no man can take care to avoid any actual sin, whose cause is natural, and not to be declined. And then where is his providence and government?

6. If God does cast infants into hell for the sin of others, and yet did not condemn devils, but for their own sin; where is his love to mankind?

7. If God chooseth the death of so many millions of persons who are no sinners upon their own stock, and yet swears that he does not love the death of a sinner, viz. sinning with his own choice; how can that be credible, he should love to kill innocents, and yet should love to spare the criminal? Where then is his mercy, and where is his truth?

8. If God hath given us a nature by derivation, which is wholly corrupted, then how can it be, that all which God made, is good? For though Adam corrupted himself, yet in propriety of speaking, we did not; but this was the decree of God; and then where is the excellency of his providence and power, where is the glory of the creation?

Because therefore that God is all goodness, and justice, and wisdom, and love, and that he governs all things, and all men, wisely and holily, and according to the capacities of their natures and persons; that he gives us a wise law, and binds that law on us by promises and threatenings; I had reason to assert these glories of the Divine Majesty, and remove the hinderances of a good life; since every thing can hinder us from living well, but scarcely can all the arguments of God and man, and all the powers of heaven and hell, persuade us to strictness and severity.

Qui serere ingenuum volet agrum,
Liberet arva priùs fruticibus;
Falce rubos, silicemque resecet,
Ut novâ fruge gravis ceres eat[1].

He that will sow his field with hopeful seed,
Must every bramble, every thistle weed:
And when each hinderance to the grain is gone,
A fruitful crop shall rise of corn alone.

When, therefore, there were so many ways made to the devil, I was willing amongst many others to stop this also; and I dare say, few questions in Christendom can say half so much in justification of their own usefulness and necessity.

I know, Madam, that they who are of the other side, do

[1] Boeth. lib. 3. Metr. 1.

and will disavow most of these consequences; and so do all the world, all the evils which their adversaries say, do follow from their opinions; but yet all the world of men that perceive such evils to follow from a proposition, think themselves bound to stop the progression of such opinions, from whence they believe such evils may arise. If the church of Rome did believe, that all those horrid things were chargeable upon transubstantiation, and upon worshipping of images, which we charge upon the doctrines, I do not doubt but they would as much disown the propositions, as now they do the consequents; and yet I do as little doubt, but that we do well to disown the first, because we espy the latter: and though the man be not, yet the doctrines are, highly chargeable with the evils that follow: it may be, the men espy them not, yet from the doctrines they do certainly follow; and there are not in the world many men, who own that which is evil in the pretence, but many do such as are dangerous in the effect; and this doctrine, which I have reproved, I take to be one of them.

Object. 4. But if original sin be not a sin properly, why are children baptized? And what benefit comes to them by baptism?

I answer, 1. As much as they need, and are capable of: and it may as well be asked, Why were all the sons of Abraham circumcised, when, in that covenant, there was no remission of sins at all? for little things, and legal impurities, and irregularities, there were; but there being no sacrifice there but of beasts, whose blood could not take away sin, it is certain and plainly taught us in Scripture, that no rite of Moses was expiatory of sins. But, 2. This objection can press nothing at all; for why was Christ baptized, who knew no sin? But yet so it behoved him to fulfil all righteousness. 3. Baptism is called 'regeneration,' or the 'new-birth,' and therefore, since in Adam children are born only to a natural life and a natural death, and by this they can never arrive at heaven,—therefore infants are baptized, because, until they be born anew, they can never have title to the promises of Jesus Christ, or be heirs of heaven, and coheirs of Jesus. 4. By baptism children are made partakers of the Holy Ghost and of the grace of God; which I desire to be observed in opposition to the Pelagian heresy, who did suppose nature

to be so perfect[k], that the grace of God was not necessary, and that, by nature alone, they could go to heaven; which because I affirm to be impossible, and that baptism is therefore necessary, because nature is insufficient, and baptism is the great channel of grace; there ought to be no envious and ignorant load laid upon my doctrine, as if it complied with the Pelagian, against which it is so essentially and so mainly opposed in the main difference of his doctrine. 5. Children are therefore baptized, because, if they live, they will sin, and though their sins are not pardoned beforehand, yet in baptism they are admitted to that state of favour, that they are within the covenant of repentance and pardon; and this is expressly the doctrine of St. Austin[l]. But of this I have already given larger accounts in my discourse of baptism[m]. 6. Children are baptized for the pardon even of original sin; this may be affirmed truly, but yet improperly: for so far as it is imputed, so far also it is remissible; for the evil that is done by Adam, is also taken away in Christ; and it is imputed to us to very evil purposes, as I have already explicated: but as it was among the Jews, who believed then the sin to be taken away, when the evil of punishment is taken off; so is original sin taken away in baptism; for though the material part of the evil is not taken away, yet the curse, in all the sons of God, is turned into a blessing, and is made an occasion of reward, or an entrance to it. Now in all this I affirm all that is true, and all that is probable: for in the same sense, as original stain is a sin, so does baptism bring the pardon. It is a sin metonymically, that is, because it is the effect of one sin, and the cause of many; and just so, in baptism, it is taken away, that it is now the matter of a grace, and the opportunity of glory; and upon these accounts, the church baptizes all her children.

Object. 5. But to deny original sin to be a sin properly and inherently, is expressly against the words of St. Paul in the fifth chapter to the Romans:—If it be, I have done; but that it is not, I have these things to say. 1. If the words be capable of any interpretation, and can be permitted to signify otherwise than is vulgarly pretended, I suppose myself

[k] Vide August. de Gestis Palestin. et lib. de Natur. et Grat. c. 21. Opus Imperf. in Julian. l. 1. c. 54. et lib. de Peccat. Orig. c. 21.

[l] Lib. 1. de Nupt. et Concup. cap. 26. et cap. 33. et tract. 124. in Johan.

[m] Part 2. p. 194. in the Great Exemplar.

to have given reasons sufficient, why they ought to be. For any interpretation, that does violence to right reason, to religion, to holiness of life, and the divine attributes of God,—is therefore to be rejected, and another chosen; for in all Scriptures, all good and all wise men do it.

2. The words in question, 'sin' and 'sinner' and 'condemnation,' are frequently used in Scripture [n] in the lesser sense, and 'sin' is taken for the punishment of sin; and 'sin' is taken for him who bore the evil of the sin; and 'sin' is taken for legal impurity; and for him who could not be guilty, even for Christ himself; as I have proved already: and in the like manner 'sinners' is used, by the rule of the conjugates and denominatives; but it is so also in the case of Bathsheba the mother of Solomon [o]. 3. For the word 'condemnation,' it is, by the Apostle himself, limited to signify temporal death; for when the Apostle says, 'Death passed upon all men, inasmuch as all men have sinned;' he must mean 'temporal death;' for eternal death did not pass upon all men; or if he means 'eternal death,' he must not mean, that it came for Adam's sin; but 'inasmuch as all men have sinned,' that is, upon all those upon whom eternal death did come, it came, because they also have sinned. For if it had come for Adam's sin; then it had absolutely descended upon all men; because from Adam all men descended; and therefore all men, upon that account, were equally guilty: as we see all men die naturally. 4. The Apostle here speaks of sin imputed; therefore, not of sin inherent: and if imputed only to such purposes, as he here speaks of, viz. to temporal death, then it is neither a sin properly, nor yet imputable to eternal death, so far as is, or can be, implied by the Apostle's words. And in this I am not a little confirmed by the discourse of St. Irenæus to this purpose [p]; "Propter hoc et initio transgressionis Adæ," &c. "Therefore, in the beginning of Adam's transgression, as the Scripture tells, God did not curse Adam, but the earth in his labours; as one of the ancients saith, God removed the curse upon the earth, that it might not abide on man. But the condemnation of his sin he received, weariness, and labour, and to eat in the sweat of his brows, and to return to dust again;

[n] 1 Kings, i. 21. Zech. xiv. 19. 2 Cor. v. 21. Isa. liii. 10. Heb. ix. 28.
[o] 1 Kings, i. 21. [p] Lib. iii. cap. 35.

and likewise the woman had for her punishment, tediousness, labours, groans, sorrows of child-birth, and to serve her husband; that they might not wholly perish in the curse, nor yet despise God, while they remained without punishment. But all the curse ran upon the serpent, who seduced them,—and this our Lord in the Gospel saith to them on his left hand: 'Go, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which my Father prepared for the devil and his angels:' signifying, that not to man, in the prime intention, was eternal fire prepared, but to him, who was the seducer—but this they also shall justly feel, who, like them, without repentance and departing from them, persevere in the works of malice." 5. The Apostle says; 'By the disobedience of one, many were made sinners:' by which it appears, that we, in this, have no sin of our own, neither is it at all our own formally and inherently; for though efficiently it was his, and effectively ours, as to certain purposes of imputation; yet it could not be a sin to us formally; because it was 'unius inobedientia,' 'the disobedience of one man;' therefore in no sense, could it be properly ours. For then it were not 'unius,' but 'inobedientia singulorum:' 'the disobedience of all men.' 6. Whensoever another man's sin is imputed to his relative, therefore, because it is another's and imputed, it can go no further but to effect certain evils, to afflict the relative, and to punish the cause, not formally to denominate the descendant or relative to be a sinner; for it is as much a contradiction to say, that I am formally by him a sinner, as that I did really do his action. Now to 'impute,' in Scripture, signifies, to reckon as if he had done it; 'not to impute' is to treat him so, as if he had not done it. So far then as the imputation is, so far we are reckoned as sinners; but Adam's sin being by the Apostle signified to be imputed but to the condemnation or sentence to a temporal death; so far we are sinners in him, that is, so as that for his sake death was brought upon us; and indeed the word 'imputare,' 'to impute,' does never signify more, nor always so much. "Imputare verò frequenter ad significationem exprobrantis accedit, sed citra reprehensionem," says Laurentius Valla; "It is like an exprobration, but short of a reproof:" so Quintilian; "Imputas nobis propitios ventos, et secundum mare, ac civitatis opulentæ liberalitatem:" "Thou dost im-

pute, that is, upbraid to us, our prosperous voyages, and a calm sea, and the liberality of a rich city."—'Imputare' signifies oftentimes the same that 'computare,' to 'reckon or account:' "Nam hæc in quartâ non imputantur," say the lawyers, "they are not imputed," that is, they are not computed or reckoned. Thus Adam's sin is imputed to us, that is, it is put into our reckoning; and when we are sick and die, we pay our symbols, the portion of evil that is laid upon us: and what Marcus said, I may say in this case with a little variety; "Legata in hæreditate—sive legatum datum sit hæredi, sive percipere, sive deducere vel retinere passus est, ei imputantur: "The legacy, whether it be given or left to the heir, whether he may take it or keep it, is still imputed to him;" that is, it is within his reckoning.

But no reason, no scripture, no religion, does enforce, and no divine attribute does permit, that we should say, that God did so impute Adam's sin to his posterity, that he did really esteem them to be guilty of Adam's sin; equally culpable, equally hateful: for if, in this sense, it be true that in him we sinned, then we sinned as he did, that is, with the same malice, in the same action; and then we are as much guilty as he; but if we have sinned less, then we did not sin in him; for to sin in him, could not by him be lessened to us; for what we did in him, we did by him, and therefore as much as he did; but if God imputed this sin less to us than to him, then this imputation supposes it only to be a collateral and indirect account to such purposes as he pleased: of which purposes we judge by the analogy of faith, by the words of Scripture, by the proportion and notices of the divine attributes. 7. There is nothing in the design or purpose of the Apostle, that can or ought to infer any other thing; for his purpose is to signify, that, by man's sin, death entered into the world; which the Son of Sirach [q] expresses thus; "A muliere factum est initium peccati, et inde est quod morimur:" "From the woman is the beginning of sin; and from her it is that we all die:" and again [r]; "By the envy of the devil, death came into the world;" this evil being universal, Christ came to the world, and became our head, to other purposes, even to redeem us from death; which he hath begun and will finish,

[q] Ecclus. xxv. 33. [r] Ecclus. i. 24.

and to become to us our parent in a new birth, the author of a spiritual life; and this benefit is of far more efficacy by Christ, than the evil could be by Adam; and as by Adam we are made sinners, so by Christ we are made righteous; not just so, but so and more; and therefore as our 'being made sinners' signifies that by him we die,—so being by Christ made righteous, must at least signify that by him we live: and this is so evident to them who read St. Paul's words, Rom. v. from verse 12. to verse 19. inclusively, that I wonder any man should make a further question concerning them; especially since Erasmus and Grotius, who are to be reckoned amongst the greatest and the best expositors of Scripture, that any age, since the apostles and their immediate successors, hath brought forth, have so understood and rendered it. But, Madam, that your Honour may read the words and their sense together, and see that, without violence they signify what I have said, and no more; I have here subjoined a paraphrase of them; in which if I use any violence, I can very easily be reproved.

Rom. v. 12.—"As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin: and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned:" i. e.

As, by the disobedience of Adam, sin had its beginning; and by sin death, that is, the sentence and preparations, the solemnities and addresses of death, sickness, calamity, diminution of strengths, old age, misfortunes, and all the affections of mortality, for the destroying of our temporal life; and so this mortality, and condition or state of death, passed actually upon all mankind; for Adam, being thrown out of Paradise, and forced to live with his children where they had no trees of life, as he had in Paradise, was remanded to his mortal, natural state; and therefore death passed upon them, mortally seized on all, 'for that all have sinned;' that is, the sin was reckoned to all, not to make them guilty like Adam; but Adam's sin passed upon all, imprinting this real calamity on us all: but yet death descended also upon Adam's posterity for their own sins; for since all did sin, all should die. But some Greek copies leave out the second καὶ, which indeed seems superfluous

and of no signification: but then the sense is clearer; and the following words are the second part of a similitude: "As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned:" but ἐφ' ᾧ signifies neutrally: and the meaning is; As Adam died in his own sin; so death passed upon all men for their own sin: in the sin which they sinned, in that sin they died: as it did at first to Adam, by whom sin first entered, and by sin death; so death passed upon all men, upon whom sin passed: that is, in the same method, they who did sin, should die. But then he does not seem to say that all did sin: for he presently subjoins; "that death reigned (even upon those who did not sin) after the similitude of Adam's transgression;" but this was upon another account, as appears in the following words. But others expound ἐφ' ᾧ to signify masculinely, and to relate to Adam; viz. that in him we all sinned. Now although this is less consonant to the mind of the Apostle, and is harsh and improper both in the language and in the sense, yet if it were so, it could mean but this; that the sin of Adam was of universal obligation; and in him we are reckoned as sinners, obnoxious to his sentence; for by his sin, human nature was reduced to its own mortality.

13.—"For until the law, sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed, where there is no law."

And marvel not, that death did presently descend on all mankind, even before a law was given them with an appendant penalty, viz. with the express intermination of death; for they did do actions unnatural and vile enough; but yet these things, which afterward, upon the publication of the law, were imputed to them upon their personal account, even unto death, "were not yet so imputed." For nature alone gives rules, but does not directly bind to penalties. But death came upon them before the law for Adam's sin: for with him God being angry, was pleased to curse him also in his posterity, and leave them also in their mere natural condition, to which yet they disposed themselves, and had deserved but too much by committing evil things; to which things, although before the law, death was

not threatened, yet for the anger which God had against mankind, he left that death which he threatened to Adam expressly, by implication, to fall upon the posterity.

14.—"Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses (even over them that had not sinned), after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him which was to come."

And therefore it was, that death reigned from Adam to Moses, from the first law to the second; from the time that a law was given to one man, till the time a law was given to one nation; and although men had not sinned so grievously as Adam did, who had no excuse, many helps, excellent endowments, mighty advantages, trifling temptations, communication with God himself, no disorder in his faculties, free will, perfect immunity from violence, original righteousness, perfect power over his faculties; yet those men, such as Abel and Seth, Noah and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Joseph and Benjamin, who sinned less, and, in the midst of all their disadvantages, were left to fall under the same sentence. But it is to be observed, that these words, "even over them that had not sinned," according to some interpretations, are to be put into a parenthesis: and the following words, "after the similitude of Adam's transgression," are an ὑπέρβατον, and to be referred to the first words, thus,—'death reigned from Adam to Moses—after the similitude of Adam's transgression:' that is, as it was at first, so it was afterwards: death reigned upon men (who had not sinned) after the similitude of Adam's transgression; that is, like as it did in the transgression of Adam, so it did afterward; they in their innocence died, as Adam did in his sin and prevarication, and this was in the similitude of Adam: as they who obtain salvation, obtain it in the similitude of Christ, or by a conformity to Christ; so they who die, do die in the likeness of Adam; Christ and Adam being the two representatives of mankind: for this, besides that it was the present economy of the Divine Providence and government, it did also, like Janus, look πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω, 'it looked forwards as well as backwards,' and became a type of Christ, or of him that was to come. For as from Adam

evil did descend upon his natural children, upon the account of God's intercourse with Adam; so did good descend upon the spiritual children of the second Adam.

15.—"But not as the offence, so also is the free gift: for if, through the offence of one, many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many."

This should have been the latter part of a similitude, but upon further consideration, it is found, that as in Adam we die, so in Christ we live, and much rather, and much more; therefore I cannot say, 'as by one man,' verse 12. 'so by one man,' verse 15. 'But much more;' for not as the offence, so also is the free gift; for the offence of one did run over unto many, and those many, even as it were all, except Enoch, or some very few more, of whom mention peradventure is not made, are already dead upon that account; but when God comes by Jesus Christ to shew mercy to mankind, he does it in much more abundance; he may be angry to the third and fourth generation, in them that hate him, but he will shew mercy unto thousands of them, that love him; to a thousand generations, and in ten thousand degrees; so that now although a comparison proportionate was at first intended, yet the river here rises far higher than the fountain; and now no argument can be drawn from the similitude of Adam and Christ, but that as much hurt was done to human nature by Adam's sin, so very much more good is done to mankind by the incarnation of the Son of God."

16.—"And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift; for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offences, unto justification."

And the first disparity and excess are in this particular: for the judgment was δι' ἑνὸς ἁμαρτήσαντος and ἐξ ἑνὸς παραπτώματος, 'by one man sinning one sin;' that one sin was imputed; but by Christ, not only one sin was forgiven freely, but many offences were remitted unto justification: and secondly, a vast disparity there is in this; that the descendants from Adam were perfectly like him in nature, his own real natural production, and they sinned, though not so bad,

yet very much; and therefore there was a great parity of reason, that the evil which was threatened to Adam, and not to his children, should yet, for the likeness of nature and of sin, descend upon them. But in the other part, the case is highly differing; for Christ being our patriarch in a supernatural birth, we fall infinitely short of him, and are not so like him as we were to Adam; and yet that we, in greater unlikeness, should receive a greater favour, this was the excess of the comparison, and this is the free gift of God.

17.—"For if by one offence [*so it is in the King's MS.* or,] if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ."

And this is the third degree, or measure of excess of efficacy on Christ's part, over it was on the part of Adam. For if the sin of Adam alone could bring death upon the world, who, by imitation of his transgression on the stock of their own natural choice, did sin against God, though not after the similitude of Adam's transgression: much more shall we, who not only receive the aids of the Spirit of grace, but receive them also in an abundant measure, receive also the effect of all this, even to reign in life by one, Jesus Christ.

18.—"Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation: even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men, unto justification of life."

Therefore, now to return to the other part of the similitude, where I began; although I have shewn the great excess and abundance of grace by Christ, over the evil that did descend by Adam; yet the proportion and comparison lie in the main emanation of death from one, and life from the other; 'judgment unto condemnation,'—that is, the sentence of death came upon all men by the offence of one; even so, by a like economy and dispensation, God would not be behind in doing an act of grace, as he did before of judgment: and as that judgment was to condemnation by the offence of one, so the free gift and the grace came upon all to justification of life, by the righteousness of one.

19.—"For as by one man's disobedience, many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous."

The sum of all is this; by the disobedience of one man, κατεστάθησαν οἱ πόλλοι, 'many were constituted' or put into the order of sinners, they were made such by God's appointment; that is, not that God could be the author of a sin to any, but that he appointed the evil, which is the consequent of sin, to be upon their heads, who descended from the sinner: and so it shall be on the other side; for by the obedience of one, even of Christ, many shall be made or constituted righteous. But still this must be with a supposition of what was said before, that there was a vast difference; for we are made much more righteous by Christ, than we were sinners by Adam; and the life we receive by Christ, shall be greater than the death by Adam; and the graces we derive from Christ, shall be more and mightier than the corruption and declination by Adam; but yet as one is the head, so is the other: one is the beginning of sin and death, and the other of life and righteousness.

It were easy to add many particulars out of St. Paul; but I shall choose only to recite the Æthiopic version of the New Testament, translated into Latin by that excellent linguist and worthy person Dr. Dudley Loftus: the words are these: "And therefore, as by the iniquity of one man, sin entered into the world, and by *that sin* death came upon all men[a], therefore, because *that sin is imputed to all men*, even those who knew not what that sin was. Until the law came, sin remained in the world not known what it was, when sin was not reckoned; because as yet, at that time, the commandment of the law was not come. Nevertheless, death did after reign from Adam until Moses, 'as well in those that did sin, as in those that did not sin by that sin of Adam,' because every one was created in the similitude of Adam, and because Adam was a type of him that was to come. But not according to the quantity of our iniquity was the grace of God to us. If, for the offence of one man, many are dead, —how much more, by the grace of God, and by the gift of

[a] Rom. v. 12, &c.

him who did gratify us, by one man, to wit, Jesus Christ, life hath abounded upon many? Neither for the measure of the sin, which was of one man, was there the like reckoning or account of the grace of God. For if the condemnation of sin proceeding from one man, caused, that, by that sin, all should be punished,—how much rather shall his grace purify us from our sins, and give to us eternal life? If the sin of one man made death to reign, and by the offence of one man death did rule in us, how much more therefore shall the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, and his gift, justify us and make us to reign in life eternal? And as, by the offence of one man, many are condemned; likewise also, by the righteousness of one man, shall every son of man be justified and live. And as, by one man, many are made sinners (or, as the Syriac version renders it, 'there were many sinners;') in like manner, again, many are made righteous."—Now this reddition of the Apostle's discourse in this article, is a very great light to the understanding of the words, which not the nature of the thing but the popular glosses have made difficult. But here it is plain, that all the notice of this article, which those churches derived from these words of St. Paul, was this:—"That the sin of Adam brought death into the world: that it was his sin alone, that did the great mischief: that this sin was made ours not by inherence, but by imputation: that they who suffered the calamity, did not know what the sin was: that there was a difference of men even in relation to this sin; and it passed upon some, more than upon others: that is, some were more miserable than others: that some did not sin by that sin of Adam, and some did; that is, some there were, whose manners were not corrupted by that example, and some were; that it was not our sin but his; that the sin did not multiply by the variety of subject, but was still but one sin; and that it was his and not ours:"—all which particulars are as so many verifications of the doctrine I have delivered, and so many illustrations of the main article. But in verification of one great part of it, I mean that concerning infants, and that they are not corrupted properly or made sinners by any inherent impurity, is affirmed by St. Peter, whose words are thus rendered in the same Æthiopic Testament[1]. "And be ye like unto newly-be-

[1] 1 Pet. ii. 2.

gotten infants, who are begotten every one without sin, or malice, and as milk not mingled." And to the same sense those words of our blessed Saviour to the Pharisees asking 'who sinned, this man or his parents,' (John ix.) the Syriac Scholiast does give this paraphrase: "Some say it is an indirect question: for how is it possible for a man to sin, before he was born? And if his parents sinned, how could he bear their sin? But if they say, that the punishment of the parents may be upon the children, let them know that this is spoken of them that came out of Egypt, and is not universal." And those words of David, "In sin hath my mother conceived me," R. David Kimchi and Aben Ezra say, that they are expounded of Eve, who did not conceive till she had sinned. But to return to the words of St. Paul.

The consequent of this discourse must needs at least be this; that it is impossible, that the greatest part of mankind should be left in the eternal bonds of hell by Adam; for then quite contrary to the discourse of the Apostle, there had been abundance of sin, but a scarcity of grace; and the access had been on the part of Adam, not on the part of Christ, against which he so mightily and artificially contends: so that the Presbyterian way is perfectly condemned by this discourse of the Apostle; and the other more gentle way, which affirms, that we were sentenced in Adam to eternal death, though the execution is taken off by Christ, is also no way countenanced by any thing in this chapter; for that the judgment, which, for Adam's sin, came unto the condemnation of the world, was nothing but temporal death, is here affirmed; it being in no sense imaginable that the death, which here St. Paul says 'passed upon all men,' and which 'reigned from Adam to Moses,' should be eternal death; for the Apostle speaks of that death, which was threatened to Adam; and of such a death, which was afterward threatened in Moses's law; and such a death, which fell even upon the most righteous of Adam's posterity, Abel and Seth and Methuselah, that is, upon them who did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression. Since then, all the judgment, which, the Apostle says, came by the sin of Adam, was sufficiently and plainly enough affirmed to be death temporal; that God should sentence mankind to eternal damnation for Adam's sin, though in goodness through Christ he afterward

took it off,—is not at all affirmed by the apostles; and because in proportion to the evil, so was the imputation of the sin, it follows that Adam's sin is ours metonymically, and improperly; God was not finally angry with us, nor had so much as any designs of eternal displeasure upon that account; his anger went no further than the evils of this life, and therefore the imputation was not of a proper guilt,—for that might justly have passed beyond our grave, if the sin had passed beyond a metonymy, or a juridical, external imputation. And of this God and man have given this further testimony; that as no man ever imposed penance for it, so God himself in nature did never for it afflict or affright the conscience, and yet the conscience never spares any man, that is guilty of a known sin.

> Exemplo quodcunque malo committitur, ipsi
> Displicet auctori [u],

> He that is guilty of a sin
> Shall rue the crime that he lies in.

And why the conscience shall be for ever at so much peace for this sin, that a man shall never give one groan for his share of guilt in Adam's sin, unless some or other scares him with an impertinent proposition; why, I say, the conscience should not naturally be afflicted for it, nor so much as naturally know it, I confess I cannot yet make any reasonable conjecture, save this only, that it is not properly a sin, but only metonymically and improperly. And indeed there are some whole churches, which think themselves so little concerned in the matter of original sin, that they have not a word of it in all their theology: I mean, the Christians in the East Indies, concerning whom friar Luys di Urretta in his Ecclesiastical Story of Ethiopia, says, "that the Christians in Æthiopia, under the empire of Prestre Juan, never kept the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, 'no se entremetieron en essas theologias del peccato original: porque nunca tuvieron los entendimientes muy metafisicos, antes como gente afable, benigna, Llana, de entendimientos conversables, y alaguenos, seguian la dotrina de los santos antiguos, y de los sagrados concilios, sin disputas, ni diferencias,' 'nor do they insert into their theology any proposi-

[u] Juv. 13. 1. Raperti.

tions concerning original sin, nor trouble themselves with such metaphysical contemplations; but being of an affable, ingenuous, gentle comportment and understanding, follow the doctrine of the primitive saints and holy councils without disputation or difference;'" so says the story. But we unfortunately trouble ourselves by raising ideas of sin, and afflict ourselves with our own dreams, and will not believe but it is a vision. And the height of this imagination hath wrought so high in the church of Rome, that when they would do great honours to the Virgin Mary, they were pleased to allow to her an immaculate conception without any original sin, and a holy day appointed for the celebration of the dream. But the Christians in the other world are wiser, and trouble themselves with none of these things; but in simplicity, honour the divine attributes, and speak nothing but what is easy to be understood. And indeed religion is then the best, and the world will be sure to have fewer atheists, and fewer blasphemers, when the understandings of witty men are not tempted, by commanding them to believe impossible articles, and unintelligible propositions: when every thing is believed by the same simplicity it is taught: when we do not call that a mystery, which we are not able to prove, and tempt our faith to swallow that whole, which reason cannot chew

One thing I am to observe more, before I leave considering the words of the Apostle. The Apostle here having instituted a comparison between Adam and Christ; that as death came by one, so life by the other; "as by one we are made sinners, so by the other we are made righteous;" some from hence suppose, they argue strongly to the overthrow of all that I have said,—thus:—"Christ and Adam are compared: therefore, as by Christ we are made really righteous: so by Adam we are made really sinners: our righteousness by Christ is more than imputed, and therefore so is our unrighteousness by Adam;" to this, besides what I have already spoken in my humble addresses to that wise and charitable prelate the Lord Bishop of Rochester, delivering the sense and objections of others; in which I have declared my sense of the imputation of Christ's righteousness; and besides, that although the Apostle offers a similitude, yet he finds himself surprised, and that one part of the similitude does

far exceed the other,—and therefore nothing can follow hence, but that if we receive evil from Adam, we shall much more receive good from Christ;—besides this I say, I have something very material to reply to the form of the argument, which is a very trick and fallacy. For the Apostle argues thus: "As by Adam we are made sinners, so by Christ we are made righteous;" and that is very true, and much more; but to argue from hence, "As by Christ we are made really righteous, so by Adam we are made really sinners," is to invert the purpose of the Apostle (who argues from the less to the greater); and to make it conclude affirmatively from the greater to the less in matter of power, is as if one should say, If a child can carry a ten pound weight, much more can a man: and therefore whatsoever a man can do, that also a child can do. For though I can say, 'If this thing be done in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?' yet I must not say therefore, 'If this be done in the dry tree, what shall be done in the green?' for the dry tree of the cross could do much more than the green tree in the garden of Eden. It is a good argument to say, If the devil be so potent to do a shrewd turn, much more powerful is God to do good: but we cannot conclude from hence, but God can by his own mere power and pleasure save a soul; therefore the devil can by his power ruin one: in a similitude, the first part may be, and often is, less than the second; but never greater: and therefore though the Apostle said, 'As by Adam,' &c. 'So by Christ,' &c. Yet we cannot say, 'As by Christ, so by Adam:' we may well reason thus: 'As by nature there is a reward to evil doers, so much more is there by God;' but we cannot, by way of conversion, reason thus: 'As by God there is an eternal reward appointed to good actions, so by nature there is an eternal reward for evil ones.' And who would not deride this way of arguing; 'As by our fathers we receive temporal good things; so much more do we by God: but by God we also receive an immortal soul; therefore from our fathers we receive an immortal body?' For not the consequent of an hypothetical proposition, but the antecedent, is to be the assumption of the syllogism; this therefore is a fallacy; which when those wise persons, who are unwarily persuaded by it, shall observe, I doubt not but the whole way of arguing will appear unconcluding.

Object. 6. But it is objected, that my doctrine is against

the ninth article in the church of England; and that I hear, Madam, does most of all stick with you.

Of this, Madam, I should not now have taken notice, because I have already answered it in some additional papers, which are already published; but that I was so delighted to hear and to know, that a person of your interest and piety, of your zeal and prudence, is so earnest for the church of England, that I could not pass it by, without paying you that regard and just acknowledgment, which so much excellency deserves. But then, Madam, I am to say, that I could not be delighted in your zeal for our excellent church, if I were not as zealous myself for it too: I have oftentimes subscribed that article, and though, if I had cause to dissent from it, I would certainly do it in those just measures, which my duty on one side, and the interest of truth on the other, would require of me; yet because I have no reason to disagree, I will not suffer myself to be supposed to be of a differing judgment from my dear mother, which is the best church of the world. Indeed, Madam, I do not understand the words of the article as most men do; but I understand them as they can be true, and as they can very fairly signify, and as they agree with the word of God and right reason. But I remember that I have heard from a very good hand, and there are many alive this day that may remember to have heard it talked of publicly, that when Mr. Thomas Rogers had, in the year 1584, published an exposition of the thirty-nine articles, many were not only then, but long since, very angry at him, that he by his interpretation, had limited the charitable latitude, which was allowed in the subscription to them. For the articles being framed in a church but newly reformed, in which many complied with some unwillingness, and were not willing to have their consent broken by too great a straining, and even in the convocation itself so many being of a differing judgment, it was very great prudence and piety to secure the peace of the church by as much charitable latitude as they could contrive; and therefore, the articles in those things, which were publicly disputed at that time, even amongst the doctors of the Reformation (such were the articles of predestination, and this of original sin), were described, with incomparable wisdom and temper; and therefore I have reason to take it ill, if any man shall deny me liberty to use the benefit of the church's wisdom; for I am ready a thousand times to

subscribe the article, if there can be just cause to do it so often; but as I impose upon no man my sense of the article, but leave my reasons and him to struggle together for the best; so neither will I be bound to any one man, or any company of men but to my lawful superiors, speaking there where they can or ought to oblige. Madam, I take nothing ill from any man, but that he should think I have a less zeal for our church than himself, and I will, by God's assistance, be all my life confuting him; and though I will not contend with him, yet I will die with him in behalf of the church, if God shall call me; but for other little things and trifling arrests and little murmurs, I value none of it.

> Quid verum atque decens curo et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum:
> Condo et compono quæ mox depromere possim.
> Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri:
> Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes [u].

I could translate these also into bad English verse, as I do the others; but that now I am earnest for my liberty, I will not so much as confine myself to the measures of feet. But in plain English I mean by rehearsing these Latin verses, that although I love every man, and value worthy persons in proportion to their labours and abilities, whereby they can and do serve God and God's church, yet "I inquire for what is fitting, not what is pleasing: I search after ways to advantage souls, not to comply with humours, and sects, and interests; and I am tied to no man's private opinion any more than he is to mine;" if he will bring Scripture and right reason from any topic, he may govern me and persuade me, else I am free, as he is: but I hope I am beforehand with him in this question.

But one thing more I am willing to add. By the confession of all the schools of learning, it is taught, that baptism hath, infallibly, all that effect upon infants, which God designed and the church intends to them in the ministry of that sacrament: because infants cannot 'ponere obicem,' they cannot impede the gift of God, and they hinder not the effect of God's Spirit. Now all hinderances of the operation of the sacrament is sin; and if sin, before the ministration, be not morally rescinded, it remains, and remaining is a disposition contrary to the effect of the sacrament. Every inherent sin is the 'obex,' bars the gates that the grace of the

[u] Hor. Ep. 1. 1. 11. Gesner.

sacrament shall not enter. Since, therefore, infants do not bar the gates, do not hinder the effect of the sacrament, it follows, they have no sin inherent in them, but imputed only. If it be replied, that original sin though it be properly a sin, and really inherent, yet it does not hinder the effect of the sacrament;—I answer, then it follows, that original sin is of less malignity than the least actual sin in the world; and if so, then either by it no man is hated by God to eternal damnation, no man is by it an enemy of God, a son of wrath, an heir of perdition; or if he be, then, at the same time, he may be actually hated by God, and yet worthily disposed for receiving the grace and sacrament of baptism; and that sin, which, of all the sins of the world, is supposed to be the greatest, and of most universal and permanent mischief,—shall do the least harm, and is less opposed to God's grace, and indisposes a man less than a single wanton thought, or the first consent to a forbidden action; which he that can believe, is very much in love with his own proposition, and is content to believe it upon any terms. I end with the words of Lucretius [x].

Desine quapropter, novitate exterritus ipsâ,
Exspuere ex animo rationem; sed magis acri
Judicio perpende, et, si tibi vera videntur,
Dede manus; aut, si falsum est, accingere contra [x].

Fear not to own what's said, because 'tis new,
Weigh well and wisely if the thing be true.
Truth and not conquest is the best reward;
'Gainst falsehood only stand upon thy guard.

MADAM,

I HUMBLY beg you will be pleased to entertain these papers, not only as a testimony of my zeal for truth and peace below, and for the honour of God above; but also of my readiness to seize upon every occasion, whereby I may express myself to be,

Your most obliged
And most humble Servant
In the Religion of the holy Jesus,
JER. TAYLOR.

[x] Lucretius 2. 1040. Wakefield.

AN

ANSWER TO A LETTER

WRITTEN BY THE RIGHT REVEREND

THE LORD BISHOP OF ROCHESTER;

CONCERNING THE CHAPTER OF

ORIGINAL SIN,

IN THE

'UNUM NECESSARIUM.'

RIGHT REVEREND FATHER AND MY GOOD LORD,

YOUR Lordship's letter, dated July 28, I received not till September 11: it seems R. Royston detained it in his hands, supposing it could not come safely to me, while I remain a prisoner now in Chepstow-castle. But I now have that liberty, that I can receive any letters, and send any; for the gentlemen under whose custody I am, as they are careful of their charges, so they are civil to my person. It was necessary, I should tell this to your Lordship, that I may not be under a suspicion of neglecting to give accounts in those particulars, which, with so much prudence and charity, you were pleased to represent in your letter, concerning my discourse of original sin. My Lord, in all your exceptions, I cannot but observe your candour and your paternal care concerning me. For when there was nothing in the doctrine, but your greater reason did easily see the justice and the truth of it, and I am persuaded could have taught me to have said many more material things in confirmation of what I have taught; yet so careful is your charity of me, that you would not omit to represent to my consideration, what might be said by captious and weaker persons; or by the more wise and pious, who are of a different judgment.

But, my Lord, first, you are pleased to note, that this discourse runs not in the ordinary channel. True; for if it

did, it must nurse the popular error: but when the disease is epidemical, as it is so much the worse, so the extraordinary remedy must be acknowledged to be the better. And if there be in it some things hard to be understood, as it was the fate of St. Paul's Epistles (as your Lordship notes out of St. Peter), yet this difficulty of understanding proceeds not from the thing itself, nor from the manner of handling it, but from the indisposition and prepossession of men's minds to the contrary; who are angry, when they are told, that they have been deceived: for it is usual with men to be more displeased, when they are told they were in error, than to be pleased with them, who offer to lead them out of it.

But your Lordship doth with great advantages represent an objection of some captious persons, which relates not to the material part of the question, but to the rules of art. If there be no such thing as original sin transmitted from Adam to his posterity, then all that sixth chapter is a strife about a shadow, a 'non ens.'—Ans. It is true, my Lord, the question, as it is usually handled, is so. For when the Franciscan and Dominican do eternally dispute about the conception of the blessed Virgin, whether it was with, or without original sin, —meaning, by way of grace and special exemption, this is 'de non ente;' for there was no need of any such exemption; and they supposing, that commonly it was otherwise, troubled themselves about the exception of a rule, which in that sense, which they supposed it, was not true at all: she was born as innocent from any impurity or formal guilt, as Adam was created,—and so was her mother, and so were all her family. When the Lutheran and the Roman dispute, whether justice and original righteousness in Adam were natural or by grace, it is 'de non ente;' for it was positively neither, but negatively only; he had original righteousness, till he sinned,—that is, he was righteous, till he became unrighteous. When the Calvinist troubles himself and his parishioners with fierce declamations against natural inclinations or concupiscence, and disputes, whether it remains in baptized persons, or whether it be taken off by election, or by the sacrament, whether to all Christians or to some few;—this is a σκιαμαχία; for it is no sin at all in persons baptized or unbaptized, till it be consented to.

My Lord, when I was a young man in Cambridge, I knew

a learned professor of divinity, whose ordinary lectures in the Lady Margaret's chair, for many years together, nine as I suppose, or thereabouts,—were concerning original sin, and the appendant questions: this indeed could not choose but be 'andabatarum conflictus.' But then my discourse representing that these disputes are useless, and as they discourse, usually to be 'de non ente,'—is not to be reproved. For I profess to evince, that many of those things, of the sense of which they dispute, are not true a tall in any sense; I declare them to be 'de non ente,' that is, I untie their intricate knots by cutting them in pieces. For when a false proposition is the ground of disputes, the process must needs be infinite, unless you discover the first error. He that tells them, they both fight about a shadow, and with many arguments proves the vanity of their whole process,—they (if he says true), not he, is the σκιάμαχος. When St. Austin was horribly puzzled about the traduction of original sin, and thought himself forced to say, that either the father begat the soul,—or that he could not transmit sin, which is subjected in the soul,—or at least he could not tell how it was transmitted: he had no way to be relieved but by being told, that original sin was not subjected in the soul, because, properly and formally, it was no real sin of ours at all; but that it was only by imputation, and to certain purposes, not any inherent quality, or corruption: and so in effect all his trouble was 'de non ente.' But now some wits have lately risen in the church of Rome, and they tell us another story. The soul follows the temperature of the body, and so original sin comes to be transmitted by contact: because the constitution of the body is the 'fomes' or nest of the sin, and the soul's concupiscence is derived from the body's lust. But besides that this fancy disappears at the first handling, and there would be so many original sins as there are several constitutions, and the guilt would not be equal,—and they who are born eunuchs, should be less infected by Adam's pollution, by having less of concupiscence in the great instance of desires;—and after all, concupiscence itself could not be a sin in the soul, till the body was grown up to strength enough to infect it; and, in the whole process, it must be an impossible thing, because the instrument, which hath all its operations, by the force of the principal agent, cannot, of itself, produce a great change

and violent effect upon the principal agent: besides all this, I say, while one does not know, how original sin can be derived, and another, who thinks he can, names a wrong way, and both the ways infer it to be another kind of thing than all the schools of learning teach:—does it not too clearly demonstrate, that all that infinite variety of fancies, agreeing in nothing but in an endless uncertainty, is nothing else but a being busy about the quiddities of a dream, and the constituent parts of a shadow? But then, my Lord, my discourse representing all this to be vanity and uncertainty, ought not to be called or supposed to be a σκιαμαχία: as he,—that ends the question between two schoolmen disputing about the place of purgatory, by saying they need not trouble themselves about the place; for that which is not, hath no place at all,—ought not to be told he contends about a shadow, when he proves that to be true, which he suggested to the two trifling litigants.

But as to the thing itself: I do not say there is no such thing as original sin, but it is not that, which it is supposed to be: it is not our sin formally, but by imputation only; and it is imputed so, as to be an inlet to sickness, death, and disorder: but it does not introduce a necessity of sinning, nor damn any one to the flames of hell. So that original sin is not a 'non ens,' unless that be nothing, which infers so many real mischiefs.

The next thing your Lordship is pleased to note to me, is, that in your wisdom you foresee, some will argue against my explication of the word damnation, in the ninth article of our church, which affirms that original sin deserves damnation. Concerning which, my Lord, I do thus (and I hope fairly) acquit myself.

1. That it having been affirmed by St. Austin, that, infants, dying unbaptized, are damned, he is deservedly called 'durus pater infantum,' and generally forsaken by all sober men of the later ages: and it will be an intolerable thing to think the church of England guilty of that, which all her wiser sons, and all the Christian churches, generally abhor. I remember, that I have heard, that King James, reproving a Scottish minister, who refused to give private baptism to a dying infant, being asked by the minister, 'if he thought the child should be damned for want of baptism?' answered, 'No; but I think you may be damned for refusing it:' and

he said well. But then, my Lord, if original sin deserves damnation, then may infants be damned, if they die without baptism. But if it be a horrible affirmative, to say, that the poor babes shall be made devils, or enter into their portion, if they want that ceremony, which is the only gate, the only way, of salvation that stands open; then the word 'damnation' in the ninth article, must mean something less than what we usually understand by it: or else the article must be salved by expounding some other word to an allay and lessening of the horrible sentence; and particularly the word 'deserves,' of which I shall afterward give account. Both these ways I follow. The first is the way of the schoolmen.

For they suppose the state of unbaptized infants to be a 'pœna damni;' and they are confident enough to say, that this may be well supposed without inferring their suffering the pains of hell. But this sentence of theirs I admit and explicate with some little difference of expression. For so far I admit this 'pain of loss,' or rather a deficiency from going to heaven, to be the consequence of Adam's sin, that by it we being left 'in meris naturalibus,' could never, by these strengths alone, have gone to heaven. Now whereas your Lordship in behalf of those, whom you suppose may be captious, is pleased to argue, that as loss of sight or eyes infers a state of darkness or blindness; so the loss of heaven infers hell; and if infants go not to heaven in that state, whither can they go but to hell? and that is damnation in the greatest sense. I grant it, that if, in the event of things, they do not go to heaven (as things are now ordered), it is but too likely that they go to hell: but I add, that as all darkness does not infer horror and distraction of mind, or fearful apparitions and phantasms; so neither does all hell, or states in hell, infer all those torments which the schoolmen signify by a 'pœna sensus:' for I speak now in pursuance of their way. So that there is no necessity of a third place; but it concludes only, that, in the state of separation from God's presence, there is a great variety of degrees and kinds of evil, and every one is not the extreme: and yet, by the way, let me observe, that Gregory Nazianzen and Nicetas taught, that there is a third place for infants and heathens: and Irenæus affirmed, that the evils of hell were not eternal

to all, but to the devils only and the greater criminals. But neither they, nor we, nor any man else, can tell whether hell be a place or no. It is a state of evil; but whether all the damned be in one or in twenty places, we cannot tell.

But I have no need to make use of any of this. For when I affirm, that infants, being by Adam reduced and left to their mere natural state, fall short of heaven; I do not say, they cannot go to heaven at all; but they cannot go thither by their natural powers,—they cannot, without a new grace and favour, go to heaven. But then it cannot presently be inferred, that therefore they go to hell; but this ought to be inferred, which indeed was the real consequent of it; therefore it is necessary that God's grace should supply this defect, if God intends heaven to them at all; and because nature cannot, God sent a Saviour by whom it was effected. But if it be asked, What if this grace had not come? and that it be said, that without God's grace they must have gone to hell, because without it they could not go to heaven? I answer, That we know how it is, now that God in his goodness hath made provisions for them: but if he had not made such provisions, what would have been, we know not, any more than we know what would have followed, if Adam had not sinned; where he should have lived, and how long; and in what circumstances the posterity should have been provided for, in all their possible contingencies. But yet, this I know, that it follows not, that if without this grace, we could not have gone to heaven, that therefore we must have gone to hell. For although the first was ordinarily impossible, yet the second was absolutely unjust, and against God's goodness, and therefore more impossible. But because the first could not be done by nature, God was pleased to promise and to give his grace, that he might bring us to that state, whither he had designed us, that is, to a supernatural felicity. If Adam had not fallen, yet heaven had not been a natural consequent of his obedience, but a gracious; it had been a gift still: and of Adam, though he had persisted in innocence, it is true to say, That, without God's grace, that is, by the mere force of nature, he could never have arrived to a supernatural state, that is, to the joys of heaven; and yet it does not follow, that, if he had remained in innocence, he must have gone to hell. Just so it is in infants: hell was not

made for man, but for devils; and therefore it must be something besides mere nature, that can bear any man thither: mere nature goes neither to heaven nor hell. So that when I say, 'Infants naturally cannot go to heaven, and that this is a punishment of Adam's sin, he being for it punished with a loss of his gracious condition, and devolved to the state of nature, and we by him left so;' my meaning is, that this damnation, which is of our nature, is but negative, that is, as a consequent of our patriarch's sin; our nature is left imperfect and deficient, in order to a supernatural end, which the schoolmen call a 'pœna damni,' but improperly: they indeed think it may be a real event, and final condition of persons as well as things: but I affirm, it was an evil effect of Adam's sin: but, in the event of things, it became to the persons the way to a new grace, and hath no other event as to heaven and hell, directly and immediately. In the same sense and to the same purpose, I understand the word 'damnation' in the ninth article.

But the word 'damnation' may very well, truly and sufficiently, signify all the purposes of the article, if it be taken only for the effect of that sentence, which was inflicted upon Adam, and descended on his posterity, that is, for condemnation to death, and the evils of mortality. So the word is used by St. Paul[y]; "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself." Κρίμα is the word; but that it did particularly signify temporal death and evils, appears by the instances of probation in the next words; "For, for this cause some are weak amongst you, some are sick, and some are fallen asleep." This also in the article. Original sin deserves damnation; that is, it justly brought in the angry sentence of God upon man, it brought him to death, and deserved it: it brought it upon us, and deserved it too. I do not say, that we, by that sin, deserved that death, neither can death be properly a punishment of us, till we superadd some evil of our own; yet Adam's sin deserved it so, that it was justly left to fall upon us, we, as a consequent and punishment of his sin, being reduced to our natural portion. "In odiosis quod minimum est, sequimur." The lesser sense of the word is certainly agreeable to truth and reason: and it were good we used the word in

[y] 1 Cor. xi. 29.

that sense, which may best warrant her doctrine, especially for that use of the word, having the precedent of Scripture.

I am confirmed in this interpretation by the second section of the article, viz. of the remanency of concupiscence or original sin in the regenerate. All the sinfulness of original sin is the lust or concupiscence, that is the proneness to sin. Now then I demand, whether concupiscence before actual consent be a sin or no? And if it be a sin, whether it deserves damnation? That all sin deserves damnation, I am sure our church denies not. If therefore concupiscence before consent be a sin, then this also deserves damnation, wherever it is: and if so, then a man may be damned for original sin even after baptism. For even after baptism, concupiscence (or the sinfulness of original sin) remains in the regenerate: and that which is the same thing, the same viciousness, the same enmity to God after baptism, is as damnable, it deserves damnation as much, as that did that went before. If it be replied, that baptism takes off the guilt or formal part of it, but leaves the material part behind, that is, though concupiscence remains, yet it shall not bring damnation to the regenerate or baptized:—I answer, that though baptismal regeneration puts a man into a state of grace and favour, so that what went before, shall not be imputed to him afterward, that is, Adam's sin shall not bring damnation in any sense, yet it hinders not, but that what is sinful afterward, shall be then imputed to him, that is, he may be damned for his own concupiscence. He is quitted from it, as it came from Adam; but, by baptism, he is not quitted from it, as it is subjected in himself, if, I say, concupiscence before consent be a sin. If it be no sin, then for it, infants unbaptized cannot, with justice, be damned; it does not deserve damnation: but if it be a sin, then so long as it is there, so long it deserves damnation; and baptism did only quit the relation of it to Adam (for that was all that went before it), but not the danger of the man. But because the article supposes, that it does not damn the regenerate or baptized, and yet that it hath the nature of sin, it follows, evidently and undeniably, that both the phrases are to be diminished and understood in a favourable sense. As the phrase 'the nature of sin' signifies, so does 'damnation;' but 'the nature of sin' signifies something that brings no guilt, because it is affirm-

ed to be in the regenerate; therefore 'damnation' signifies something that brings no hell: but 'to deserve damnation' must mean something less than ordinary; that is, that concupiscence is a thing not morally good, not to to be allowed of, not to be nursed, but mortified, fought against, disapproved, condemned and disallowed of men, as it is of God.

And truly, my Lord, to say that, for Adam's sin, it is just in God to condemn infants to the eternal flames of hell: and to say, that concupiscence or natural inclinations before they pass into any act, could bring eternal condemnation from God's presence into the eternal portion of devils, are two such horrid propositions, that if any church in the world would expressly affirm them, I for my part should think it unlawful to communicate with her in the defence or profession of either, and to think it would be the greatest temptation in the world to make men not to love God, of whom men so easily speak such horrid things. I would suppose the article to mean any thing rather than either of these. But yet one thing more I have to say.

The article is certainly to be expounded according to the analogy of faith, and the express words of Scripture, if there be any, that speak expressly in this matter. Now whereas the article explicating original sin, affirms it to be that fault or corruption of man's nature, 'vitium naturæ,' not 'peccatum,' by which he is far gone from original righteousness, and is inclined to evil: because this is not full enough, the article adds, by way of explanation, "so that the flesh lusteth against the spirit," that is, it really produces a state of evil temptations; it lusteth, that is, actually and habitually; "it lusteth against the spirit, and therefore deserves God's wrath and damnation;" so the article: "Therefore;" for no other reason but because the flesh lusteth against the spirit; not because it can lust, or is 'apta nata' to lust, but because it lusteth actually, 'therefore it deserves damnation:' and this is original sin: or as the article expresses it, 'it hath the nature of sin;' it is the 'fomes,' or matter of sin, and is in the original of mankind, and derived from Adam as our body is; but it deserves not damnation in the highest sense of the word, till the concupiscence be actual. Till then the words of 'wrath and damnation' must be meant in the less and more easy signification, according to the former explication:

and must only relate to the personal sin of Adam. To this sense of the article I heartily subscribe. For besides the reasonableness of the thing, and the very manner of speaking used in the article; it is the very same way of speaking, and exactly the same doctrine, which we find in St. James[z], ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα: 'concupiscence,' when it is impregnated, 'when it hath conceived, then it brings forth sin: and sin when it is in' production, and 'birth, brings forth death.' But in infants, concupiscence is innocent and a virgin; it conceives not, and, therefore, is without sin; and, therefore, without death or damnation. Against these expositions I cannot imagine, what can be really and materially objected.

But, my Lord, I perceive the main outcry is like to be upon the authority of the 'Harmony of Confessions.' Concerning which I shall say this, that, in this article, the Harmony makes as good music as bells ringing backward; and they agree, especially when they come to be explicated and untwisted into their minute and explicit meanings, as much as Lutheran and Calvinist, as Papist and Protestant, as Thomas and Scotus, as Remonstrant and Dordrechtan, that is, as much as *pro* and *con*, or but a very little more. I have not the book with me here in prison, and this neighbourhood cannot supply me, and I dare not trust my memory to give a scheme of it: but your Lordship knows, that in nothing more do the reformed churches disagree, than in this and its appendages; and you are pleased to hint something of it, by saying, that some speak more of this than the church of England: and Andrew Rivet, though unwillingly, yet confesses, "De Confessionibus nostris et earum syntagmate vel Harmonia, etiamsi in non nullis capitibus non planè conveniant, dicam tamen, melius in concordiam redigi posse quàm in ecclesia Romana concordantiam discordantium canonum, quo titulo decretum Gratiani, quod canonistis regulas præfigit, solet insigniri." And what he affirms of the whole collection, is most notorious in the article of original sin. For my own part, I am ready to subscribe the first Helvetian confession, but not the second. So much difference there is in the confessions of the same church.

Now whereas your Lordship adds, that, though they are fallible, yet when they bring evidence of holy writ, their assertions are infallible, and not to be contradicted: I am

[z] Jam. i. 14.

bound to reply, that, when they do so, whether they be infallible or no, I will believe them; because then though they might, yet they are not deceived. But as evidence of holy writ hath been sufficient without their authority, so, without such evidence, their authority is nothing. But then, my Lord, their citing and urging the words of St. Paul[a], is so far from being an evident probation of their article, that nothing is to me a surer argument of their fallibility, than the urging of that, which evidently makes nothing for them, but much against them: as, 1. Affirming expressly that death was the event of Adam's sin; the whole event, for it names no other; temporal death; according to that saying of St. Paul, "In Adam we all die[b]." And, 2. Affirming this process of death to be ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, which is, and ought to be, taken to be the allay or condition of the condemnation. It became a punishment to them only who did sin; but upon them also inflicted for Adam's sake.

A like expression to which is in the Psalms; "They angered him also at the waters of strife, so that he punished Moses for their sakes[c]."—Here was plainly a traduction of evil from the nation to Moses, their relative: for their sakes he was punished, but yet ἐφ' ᾧ Μωσῆς ἥμαρτε, "forasmuch as Moses had sinned:" for so it follows, "because they had provoked his spirit, so that he spake unadvisedly with his lips."—So it is between Adam and us. He sinned, and God was highly displeased. This displeasure went further than upon Adam's sin: for though that only was threatened with death, yet the sins of his children, which were not so threatened, became so punished, and they were by nature heirs of wrath and damnation; that is, for his sake our sins inherited his curse. The curse, that was especially and only threatened to him, we, when we sinned, did inherit for his sake. So that it is not so properly to be called original sin, as an original curse upon our sin.

To this purpose we have also another example of God transmitting the curse from one to another: both were sinners, but one was the original of the curse or punishment. So said the Prophet to the wife of Jeroboam: "He shall give Israel up because of the sins of Jeroboam, who did sin, and who made Israel to sin[d]:" Jeroboam was the root of the sin

[a] Rom. v. 12. [b] 1 Cor. xv. [c] Psalm, cvi. 32, 33. [d] 1 Kings, xiv. 16.

and of the curse. Here it was also (that I may use the words of the Apostle) that "by the sin of one man, *Jeroboam*, sin went out into all *Israel*, and *the curse, captivity, or* death by sin, and so death went upon all men *of Israel*, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, inasmuch as all men *of Israel* have sinned." If these men had not sinned, they had not been punished: I cannot say they had not been afflicted; for David's child was smitten for his father's fault: but though they did sin, yet, unless their root and principal had sinned, possibly they should not have so been punished: for his sake the punishment came. Upon the same account it may be, that we may inherit the damnation or curse for Adam's sake, though we deserve it; yet it being transmitted from Adam, and not particularly threatened to the first posterity, we were his heirs, the heirs of death, deriving from him an original curse, but due also, if God so pleased, to our sins. And this is the full sense of the twelfth verse, and the effect of the phrase ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον.

But your Lordship is pleased to object, that though ἐφ' ᾧ does once signify 'forasmuch as,' yet three times it signifies 'in' or 'by.' To this I would be content to submit; if the observation could be verified, and be material, when it were true. But besides that it is so used in 2 Cor. v. 4. your Lordship may please to see it used (as not only myself, but indeed most men, and particularly the church of England, does read it and expound it) in Matt. xxvi. 50. And yet if ἐφ' ᾧ were written ἐν ᾧ, which is the same with *in* or *by*, if it be rendered word for word, yet ἐν ᾧ twice in the Scripture signifies *forasmuch as*, as you may read Rom. viii. 3. and Heb. ii. 18. So that there are two places besides this in question, and two more 'ex abundanti' to shew, that if it were not ἐφ' ᾧ, but said in words expressly as you would have it in the meaning, yet even so neither the thing, nor any part of the thing, could be evicted against me: and lastly, if it were not only said ἐν ᾧ, but that that sense of it were admitted which is desired, and that it did mean *in* or *by* in this very place: yet the question were not at all the nearer to be concluded against me. For I grant that it is true, "in him we are all sinners," as it is true, that "in him we all die:" that is, for his sake we are used as sinners; being miserable really, but sinners in account and effect: as I have largely

discoursed in my book. But then for the place here in question, it is so certain that it signifies the same thing (as our church reads it) that it is not sense without it, but a violent breach of the period without precedent or reason. And after all; I have looked upon those places where ἐφ' ὧ is said to signify *in* or *by;* and in one of them I find it so, Matt. ii. 4. but in Acts iii. 16. and Phil. i. 3. I find it not at all in any sense: but ἐπὶ indeed is used for *in* or *by*, in that of the Acts; and in the other it signifies *at* or *upon;* but if all were granted that is pretended to, it no way prejudices my cause, as I have already proved.

Next to these your Lordship seems a little more zealous and decretory in the question, upon the confidence of verses 17, 18, and 19, of the fifth chapter to the Romans. The sum of which, as your Lordship most ingeniously sums it up, is this. "As, by one, many were made sinners; so, by one, many were made righteous; that by Adam, this by Christ. But by Christ we are made δίκαιοι, 'just,' not by imputation only, but effectively and to real purposes; therefore, by Adam, we are really made sinners." And this your Lordship confirms by the observation of the sense of two words here used by the Apostle. The first is κατάκριμα, which signifies a 'sentence of guilt,' or 'punishment for sin;' and this sin to be theirs, upon whom the condemnation comes, because God punishes none but for their own sin (Ezek. xviii. 2.):—From the word δίκαιοι, 'clear from sin,' so your Lordship renders it: and in opposition to this, ἁμαρτωλοὶ is to be rendered, that is, 'guilty, criminal persons,' really and properly. —This is all which the wit of man can say from this place of St. Paul; and if I make it appear, that this is invalid, I hope, I am secure.

To this then I answer: that the antithesis in these words here urged (for there is another in the chapter), and this whole argument of St. Paul, are full and entire without descending to minutes. Death came in by one man; much more shall life come by one man; if that by Adam,—then much more this by Christ: by him to condemnation, by this man to justification. This is enough to verify the argument of St. Paul, though life and death did not come in the same manner to the several relatives; as indeed they did not: of which afterward. But for the present, it runs thus: 'By Adam

we were made sinners; by Christ, we are made righteous: as certainly one as the other, though not in the same manner of dispensation. By Adam θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε, 'death reigned;' by this man, the reign of death shall be destroyed, and life set up instead of it; by him we were used as sinners, for in him we died: but by Christ we are justified, that is, used as just persons, for by him we live.'—This is sufficient for the Apostle's argument; and yet no necessity to affirm that we are sinners in Adam any more than by imputation: for we are by Christ made just no otherwise than by imputation.

In the proof or persuasion I will use no indirect arguments, as to say, that to deny us to be just by imputation, is the doctrine of the church of Rome and of the Socinian conventicles, but expressly disliked by all the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Zuinglian churches, and particularly by the church of England; and indeed by the whole Harmony of Confessions: this, I say, I will not make use of; not only because I myself do not love to be pressed by such prejudices rather than arguments; but because the question of the imputation of righteousness is very much mistaken and misunderstood on all hands. They that say that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us for justification, do it upon this account,—because they know all that we do is imperfect, therefore they think themselves constrained to fly to Christ's righteousness, and think it must be imputed to us, or we perish. The other side, considering that this way would destroy the necessity of holy living; and that in order to our justification, there were conditions required on our parts, think it necessary to say, that we are justified by inherent righteousness. Between these the truth is plain enough to be read. Thus:

Christ's righteousness is not imputed to us for justification directly and immediately; neither can we be justified by our own righteousness: but our faith and sincere endeavours are, through Christ, accepted instead of legal righteousness: that is, we are justified through Christ, by imputation, not of Christ's, nor our own righteousness; but of our faith and endeavours of righteousness, as if they were perfect: and we are justified by a non-imputation, viz. of our past sins, and present unavoidable imperfections: that is, we are handled, as if we were just persons and no sinners. So faith was imputed to Abraham for righteousness; not that it made

him so, legally, but evangelically, that is, by grace and imputation.

And indeed, my Lord, that I may speak freely in this great question: when one man hath sinned, his descendants and relatives cannot possibly, by him, or for him, or in him, be made sinners properly and really. For in sin there are but two things imaginable: the irregular action,—and the guilt, or obligation to punishment. Now we cannot, in any sense, be said to have done the action which another did, and not we: the action is as individual as the person; and Titius may as well be Caius, and the son be his own father, as he can be said to have done the father's action; and, therefore, we cannot possibly be guilty of it: for guilt is an obligation to punishment for having done it: the action and the guilt are relatives; one cannot be without the other: something must be done inwardly or outwardly, or there can be no guilt. But then for the evil of punishment, that may pass further than the action. If it passes upon the innocent, it is not a punishment to them, but an evil inflicted by right of dominion; but yet, by reason of the relation of the afflicted to him that sinned, to him it is a punishment. But if it passes upon others that are not innocent, then it is a punishment to both; to the first principally; to the descendants or relatives, for the other's sake; his sin being imputed so far.

How far that is in the present case, and what it is, the Apostle expresses thus: it was ἀρὰ εἰς κατάκριμα; (verse 18.) or κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα, (verse 16.) 'a curse unto condemnation,' or 'a judgment unto condemnation;' that is, a curse inherited from the principal; deserved by him, and yet also actually descending upon us, after we had sinned, ἀρὰ or κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα; that is, the judgment passed upon Adam; the ἀρὰ or κρίμα was on him; but it proved to be a κατάκριμα, or a thorough condemnation, when from him it passed upon all men, that sinned. Κρίμα and κατάκριμα sometimes differ in degrees: so the words are used by St. Paul otherwhere; (1 Cor. xi. 32.) κρινόμενοι ἵνα μὴ καταριθῶμεν; a judgment to prevent a punishment, or a less to forestall a greater, in the same kind: so here the ἀρὰ passed further; the κρίμα was fulfilled in his posterity passing on further, viz. that all who sinned, should pass under the power of death as well as

he: but this became formally and actually a punishment to them only, who did sin personally: to them it was *κατάκριμα*.

This *ἀρὰ* or *κρίμα*, is the *βασίλεια τοῦ θανάτου*, (verse 17.) 'the reign of death;' this is called *βασίλεια τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*, (verse 21.) 'the reign of sin in death:' that is, the effect which Adam's sin had, was only to bring in the reign of death, which is already broken by Jesus Christ, and, at last, shall be quite destroyed. But to say, that sin here is properly transmitted to us from Adam, formally, and so as to be inherent in us, is to say, that we were made to do his action; which is a perfect contradiction.

Now then your Lordship sees, that what you note of the meaning of *κατάκριμα* I admit, and is indeed true enough, and agreeable to the discourse of the Apostle, and very much in justification of what I taught. *Κατάκριμα* signifies a punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs, upon whom the condemnation comes. I easily subscribe to it: but then take in the words of St. Paul, *δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος*, 'by one sin,' or 'by the sin of one,' the curse passed upon all men unto condemnation; that is, the curse descended from Adam; for his sake it was propagated *εἰς κατάκριμα* to a real condemnation, viz. when they should sin. For though this *ἀρὰ* or 'the curse' of death was threatened only to Adam, yet, upon God's being angry with him, God resolved it should descend: and if men did sin as Adam, or if they did sin at all, though less than Adam, yet the *ἀρὰ* or 'the curse' threatened to him should pass, *εἰς κατάκριμα*, 'unto the same actual condemnation,' which fell upon him; that is, it should actually bring them under the reign of death.

But then, my Lord, I beseech you let it be considered, if this *κατάκριμα* must suppose a punishment for sin, for the sin of him, his own sin that is so condemned, as your Lordship proves perfectly out of Ezek. xviii. how can it be just, that the *κατάκριμα* 'condemnation' should pass upon us for Adam's sin, that is, not for his own sin who is so condemned, but for the sin of another? St. Paul easily resolves the doubt, if there had been any. The *κατάκριμα*, the reign of death, passed upon all men, *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, 'inasmuch as all men have sinned.'—And now why shall we suppose, that we must be guilty of what we did not, when, without any such *φαινόμενον*, there is so much guilt of what we did really and per-

sonally? Why shall it be, that we die only for Adam's sin, and not rather as St. Paul expressly affirms, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, 'inasmuch as all men have sinned,' since, by your own argument, it cannot be 'inasmuch as all men have not sinned;' this you say cannot be, and yet you will not confess this which can be, and which St. Paul affirms to have been indeed: as if it were not more just and reasonable to say, that, from Adam, the curse descended unto the condemnation of the sins of the world;—than to say, the curse descended without consideration of their sins; but a sin must be imagined to make it seem reasonable and just to condemn us. Now I submit it to the judgment of all the world, which way of arguing is most reasonable and concluding: you, my Lord, in behalf of others, argue thus:—Κατάκριμα or 'condemnation' cannot pass upon a man for any sin but his own: therefore, every man is truly guilty of Adam's sin, and that becomes his own. Against this I oppose mine:—Κατάκριμα or 'condemnation' cannot pass upon a man for any sin but his own: therefore it did not pass upon man for Adam's sin; because Adam's sin was Adam's, not our own: but we all have sinned, we have sins of our own; therefore, for these the curse passed from Adam to us. To back mine, besides that common notices of sense and reason defend it, I have the plain words of St. Paul; "Death passed upon all men, forasmuch as all men have sinned;" all men, that is, the generality of mankind, all that lived till they could sin; the others that died before, died in their nature, not in their sin, neither Adam's nor their own, save only that Adam brought it in upon them, or rather left it to them, himself being disrobed of all that, which could hinder it.

Now for the word δίκαιοι, which your Lordship renders 'clear from sin,' I am sure no man is so justified in this world, as to be clear from sin; and if we all be sinners, and yet healed as just persons, it is certain, we are just by imputation only; that is, Christ imputing our faith, and sincere, though not unerring obedience to us for righteousness: and then the antithesis must hold thus; 'By Christ comes justification to life, as by Adam came the curse or the sin to the condemnation of death: but our justification, which comes by Christ, is by imputation and acceptilation, by grace and favour: not that we are made really, that is, legally and perfectly righte-

ous, but by imputation of faith and obedience to us, as if it were perfect: and therefore Adam's sin was but by imputation only to certain purposes; not real, or proper, not formal or inherent. For the grace by Christ is more than the sin by Adam: if therefore that was not legal and proper, but evangelical and gracious, favourable and imputative, much more is the sin of Adam in us improperly, and by imputation.' And truly, my Lord, I think that no sound divine, of any of our churches, will say, that we are δικαιωθέντες or δίκαιοι in any other sense: not that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us without any inherent graces in us; but that our imperfect services, our true faith and sincere endeavours of obedience, are imputed to us for righteousness through Jesus Christ: and since it is certainly so, I am sure the antithesis between Christ and Adam can never be salved by making us sinners really by Adam, and yet just or righteous by Christ, only in acceptation and imputation. For then sin should abound more than grace; expressly against the honour of our blessed Saviour, the glory of our redemption, and the words of St. Paul. But rather on the contrary is it true, that though by Christ we were really and legally made perfectly righteous, it follows not, that we were made sinners by Adam, in the same manner and measure: for this similitude of St. Paul ought not to extend to an equality in all things; but still the advantage and prerogative, the abundance and the excess, must be on the part of grace: for, "if sin does abound, grace does much more abound;" and we do more partake of righteousness by Christ, than of sin by Adam. Christ and Adam are the several fountains of emanation, and are compared 'æque,' but not 'æqualiter.' Therefore this argument holds redundantly, since by Christ we are not made legally righteous, but by imputation only; much less are we made sinners by Adam. This, in my sense, is so infinitely far from being an objection, that it perfectly demonstrates the main question; and for my part, I mean to rely upon it.

As for that which your Lordship adds out of Rom. v. 19. that ἁμαρτωλοὶ signifies 'sinners,' not by imitation, as the Pelagians dream, but sinners really and effectively; I shall not need to make any other reply; but that, 1. I do not approve of that gloss of the Pelagians, that in Adam we are

made sinners by imitation; and much less of that which affirms, we are made so properly and formally. But 'made sinners' signifies, used like sinners; so as 'justified' signifies, healed like just persons: in which interpretation I follow St. Paul, not the Pelagians; they, who are on the other side of the question, follow neither. And unless men take in their opinion before they read; and resolve not to understand St. Paul in this Epistle, I wonder why they should fancy that all that he says, sounds that way, which they commonly dream of: but as men fancy, so the bells will ring. But I know your Lordship's grave and wiser judgment sees not only this that I have now opened, but much beyond it; and that you will be a zealous advocate for the truth of God, and for the honour of his justice, wisdom, and mercy.

That which follows, makes me believe your Lordship resolved to try me, by speaking your own sense in the line, and your temptation in the interline. For when your Lordship had said that, "My arguments for the vindication of God's goodness and justice are sound and holy," your hand run it over again, and added "as abstracted from the case of original sin." But why should this be abstracted from all the whole economy of God, from all his other dispensations? Is it, in all cases of the world, unjust for God, to impute our fathers' sins to us unto eternal condemnation; and is it otherwise in this only? Certainly a man would think this were the more favourable case; as being a single act, done but once, repented of after it was done, not consented to by the parties interested, not stipulated by God that it should be so, and being against all laws and all the reason of the world: therefore it were but reason that, if any where, here much rather, God's justice and goodness should be relied upon as the measure of the event. And if, in other cases, laws be never given to idiots and infants and persons incapable, why should they be given here? But if they were not capable of a law, then neither could they be of sin; for where there is no law, there is no transgression. And is it unjust to condemn one man to hell for all the sin of a thousand of his ancestors actually done by them? And shall it be accounted just to damn all the world for one sin of one man? But if it be said, that it is unjust to damn the innocent for the sin of another; but the world is not innocent, but really guilty in

Adam;—besides that this is a begging of the question, it is also against common sense, to say that a man is not innocent of that, which was done, before he had a being; for if that be not sufficient, then it is impossible for a man to be innocent. And if this way of answer be admitted, any man may be damned for the sin of any father; because it may be said here as well as there, that although the innocent must not perish for another's fault, yet the son is not innocent as being in his father's loins when the fault was committed, and the law calls him and makes him guilty. And if it were so indeed, this were so far from being an excuse, to say that the law makes him guilty, that this were absolute tyranny, and the thing that were to be complained of.

I hope, by this time, your Lordship perceives, that I have no reason to fear that I prevaricate St. Paul's rule: Μὴ ὑπερφρονεῖν παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν. I only endeavour to understand St. Paul's words, and I read them, κατ' ἀναλογίαν πίστεως, in proportion to, and so as they may not intrench upon, the reputation of God's goodness and justice: that is φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν, 'to be wise unto sobriety.' But they that do so δουλεύειν ὑποθέσει, as to resolve it to be so, whether God be honoured in it, or dishonoured, and to answer all arguments, whether they can or cannot be answered, and to efform all their theology to the air of that one great proposition, and to find out ways for God to proceed in, which he hath never told of, ὁδοὶ ἄβατοι, ways that are crooked and not to be insisted in, ways that are not right, if these men do not ὑπερφρονεῖν παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν, then I hope I shall have less need to fear that I do, who do none of these things.

And in proportion to my security here, I am confident that I am unconcerned in the consequent threatening. If any man shall evangelize παρ' ὃ παρελάβετε, 'any other doctrine than what ye have received,' something for gospel which is not gospel, something that ye have not received,—let him be accursed. My Lord, if what I teach were not that which we have received, that God is just, and righteous, and true: that the soul that sins, the same shall die: that we shall have no cause to say, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge:" that God is a gracious Father, pardoning iniquity, and therefore not exacting it where it is not: that infants are, from their mothers' wombs, beloved

of God their Father: that of such is the kingdom of God: that he pities those souls, who cannot discern the right hand from the left, as he declared in the case of the Ninevites: that to infants there are special angels appointed, who always behold the face of God: that Christ took them in his arms and blessed them, and therefore they are not hated by God, and accursed heirs of hell, and coheirs with Satan: that the Messias was promised, before any children were born; as certainly as that Adam sinned, before they were born: that if sin abounds, grace does superabound; and therefore, children are, with greater effect, involved in the grace than they could be in the sin: and the sin must be gone, before it could do them mischief:—if this were not the doctrine of both Testaments, and if the contrary were, then the threatening of St. Paul might well be held up against me: but else, my Lord, to shew such a scorpion to him, that speaks the truth of God in sincerity and humility, though it cannot make me to betray the truth and the honour of God, yet the very fear and affrightment, which must needs seize upon every good man that does but behold it, or hear the words of that angry voice, shall and hath made me to pray not only that myself be preserved in truth, but that it would please God to bring into the way of truth all such, as have erred and are deceived.

My Lord, I humbly thank your Lordship for your grave and pious counsel, and kiss the hand that reaches forth so paternal a rod. I see you are tender both of truth and me: and though I have not made this tedious reply to cause trouble to your Lordship, or to steal from you any part of your precious time, yet because I see your Lordship was persuaded 'induere personam,' to give some little countenance to a popular error out of jealousy against a less usual truth, I thought it my duty to represent to your Lordship such things, by which as I can, so I ought to be, defended against captious objectors. It is hard, when men will not be patient of truth, because another man offers it to them, and they did not first take it in; or, if they did, were not pleased to own it.

But from your Lordship I expect, and am sure to find, the effects of your piety, wisdom, and learning; and that an error, for being popular, shall not prevail against so necessary, though unobserved truth. A necessary truth I call it;

because without this, I do not understand how we can declare God's righteousness and justify him, with whom unrighteousness cannot dwell: but, if men, of a contrary opinion, can reconcile their usual doctrines of original sin with God's justice, and goodness, and truth, I shall be well pleased with it, and think better of their doctrine than now I can.

But until that be done, it were well, my Lord, if men would not trouble themselves or the church with impertinent contradictions; but patiently give leave to have truth advanced, and God justified in his sayings and in his judgments, and the church improved, and all errors confuted, that what did so prosperously begin the Reformation, may be admitted to bring it to perfection, that men may no longer go 'quà itur,' but 'quà eundum est'

THE

BISHOP OF ROCHESTER'S LETTER

TO

DR. TAYLOR:

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF

THE PARTICULARS THERE GIVEN IN CHARGE.

WORTHY SIR,

LET me request you to weigh that of St. Paul, Ephes. ii. 5. which are urged by some ancients: and to remember, how often he calls concupiscence *sin*; whereby it is urged, that although baptism take away the guilt, as concretively redounding to the person,—yet the simple abstracted guilt, as to the nature, remains: for sacraments are administered to persons, not to natures. I confess, I find not the fathers so fully and plainly speaking of original sin, till Pelagius had puddled the stream: but, after this, you may find St. Jerome [d] saying, "In Paradiso, omnes prævaricati sunt in Adamo."—And St. Ambrose [e], "Manifestum est omnes peccasse in Adam, quasi in massâ; ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex eo sumus omnes;" and St. Gregory [f], "Sine culpâ in mundo esse non potest, qui in mundum cum culpâ venit."—But St. Austin is so frequent, so full and clear, in his assertions, that his words and reasons will require your most judicious examinations, and more strict weighing of them; he saith, "Scimus, secundùm Adam, nos primâ nativitate contagium mortis contrahere; nec liberamur à supplicio mortis æternæ, nisi per gratiam renascamur in Christo [g]." "Peccatum à primo homine in omnes homines pertransiit, etenim illud peccatum non in fonte mansit, sed pertransiit [h]; " and "Ubi te invenit? venundatum sub peccato, trahentem peccatum primi hominis, habentem peccatum antequam possis habere arbitrium."—"Si infans unius diei non sit sine peccato, qui proprium habere non potuit, conficitur, ut illud traxerit alienum; de quo Apostolus [i], 'Per unum

[d] In Hos. [e] Rom. i. 5. [f] 39 Hom. in Ezek.
[g] Epist. 107. [h] Id. de Verb. Apost. ser. 4. [i] Rom. v.

hominem peccatum intravit in mundum;' quod qui negat, negat profectò nos esse mortales; quoniam mors est pœna peccati, sequitur, necesse est, pœna peccatum[k]."—Sola gratia redemptos discernit à perditis, quos in unam perditionis massam concreverat, ab origine ducta, communis contagio[l]."—"Concupiscentia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis. Quid potest, aut potuit nasci ex servo, nisi servus? ideo sicut omnis homo ab Adamo est, ita et omnis homo per Adamum servus est peccati[m]."—"Falluntur ergo omnino, qui dicunt mortem solam, non et peccatum transiisse in genus humanum. Prosperus respondet ad articulum Augustino falsò impositum; omnes homines prævaricationis reos, et damnationi obnoxios nasci perituros-que, nisi in Christo renascamur, asserimus[n]."—"Secundum fidem catholicam tenendum est, quod primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros, propter quod etiam pueri, mox nati, deferuntur ad baptismum, ab interiore culpâ abluendi. Contrarium est hæresis Pelag., unde peccatum, quod sic à primo parente derivatur, dicitur originale; sicut peccatum, quod ab animâ derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale[o]."—"Sicut peccatum actuale tribuitur alicui ratione singularis personæ: ita peccatum originale tribuitur ratione naturæ; corpus infectum traducitur, quia persona Adæ infecit naturam, et natura infecit personam. Anima enim inficitur à carne per colligantiam, quum unita carni traxit ad se alterius proprietates[p]." "Peccatum originale per corruptionem carnis, in anima fit: in vase enim dignoscitur vitium esse, quo vinum acescit[q]."

If you take into consideration the covenant made between Almighty God and Adam as relating to his posterity, it may conduce to the satisfaction of those, who urge it for a proof of original sin. Now that the work may prosper under your hands, to the manifestation of God's glory, the edification of the church, and the satisfaction of all good Christians, is the hearty prayer of,

Your Fellow-servant in our most
Blessed Lord Christ Jesu,
JO. ROFFENS.

[k] Id. de Prædestin. et Grat. c. 2. [l] Id. Enchir. c. 9. 29.
[m] Id. de Peccator. Mer. et Remiss. lib. 1. c. 3. [n] Rom. v. [o] Tho. 12. q. 8.
[p] Bonavent. in 1. sent. dist. 31. [q] Lombar. 2. sent. dist. 31.

MY LORD,

I PERCEIVE that you have a great charity to every one of the sons of the church, that your Lordship refuses not to solicit their objections, and to take care that every man be answered, that can make objections against my doctrine; but as your charity makes you refuse no work or labour of love; so shall my duty and obedience make me ready to perform any commandment, that can be relative to so excellent a principle.

I am indeed sorry, your Lordship is thus haunted with objections about the question of original sin; but because you are pleased to hand them to me, I cannot think them so inconsiderable, as, in themselves, they seem; for what your Lordship thinks worthy the reporting from others, I must think are fit to be answered and returned by me.

In your Lordship's of November 10, these things I am to reply to:

"Let me request you to weigh that of St. Paul, Ephes. ii. 5."—The words are these, 'Even when we were dead in sins, (God) hath quickened us together with Christ;' which words I do not at all suppose relate to the matter of original sin, but to the state of heathen sins, habitual idolatries and impurities; in which the world was dead before the great reformation by Christ. And I do not know any expositor of note, that suspects any other sense of it; and the second verse of that chapter makes it so certain and plain, that it is too visible to insist upon it longer. But your Lordship adds further;

"And to remember how often he calls concupiscence *sin*."—I know St. Paul reckons concupiscence to be one of the works of the flesh, and consequently such as excludes from heaven; 'evil concupiscence[r];' concupiscence with something superadded, but certainly that is nothing that is natural; for God made nothing that is evil, and whatsoever is natural and necessary, cannot be mortified; but this may and must, and the Apostle calls upon us to do it; but that this is a superinducing, and an actual or habitual lusting, appears by the following words, 'in which ye also walked

[r] Col. iii. 5.

sometimes when ye lived in them[s],' such a concupiscence as that which is the effect of habitual sins or an estate of sins, of which the Apostle speaks: "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence[t];" that is, so great a state of evil, such strong inclinations and desires to sin, that I grew as captive under it; it introduced a necessity, like those in St. Peter, who had eyes μεστοὺς μοιχαλίδος, 'full of an adulteress:' the women had possessed their eyes, and therefore they were ἀκατάπαυστοι τῆς ἁμαρτίας, 'they could not cease from sin:' because having πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν, 'all concupiscence,' that is, the very spirit of sinful desires, they could relish nothing but the productions of sin, they could fancy nothing but coloquintida and toadstools of the earth. Once more I find St. Paul speaking of concupiscence: "Let every man know to possess his vessel in holiness and honour; not in the lust of concupiscence, as do the Gentiles which know not God[u]." In the 'lust of concupiscence,' that is plainly, in lustfulness and impurity; for it is a Hebraism, where a superlative is usually expressed by the synonymon: as 'lutum cœni;' 'pluvia imbris;' so 'the gall of bitterness,' and the 'iniquity of sins;' 'robur virium;' 'the blackness of darkness,' that is, σκότος ἐξώτερον, 'the outer darkness,' or the greatest darkness: so here 'the lust of concupiscence,' that is, the vilest and basest of it. I know no where else that the Apostle uses the word in any sense. But the like is to be said of the word 'lust,' which the Apostle often uses, for the 'habits produced' or 'the pregnant desires,' but never for the natural principle and affection, when he speaks of sin:

But your Lordship is pleased to add a subtilty in pursuance of your former advices and notices, which, I confess, I shall never understand.

"Although baptism take away the guilt as concretively redounding to the person, yet the simple abstracted guilt, as to the nature, remains; for sacraments are administered to persons, not to natures:"—This I suppose, those persons, from whom your Lordship reports it, intended as an answer to a secret objection. For if concupiscence be a sin, and yet remains after baptism, then what good does baptism effect? But if it be no sin after, then it is no sin before. To this it

[s] Col. iii. 7. [t] Rom. vii. 8. [u] 1 Thess. iv. 5.

is answered as you see: there is a double guilt; a guilt of person, and of nature. That is taken away, this is not: for sacraments are given to persons, not to natures.

But, first, where is there such a distinction set down in Scripture, or in the prime antiquity, or in any moral philosopher? There is no human nature but what is in the persons of men; and though our understanding can make a separate consideration of these, or rather consider a person in a double capacity, in his personal and in his natural, that is, if I am to speak sense, a person may be considered in that, which is proper to him, and in that, which is common to him and others; yet these two considerations cannot make two distinct subjects capable of such different events. I will put it to the trial.

This guilt, that is in nature, what is it? Is it the same thing, that was in the person? that is, is it an obligation to punishment? If it be not, I know not the meaning of the word; and therefore I have nothing to do with it. If it be, then if this guilt or obligation to punishment remains in the nature, after it is taken from the person, then, if this concupiscence deserve damnation, this nature shall be damned, though the person be saved. Let the objectors, my Lord, choose which they will. If it does not deserve damnation, why do they say it does? If it does, then the guilty may suffer what they deserve, but the innocent or the absolved must not; the person then being acquitted, and the nature not acquitted, the nature shall be damned and the person be saved.

But if it be said, That the guilt remains in the nature to certain purposes, but not to all; then I reply, So it does in the person; for it is in the person after baptism, so as to be a perpetual possibility and proneness to sin, and a principle of trouble; and if it be no otherwise in the nature, then this distinction is to no purpose; if it be otherwise in the nature, then it brings damnation to it, when it brings none to the man, and then the former argument must return. But whether it prevail or no, yet I cannot but note, that what is here affirmed is expressly against the words commonly attributed to St. Cyprian, 'de Ablutione Pedum;' "Sic abluit, quos parentalis labes infecerat, ut nec actualis nec originalis macula, post ablutionem illam, ulla sui vestigia derelinquat." How

this, supposing it of baptism, can be reconciled with the guilt remaining in the nature, I confess, I cannot give an account. It is expressly against St. Austin (tom. 9. tract. 41. in Johan. Epist. ad Ocean.) saying, "Deleta est tota iniquitas:" expressly against St. Jerome; "Quomodo justificati sumus et sanctificati, si peccatum aliquid in nobis relinquitur?"

But again, my Lord, I did suppose, that concupiscence or original sin had been founded in nature, and had not been a personal but a natural evil. I am sure, so the article of our church affirms; "it is the fault and corruption of our nature." And so St. Bonaventure affirms in the words, cited by your Lordship in your letter; "Sicut peccatum actuale tribuitur alicui, ratione singularis personæ: ita peccatum originis tribuitur, ratione naturæ." Either then the sacrament must have effect upon our nature, to purify that which is vitiated by concupiscence, or else it does no good at all. For if the guilt or sin be founded in the nature, as the article affirms, and baptism does not take off the guilt from the nature,—then it does nothing.

Now since your Lordship is pleased, in the behalf of the objectors, so warily to avoid what they thought pressing, I will take leave to use the advantages it ministers; for so the serpent teaches us where to strike him, by his so warily and guiltily defending his head. I therefore argue thus:

Either baptism does not take off the guilt of original sin, or else there may be punishment, where there is no guilt, or else natural death was not it which God threatened as the punishment of Adam's fact. For it is certain, that all men die, as well after baptism, as before; and more after, than before. That which would be properly the consequent of this dilemma, is this, that when God threatened death to Adam, saying, "On the day thou eatest of the tree, thou shalt die the death," he inflicted, and intended to inflict, the evils of a troublesome mortal life. For Adam did not die that day, but Adam began to be miserable that day, to live upon hard labour, to eat fruits from an accursed field, till he should return to the earth whence he was taken [x]. So that death, in the common sense of the word, was to be the end of his labour, not so much the punishment of the sin. For it is probable, he should have gone off from the scene of

[x] Gen. iii. 17—19.

this world to a better, though he had not sinned; but if he had not sinned, he should not be so afflicted, and he should not have died daily till he had died finally, that is, till he had 'returned to his dust whence he was taken,' and whither he would naturally have gone: and it is no new thing in Scripture, that miseries and infelicities should be called 'dying' or 'death[y].' But I only note this as probable; as not being willing to admit what the Socinians answer in this argument; who affirm, that God, threatening death to the sin of Adam, meant 'death eternal:' which is certainly not true; as we learn from the words of the Apostle, saying, "In Adam we all die;" which is not true of death eternal, but it is true of the miseries and calamities of mankind, and it is true of temporal death in the sense now explicated, and in that which is commonly received.

But I add also this problem. That which would have been, had there been no sin, and that which remains, when the sin or guiltiness is gone, is not properly the punishment of the sin. But dissolution of the soul and body should have been, if Adam had not sinned; for the world would have been too little to have entertained those myriads of men, which must, in all reason, have been born from that blessing of 'Increase and multiply,' which was given at the first creation; and to have confined mankind to the pleasures of this world, in case he had not fallen, would have been a punishment of his innocence; but however, it might have been, though God had not been angry, and shall still be, even when the sin is taken off. The proper consequent of this will be, that when the Apostle says, 'Death came in by sin,' and that 'Death is the wages of sin,' he primarily and literally means the solemnities, and causes, and infelicities, and untimeliness, of temporal death, and not merely the dissolution,—which is directly no evil, but an inlet to a better state. But I insist not on this, but offer it to the consideration of inquisitive and modest persons.

And now, that I may return thither, from whence this objection brought me; I consider, that if any should urge this argument to me:

Baptism delivers from original sin:—

[y] Exod. x. 17. 1. Cor. xv. 31. 2 Cor. i. 10. iv. 10—12. xi. 23.

Baptism does not deliver from concupiscence; therefore concupiscence is not original sin.

I did not know well what to answer; I could possibly say something to satisfy the boys and young men at a public disputation, but not to satisfy myself, when I am upon my knees, and giving an account to God of all my secret and hearty persuasions. But I consider, that by 'concupiscence' must be meant either the first inclinations to their object; or the proper acts of election, which are the second acts of concupiscence. If the first inclinations be meant, then certainly that cannot be a sin, which is natural, and which is necessary. For I consider that concupiscence and natural desires are like hunger; which, while it is natural and necessary, is not for the destruction but conservation of man: when it goes beyond the limits of nature, it is violent and a disease; and so is concupiscence; but desires, or lustings, when they are taken for the natural propensity to their proper object, are so far from being a sin, that they are the instruments of felicity for this duration; and when they grow towards being irregular, they may, if we please, grow instruments of felicity in order to the other duration, because they may serve a virtue by being restrained; and to desire that to which all men tend naturally, is no more a sin, than to desire to be happy is a sin: 'desire' is no more a sin than 'joy' or 'sorrow' is: neither can it be fancied, why one passion more than another can be, in its whole nature, criminal: either all or none are so; when any of them grows irregular or inordinate, joy is as bad as desire, and fear as bad as either.

But if, by concupiscence, we mean the second acts of it, that is, avoidable consentings, and deliberate elections,—then let it be as much condemned, as the Apostle and all the church after him hath sentenced it; but then it is not Adam's sin, but our own, by which we are condemned; for it is not his fault, that we choose: if we choose, it is our own; if we choose not, it is no fault. For there is a natural act of the will as well as of the understanding, and in the choice of the supreme good, and in the first apprehension of its proper object, the will is as natural as any other faculty; and the other faculties have degrees of adherence as well as the will: so have the potestative and intellective faculties; they are delighted

in their best objects. But because these only are natural, and the will is natural sometimes, but not always,—there it is, that a difference can be.

For I consider, if the first concupiscence be a sin, original sin (for actual it is not), and that this is properly, personally, and inherently, our sin by traduction,—that is, if our will be necessitated to sin by Adam's fall, as it must needs be, if it can sin when it cannot deliberate,—then there can be no reason told, why it is more a sin to will evil, than to understand it: and how does that, which is moral, differ from that, which is natural? For the understanding is first and primely moved by its object, and in that motion by nothing else but by God, who moves all things: and if that, which hath nothing else to move it but the object, yet is not free; it is strange, that the will can, in any sense, be free, when it is necessitated by wisdom and by power, and by Adam, that is, 'from within' and 'from without,' besides what God and violence do and can do.

But, in this, I have not only Scripture and all the reason of the world on my side, but the complying sentences of the eminent writers of the primitive church; I need not trouble myself with citations of many of them, since Calvin[z] confesses, that St. Austin hath collected their testimonies, and is of their opinion, that concupiscence is not a sin, but an infirmity only. But I will here set down the words of St. Chrysostom[a], because they are very clear; "Ipsæ passiones, in se, peccatum non sunt: effrænata verò ipsarum immoderantia peccatum operata est. Concupiscentia quidem peccatum non est; quando verò egressa modum foras eruperit, tunc demum adulterium fit, non à concupiscentia, sed à nimio et illicito illius luxu."

By the way, I cannot but wonder why men are pleased, wherever they find the word 'concupiscence' in the New Testament, presently to dream of original sin, and make that to be the sum total of it; whereas 'concupiscence,' if it were the product of Adam's fall, is but one small part of it; "et ut, exempli gratia, unam illarum tractem," said St. Chrysostom in the forecited place; concupiscence is but one of the passions, and in the utmost extension of the word, it can be taken but for one half of the passion; for not only all the

[z] Lib. 3. Instit. c. 3. sect. 10. [a] Homil. 13. in Epist. Rom.

passions of the concupiscible faculty can be a principle of sin, but the irascible does more hurt in the world; that is more sensual, this is more devilish. The reason why I note this, is because upon this account it will seem, that concupiscence is no more to be called a sin than anger is; and as St. Paul said, "Be angry but sin not;" so he might have said, "Desire, or lust, but sin not."—For there are some lustings and desires without sin, as well as some angers; and that, which is indifferent to virtue and vice, cannot of itself be a vice; to which I add, that if concupiscence, taken for all desires, be a sin, then so are all the passions of the irascible faculty. Why one more than the other is not to be told; but that anger, in the first motions, is not a sin, appears, because it is not always sinful in the second; a man may be actually angry, and yet really innocent: and so he may be lustful and full of desire, and yet he may be not only that which is good, or he may overcome his desires to that, which is bad. I have now considered what your Lordship received from others, and gave me in charge yourself, concerning concupiscence.

Your next charge is concerning antiquity, intimating, that although the first antiquity is not clearly against me, yet the second is. For thus your Lordship is pleased to write their objection: "I confess, I find not the fathers so fully and plainly speaking of original sin, till Pelagius had puddled the stream; but after this you may find St. Jerome," &c.

That the fathers, of the first four hundred years, did speak plainly and fully of it, is so evident as nothing more; and I appeal to their testimonies, as they are set down in the papers annexed in their proper place; and, therefore, that must needs be one of the little arts, by which some men use to escape from the pressure of that authority, by which, because they would have other men concluded, sometimes upon strict inquiry they find themselves entangled. Original sin, as it is at this day commonly explicated, was not the doctrine of the primitive church; but when "Pelagius had puddled the stream," St. Austin was so angry that he stamped and disturbed it more: and truly, my Lord, I do not think, that the gentlemen, that urged against me St. Austin's opinion, do well consider, that I profess myself to follow those fa-

thers, who were before him; and whom St. Austin did forsake, as I do him, in the question. They may as well press me with his authority in the article of the damnation of infants dying unbaptized, or of absolute predestination. In which article, St. Austin's words are equally urged by the Jansenists and Molinists, by the Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants; and they can serve both; and, therefore, cannot determine me. But then, my Lord, let it be remembered, that they are as much against St. Chrysostom as I am against St. Austin, with this only difference; that St. Chrysostom speaks constantly in the argument, which St. Austin did not,—and particularly in that part of it, which concerns concupiscence. For in the inquiry, whether it be a sin or no; he speaks so variously, that though Calvin complains of him, that he calls it only an 'infirmity,' yet he also brings testimonies from him to prove it to be a 'sin;' and let any man try if he can tie these words together; "Concupiscentia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis[b];" which are the words your Lordship quotes: "Concupiscence is a sin, because it is a disobedience to the empire of the Spirit." But yet in another place; "Illa concupiscentialis inobedientia quanto magis absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis[c]?" It is a sin and it is no sin; it is criminal, but is without fault; it is culpable because it is a disobedience; and yet this disobedience, without actual consent, is not culpable. If I do believe St. Austin, I must disbelieve him; and which part soever I take, I shall be reproved by the same authority. But when the fathers are divided from each other, or themselves, it is indifferent to follow either; but when any of them are divided from reason and Scripture, then it is not indifferent for us to follow them, and neglect these; and yet if these, who object St. Austin's authority to my doctrine, will be content to be subject to all that he says, I am content they shall follow him in this too; provided that they will give me my liberty, because I will not be tied to him that speaks contrary things to himself, and contrary to them that went before him; and though he was a rare person, yet he was as fallible as any of my brethren at this day. He was followed by many igno-

[b] De Peccator. Mer. et Remission. l. 1. c. 3. [c] Lib. 1. de Civit. Dei, cap. 25.

rant ages, and all the world knows by what accidental advantages he acquired a great reputation: but he who made no scruple of deserting all his predecessors, must give us leave, upon the strength of his own reasons, to quit his authority.

All that I shall observe, is this; that the doctrine of original sin, as it is explicated by St. Austin, had two parents; one was the doctrine of the Encratites, and some other heretics, who forbade marriage,—and, supposing it to be evil, thought they were warranted to say, it was the bed of sin, and children the spawn of vipers and sinners. And St. Austin himself, and especially St. Jerome, whom your Lordship cites, speaks some things of marriage, which if they were true, then marriage were highly to be refused, as being the increaser of sin rather than of children,—and a semination in the flesh, and contrary to the Spirit,—and such a thing which, being mingled with sin, produces univocal issues; the mother and the daughter are so like, that they are the worse again. For if a proper inherent sin be effected by chaste marriages, then they are, in this particular, equal to adulterous embraces, and rather to be pardoned than allowed; and if all concupiscence be vicious, then no marriage can be pure. These things, it may be, have not been so much considered; but your Lordship, I know, remembers strange sayings in St. Jerome, in Athenagoras, and in St. Austin, which possibly have been countenanced and maintained at the charge of this opinion. But the other parent of this is the zeal against the Pelagian heresy, which did serve itself by saying too little in this article; and therefore was thought fit to be confuted by saying too much; and that I conjecture right in this affair, I appeal to the words, which I cited out of St. Austin, in the matter of concupiscence; concerning which he speaks the same thing that I do, when he is disengaged; as in his books 'de Civitate Dei:' but in his tractate 'de Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione,' which was written in his heat against the Pelagians, he speaks quite contrary. And whoever shall with observation read his one book of original sin against Pelagius, his two books 'de Nuptiis et Concupiscentia' to Valerius, his three books to Marcellinus, 'de Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione,' his four books to Boniface, 'contra duas epistolas

Pelagianorum,' his six books to Claudius against Julianus, —and shall think himself bound to believe all that this excellent man wrote, will not only find it impossible he should, but will have reason to say, that zeal against an error is not always the best instrument to find out truth. The same complaint hath been made of others; and St. Jerome hath suffered deeply in the infirmity. I shall not therefore trouble your Lordship with giving particular answers to the words of St. Jerome and St. Ambrose, because, besides what I have already said, I do not think, that their words are an argument fit to conclude against so much evidence, nor against a much less than that, which I have, every where, brought in this article,—though indeed their words are capable of a fair interpretation,—and, besides, the words quoted out of St. Ambrose are none of his; and for Aquinas, Lombard, and Bonaventure, your Lordship might as well press me with the opinion of Mr. Calvin, Knox, and Buchanan, with the synod of Dort, or the Scots' Presbyteries: I know they are against me, and therefore I reprove them for it; but it is no disparagement to the truth, that other men are in error. And yet of all the schoolmen, Bonaventure should least have been urged against me, for the proverb's sake: for 'Adam non peccavit in Bonaventura;' Alexander of Hales would often say, that 'Adam never sinned in Bonaventure.' But, it may be, he was not in earnest: no more am I.

The last thing your Lordship gives to me in charge in the behalf of the objectors, is, that "I would take into consideration the covenant made between Almighty God and Adam, as relating to his posterity."

To this I answer, That I know of no such thing; God made a covenant with Adam indeed, and used the right of his dominion over his posterity, and yet did nothing but what was just; but I find in Scripture no mention made of any such covenant, as is dreamt of about the matter of original sin: only the covenant of works God did make with all men till Christ came; but he did never exact it after Adam; but for a covenant that God should make with Adam, that if he stood, all his posterity should be I know not what; and if he fell, they should be in a damnable condition; of this, I say, there is 'nec vola nec vestigium' in Holy Scripture, that ever I could meet with: if there had been any such

covenant, it had been but equity, that, to all the persons interessed, it should have been communicated, and caution given to all, who were to suffer, and abilities given to them to prevent the evil: for else it is not a covenant with them, but a decree concerning them; and it is impossible that there should be a covenant made between two, when one of the parties knows nothing of it.

I will enter no further into this inquiry, but only observe, that though there was no such covenant, yet the event that happened, might, without any such covenant, have justly entered in at many doors. It is one thing to say, that God, by Adam's sin, was moved to a severer intercourse with his posterity,—for that is certainly true; and it is another thing to say, that Adam's sin, of itself, did deserve all the evil, that came actually upon his children; death is the wages of sin; one death for one sin; but not ten thousand millions for one sin; but therefore the Apostle affirms it to have descended on all, "inasmuch as all men have sinned;" but if from a sinning parent a good child descends; the child's innocence will more prevail with God for kindness, than the father's sin shall prevail for trouble. "Non omnia peccata parentum dii in liberos convertunt. Sed si quis de malo nascitur bonus, tanquam bene affecto corpore natus de morboso, is generis pœnâ liberatur, veluti e malitiæ genere in virtutis familiam transcriptus. Qui verò morbo in similitudinem generis refertur vitiosi, ei nimirum convenit, tanquam hæredi, debitas pœnas vitii persolvere," said Plutarch 'de iis, qui serò à numine puniuntur[d].' "God does not always make the fathers' sins descend upon the children. But if a good child is born of a bad father, like a healthful body from an ill-affected one, he is freed from the punishment of his stock, and passes from the house of wickedness into another family. But he who inherits the disease, he also must be heir of the punishment;" "quorum natura complexa est cognatam malitiam, hos justitia similitudinem pravitatis persequens supplicio affecit;" "if they pursue their kindred's wickedness, they shall be pursued by a cognation of judgment."

Other ways there are, by which it may come to pass, that the sins of others may descend upon us. He that is author

[d] Wytienbach. p. 80.

or the persuader, the minister or the helper, the approver or the follower, may derive the sins of others to himself; but then it is not their sins only, but our own too; and it is like a dead taper put to a burning light and held there, this derives light and flames from the other, and yet then hath it of its own, but they dwell together and make one body. These are the ways by which punishment can enter; but there are evils, which are no punishments, and they may come upon more accounts,—by God's dominion,—by natural consequence,—by infection,—by destitution and dereliction,—for the glory of God,—by right of authority,—for the institution or exercise of the sufferers,—or for their more immediate good.

But that, directly and properly, one should be punished for the sins of others, was indeed practised by some commonwealths; "Utilitatis specie, sæpissime in repub. peccari," said Cicero; they do it sometimes for terror; and because their way of preventing evil is very imperfect: and when Pedanius Secundus, the prætor, was killed by a slave, all the family of them was killed in punishment; this was 'vetere ex more,' said Tacitus[f]: for, in the slaughter of Marcellus, the slaves fled for fear of such usage;—it was thus, I say, among the Romans; but 'habuit aliquid iniqui;' and God forbid, we should say such things of the fountain of justice and mercy. But I have done, and will move no more stones, but hereafter carry them as long as I can, rather than make a noise by throwing them down; I shall only add this one thing: I was troubled with an objection lately; for it being propounded to me, why it is to be believed that the sin of Adam could spoil the nature of man, and yet the nature of devils could not be spoiled by their sin, which was worse; I could not well tell what to say, and therefore I held my peace.

[f] Annal. 14. 42. Ruperti, p. 385.

THE

REAL PRESENCE

AND

SPIRITUAL OF CHRIST

IN THE

BLESSED SACRAMENT,

PROVED AGAINST

THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION.

TO THE

RIGHT REVEREND DR. WARNER,

LORD BISHOP OF ROCHESTER.

RIGHT REVEREND FATHER,

I AM, against my resolution and proper disposition, by the overruling power of the Divine Providence, which wisely disposes all things, accidentally engaged in the question of transubstantiation, which hath already so many times passed by the fire and under the saw of contention: that, it might seem, nothing could remain, which had not been already considered, and sifted to the bran. I had been by chance engaged in a conference with a person of another persuasion, the man not unlearned nor unwary, but much more confident than I perceived the strength of his argument could warrant; and yet he had some few of the best, which their schools did furnish out and ordinarily minister to their προσηλυτο-δεκται, their emissaries and ministers of temptation to our people. I then began to consider, whether there were not muchmore in the secret of the question, which might not have persuaded him more fiercely than I could then see cause for, or others at least, from whom, upon the strength of education, he might have de-

rived his confidence; and searching into all the secrets of it, I found infinite reason to reprove the boldness of those men, who, in the sum of affairs and upon examination, will be found to think men damned, if they will not speak nonsense, and disbelieve their eyes and ears, and defy their own reason, and recede from antiquity, and believe them in whatsoever they dream, or list to obtrude upon the world who hath been too long credulous, or it could never have suffered such a proposition to be believed by so many men against all the demonstration in the world. And certainly it is no small matter of wonder, that those men of the Roman church should pretend learning, and yet rest their new articles of faith upon propositions against all learning; that they should engage their scholars to read and believe Aristotle, and yet destroy his philosophy, and reason by their article; that they should think all the world fools but themselves, and yet talk and preach such things, which if men had spoken before this new device arose, they would have been thought mad. But if these men had, by chance or interest, fallen upon the other opinion, which we maintain against them, they would have filled the world with declamations against the impossible propositions and the δόγματα ἀφιλόσοφα of their adversaries; they would have called us dunces, idiots, men without souls, without philosophy, without sense, without reason, without logic, destroyers of the very first notions of mankind. But now that

they are engaged upon the impossible side, they proceed with a prodigious boldness; and seem to wonder, that mankind does not receive from them all their first principles, and credit the wildness and new notions of their cataphysics: for metaphysics it is not. Their affirmatives and negatives are neither natural, nor above, nor besides, nature, but against it in those first principles, which are primely credible. For, that I may use St. Austin's words, "Nemo enim huic evidentiæ contradicet, nisi quem plus defensare delectat quod sentit, quam quid sentiendum sit invenire." But I see it is possible for a man to believe any thing he hath a mind to; and this, to me, seems to have been permitted to reprove the vanity of man's imagination, and the confidence of opinion, to make us humble, apt to learn, inquisitive, and charitable; for if it be possible, for so great a company of men, of all sorts and capacities, to believe such impossible things, and to wonder that others do not 'eandem insaniam insanire,' it will concern the wisest man alive to be inquisitive in the articles of his first persuasion, to be diligent in his search, modest in his sentences, to prejudge no man, to reprove the adversaries with meekness, and a spirit conscious of human weakness, and aptness to be abused. But if we remember that Pere Coton, confessor to Henry the Fourth of France, was wont to say, "that he could do any thing when he had his God in his hand, and his king at his feet," meaning him at

confession, and the other in effigy of the crucifix or in the host, we may well perceive, that they are not such fools but they will consider the advantages that come to their persons and calling, if they can be supposed to make, with pronouncing four words, bread to become God. Upon the reputation of this great thing, the priests were exempt from secular jurisdiction and violence, in the council in Dalmatia held by the legates of Pope Innocent the Third, A. D. 1199. can. 5. Upon this account Pope Urbán the Second, in a council which he held at Rome 1097, against the emperor Henry the Fourth, took from secular princes the investiture of benefices, and advanced the clergy above kings, because "their hands create God their Creator," as Simeon Dunelmensis reports, lib. 2. Chron. apud Vigner. Hist. Eccles. And the same horrible words are used in the famous book called 'Stella Clericorum:' where the priest is called 'the creator of his Creator:' and thence also infers his privilege and immunity from being condemned. I will not, with any envy and reproach, object to them that saying of a Bohemian priest, against which John Huss wrote a book on purpose, that "before the priest said his first mass, he was but the son of God, but afterward, he was the father of God, and the creator of his body:" it was a rude kind of blasphemy, but not much more than that, which their severest men do say, and were never corrected by their expurgatory indices, and is to be seen in Biel

on canon of the mass, lection. 4., and Pere de Bessé in his 'Royal Priesthood,' lib. 1. c. 3. where the priest, upon the stock of his power, is advanced above angels, and the blessed Virgin herself; which is the biggest expression, which they can devise, unless they advance him above God himself. The consequent of this is a double honour, that is, an honour and maintenance in such a manner, as may serve the design of ambition, and fill the belly of covetousness.

This was enough to make them willing to introduce it, and, as to them, the wonder ceases; but it is strange the world could receive it; for though men might be willing to believe a thing, that would make for their profit and reputation, yet that they should entertain it to their prejudice, as the other part must do, that, at so great a price, and with so great a diminution of their rights, they should suffer themselves to be cozened of their reason, is the stranger thing of the two. But to this also there were many concurrent causes; for, 1. This doctrine entered upon the world in the most barbarous, most ignorant, and most vicious ages of the world; for we know, when it began, by what steps and progressions it prevailed, and by what instruments. It began in the ninth age; and in the tenth was suckled with little arguments and imperfect pleadings; in the eleventh it grew up with illusions and pretence of miracles; and was christened and confirmed in the twelfth, and after-

ward lived upon blood, and craft, and violence; but when it was disputed by Pascasius Ratbert, the deacon, in the ninth century, the first collateral device, by which they attempted to set up their fancy, was to devise miracles; which we find done accordingly in the same Pascasius, telling a tale of Plegilus, seeing upon the altar a babe, like that which was pictured in the arms of Simeon: in Joannes Diaconus, telling a story of something in the days of St. Gregory the Great, but never told by any before him, viz. in the year 873, that is two hundred and seventy years after the death of St. Gregory; and extracted from the archives of Rome or Italy out of England, where it seems they could better tell what was so long before done at Rome, by Damianus in the year 1060, who tells two more; by Guitmond writing against Berengarius out of the Vitæ Patrum, by Lanfranck, who served his end upon the report of strange apparitions, and from him Alexander of Hales also tells a pretty tale. For they then observed, that the common people did not only then believe all reports of miracles, but desired them passionately, and with them would swallow any thing: but how vainly and falsely the world was then abused, we need no greater witness than the learned bishop of the Canaries, Melchior Camus. And yet even one of these authors, though possibly apt enough to credit or report any such fine device, for the promotion of his new opinion, yet it is vehemently suspected, that even the tale, which was reported out of Pas-

casius, was, a long time after his death, thrust in by some monk in a place to which it relates not, and which, without that tale, would be more united and more coherent: and yet if this and the other miracles pretended, had not been illusions or directly fabulous, it had made very much against the present doctrine of the Roman church; for they represent the body in such manner, as by their explications it is not, and it cannot be: they represent it broken, a finger, or a piece of flesh, or bloody, or bleeding, or in the form of an infant; and then, when it is in the species of bread: for if, as they say, Christ's body is present no longer than the form of bread remained, how can it be Christ's body in the miracle, when the species being gone, it is no longer a sacrament? But the dull inventors of miracles in those ages considered nothing of this; the article itself was then gross and rude, and so were the instruments of probation. I noted this, not only to shew at what door so incredible a persuasion entered, but that the zeal of prevailing in it hath so blinded the refiners of it in this age, that they still urge these miracles for proof, when, if they do any thing at all, they reprove the present doctrine.

But, besides this device, they enticed the people forward by institution of the solemn feast of Corpus Christi day, entertained their fancies by solemn and pompous processions, and rewarded their worshippings and attendances on the blessed sacrament, with

indulgences granted by Pope Urban the Fourth, inserted in the Clementines, and enlarged by John the Twenty-second, and Martin the Fifth, and for their worshipping of the consecrated water they had authentic precedents, even the example of Bonaventure's lamb, St. Francis's mule, St. Anthony of Padua's ass; and if these things were not enough to persuade the people to all this matter, they must needs have weak hearts and hard heads; and because they met with opponents at all hands, they proceeded to a more vigorous way of arguing: they armed legions against their adversaries; they confuted, at one time, in the town of Beziers, sixty thousand persons,—and in one battle disputed so prosperously and acutely, that they killed about ten thousand men that were sacramentaries: and this Bellarmine gives as an instance of the marks of his church; this way of arguing was used in almost all the countries of Christendom, till, by crusadoes, massacres and battles, burnings and the constant carnificia, and butchery of the Inquisition, which is the main prop of the Papacy, and does more than 'Tu es Petrus,'—they prevailed far and near; and men durst not oppose the evidence whereby they fought. And now the wonder is out, it is not strange that the article hath been so readily entertained. But in the Greek church it could not prevail, as appears not only in Cyril's book of late, dogmatically affirming the article in our sense, but in the answer

of Cardinal Humbert to Nicetas, who maintained the receiving the holy sacrament does break the fast, which it could not do, if it were not, what it seems, bread and wine, as well as what we believe it to be, the body and blood of Christ.

And now, in prosecution of their strange improbable success, they proceed to persuade all people that they are fools, and do not know the measures of sense, nor understand the words of Scripture, nor can tell when any of the fathers speak affirmatively or negatively; and after many attempts made by divers unsprosperously enough (as the thing did constrain and urge them),—a great wit, Cardinal Perron, hath undertaken the question, and hath spun his thread so fine, and twisted it so intricately, and adorned it so sprucely with language and sophisms, that although he cannot resist the evidence of truth, yet he is too subtile for most men's discerning; and though he hath been contested by potent adversaries, and wise men, in a better cause than his own, yet he will always make his reader believe that he prevails; which puts me in mind of what Thucydides told Archidamus the king of Sparta, asking him, 'whether he or Pericles were the better wrestler?' he told him, that 'when he threw Pericles on his back, he would, with fine words, persuade the people, that he was not down at all, and so he got the better.'—So does he; and is, to all considering men, a great argument of the danger that articles of

religion are in, and consequently men's persuasions, and final interest, when they fall into the hands of a witty man and a sophister, and one who is resolved to prevail by all means. But truth is stronger than wit, and can endure when the other cannot: and I hope it will appear so in this question, which although it is managed by weak hands, that is, by mine, yet to all impartial persons it must be certain and prevailing, upon the stock of its own sincerity, and derivation from God.

And now, Right Reverend, though this question hath so often been disputed, and some things so often said,—yet I was willing to bring it once more upon the stage, hoping to add some clearness to it, by fitting it with a good instrument, and clear conveyance, and representment, by saying something new, and very many which are not generally known, and less generally noted; and I thought there was a present necessity of it, because the emissaries of the church of Rome are busy now to disturb the peace of consciences by troubling the persecuted, and ejecting scruples into the unfortunate, who suspect every thing, and being weary of all, are most ready to change from the present. They have got a trick to ask, Where is our church now? What is become of your articles of your religion? We cannot answer them as they can be answered; for nothing satisfies them, but being prosperous, and that we cannot pretend to, but upon the accounts of the

cross; and so we may indeed "rejoice and be exceeding glad," because we hope that "great is our reward in heaven." But although they are pleased to use an argument, that, like Jonah's gourd or asparagus, is in season only at some times, yet we, according to the nature of truth, inquire after the truth of their religion upon the account of proper and theological objections; our church may be a beloved church and dear to God though she be persecuted, when theirs is in an evil condition by obtruding upon the Christian world articles of religion, against all that which ought to be the instruments of credibility and persuasion, by distorting and abusing the sacraments, by making error to be an art, and that a man must be witty to make himself capable of being abused, by outfacing all sense and reason,—by damning their brethren for not making their understanding servile and sottish,—by burning them they can get, and cursing them that they cannot get,—by doing so much violence to their own reasons,—and forcing themselves to believe, that no man ever spake against their new device,—by making a prodigious error to be necessary to salvation,—as if they were lords of the faith of Christendom.

But these men are grown to that strange triumphal gaiety, upon their joy that the church of England, as they think, is destroyed, that they tread upon her grave, which themselves have digged for her, who lives and pities them; and they wonder,

that any man should speak in her behalf, and suppose men do it out of spite and indignation, and call the duty of her sons, who are by persecution made more confident, pious, and zealous, in defending those truths for which she suffers on all hands, by the name of 'anger,' and suspect it of 'malicious, vile purposes.' I wondered when I saw something of this folly in one, that was her son once, but is run away from her sorrow, and disinherited himself, because she was not able to give him a temporal portion, and thinks he hath found out reasons enough to depart from the miserable. I will not trouble him, or so much as name him, because if his words are as noted as they are public, every good man will scorn them; if they be private, I am not willing to publish his shame, but leave him to consideration and repentance; but for our dear afflicted mother, she is under the portion of a child, in the state of discipline, her government indeed hindered, but her worshippings the same, the articles as true, and those of the church of Rome as false, as ever, of which I hope the following book will be one great instance. But I wish that all tempted persons would consider the illogical deductions, by which these men would impose upon their consciences; if the church of England be destroyed, then transubstantiation is true; which indeed had concluded well, if that article had only pretended false, because the church of England was prosperous. But put the case the Turk should

invade Italy, and set up the Alcoran in St. Peter's church, would it be endured that we should conclude, that Rome was antichristian, because her temporal glory is defaced? The Apostle, in this case, argued otherwise. The church of the Jews was cut off for their sins; 'Be not high-minded, O Gentile, but fear' lest he also cut thee off; it was counsel given to the Romans. But though, blessed be God, our afflictions are great, yet we can and do enjoy the same religion, as the good Christians in the first three hundred years did theirs; we can serve God in our houses, and sometimes in churches; and our faith, which was not built upon temporal foundations, cannot be shaken by the convulsions of war and the changes of state. But they who make our afflictions an objection against us, unless they have a promise that they shall never be afflicted, might do well to remember, that if they ever fall into trouble, they have nothing left to represent or make their condition tolerable; for by pretending religion is destroyed when it is persecuted, they take away all that, which can support their own spirits and sweeten persecution: however, let our church be where it pleases God it shall, it is certain that transubstantiation is an evil doctrine, false and dangerous; and I know not any church in Christendom, which hath any article more impossible, or apt to render the communion dangerous, than this in the church of Rome: and since they command us to

believe all, or will accept none, I hope the just reproof of this one will establish the minds of those who can be tempted to communicate with them in others. I have now given an account of the reasons of my present engagement; and though it may be inquired also, why I presented it to you, I fear I shall not give so perfect an account of it; because those excellent reasons, which invited me to this signification of my gratitude, are such which, although they ought to be made public, yet I know not whether your humility will permit it: for you had rather oblige others than be noted by them. Your predecessor in the see of Rochester, who was almost a cardinal, when he was almost dead, did, publicly, in those evil times, appear against the truth defended in this book,—and yet he was more moderate and better tempered than the rest: but because God hath put the truth into the hearts and mouths of his successors, it is not improper, that to you should be offered the opportunities of owning that, which is the belief and honour of that see, since the religion was reformed. But lest it be thought that this is an excuse, rather than a reason of my address to you, I must crave pardon of your humility, and serve the end of glorification of God in it, by acknowledging publicly that you have assisted my condition by the emanations of that grace, which is the crown of martyrdom: expending the remains of your lessened fortunes, and increasing charity

upon your brethren, who are dear to you, not only by the band of the same ministry, but the fellowship of the same sufferings. But indeed the cause, in which these papers are engaged, is such that it ought to be owned by them, that can best defend it; and since the defence is not with secular arts and aids, but by spiritual; the diminution of your outward circumstances cannot render you a person unfit to patronise this book, because where I fail, your wisdom, learning, and experience, can supply: and therefore, if you will pardon my drawing your name from the privacy of your retirement into a public view, you will singularly oblige, and increase those favours, by which you have already endeared the thankfulness and service of,

Right Reverend,

Your most affectionate

And endeared Servant in the Lord Jesus,

JER. TAYLOR.

THE

REAL PRESENCE,

&c.

SECTION I.

State of the Question.

1. THE tree of knowledge became the tree of death to us; and the tree of life is now become an apple of contention. The holy symbols of the eucharist were intended to be a contesseration, and a union of Christian societies to God, and with one another; and the evil taking it, disunites us from God; and the evil understanding it, divides us from each other. *Οὐκοῦν δεινὸν, εἰ γῆ χρηστὴ μὲν ἁμαρτοῦσ' ὧν χρεὼν αὐτὴν τυχεῖν, κακὸν δίδωσι καρπόν.* And yet if men would but do reason, there were in all religion no article, which might more easily excuse us from meddling with questions about it, than this of the holy sacrament. For as the man in Phædrus, that being asked what he carried hidden under his cloak, answered, it was hidden under his cloak; meaning, that he would not have hidden it, but that he intended it should be secret:—so we may in this mystery to them that curiously ask, what, or how it is? 'Mysterium est;' 'It is a sacrament, and a mystery;' by sensible instruments it consigns spiritual graces; by the creatures it brings us to God; by the body it ministers to the spirit. And that things of this nature are undiscernible secrets, we may learn by the experience of those men, who have, in cases not unlike, vainly laboured to tell us, how the material fire of hell should torment an immaterial soul, and how baptismal water should cleanse the spirit, and how a sacrament should nourish a body, and make it sure of the resurrection.

2. It was happy with Christendom, when she, in this article, retained the same simplicity which she always was bound to do in her manners and intercourse; that is, to believe the

thing heartily, and not to inquire curiously; and there was peace in this article for almost a thousand years together; and yet that transubstantiation was not determined, I hope to make very evident; "In synaxi transubstantiationem serò definivit ecclesia; diù satis erat credere, sive sub pane consecrato, sive quocunque modo adesse verum corpus Christi;" so said the great Erasmus [m]: "It was late before the church defined transubstantiation; for a long time together it did suffice to believe, that the true body of Christ was present, whether under the consecrated bread or any other way:" so the thing was believed, the manner was not stood upon. And it is a famous saying of Durandus [n]; "Verbum audimus, motum sentimus, modum nescimus, præsentiam credimus:" "We hear the word, we perceive the motion, we know not the manner, but we believe the presence:" and Ferus [o], of whom Sixtus Senensis [p] affirms that he was 'vir nobiliter doctus, pius et eruditus,' hath these words: "Cum certum sit ibi esse corpus Christi, quid opus est disputare, num panis substantia maneat, vel non?" "When it is certain that Christ's body is there, what need we dispute whether the substance of bread remain or no?" and therefore Cuthbert Tonstal, bishop of Duresme, would have every one left to his conjecture concerning the manner: "De modo quo id fieret, satius erat curiosum quemque relinquere suæ conjecturæ, sicut liberum fuit ante concilium Lateranum [q]:" 'Before the Lateran council, it was free for every one to opine as they please, and it were better it were so now.'—But St. Cyril [r] would not allow so much liberty; not that he would have the manner determined, but not so much as thought upon. "Firmam fidem mysteriis adhibentes, nunquam in tam sublimibus rebus, illud *quomodo*, aut cogitemus aut proferamus." For if we go about to think it or understand it, we lose our labour. "Quomodo enim id fiat, ne in mente intelligere, nec linguâ dicere possumus, sed silentio et firmâ fide id suscipimus:" "We can perceive the thing by faith, but cannot express it in words, nor understand it with our mind," said St. Bernard [s]. "Oportet igitur (it is at last, after the steps of the former progress, come to be a duty), nos in sumptionibus divinorum mys-

[m] 1 Cor. vii. [n] Neand. Synops. Chron. p. 203. [o] In Matt. xxvi.
[p] Biblioth. Sixt. Senensis, lib. 4. tit. Johannes Ferus.
[q] Tonstal de Eucharist. lib. 1. p. 46. [r] Cyril. in Joh. lib. 4. c. 13.
[s] Epist. 77.

teriorum, indubitatam retinere fidem, et non quærere quo pacto." The sum is this; The manner was defined but very lately: there is no need at all to dispute it; no advantages by it; and therefore it were better it were left at liberty, to every man to think as he please; for so it was in the church for above a thousand years together; and yet it were better, men would not at all trouble themselves concerning it; for it is a thing impossible to be understood; and therefore it is not fit to be inquired after. This was their sense: and I suppose we do, in no sense, prevaricate their so pious and prudent council by saying, 'The presence of Christ is real and spiritual;' because this account does still leave the article in his deepest mystery: not only because spiritual formalities and perfections are undiscernible and incommensurable by natural proportions, and the measures of our usual notices of things, but also because the word 'spiritual' is so general a term, and operations so various and many, by which the Spirit of God brings his purposes to pass, and does his work upon the soul, that we are, in this specific term, very far from limiting the article to a minute and special manner. Our word of 'spiritual presence' is particular in nothing, but that it excludes the corporal and natural manner; we say it is not this, but it is to be understood figuratively, that is, not naturally, but to the purposes and in the manner of the Spirit and spiritual things; which how they operate or are effected, we know no more than we know how a cherub sings or thinks, or by what private conveyances a lost notion returns suddenly into our memory, and stands placed in the eye of reason. Christ is present spiritually, that is, by effect and blessing; which, in true speaking, is rather the consequent of his presence than the formality. For though we are taught and feel *that*, yet *this* we profess we cannot understand; and therefore curiously inquire not. Σαφὴς ἔλεγχος, ἀπιστίας τὸ πῶς περὶ Θεοῦ λέγειν, said Justin Martyr; "It is a manifest argument of infidelity, to inquire, concerning the things of God, *How*, or *After what manner?*" And in this it was, that many of the fathers of the church laid their hands upon their mouths, and revered the mystery, but like the remains of the sacrifice, they burnt it; that is, as themselves expound the allegory, it was to be adored by faith, and not to be discussed with reason: knowing that, as So-

lomon said, " Scrutator majestatis opprimetur à gloria :" " He that pries too far into the majesty, shall be confounded with the glory."

3. So far it was very well; and if error or interest had not unravelled the secret, and looked too far into the sanctuary, where they could see nothing but a cloud of fire, majesty and secrecy indiscriminately mixed together,—we had kneeled before the same altars, and adored the same mystery, and communicated in the same rites, to this day. For, in the thing itself, there is no difference amongst wise and sober persons; nor ever was, till the manner became an article, and declared or supposed to be of the substance of the thing. But now the state of the question is this:

4. The doctrine of the church of England, and generally of the Protestants, in this article, is,—that after the minister of the holy mysteries hath rightly prayed, and blessed or consecrated the bread and the wine, the symbols become changed into the body and blood of Christ, after a sacramental, that is, in a spiritual real manner: so that all that worthily communicate, do by faith receive Christ really, effectually, to all the purposes of his passion: the wicked receive not Christ, but the bare symbols only; but yet to their hurt [t], because the offer of Christ is rejected, and they pollute the blood of the covenant, by using it as an unholy thing. The result of which doctrine is this: It is bread, and it is Christ's body. It is bread in substance, Christ in the sacrament; and Christ is as really given to all that are truly disposed, as the symbols are; each as they can; Christ as Christ can be given; the bread and wine as they can; and to the same real purposes, to which they are designed; and Christ does as really nourish and sanctify the soul, as the elements do the body. It is here, as in the other sacrament; for as there natural water becomes the laver of regeneration; so here, bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ; but, there and here too, the first substance is changed by grace, but remains the same in nature.

5. That this is the doctrine of the church of England, is apparent in the church-catechism; affirming "the inward part or thing signified" by the consecrated bread and wine to be

[t] Dum enim sacramenta violantur, ipse cujus sunt sacramenta violatur. S. Hieron. in 1 Malac.

"the body and blood of Christ, which are verily and indeed taken and received of the faithful in the Lord's supper;" and the benefit of it to be, "the strengthening and refreshing of our souls by the body and blood of Christ, as our bodies are by the bread and wine:" and the same is repeated severally in the exhortation, and in the prayer of the address before the consecration, in the canon of our communion; 'verily and indeed' is 'reipsâ,' that is, 'really enough;' that is our sense of the real presence; and Calvin [u] affirms as much, saying, "In the supper Christ Jesus, viz. his body and blood, is truly given under the signs of bread and wine." And Gregory de Valentia gives this account of the doctrine of the Protestants; that 'although Christ be corporally in heaven, yet is he received of the faithful communicants in this sacrament truly, both spiritually by the mouth of the mind, through a most near conjunction of Christ with the soul of the receiver by faith, and also sacramentally with the bodily mouth,' &c. And, which is the greatest testimony of all, we, who best know our own minds, declare it to be so.

6. Now that the spiritual is also a real presence, and that they are hugely consistent, is easily credible to them, that believe that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are real graces, and a spirit is a proper substance: and τὰ νοητὰ are amongst the Hellenists τὰ ὄντα, 'intelligible things;' or things discerned by the mind of a man, are more truly and really such, and of a more excellent substance and reality, than things only sensible. And therefore, when things spiritual are signified by materials, the thing under the figure is called true, and the material part is opposed to it, as less true or real. The examples of this are not unfrequent in Scripture: "the tabernacle," into which the high-priest entered, was a type or a figure of heaven. Heaven itself is called σκηνὴ ἀληθινὴ, 'the true tabernacle [x];' and yet the other was the material part. And when they are joined together, that is, when a thing is expressed by a figure, ἀληθῆ, 'true,' is spoken of such things, though they are spoken figuratively: "Christ, the true light, that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world [y];" he is also 'the true vine [z],' and 'verè cibus' 'truly or really meat,' and 'panis verus è cœlo,' 'the true [a] bread from

[u] Lib. 4. Inst. c. 7. sect. 32. De Missæ Sacrific. [x] Heb. viii. 2.
[y] 1 John, ii. 8. [z] John, xv. 1. [a] John, vi. 32. 55.

heaven;' and spiritual goods are called "the true riches[b]:" and in the same analogy, the spiritual presence of Christ is the most true, real, and effective; the other can be but the image and shadow of it, something in order to this: for if it were in the sacrament naturally or corporeally, it could be but in order to this spiritual, celestial, and effective presence, as appears beyond exception in this; that the faithful and pious communicants receive the ultimate end of his presence, that is, spiritual blessings; the wicked (who, by the affirmation of the Roman doctors[c], do receive Christ's body and blood in the natural and corporal manner) fall short of that for which this is given, that is, of the blessings and benefits.

7. So that, as St. Paul[d] said, "He is not a Jew, who is one outwardly: neither is that circumcision, which is outwardly, in the flesh: but he is a Jew, which is one inwardly," ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος, and περιτομὴ καρδίας ἐν πνεύματι, that is the real Jew, and "the true circumcision, that which is of the heart, and in the spirit;" and in this sense it is that Nathaniel is said to be ἀληθῶς Ἰσραηλίτης, really and "truly an Israelite[e]:" so we may say of the blessed sacrament, 'Christ is more truly and really present in spiritual presence, than in corporal, in the heavenly effect, than in the natural being;' this, if it were at all, can be but the less perfect; and, therefore, we are, to the most real purposes, and in the proper sense of Scripture, the more real defenders of the real presence of Christ in the sacrament; for the spiritual sense is the most real, and most true, and most agreeable to the analogy and style of Scripture, and right reason, and common manner of speaking. For every degree of excellency is a degree of being, of reality, and truth: and therefore spiritual things, being more excellent than corporal and natural, have the advantage both in truth and reality. And this is fully the sense of the Christians, who use the Egyptian liturgy. "Sanctifica nos, Domine noster, sicut sanctificasti has oblationes propositas; sed fecisti illas *non fictas* (that is for *real*); et quicquid apparet, est mysterium tuum *spirituale* (that is for *spiritual*.") To all which I add the testimony of Bellarmine[f] concerning St. Austin; "Apud Augustinum sæpis-

[b] Luke, xvi. 12. [c] Concil. Trident. sess. 4. sub Julio 3. 1551. can. 8.
[d] Rom. ii. 29. [e] John, i. 47.
[f] Lib. 1. Eucha. c. 14. sect. Respondeo apud.

simè, illud solum dici tale, et verè tale, quod habet effectum suum conjunctum: res enim ex fructu æstimatur: itaque illos dicit verè comedere corpus Christi, qui utiliter comedunt:" "They only truly eat Christ's body, that eat it with effect; for then a thing is really or truly such, when it is not to no purpose; when it hath his effect."—And in his eleventh book 'against Faustus the Manichee,' chap. 7., he shews, that, in Scripture, the words are often so taken, as to signify not the substance, but the quality and effect, of a thing. So when it is said, '*flesh and blood* shall not inherit the kingdom of God," that is, "*corruption* shall not inherit:' and, in the resurrection, our bodies are said to be spiritual, that is, not in substance, but in effect and operation: and in the same manner he often speaks concerning the blessed sacrament; and Clemens Romanus affirms expressly, Τοῦτ' ἔστι πιεῖν τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, τῆς κυριακῆς μεταλαβεῖν ἀφθαρσίας: "This is to drink the blood of Jesus, to partake of the Lord's immortality."

8. This may suffice for the word 'real,' which the English Papists much use, but, as it appears, with less reason than the sons of the church of England: and when the real presence is denied, the word 'real' is taken for 'natural;' and does not signify 'transcendenter,' or, in his just and most proper signification. But the word 'substantialiter' is also used by Protestants in this question: which I suppose may be the same with that which is in the article of Trent; "sacramentaliter præsens Salvator substantiâ suâ nobis adest," "in substance, but after a sacramental manner[g]:" which words if they might be understood in the sense, in which the Protestants use them, that is, really, truly, without fiction or the help of fancy, but 'in rei veritate,' so, as Philo calls spiritual things ἀναγκαιότατα οὐσίαι, 'most necessary, useful, and material substances,' it might become an instrument of a united confession; and this is the manner of speaking which St. Bernard[h] used in his sermon of St. Martin, where he affirms, "In sacramento exhiberi nobis veram carnis substantiam, sed spiritualiter, non carnaliter;" "In the sacrament is given us the true substance of Christ's body or flesh, not carnally, but spiritually;" that is, not to our mouths, but to our hearts; not to be chewed by teeth,

[g] Decretum de SS. Euchar. Sacra. can. 1. [h] Lib. 1. Euchar. c. 2. reg. 3.

but to be eaten by faith. But they mean it otherwise, as I shall demonstrate by and by. In the meantime it is remarkable, that Bellarmine, when he is stating this question, seems to say the same thing, for which he quotes the words of St. Bernard now mentioned; for he says 'that Christ's body is there truly, substantially, really; but not corporally; nay, you may say spiritually:' and now a man would think we had him sure; but his nature is labile and slippery, you are never the nearer for this; for first he says, 'It is not safe to use the word 'spiritually,' nor yet safe to say, he is not there 'corporally,' lest it be understood, not of the manner of his presence, but to the exclusion of the nature.' For he intends not (for all these fine words) that Christ's body is present spiritually, as the word is used in Scripture, and in all common notices of usual speaking; but spiritually, with him, signifies after the manner of spirits,—which, besides that it is a cozening the world in the manner of expression, is also a direct folly and contradiction, that a body should be substantially present, that is, with the nature of a body, naturally,—and yet be not as a body but as a spirit, with that manner of being with which a spirit is distinguished from a body. In vain, therefore, it is, that he denies the carnal manner, and admits a spiritual,—and ever after requires, that we believe a carnal presence, even in the very manner. But this caution and exactness in the use of the word 'spiritual' are, therefore, carefully to be observed, lest the contention of both parties should seem trifling, and to be for nothing. We say that Christ's body is in the sacrament 'really, but spiritually.' They say, it is there 'really, but spiritually.' For so Bellarmine is bold to say, that the word may be allowed in this question. Where now is the difference? Here, by 'spiritually' they mean 'present after the manner of a spirit;' by 'spiritually' we mean, 'present to our spirits only;' that is, so as Christ is not present to any other sense but that of faith or spiritual susception; but their way makes his body to be present no way, but that which is impossible, and implies a contradiction; a body not after the manner of a body, a body like a spirit; a body without a body; and a sacrifice of body and blood without blood: "corpus incorporeum, cruor incruentus." They say, that Christ's body is truly present there, as it was upon the cross, but not after

the manner of all or any body, but after that manner of being as an angel is in a place:—that is their spiritually. But we, by the real spiritual presence of Christ, do understand Christ to be present, as the Spirit of God is present in the hearts of the faithful, by blessing and grace; and this is all which we mean besides the tropical and figurative presence.

9. That which seems of hardest explication is the word 'corporaliter,' which I find that Melancthon used; saying, "Corporaliter quoque communicatione carnis Christi Christum in nobis habitare;" which manner of speaking, I have heard, he avoided, after he had conversed with Œcolampadius, who was able then to teach him, and most men, in that question; but the expression may become warrantable, and consonant to our doctrine; and means no more than 'really' and 'without fiction,' or 'beyond a figure:' like that of St. Paul, "In Christ dwelleth the fulness of the Godhead bodily [i]:" upon which St. Austin says, "In ipso inhabitat plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter, quia in templo habitaverat umbraliter;" and in St. Paul σκία καὶ σῶμα are opposed, "which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ [k];" that is, 'the substance,' 'the reality,' the correlative of the type and figure, the thing signified: and among the Greeks σωματοποιεῖν signifies 'solidare,' 'to make firm, real, and consistent;' but among the fathers, σῶμα, or 'body,' signifies πᾶν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι γενόμενον, 'every thing that is produced from nothing,' saith Phavorinus; that is, every thing that is real 'extra non ens,' that hath a proper being; so that we, receiving Christ in the sacrament 'corporally' or 'bodily,' understand, that we do it really, by the ministry of our bodies receiving him into our souls. And thus we affirm Christ's body to be present in the sacrament: not only in type or figure, but in blessing and real effect; that is, more than in the types of the law; the shadows were of the law, "but the body is of Christ [l]." And besides this; the word 'corporally' may be very well used, when by it is only understood a corporal sign. So St. Cyril of Jerusalem, in his third catechism says, that the "Holy Ghost did descend corporally in the likeness of a dove;" that is, in a type or representment of a dove's body (for so he and many of the ancients did suppose): and so he [m]

[i] Col. ii. 9.
[k] Col. ii. 17.
[l] Col. ii. 17.
[m] Dial. de Incar. Unig.

again uses the word; "Jesus Christ, as a man, did inspire the Holy Spirit corporally into his apostles;" where by 'corporally' it is plain he means 'by a corporal or material sign or symbol,' viz. by "breathing upon them and saying, Receive ye the Holy Ghost." In either of these senses if the word be taken, it may indifferently be used in this question.

10. I have been the more careful to explain the question, and the use of these words according to our meaning in the question, for these two reasons. 1. Because until we are agreed upon the signification of the words, they are equivocal; and by being used on both sides to several purposes, sometime are pretended as instruments of union, but indeed effect it not; but sometimes displease both parties, while each suspects the word in a wrong sense. And this hath with very ill effect been observed in the conferences for composing the difference in this question; particularly that of Poissy, where it was propounded in these words; "Credimus in usu cœnæ Dominicæ verè, reipsâ, substantialiter, seu in substantiâ verum corpus, et sanguinem Christi spirituali et ineffabili modo esse, exhiberi, sumi à fidelibus communicantibus[n]." Beza and Gallasius for the reformed, and Espencæus and Monlucius for the Romanists, undertook to propound it to their parties. But both rejected it: for though the words were not disliked, yet they suspected each other's sense. But now, that I have declared what is meant by us in these words, they are made useful in the explicating the question. 2. But because the words do perfectly declare our sense, and are owned publicly in our doctrine and manner of speaking, it will be in vain to object against us those sayings of the fathers, which use the same expressions: for if by virtue of those words, 'really, substantially, corporally, verily, and indeed, and Christ's body and blood,' the fathers shall be supposed to speak for 'transubstantiation,' they may as well suppose it to be our doctrine too, for we use the same words; and therefore, those authorities must signify nothing against us, unless these words can be proved in them to signify more than our sense of them does import: and by this truth, many, very many of their pretences, are evacuated.

11. One thing more I am to note in order to the same

[n] Eccles. Hist. Eccles. Gallic. lib. 4. p. 604, 605. et Comment. de Statu Relig. et reip. sub. Carolo 9. A. D. 1651. et Thuanum, Hist. lib. 28. ad eundem annum.

purposes; that, in the explication of this question, it is much insisted upon, that it be inquired whether, when we say we believe Christ's body to be 'really' in the sacrament, we mean, "that body, that flesh, that was born of the Virgin Mary," that was crucified, dead and buried? I answer, I know none else that he had, or hath: there is but one body of Christ natural and glorified; but he that says, that body is glorified, which was crucified, says it is the same body, but not after the same manner[o]: and so it is in the sacrament; we eat and drink the body and blood of Christ, that was broken and poured forth; for there is no other body, no other blood, of Christ; but though it is the same which we eat and drink, yet it is in another manner: and therefore, when any of the Protestant divines, or any of the fathers[p], deny that body, which was born of the Virgin Mary, that which was crucified, to be eaten in the sacrament,—as Bertram, as St. Jerome, as[q] Clemens Alexandrinus, expressly affirm; the meaning is easy;—they intend that it is not eaten in a natural sense; and then calling it 'corpus spirituale,' the word 'spiritual' is not a substantial predication, but is an affirmation of the manner, though, in disputation, it be made the predicate of a proposition, and the opposite member of a distinction. 'That body which was crucified, is not that body, that is eaten in the sacrament,'—if the intention of the proposition be to speak of the eating it in the same manner of being; but 'that body which was crucified, the same body we do eat,'—if the intention be to speak of the same thing in several manners of being and operating: and this I noted, that we may not be prejudiced by words, when the notion is certain and easy: and thus far is the sense of our doctrine in this article.

12. On the other side, the church of Rome uses the same words we do, but wholly to other purposes; affirming, 1. That after the words of consecration, on the altar there is no bread; in the chalice there is no wine. 2. That the accidents[r], that is, the colour, the shape, the bigness, the weight, the smell, the nourishing qualities, of bread and wine,

[o] See Bp. Ridley's answer to Curtop's first argument in his disp. at Oxford, Fox Martyrol. p. 1451. vet. edit.

[p] Vide infrà, sect. 12.

[q] Dupliciter verò sanguis Christi et caro intelligitur, spiritualis illa, atque divina, de quâ ipse dixit, Caro mea verè est cibus, &c.; vel caro et sanguis, quæ crucifixa est, et qui militis effusus est lanceâ: in Epist. Ephes. c. 1.

[r] Concil. Trid. decretum de SS. Eucharistiæ Sacram.

do remain; but neither in the bread, nor in the body of Christ, but by themselves, that is, so that there is whiteness, and nothing white; sweetness, and nothing sweet, &c. 3. That in the place of the substance of bread and wine, there is brought the natural body of Christ, and his blood that was shed upon the cross. 4. That the flesh of Christ is eaten by every communicant, good and bad, worthy and unworthy. 5. That this is conveniently, properly, and most aptly, called transubstantiation, that is, a conversion of the whole substance of bread into the substance of Christ's natural body, of the whole substance of the wine into his blood. In the process of which doctrine they oppose 'spiritualiter' to 'sacramentaliter' and 'realiter,' supposing the spiritual manducation, though done in the sacrament by a worthy receiver, not to be sacramental and real[s].

13. So that now the question is not, whether the symbols be changed into Christ's body and blood, or no? For it is granted on all sides: but whether this conversion be sacramental and figurative? Or whether it be natural and bodily? Nor is it, whether Christ be really taken, but whether he be taken in a spiritual, or in a natural manner? We say, the conversion is figurative, mysterious, and sacramental; they say it is proper, natural, and corporal: we affirm, that Christ is really taken by faith, by the Spirit, to all real effects of his passion; they say, he is taken by the mouth, and that the spiritual and the virtual taking him, in virtue or effect, is not sufficient, though done also in the sacrament. 'Hic Rhodus, hic saltus.' This thing I will try by Scripture, by reason, by sense, and by tradition.

SECTION II.

Transubstantiation not warrantable by Scripture.

1. The scriptures pretended for it, are St. John vi. and the words of institution, recorded by three Evangelists, and St. Paul. Concerning which, I shall first lay this prejudice; that, by the confession of the Romanists themselves, men learned and famous in their generations, nor these places,

[s] Can. 8. Anathematis.

not any else in Scripture are sufficient to prove transubstantiation. Cardinal Cajetan affirms, that there is in Scripture nothing of force or necessity to infer transubstantiation out of the words of institution, and that the words, 'seclusâ ecclesiæ auctoritate,' 'setting aside the decree of the church,' are not sufficient. This is reported by Suarez; but he says [t], that the words of Cajetan, by the command of Pius V., were left out of the Roman edition, and he adds that 'Cajetanus solus ex catholicis hoc docuit,' 'he only of their side taught it;' which is carelessly affirmed by the Jesuit; for another cardinal, bishop of Rochester, John Fisher, affirmed the same thing; for, speaking of the words of institution recorded by St. Matthew, he says, "Neque ullum hic verbum positum est, quo probetur in nostrâ missâ, veram fieri carnis et sanguinis Christi præsentiam [u];" "There are no words set down here [viz. in the words of institution] by which it may be proved, that in our mass there is a true presence of the flesh and blood of Christ."—To this I add a third cardinal, Bishop of Cambray, De Aliaco, who though he likes the opinion, because it was then more common, that the substance of bread does not remain after consecration; yet 'ea non sequitur evidenter ex Scripturis,'—'it does not follow evidently from Scripture [x].'

2. To these three cardinals, I add the concurrent testimony of two famous schoolmen; Johannes Duns Scotus, who, for his rare wit and learning, became a father of a scholastical faction in the schools of Rome,—affirms, "Non exstare locum ullum Scripturæ, tam expressum, ut sine ecclesiæ declaratione evidenter cogat transubstantiationem admittere:" "There is no place of Scripture so express, that, without the declaration of the church, it can evidently compel us to admit transubstantiation [y]." And Bellarmine himself says, that it is not altogether improbable, since it is affirmed "à doctissimis et acutissimis hominibus," "by most learned and most acute men [z]." The Bishop of Evreux, who was afterward Cardinal Richelieu, not being well pleased with Scotus in this question, said that Scotus had only considered the tes-

[t] Tom. 3. disp. 46. sect. 3.
[u] Cap. 1. contr. Captiv. Babylon.
[x] In 4. Sent. q. 6. lit. f.
[y] Veritas Eucharistiæ sine Transubstantiatione salvari potest. Scotus in 4. dist. 11. q. 3.
[z] Bellarmin. de Euch. lib. 3. c. 23. sect. secundo dicit.

timonies of the fathers cited by Gratian, Peter Lombard, Aquinas, and the schoolmen before him; suppose that. But these testimonies are not few, and the witty man was as able to understand their opinion by their words as any man since; and therefore we have the income of so many fathers as are cited by the canon law, the Master of the Sentences and his scholars, to be partly a warrant, and none of them to contradict the opinion of Scotus; who neither believed it to be taught evidently in Scripture, nor by the fathers[a].

3. The other schoolman I am to reckon in this account, is Gabriel Biel. "Quomodo ibi sit corpus Christi, an per conversionem alicujus in ipsum, an sine conversione incipiat esse corpus Christi cum pane, manentibus substantiâ et accidentibus panis, non invenitur expressum in canone Bibliæ:" "How the body of Christ is there, whether by conversion of any thing into it, or without conversion it begin to be the body of Christ with the bread, the accidents and the substance of the bread still remaining, is not found expressed in the canon of the Bible[b]."—Hitherto I could add the concurrent testimony of Ocham in '4. q. 6. of Johannes de Bassolis,' who is called 'Doctor Ordinatissimus,' but that so much to the same purpose is needless, and the thing is confessed to be the opinion of many writers of their own party; as appears in Salmeron[c]. And Melchior Camus, bishop of the Canaries, amongst the things not expressed in Scripture, reckons the conversion of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ[d].

4. If it be said,—that the church's determination is a better interpreter of Scripture than they;—it is granted: but did the church ever interpret Scripture to signify transubstantiation, and say, that, by the force of the words of Scripture, it was to be believed? If she did not, then to say she is a better interpreter, is to no purpose; for though the church be a better interpreter than they, yet they did not contradict each other; and their sense might be the sense of the church. But if the church, before their time, had expounded it against their sense, and they not submit to it, how do you reckon them Catholics, and not me? For it is certain if the church, expounding Scripture, did declare it to signify 'tran-

[a] Vide infra, sect. 11. n. 19.
[b] Lect. 40. in can. Missæ.
[c] Tom. 9. tract. 16.
[d] Loc. Com. lib. 3. c. 3. fund. 2.

substantiation,' they did not submit themselves and their writings to the church. But if the church had not in their times done it, and hath done it since, that is another consideration; and we are left to remember, that till Cajetan's time, that is, till Luther's time,—the church had not declared that Scripture did prove transubstantiation; and since that time we know who hath; but not the church catholic.

5. And indeed it had been strange, if the cardinals of Cambray, de Sanctovio, and of Rochester, if Scotus and Biel should never have heard, that the church had declared that the words of Scripture did infer transubstantiation. And it is observable, that all these lived long after the article itself was said to be decreed in the Lateran; where if the article itself was declared, yet it was not declared as from Scripture; or if it was, they did not believe it. But it is a usual device amongst their writers to stifle their reason, or to secure themselves with a submitting to the authority of their church, even against their argument: and if any one speaks a bold truth, he cannot escape the Inquisition, unless he compliment the church, and with a civility tell her that she knows better: which, in plain English, is no otherwise than the fellow, that did penance for saying the priest lay with his wife: he was forced to say, 'Tongue, thou liest,' though he was sure his *eyes* did not lie. And this is that which Scotus said: "Transubstantiation, without the determination of the church, is not evidently inferred from Scripture." This I say is a compliment, and was only to secure the friar from the inquisitors: or else was a direct trifling of his reason: for it contains in it a great error, or a worse danger: for if the article be not contained so in Scripture as that we are bound to believe it by his being there, then the church must make a new article; or it must remain as it was, that is, obscure: and we uncompelled and still at liberty. For she cannot declare, unless it be so: she declares what is, or what is not: if what is not, she declares a lie: if what is, then it is in Scripture before, and then we are compelled, that is, we ought, to have believed it. If it be said it was there, but in itself obscurely; I answer, then so it is still: for it was obscurely there, and not only 'quoad nos,' or by defect on our part, she cannot say it is plain there: neither can she alter it, for if she sees it plain, then it was plain: if it be obscure, then

she sees it obscurely: for she sees it as it is, or else she sees it not at all: and therefore must declare it to be so: that is, probably, obscurely, peradventure, but not evidently, compellingly, necessarily.

6. So that if, according to the casuists, especially of the Jesuits' order, it be lawful to follow the opinion of any one probable doctor; here we have five good men and true, besides Ocham, Bassolis, and Melchior Camus, to acquit us from our search after this question in Scripture. But because this, although it satisfies me, will not satisfy them that follow the decree of Trent; we will try whether this doctrine be to be found in Scripture.—'Pede pes.'—

SECTION III.

Of the Sixth Chapter of St. John's Gospel.

In this chapter, it is earnestly pretended, that our blessed Saviour taught the mystery of transubstantiation; but with some different opinions; for in this question they are divided all the way: some reckon the whole sermon as the proof of it, from verse 33. to 58.; though how to make them friends with Bellarmine I understand not; who says [e], "'Constat,' 'It is known' that the eucharist is not handled in the whole chapter: for Christ there discourses of natural bread: the miracle of the loaves, of faith, and of the incarnation, are a great part of the chapter; 'Solùm igitur quæstio est de illis verbis,—Panis quem ego dabo, caro mea est pro mundi vitâ—et de sequentibus, fere ad finem capitis;'—'The question only is concerning those words, (verse 51.) The bread which I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world,—and so forward almost until the end of the chapter.'" The reason which is pretended for it, is, because Christ speaks in the future, and therefore probably relates to the institution, which was to be next year: but this is a trifle; for the same thing, in effect, is before spoken in the future tense, and by way of promise [f]; "Labour not for the meat that perisheth, but for that meat, that endureth to everlasting life,

[e] Lib. de Euchar. cap. 5. [f] John, vi. 27.

which the Son of man shall give unto you." The same also is affirmed by Christ, under the expression of water, St. John, iv. 14.; "He that drinketh the water, which I shall give him, shall never thirst; but the water which I shall give him, shall be a fountain of water springing up to life eternal." The places are exactly parallel; and yet, as this is not meant of baptism, so neither is the other of the eucharist; but both of them of spiritual sumption of Christ. And both of them being promises to them that shall come to Christ and be united to him, it were strange if they were not expressed in the future; for although they always did signify in present and 'in sensu currenti,' yet because they are of never-failing truth, to express them in the future is most proper, that the expectation of them may appertain to all,

Ad natos natorum et qui nascentur ab illis.

But then, because Christ said, "The bread which I will give, is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world,"—to suppose this must be meant of a corporal manducation of his flesh in the holy sacrament, is as frivolous as if it were said, that nothing that is spoken in the future, can be figurative; and if so, then let it be considered what is meant by these; "To him that overcomes, I will give to eat of the tree of life:" and, "To him that overcomes, I will give to eat of the hidden manna[g]." These promises are future, but certainly figurative; and, therefore, why it may not be so here, and be understood of eating Christ spiritually or by faith, I am certain there is no cause sufficient in this excuse. For if eating Christ by faith be a thing of all times, then it is also of the future; and no difference of time is so apt to express an 'eternal truth' as is the future, which is always in flux and potential signification. But the secret of the thing was this; the arguments against the sacramental sense of these words, drawn from the following verses between this and the fifty-first verse, could not be so well answered; and therefore, Bellarmine found out the trick of confessing all till you come thither, as appears in his answer to the ninth argument: "that of some Catholics[h]." However, as to this article I am to say these things:—

1. That very many of the most learned Romanists affirm, that, in this chapter, Christ does not speak of sacramental or

[g] Rev. ii. 7. 17. [h] Lib. 1. Euch. c. 7. sect. Respondeo Verba.

oral manducation, or of the sacrament at all: Johannes de Ragusio[i], Biel[k], Cusanus[l], Ruard, Tapper[m], Cajetan[n], Hessels[o], Jansenius[p], Waldensis[q], Armachanus[r]:—save only that Bellarmine, going to excuse it, says in effect, that they did not do it very honestly; for he affirms, that they did it, that they might confute the Hussites and the Lutherans about the communion under both kinds: and if it be *so*, and not be *so*, as it may serve a turn, it is *so* for transubstantiation, and it is not *so* for the half-communion, we have but little reason to rely upon their judgment or candour in any exposition of Scripture. But it is no new thing for some sort of men to do so. The heretic Severus, in Anastasius Sinaita, maintained it lawful, and even necessary, δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ἀνακυπτούσας αἱρέσεις τὰ δόγματα Χριστοῦ μεταλλάττειν καὶ μεταῤῥυθμίζεσθαι, "according to occasions and emergent heresies to alter and change the doctrines of Christ:" and the Cardinal of Cusa[s] affirmed it lawful, "diversely to expound the Scriptures according to the times." So that we know what precedents and authorities they can urge for so doing: and I doubt not but it is practised too often, since it was offered to be justified by Dureus against Whitaker.

2. These great clerks had reason to expound it, not to be meant of sacramental manducation, to avoid the unanswerable argument against their half-communion: for so Christ said, "Unless ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." 1. It is therefore as necessary to drink the chalice as to eat the bread, and we perish if we omit either. And their new whimsey of 'concomitancy' will not serve the turn, because there it is 'sanguis effusus,' that is, sacramentally poured forth: 'blood that is poured forth,' not that is in the body. 2. If it were in the body, yet a man, by no concomitancy, can be said to drink what he only eats. 3. If in the sacramental body, Christ gave the blood by concomitancy, then he gave the blood twice; which to what purpose it might be done, is not yet revealed. 4. If the blood be, by concomitancy, in the

[i] De Communione sub utraque specie.
[k] In Canon.
[l] Epist. 7. ad Bohem.
[m] Artic. 15.
[n] Part. 3. q. 80. art. 3.
[o] Lib. de Commun. sub unâ specie.
[p] Concord. Evang. c. 59.
[q] Tom. 2. de Sacram. c. 91.
[r] Lib. 9. c. 8. Ejusdem sententiæ sunt Æneas Sylvius dial. contr. Tabor. Alensis part. 4. q. 11. mem. 2. a. 4. Lindanus, Gaspar Sagerus, et alii.
[s] Epist. 2. ad Bohem. ver. 53.

body, then so is the body with the blood; and then it will be sufficient to drink the chalice without the host, as to eat the host without the chalice; and then we must drink his flesh as well as eat his blood; which if we could suppose to be possible, yet the precept of eating his flesh, and drinking his blood, were not observed by drinking that, which is to be eaten,—and eating that, which is to be drunk. But certainly they are fine propositions which cannot be true, unless we can eat our drink and drink our meat, unless bread be wine and wine be bread, or, to speak in their style, unless the body be the blood, and the blood the body; that is, unless each of the two symbols be the other as much as itself; as much that which it is not, as that which it is. And this thing their own Pope Innocentius the Third [t], and from him Vasques [u], noted, and Salmeron [x],—who affirmed that Christ commanded the manner as well as the thing; and that, without eating and drinking, the precept of Christ is not obeyed.

3. But whatever can come of this, yet upon the account of these words so expounded by some of the fathers concerning oral manducation and potation, they believed themselves bound by the same necessity to give the eucharist to infants, as to give them baptism; and did, for above seven ages together, practise it; and let these men, that will have these words spoken of the eucharist, answer the argument:—Bellarmine is troubled with it, and, instead of answering, increases the difficulty, and concludes firmly against himself, saying, "If the words be understood of eating Christ's body spiritually, or by faith, it will be more impossible to infants; for it is easier to give them 'intinctum panem,' 'bread dipped in the chalice,' than to make them believe [y]." To this I reply, that therefore it is spoken to infants in neither sense, neither is any law at all given to them; and no laws can be understood as obligatory to them in that capacity. But then, although I have answered the argument, because I believe it not to be meant in the sacramental sense to any; nor in the

[t] Lib. 4. de Miss. Myster. c. 21.

[u] In 3. t. 3. dist. 216. n. 50.

[x] Tom. 8. tr. 24.

[y] Clem. Rom. l. 8. c. 20. Constit. Apost. Eccles. Hierarch. cap. ult. Gennadius, cap. 52. de Dogmat. Eccles. cap. de Sabbato Sancto Paschatis. S. Cyprian. Epist. 59. ad Fiduc. Concil. Tolet. 2 c. 11. S. August. Epist. 93. 106. Innocentius Papa, ibid. Paulinus Episc. Nolanus A. D. 353. Epist. 12. ad Severum. Paulinus de Infantibus ait: Pura salutiferis imbuit ora cibis.—Hic mos duravit ad tempora Ludovici Pii, et Lotharii, ait Beat. Rhenan. in Tertul. de Cor. Milit.

spiritual sense to them; yet Bellarmine hath not answered the pressure that lies upon his cause. For since it is certain (and he confesses it[z]) that it is easier, that is, it is possible to give infants the sacrament; it follows, that if here the sacrament be meant, infants are obliged; that is, the church is obliged to minister it, as well as baptism: there being, in virtue of these words, the same necessity, and, in the nature of the thing, the same possibility, of their receiving it. But then, on the other side, no inconvenience can press our interpretation of 'spiritual eating Christ by faith,' because it being naturally impossible that infants should believe, they cannot be concerned in an impossible commandment. So that we can answer St. Austin's and Innocentius's arguments for communicating of infants, but they cannot.

4. If these words be understood of sacramental manducation, then no man can be saved but he that receives the holy sacrament. 1. For "Unless ye eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you;" if it be answered, that the holy sacrament must be eaten in act or desire; I reply, that is not true; because if a catechumen desires baptism only in the article of his death, it is sufficient to salvation, and they dare not deny it. 2. Fools, young persons, they that are surprised with sudden death, cannot be thought to perish for want of the actual susception or desire. 3. There is nothing in the words, that can warrant or excuse the actual omission of the sacrament; and it is a strange deception, that these men suffer by misunderstanding this distinction of receiving the sacrament either in act or desire. For, they are not opposite but subordinate members, and differ only as act and disposition; and this disposition is not at all required, but as it is in order to the act, and therefore is nothing of itself, and is only the imperfection of, or passage to, the act; if therefore the act were not necessary, neither were the disposition; but if the act be necessary, then the desire, which is but the disposition to the act, is not sufficient. As, if it be necessary to go from Oxford to London, then it is necessary that you go to Henley, or Uxbridge; but if it be necessary to be at London, it is not sufficient to go to Uxbridge; but if it be not necessary to be at London, neither is it necessary to go so far. But this distinction, as

[z] Lib. 1. Euchar. c. 7. sect. Respondeo Communem.

it is commonly used, is made to serve ends, and is grown to that inconvenience, that repentance itself is said to be sufficient, if it be only in desire; for so they must, that affirm repentance, in the article of death, after a wicked life, to be sufficient; when it is certain there can be nothing actual but ineffective desires; and all the real and most material events of it cannot be performed, but desired only. But whosoever can be excused from the actual susception of a sacrament, can also, in an equal necessity, be excused from the desire; and no man can be tied to an absolute, irrespective desire of that, which cannot be had: and if it can, the desire alone will not serve the turn. And indeed a desire of a thing, when we know it cannot be had, is a temptation either to impatience, or a scruple; and why, or how can a man be obliged to desire that to be done, which, in all his circumstances, is not necessary it should be done. A preparation of mind to obey in those circumstances, in which it is possible, that is, in which he is obliged, is the duty of every man; but this is not an explicit desire of the actual susception, which, in his case, is not obligatory, because it is impossible; and lastly, such a desire of a thing is wholly needless, because, in the present case, the thing itself is not necessary; therefore neither is the desire; neither did God ever require it but in order to the act. But however if we find by discourse, that for all these decretory words the desire can suffice, I demand by what instrument is that accepted; whether by faith, or no? I suppose it will not be denied. But if it be not denied, then a spiritual manducation can perform the duty of those words: for susception of the sacrament in desire, is at the most but a spiritual manducation. And St. Austin affirms, that baptism can perform the duty of those words, if Beda[a] quotes him right; for in his sermon to infants, and in his third book 'de Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione,' he affirms that, in baptism, infants receive the body of Christ; so that these words may as well be understood of baptism, as of the eucharist, and of faith better than either.

5. The men of Capernaum understood Christ to speak these words of his natural flesh and blood, and were scandalized at it; and Christ reproved their folly, by telling them his words were to be understood in a spiritual sense; so

[a] Beda in 1 Cor. x. citat Augustini serm. ad Infantes.

that if men would believe him, that knew best the sense of his own words, there need be no scruple of the sense; I do not understand these words in a fleshly sense, but in a spiritual, saith Christ: "The flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I have spoken, they are spirit, and they are life[b]." Now, besides that the natural sense of the words hath in it too much of the sense of the offended disciples, the reproof and consultation of it are equally against the Romanists, as against the Capernaites. For we contend it is spiritual; so Christ affirmed it: they that deny the spiritual sense, and affirm the natural, are to remember, that Christ reproved all senses of these words, that were not spiritual. And by the way let me observe, that the expressions of some chief men among the Romanists are so rude and crass, that it will be impossible to excuse them from the understanding the words in the sense of the men of Capernaum; for as they understood Christ to mean his 'true flesh natural and proper,' so do they: as they thought Christ intended they should tear him with their teeth and suck his blood, for which they were offended, so do these men not only think so, but say so, and are not offended. So said Alanus; "Apertissimè loquimur, corpus Christi verè à nobis contrectari, manducari, circumgestari, dentibus teri, sensibiliter sacrificari, non minùs quàm ante consecrationem panis[c]." And they frequently quote those metaphors of St. Chrysostom, which he preaches in the height of his rhetoric, as testimonies of his opinion in the doctrinal part: and Berengarius was forced by Pope Nicolas to recant in those very words, affirming that Christ's body, "sensualiter non solùm sacramento, sed in veritate manibus sacerdotum tractari, frangi, et fidelium dentibus atteri," that "Christ's flesh was sensually not only in the sacrament, but in truth of the thing, to be handled by the priest's hands, to be broken and grinded by the teeth of the faithful:" insomuch that the gloss on the canon 'de Consecratione, dist. 2. cap. Ego Berengarius,' affirms it to be a worse heresy than that of Berengarius, unless it be so soberly understood: to which also Cassander assents:—and indeed I thought that the Romanists had been glad to separate their own opinion from the carnal conceit of the men of Capernaum, and the offended disciples,—supposing it to be a

[b] St. John, vi. 63. [c] Lib. 3. de Euchar. c. 37.

great objection against their doctrine, that it was the same with the men of Capernaum, and is only finer dressed: but I find that Bellarmine owns it, even in them, in their rude circumstances: for he affirms that "Christ corrected them not for supposing so, but reproved them for not believing it to be so[d]." And indeed himself says as much: "Corpus Christi verè ac propriè manducari etiam corpore in eucharistiâ:" "The body of Christ is truly and properly manducated or chewed with the body in the eucharist:"—and to take off the foulness of the expression by avoiding a worse, he is pleased to speak nonsense. "Nam ad rationem manducationis non est mera attritio, sed satis est sumptio et transmissio ab ore ad stomachum per instrumenta humana:" "A thing may be manducated or chewed, though it be not attrite or broken[e]:" if he had said, it might be swallowed and not chewed, he had said true; but to say, it may be chewed without chewing or breaking, is a riddle fit to spring from the miraculous doctrine of transubstantiation: and indeed it is a pretty device, that we take the flesh, and swallow down flesh, and yet manducate or chew no flesh, and yet we swallow down only what we manducate; "Accipite, manducate," were the words in the institution. And indeed, according to this device there were no difference between eating and drinking: and the whale might have been said to have eaten Jonas, when she swallowed him without manducation or breaking him, and yet no man does speak so: but in the description of that accident reckon the whale to be fasting for all that morsel: "Invasusque cibus jejunâ vixit in alvo," said Alcimus Avitus: "Jejuni, plenique tamen vate intemerato," said Sidonius Apollinaris; "Vivente jejunus cibo," so Paulinus: 'The fish was full and fasting,' that is, she swallowed Jonas, but eat nothing. As a man does not eat bullets or quicksilver against the iliack passion, but swallows them, and we do not eat our pills: the Greek physicians therefore call a pill καταπότιον, 'a thing to be swallowed:' and that this is distinct from eating, Aristotle tells us, speaking of the elephant, ἐσθίει τὴν γῆν, καταπίνει τοὺς λίθους, "he eats the earth, but swallows the stones." And Hesychius determined this thing, "non comedet ex eo quis-

[d] Lib. 1. Euchar. cap. 6. sect. 2. ex Dubitatione.
[e] Ibid. cap. 11. Resp. ad 5. arg.

quam, i. e. non dividetur, quia dentium est dividere, et partiri cibos, cum aliter mandi non possint[f]." To chew is but a circumstance of nourishment, but the essence of manducation. But Bellarmine adds, that if you will not allow him to say so, then he grants it in plain terms, that Christ's body is chewed, is attrite or broken with the teeth,—and that not tropically but properly,—which is the crass doctrine, which Christ reproved in the men of Capernaum. To lessen and sweeten this expression he tells us, it is indeed broken; but how? under the species of bread and invisibly; well, so it is, though we see it not: and it matters not under what; if it be broken, and we bound to believe it, then we cannot avoid the being that, which they so detested, 'devourers of man's flesh.' See Theophylact in numb. 51. of this section.

6. Concerning the 'bread' or the 'meat indeed,' of which Christ speaks, he also affirms that "whosoever eats it, hath life abiding in him[g]:" but this is not true of the sacrament; for the wicked eating it, receive to themselves damnation. It cannot therefore be understood of oral manducation, but of spiritual, and of eating Christ by faith: that is, receiving him by an instrument or action evangelical. For receiving Christ by faith includes any way of communicating with his body: by baptism, by holy desires, by obedience, by love, by worthy receiving of the holy sacrament; and it signifies no otherwise, but as if Christ had said, 'To all, that believe in me and obey, I will become the author of life and salvation:' now because this is not done by all that receive the sacrament, not by unworthy communicants, who yet eat the symbols (according to us), and eat Christ's body (according to their doctrine), it is unanswerably certain, that Christ here spake of spiritual manducation, not of sacramental. Bellarmine (he that answers all things whether he can or no) says that words of this nature are conditional; meaning, that he who eats Christ's flesh worthily, shall live for ever: and therefore this effects nothing upon vicious persons, yet it may be meant of the sacrament, because without his proper condition, it is not prevalent. I reply, that it is true it is not, it cannot: and that this condition is spiritual manducation: but then without this condition the man doth not eat Christ's

[f] In Levit. lib. 2. c. 1. [g] John, vi. 54.

flesh, that which himself calls the true bread, for he that eats this, ἔχει, he 'hath' life in him, that is, he is united to me, he is in the state of grace at present. For it ought to be observed, that although promises 'de futuro possibili' are to be understood with a condition appendant: yet propositions, affirmative at present, are declarations of a thing in being, and suppose it actually existent: and the different parts of this observation are observable in the several parts of the fifty-fourth verse. "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life;"—that is an affirmation of a thing in being, and therefore implies no other condition but the connexion of the predicate with the subject; 'He that eats hath life.'—But it follows, καὶ ἐγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν ἐν ἐσχάτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, "and I will raise him up at the last day,"—that is 'de futuro possibili:' and therefore implies a condition besides the affirmation of the antecedent, viz. 'si permanserit,' 'if he remain' in this condition, and does not unravel his first interest and forfeit his life. And so the argument remains unharmed, and is no other than what I learned from St. Austin, "Hujus rei sacramentum," &c. "De mensâ Dominica sumitur quibusdam ad vitam, quibusdam ad exitium: res verò ipsa cujus sacramentum est, omni homini ad vitam, nulli ad exitium, quicunque ejus particeps fuerit[h]." And it is remarkable that the context and design of this place take off this evasion from the adversary: for here Christ opposes this eating of his flesh, to the Israelites' eating of manna, and prefers it infinitely; because they who did eat manna, might die, viz. spiritually and eternally: but they that eat his flesh, shall never die, meaning, they shall not die eternally: and therefore this eating cannot be a thing, which can possibly be done unworthily. For if manna, as it was sacramental, had been eaten worthily, they had not died, who ate it; and what privilege then is in this above manna, save only that the eating of this, supposes the man to do it worthily, and to be a worthy person, which the other did not? Upon which consideration Cajetan[i] says, that this eating is not common to worthily and unworthily, and that it is not spoken of eating the sacrament, but of eating and drinking, that is, communicating with the death of Jesus. The argument therefore lies thus. There is something,

[h] Tract. 26. in Johan. [i] In John, vi.

which Christ hath promised us, which whosoever receives, he receives life and not death; but this is not the sacrament: for of them that communicate, some receive to life, and some to death, saith St. Austin,—and a greater than St. Austin, St. Paul[k]: and yet this, which is life to all that receive it, is Christ's flesh, said Christ himself; therefore Christ's flesh here spoken of, is not sacramental.

7. To warrant the spiritual sense of these words against the natural, it were easy to bring down a traditive interpretation of them by the fathers; at least a great consent. Tertullian[l] hath these words: "Etsi carnem ait nihil prodesse, materiâ dicti dirigendus est sensus. Nam quia durum et intolerabilem existimaverunt sermonem ejus, quasi verè carnem suam illis edendum determinâsset, ut in spiritu disponeret statum salutis, præmisit, 'Spiritus est qui vivificat;' atque ita subjunxit, 'Caro nihil prodest,' ad vivificandum scil:" "Because they thought his saying hard and intolerable, as if he had determined his flesh to be eaten by them, that he might dispose the state of salvation in the Spirit, he premised, 'It is the Spirit that giveth life:' and then subjoins; 'The flesh profiteth nothing,' meaning, nothing to the giving of life."—So that here we have, besides his authority, an excellent argument for us: Christ said, He that eateth my flesh hath life; but the flesh, that is, the fleshly sense of it, profits nothing to life; but the Spirit, that is, the spiritual sense, does; therefore these words are to be understood in a spiritual sense.

8. And because it is here opportune by occasion of this discourse, let me observe this, that the doctrine of transubstantiation is infinitely useless and to no purpose; for by the words of our blessed Lord, by the doctrine of St. Paul, and the sense of the church, and the confession of all sides, the natural eating of Christ's flesh,—if it were there, or could so be eaten, alone, or of itself,—does no good, does not give life; but the spiritual eating of him is the instrument of life to us; and this may be done without the transubstantiated flesh; it may be done in baptism, by faith and charity, by hearing and understanding, and therefore it may also in the blessed eucharist, although there also, according to our doctrine, he be eaten only sacramentally and spiritually. And hence it

[k] 1 Cor. xi. [l] Tertul. de Resur. Carn. c. 37.

is, that, in the mass-book, anciently it is prayed after consecration, "Quæsumus, Omnipotens Deus, ut, de perceptis muneribus gratias exhibentes, beneficia potiora sumamus[m];" "We beseech thee, Almighty God, that we, giving thanks for these gifts received, may receive greater gifts:" which besides that it concludes against the natural presence of Christ's body, (for what greater thing can we receive, if we receive *that?*) it also declares, that the grace and effect of the sacramental communion are the thing designed beyond all corporal sumption: and as it is more fully expressed in another collect[n]; "ut terrenis affectibus expiati ad superni plenitudinem sacramenti, cujus libavimus sancta, tendamus;" "that being redeemed from all earthly affections we may tend to the fulness of the heavenly sacrament, the holy things of which we have now began to taste."—And therefore, to multiply so many miracles and contradictions and impossibilities to no purpose, is an insuperable prejudice against any pretence, less than a plain declaration from God.

9. Add to this, that this bodily presence of Christ's body, 1. is either for corporal nourishment, or for spiritual: not for corporal; for natural food is more proper for it; and to work a miracle to do that, for which so many natural means are already appointed, is to no purpose, and therefore cannot be supposed to be done by God; neither is it done for spiritual nourishment: because to the spiritual nourishment, virtues and graces, the word and the efficacious signs, faith and the inward actions, and all the emanations of the Spirit, are as proportioned, as meat and drink are to natural nourishment; and therefore there can be no need of a corporal presence. 2. Corporal manducation of Christ's body is apparently inconsistent with the nature and condition of a body. 1. Because that, which is after the manner of a spirit, and not of a body, cannot be eaten and drunk after the manner of a body, but of a spirit; as no man can eat a cherub with his mouth, if he were made apt to nourish the soul: but, by the confession of the Roman doctors, Christ's body is present in the eucharist after the manner of a spirit, therefore, without proportions to our body, or bodily actions. 2. That which neither can feel or be felt, see or be seen, move or be moved, change or be

[m] Ser. 6. 4. temp. Septembr. post Consecrat.
[n] In Miss. vol. pro quacunque Necessitate.

changed, neither do or suffer corporally, cannot certainly be eaten corporally; but so they affirm concerning the body of our blessed Lord; it cannot do or suffer corporally in the sacrament, therefore, it cannot be eaten corporally, any more than a man can chew a spirit, or eat a meditation, or swallow a syllogism into his belly. This would be so far from being credible, that God should work so many miracles in placing Christ's natural body for spiritual nourishment, that in case it were revealed, to be placed there to that purpose, itself must need one great miracle more to verify it, and reduce it to act; and it would still be as difficult to explain, as it is to tell how the material fire of hell should torment spirits and souls. And Socrates in Plato's banquet said well, "Wisdom is not a thing that can be communicated by local or corporal contiguity." 3. That the corporal presence does not nourish spiritually, appears; because some are nourished spiritually, who do not receive the sacrament at all, and some that do receive, yet fall short of being spiritually nourished, and so do all unworthy communicants. This therefore is to no purpose, and therefore cannot be supposed to be done by the wise God of all the world, especially with so great a pomp of miracles. 4. Cardinal Perron affirms[o], that the real natural presence of Christ in the sacrament is to greatest purpose, because the residence of Christ's natural body in our bodies does really and substantially join us unto God, establishing a true and real unity between God and men. And Bellarmine speaks something like this 'de Euchar. lib. 3. c. 9.' But concerning this, besides that every faithful soul is actually united to Christ without the actual residence of Christ's body in our bodies, since every one that is regenerated and born anew of water and of the Spirit, is σύμφυτος, 'the same plant with Christ,' as St. Paul calls him, Rom. vi. 5.—He hath put on Christ, he is bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh, Gal. iii. 27. Ephes. v. 30.; and all this by faith, by baptism, by regeneration of the Spirit; besides this, I say, this corporal union of our bodies to the body of God incarnate, which these great and witty dreamers dream of, would make man to be God. For that which hath a real and substantial unity with God, is consubstantial with the true God, that is, he is really, substantially, and truly God;

[o] De l'Euchar. p. 165. Gallic.

which to affirm were highest blasphemy. 5. One device more there is to pretend a usefulness of the doctrine of Christ's natural presence: viz. that, by his contact and conjunction, it becomes the cause and the seed of the resurrection. But besides that this is condemned by [p] Vasquez as groundless, and by [q] Suarez as improbable and a novel temerity; it is highly confuted by their own doctrine; for how can the contact or touch of Christ's body have that or any effect on ours, when it can neither be touched, nor seen, nor understood, but by faith? which [r] Bellarmine expressly affirms. But to return from whence I am digressed.

10. Tertullian adds in the same place; "Quia et sermo caro erat factus, proinde in causam vitæ appetendus, et devorandus auditu, et ruminandus intellectu, et fide digerendus. Nam et paulò antè, carnem suam panem quoque cœlestem pronunciârat, urgens usquequaque per allegoriam necessariorum pabulorum memoriam patrum, qui panes et carnes Egyptiorum præverterant divinæ vocationi:" "Because the Word was made flesh, therefore he was desired for life, to be devoured by hearing, to be ruminated or chewed by the understanding, to be digested by faith. For a little before, he called his flesh also celestial bread, still, or all the way, urging, by an allegory of necessary food, the memory of their fathers, who preferred the bread and flesh of Egypt before the divine calling."

11. St. Athanasius, or who is the author of the tractate upon the words, "Quicunque dixerit verbum in filium hominis," in his works, saith, "Ὅτι ἃ λέγει οὐκ ἐστὶ σαρκικὰ, ἀλλὰ πνευματικά· πόσοις γὰρ ἤρκει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς βρῶσιν, ἵνα καὶ τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς τοῦτο τροφὴ γένηται; ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο τῆς εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀναβάσεως ἐμνημόνευσε τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἵνα τῆς σωματικῆς ἐννοίας αὐτοὺς ἀφελκύσῃ καὶ λοιπὸν τὴν εἰρημένην σάρκα βρῶσιν ἄνωθεν οὐράνιον καὶ πνευματικὴν τροφὴν παρ' αὐτοῦ διδομένην μάθωσιν. Ἃ γὰρ λελάληκα (φησὶν) ὑμῖν, πνεῦμά ἐστι καὶ ζωή. i. e. "The things which he speaks, are not carnal but spiritual: for to how many might his body suffice for meat, that it should become the nourishment of the whole world? But for this it was, that he put them in mind of the ascension of the Son of man into heaven, that he might draw

[p] Tom. 3. in 3. disp. 204. n. 3. [q] Ibid. disp. 64. sect. 1.
[r] Lib. 3. de Euchar. c. 9.

them off from carnal and corporal senses, and that they might learn that his flesh, which he called meat, was from above, heavenly and spiritual nourishment. For, saith he, the things that I have spoken, they are spirit and they are life."

12. But Origen is yet more decretory in this affair. "Est et in Novo Testamento litera, quæ occidit eum, qui non spiritualiter ea quæ dicuntur, adverterit; si enim secundum literam sequaris hoc ipsum quod dictum est,' Nisi manducaveritis carnam meam, et biberitis sanguinem meum,' occidit hæc litera:" "If we understand these words of Christ, 'Unless ye eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood,' literally, this letter kills. For there is in the New Testament a letter that kills him, who does not spiritually understand those things which are spoken[s]."

13. St. Ambrose not only expounds it in a spiritual sense; but plainly denies the proper and natural: "Non iste panis est, qui vadit in corpus, sed ille panis vitæ æternæ, qui animæ nostræ substantiam fulcit;" 'That is not the bread of life which goes into the body, but that which supports the substance of the soul[t];" and, "Fide tangitur, fide videtur, non tangitur corpore, non oculis comprehenditur:" "This bread is touched by faith, it is seen by faith[u]:" and without all peradventure that it is to be understood of eating and drinking Christ by faith, is apparent from Christ's own words, verse 35: "I am the bread of life; he that cometh to me, shall not hunger; and he that believeth on me, shall not thirst:" 'coming' to Christ is eating him; 'believing him' is drinking his blood. It is not touched by the body, it is not seen with the eyes. St. Chrysostom, in his forty-seventh homily upon this chapter of St. John, expounds these words in a spiritual sense; "for these things," saith he, "are οὐδὲν σαρκικὸν ἔχοντα οὐδὲ ἀκολουθίαν φυσικὴν, such as have in them nothing carnal, nor any carnal consequence."

14. St. Austin gave the same exposition: "Ut, quid paras dentes et ventrem? crede et manducasti:" and again: "Credere in eum, hoc est manducare panem vivum. Qui credit in eum, manducat[x]."

15. Theophylact makes the spiritual sense to be the only

[s] Origen. in Lect. c. 10. hom. 7.
[t] De Sacrament. lib. 5. c. 4.
[u] In Lucam, lib. 6. c. 8.
[x] Tract. 25. in Joh. Tract. 26.

answer in behalf of our not being cannibals, or devourers of man's flesh, as the men of Capernaum began to dream, and the men of Rome, though in better circumstances, to this day dream on. "Putabant isti, quod Deus cogeret σαρκοφάγους: quia enim nos hoc spiritualiter intelligimus, neque carnium voratores sumus, imò sanctificamur per talem cibum, non sumus carnis voratores:" "The men of Capernaum thought Christ would compel them to devour man's flesh. But because we understand this spiritually, therefore we are not devourers of man's flesh, but are sanctified by this meat[y]." Perfectly to the same sense, and almost in the very words, Theodorus, bishop of Heraclea, is quoted in the Greek Catena upon John.

16. It were easy to add, that Eusebius[z] calls the 'words' of Christ 'his flesh and blood,' ὥστε αὐτὰ εἶναι τὰ ῥήματα καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν σάρκα καὶ τὸ αἷμα: that so also does St. Jerome, saying, that, although it may be understood in mystery, "tamen veriùs corpus Christi et sanguis ejus sermo scripturarum est[a]; that so does Clemens Alexandrinus[b]; that St. Basil[c] says, that his doctrine and his mystical coming are his flesh and blood; that St. Bernard says, to imitate his life and communicate with his passion, is to eat his flesh: but I decline, for the present, to insist upon these, because all of them, excepting St. Jerome only, may be supposed to be mystical expositions, which may be true, and yet another exposition may be true too. It may suffice that it is the direct sense of Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, St. Ambrose, St. Austin, and Theophylact, that these words of Christ, in John, vi., are not to be understood in the natural or proper, but in the spiritual sense. The spiritual they declare not to be the mystical, but the literal sense; and, therefore, their testimonies cannot be eluded by any such pretence.

17. And yet after all this, suppose that Christ, in these words, did speak of the sacramental manducation, and affirmed that the bread, which he would give, should be his flesh;—what is this to transubstantiation? That Christ did speak of the sacrament as well as of any other mystery, of this amongst others; that is, of all the ways of taking him,

[y] In John, vi. [z] Lib. 3. Eccles. Theol. contra Marcel. Ancyran. M. S.
[a] S. Hieron. Psal. cxlvii. [b] Clem. Alex. lib. 1. pædag. c. 6.
[c] Ἐστὶ καὶ ποτὸν στόμα τοῦ ἐνδὸν ἀνθρώπου, ᾧ τρέφεται μεταλαμβάνων τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς, ὃς ἐστιν ἄρτος ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς. St. Basil in Psal. xxxiii.

is to me highly probable; Christ is the food of our souls; this food we receive in at our ears, mouth, our hearts; and the allusion is plainer in the sacrament than in any other external rite, because of the similitude of bread, and eating, which Christ used upon occasion of the miracle of the loaves, which introduced all that discourse. But then this comes in only as it is an act of faith; for the meat, which Christ gives, is to be taken by faith, himself being the expounder[d]. Now the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist, being acts and symbols and consignations of faith, and effects of believing, that is, of the first and principal receiving him by faith in his words, and submission to his doctrine, may well be meant here, not by virtue of the words; for the whole form of expression is metaphorical, not at all proper; but by the proportion of reason and nature of his effect, it is an act or manner of receiving Christ, and an issue of faith, and therefore is included in the mystery. The food that Christ said he would give, is "his flesh, which he would give for the life of the world[e]," viz. to be crucified and killed. And from that verse forward he doth more particularly refer to his death; for he speaks of 'bread' only before, or 'meat,' ἄρτος ἢ βρῶσις,—but now he speaks of flesh and blood, ἄρτος καὶ πόσις; 'bread and drink;' and therefore, by analogy, he may allude to the sacrament, which is his similitude and representation; but this is but the meaning of the second or third remove; if here Christ begins to change the particulars of his discourse, it can primarily relate to nothing but his death upon the cross; at which time he gave his flesh for the life of the world; and so giving it, it became meat; the receiving this gift was a receiving of life, for it was given for the life of the world. The manner of receiving it is by faith, and hearing the word of God, submitting our understanding; the digesting this meat is imitating the life of Christ, conforming to his doctrine and example; and as the sacraments are instruments or acts of this manducation, so they come under this discourse, and no otherwise.

18. But to return: this very allegory of the word of God to be called 'meat,' and particularly 'manna,' which, in this chapter, Christ particularly alludes to,—is not unusual in the Old Testament. Εἶπε δὲ αὐτοῖς Μωσῆς (saith Philo[f]), Οὗτος ὁ

[d] St. John, vi. 29. 47. 64. [e] Ver. 51. [f] In Allegoriis.

ἄρτος ὃν δέδωκεν ἡμῖν Κύριος τοῦ φαγεῖν, τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὃ συνέταξε Κύριος, ὁρᾷς τῆς ψυχῆς τροφὴν ὅια ἐστὶ Λόγος Θεοῦ συνεχὴς, ἐοικὼς δρόσῳ κύκλῳ πᾶσαν περιειληφὼς, καὶ μηδὲν μέρος ἀμέτοχον αὐτοῦ ἐῶν. "Moses said unto them, 'This is the Word which the Lord hath given us to eat, This is the Word which the Lord hath ordained;' you see what is the food of the soul, even the eternal Word of God," &c. Καλεῖ μάννα τὸν πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων Λόγον Θεῖον, "The Word of God, the most honourable and eldest of things, is called manna [g];" and τρέφεται δὲ τῶν μετὰ τελειότερον ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλῳ τῷ Λόγῳ. "The soul is nourished by the Word [h],"

——— qui pastus pulcherrimus est animorum.

19. And, therefore, now I will resume those testimonies of Clemens Alexandrinus, of Eusebius, St. Basil, St. Jerome, and St. Bernard, which I waved before, all agreeing upon this exposition, that "the word of God, Christ's doctrine, is the flesh" he speaks of, and the receiving it and practising it, is the eating his flesh; for this sense is the literal and proper: and St. Jerome is express to affirm, that the other exposition is mystical, and that this is the more true and proper: and therefore, the saying of Bellarmine [i], that they only give the mystical sense, is one of his confident sayings without reason, or pretence of proof: and whereas he adds, that they do not deny, that these words are also understood, literally, of the sacrament; I answer, it is sufficient that they agree in this sense: and the other fathers do so expound it with an exclusion to the natural sense of eating Christ in the sacrament; particularly this appears in the testimonies of Origen and St. Ambrose above quoted: to which I add the words of Eusebius in the third book of his 'Theologia Ecclesiastica,' expounding the sixty-third verse of the sixth of St. John; he brings in Christ speaking thus; "Think not, that I speak of this flesh, which I bear; and do not imagine, that I appoint you to drink this sensible and corporal blood: but know ye, that the words which I have spoken, are spirit and life."—Nothing can be fuller to exclude their interpretation, and to affirm ours: though to do so be not usual, unless they were to expound Scripture in opposition to an adver-

[g] In libro, Pejorem insidiari meliori. [h] Allegoriis.
[i] De Euchar. lib. 1. c. 7. et ad alios patres.

sary; and to require such hard conditions in the sayings of men, that when they speak against Titius, they shall be concluded not to speak against Caius, if they do not clap their contrary negative to their positive affirmative, though Titius and Caius be against one another in the cause,—is a device to escape rather than to intend truth and reality in the discourses of men. I conclude, it is notorious and evident what Erasmus notes upon this place: "Hunc locum veteres interpretantur de doctrinâ cœlesti: sic enim dicit panem suum, ut frequenter dixit sermonem suum:" "The ancient fathers expound this place of the heavenly doctrine: so he calls the bread 'his own,' as he said often 'the word' to be 'his.'"—And if the concurrent testimonies of Origen, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, St. Basil, Athanasius, Eusebius, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, St. Austin, Theophylact, and St. Bernard, are a good security for the sense of a place of Scripture, we have read their evidence, and may proceed to sentence.

20. But it was impossible, but these words, falling upon the allegory of bread and drink, and signifying the receiving Christ crucified, and communicating with his passion in all the ways of faith and sacrament,—should also meet with as allegorical expounders, and for the likeness of expression be referred to sacramental manducation: and yet, I said, this cannot at all infer transubstantiation, though sacramental manducation were only and principally intended. For if it had been spoken of the sacrament, the words had been verified in the spiritual sumption of it; for as Christ is eaten by faith out of the sacrament, so is he also in the sacrament: as he is real and spiritual meat to the worthy hearer, so is he to the worthy communicant: as Christ's flesh is life to all that obey him, so to all that obediently remember him; so Christ's flesh is meat indeed, however it be taken, if it be taken spiritually, but not however it be taken, if it be taken carnally: he is nutritive in all the ways of spiritual manducation, but not in all the ways of natural eating, by their own confession, nor in any, by ours. And therefore it is a vain confidence to run away with the conclusion, if they should gain one of the premises; but the truth is this: it is neither properly spoken of the sacrament; neither, if it were, would prove any thing of transubstantiation.

21. I will not be alone in my assertion, though the reasonableness and evidence would bear me out: St. Austin saith the same; "Spiritualiter intelligite, quod loquutus sum vobis: non hoc corpus, quod videtis, manducaturi estis: sacramentum aliquod commendavi vobis, spiritualiter intellectum vivificabit vos:" "That which I have spoken, is to be understood spiritually: ye are not to eat that body, which ye see: I have commended a sacrament to you, which, being understood spiritually, will give you life[k];"—where, besides that he gives testimony to the main question on our behalf, he also makes sacramentally and spiritually to be all one. And again: "Ut quia jam similitudinem mortis ejus in baptismo accipimus, similitudinem quoque sanguinis et carnis sumamus, ita ut et veritas non desit in sacramento, et ridiculum nullum fiat in Paganis, quod cruorem occisi hominis bibamus:" "That as we receive the similitude of his death in baptism, so we may also receive the likeness of his flesh and blood, so that neither truth be wanting in the sacrament, nor the Pagans ridiculously affirm, that we should drink the blood of the crucified man[l]."—Nothing could be spoken more plain in this question; "We receive Christ's body in the eucharist, as we are baptized into his death; that is, by figure and likeness. In the sacrament there is a verity or truth of Christ's body: and yet no drinking of blood or eating of flesh, so as the heathen may calumniate us by saying, we do that which the men of Capernaum thought Christ taught them they should."—So that though these words were spoken of sacramental manducation (as sometimes it is expounded), yet there is reality enough in the spiritual sumption to verify these words of Christ, without a thought of any bodily eating his flesh. And that we may not think this doctrine dropped from St. Austin by chance, he again affirms dogmatically, "Qui discordat à Christo, nec carnem ejus manducat, nec sanguinem bibit, etiamsi tantæ rei sacramentum ad judicium suæ præsumptionis quotidiè indifferenter accipiat:" "He that disagrees from Christ (that is, disobeys him), neither eats his flesh nor drinks his blood, although, to his condemnation, he every day receives the sacrament of so

[k] Aug. in Psal. xcviii.
[l] Gratianus ex Augustino de Consecrat. dist. 2. sect. utrum. Lugduni 1541.

great a thing[m]."—The consequent of which words is plainly this, that there is no eating of Christ's flesh or drinking his blood, but by a moral instrument, faith and subordination to Christ; the sacramental external eating alone being no eating of Christ's flesh, but the symbols and sacrament of it.

22. Lastly: Suppose these words of Christ, "The bread which I shall give, is my flesh," were spoken literally of the sacrament; what he promised he would give, he performed, and what was here expressed in the future tense, was, in his time, true in the present tense; and, therefore, is always presently true after consecration; it follows, that in the sacrament this is true; "Panis est corpus Christi," "The bread is the body of Christ."—Now I demand whether this proposition will be owned. It follows inevitably from this doctrine, if these words be spoken of the sacrament. But it is disavowed by the princes of the party against us. "Hoc tamen est impossibile, quòd panis sit corpus Christi;" "It is impossible that the bread should be Christ's body," saith the gloss of Gratian[n]; and Bellarmine says it cannot be a true proposition, "in quâ subjectum supponit pro pane, prædicatum autem pro corpore Christi; panis enim et corpus Domini res diversissimæ sunt[o]."—The thing that these men dread, is, lest it be called 'bread' and 'Christ's body' too, as we affirm it unanimously to be; and as this argument, upon their own grounds, evinces it. Now then, how they can serve both ends, I cannot understand. If they will have the bread or the meat which Christ promised to give, to be his flesh, then so it came to pass; and then it is bread and flesh too. If it did not so come to pass, and that it is impossible that bread should be Christ's flesh; then, when Christ said the bread which he would give, should be his flesh,—he was not to be understood properly of the sacrament; but either figuratively in the sacrament, or in the sacrament not at all; either of which will serve the end of truth in this question. But of this hereafter.

By this time I hope I may conclude, that transubstantiation is not taught by our blessed Lord in the sixth chap-

[m] Prosper Sent. 339. sed verba sunt St. Augustini.
[n] De Consecrat. dist. 2. c. 55. Gloss. Panis est in altari.
[o] De Eucher. lib. 3. c. 19.

ter of St. John. "Johannes de tertiâ et eucharisticâ cœnâ nihil quidem scribit, eò quod cæteri tres evangelistæ ante illum eam plenè descripsissent."—They are the words of Stapleton [p], and are good evidence against them.

SECTION IV.

Of the Words of Institution.

1. "MULTA male oportet interpretari eos, qui unum non rectè intelligere volunt," said Irenæus [q]; "They must needs speak many false things, who will not rightly understand one."—The words of consecration are "præcipuum fundamentum totius controversiæ atque adeò totius hujus altissimi mysterii," said Bellarmine [r]; "the greatest ground of the whole question;" and by adhering to the letter the mystery is lost, and the whole party wanders in eternal intricacies, and inextricable riddles; which because themselves cannot untie, they torment their sense and their reason, and many places of Scripture, while they pertinaciously stick to the impossible letter, and refuse the spirit of these words:—

The words of institution are these:—

St. Matt. xxvi. 26.—"Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and brake it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat, this is my body: and he took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all, of it; for this is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins."

St. Mark, xiv. 22.—"Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and gave to them, and said, Take, eat, this is my body: and he took the cup, and when he had given thanks he gave it to them, and they all drank of it; and he said to them, This is my blood of the New Testament which is shed for many."

St. Luke, xxii. 19.—"And he took bread, and gave thanks,

[p] Pompt. Cathol. ser. 3. Heb. Sanct. [q] Contr. Hæres. lib. 5.
[r] Lib. 1. c. 8. Euchar. sect. sequitur argumentum.

and brake it, and gave to them, saying, This is my body which is given for you; this do in remembrance of me. Likewise also the cup after supper, saying, This cup is the New Testament in my blood, which is shed for you."

1 Cor. xi. 23.—"The Lord Jesus, the same night in which he was betrayed, took bread. And when he had given thanks he brake it, and said, Take, eat, this is my body which is broken for you: this do in remembrance of me. After the same manner also he took the cup, when he had supped, saying, This cup is the New Testament in my blood: This do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me."

2. These words contain the institution, and are wholly called 'the words of consecration,' in the Latin church. Concerning which the consideration is material. Out of these words the Latin church separates, 'Hoc est corpus meum,' 'This is my body,'—and say, that these words, pronounced by the priest with due intention, do effect this change of the bread into Christ's body, which change they call 'transubstantiation.' But if these words do not effect any such change, then it may be Christ's body before the words; and these may only declare what is already done by the prayers of the holy man; or else it may become Christ's body only in the use and manducation: and as it will be uncertain when the change is, so also it cannot be known, what it is. If it be Christ's body before those words, then the literal sense of these words will prove nothing, it is so as it will be before these words, and made so by other words, which refer wholly to use; and then the 'præcipuum fundamentum,' 'the pillar and ground' of transubstantiation is supplanted. And if it be only after the words, and not effected by the words, it will be Christ's body only in the reception. Now, concerning this, I have these things to say:

3. First: By what argument can it be proved, that these words, "Take, and eat," are not as effective of the change, as "Hoc est corpus meum," "This is my body?"—If they be, then the taking and eating do consecrate: and it is not Christ's body till it be taken and eaten; and then, when that is done, it is so no more; and besides, that reservation,

circumgestation, adoration, elevation of it, must of themselves fall to the ground; it will also follow, that it is Christ's body only in a mystical, spiritual, and sacramental manner.

4. Secondly: By what argument will it so much as probably be concluded, that these words, "This is my body," should be the words effective of conversion and consecration? That Christ used these words is true, and so he used all the other; but did not tell, which were the consecrating words, nor appoint them to use those words; but to do the thing, and so to remember and represent his death. And therefore, the form and rites of consecration and ministries are in the power of the church, where Christ's command does not intervene; as appears in all the external ministries of religion; in baptism, confirmation, penance, ordination, &c. And for the form of consecration of the eucharist, St. Basil affirms that it is not delivered to us: Τὰ τῆς ἐπικλήσεως ῥήματα ἐπὶ τῇ ἀναδείξει τοῦ ἄρτου τῆς εὐχαριστίας καὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου τῆς εὐλογίας τίς τῶν ἁγίων ἡμῖν καταλέλοιπεν, &c. "The words of invocation in the manifestation or opening the eucharistical bread and cup of blessing, which of all the saints hath left us? for we are not content with these, which the apostles and the evangelists mention, but before and after, we say other things, which have great efficacy to this mystery[s]." —But it is more material, which St. Gregory affirms concerning the apostles: "Mos apostolorum fuit, ut ad ipsam solummodò orationem Dominicam oblationis hostiam consecrarent:" "The apostles consecrated the eucharist only by saying the Lord's prayer[t]." To which I add this consideration, that it is certain, Christ interposed no command in this case, nor the apostles; neither did they, for aught appears, intend the recitation of those words to be the sacramental consecration, and operative of the change;—because themselves recited several forms of institution in St. Matthew and St. Mark for one, and St. Luke and St. Paul for the other, in the matter of the chalice especially; and by this difference declared, there is no necessity of one, and therefore no efficacy in any as to this purpose.

5. Thirdly: If they make use of words to signify properly and not figuratively, then it is a declaration of something already in being, and not effective of any thing after it. For

[s] De Spir. S. c. 27. [t] Lib. 7. ep. 63.

else *est* does not signify *is* but *it shall be;* because the conversion is future to the pronunciation: and by the confession of the Roman doctors[u] the bread is not transubstantiated till the *um* in *meum* be quite out, till the last syllable be spoken; but yet I suppose, they cannot shew an example, or reason, or precedent, or grammar, or any thing for it, that *est* should be an active word. And they may remember, how confidently they use to argue against them, that affirm men to be justified by a 'fiducia' and 'persuasion,' that their sins are pardoned: saying, that 'faith must suppose the thing done, or their belief is false: and if it be done before, then to believe it does not do it at all, because it is done already.'—The case is here the same: they affirm that it is made Christ's body, by saying, 'It is Christ's body;' but their saying so must suppose the thing done, or else their saying so is false; and if it be done before, then to say it, does not do it at all, because it is done already.

6. Fourthly: When our blessed Lord "took bread, he gave thanks," said St. Luke and St. Paul; he "blessed it," said St. Matthew and St. Mark; εὐχαριστήσας, 'making it eucharistical;' εὐλογήσας, that was 'consecrating' or making it holy; it was common bread, unholy when he blessed it, and made it eucharistical; for εὐχαριστήσας was the same with εὐλογήσας. Εὐχαριστηθεῖσα τροφὴ is the word in Justin, and εὐχαριστηθέντα ἄρτον καὶ οἶνον, 'bread and wine, food made eucharistical,' or on which Christ had given thanks; "Eucharistia sanguinis et corporis Christi," so Irenæus and others; and St. Paul[x] does promiscuously use εὐλογεῖν, and εὐχαριστεῖν, and προσεύχεσθαι; and in the same place the Vulgar Latin renders εὐχαριστίαν by 'benedictionem,' and therefore St. Paul[y] calls it "the cup of blessing;" and, in this very place of St. Matthew, St. Basil reads εὐχαριστήσας instead of εὐλογήσας, either, in this, following the old Greek copies who so read this place, or else by interpretation so rendering it, as being the same[z]; and on the other side St. Cyprian renders εὐχαριστήσας (the word used in the blessing the chalice) by "benedixit[a]." Against this Smiglecius[b], the Jesuit, with some little scorn, says, 'It is very absurd to say that Christ

[u] Bellar. lib. 1. de Euch. c. 11. sect. Respondeo cum.
[x] 1 Cor. xiv. 15—17.
[y] 1 Cor. x.
[z] In Regulis Moralibus.
[a] Epist. ad Cæcilium.
[b] Respons. ad Nod. Gordium.

gave thanks to the bread,' and so it should be, if εὐλογεῖν and εὐχαριστεῖν, "blessing and giving of thanks," were all one. But in this he shewed his anger or want of skill; not knowing, or not remembering, that the Hebrews and Hellenist Jews love abbreviature of speech; and, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, St. Paul uses ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, 'to appease or propitiate our sins,' instead of ἱλάσκεσθαι Θεὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, 'to propitiate or appease God concerning our sins;' and so is εὐχαριστεῖν τὸν ἄρτον, that is, Θεὸν περὶ τοῦ ἄρτου, only that, by this means, God also makes the bread holy, blessed, and eucharistical. Now I demand, what did Christ's blessing effect upon the bread and the chalice? any thing, or nothing? If no change was consequent, it was an ineffective blessing, a blessing that blessed not: if any change was consequent, it was a blessing of the thing in order to what was intended, that is, that it might be eucharistical: and then the following words, "This is my body," "This is the blood of the New Testament," or "the New Testament in my blood," were, as Cabasilas affirms, ἐν εἴδει διηγήσεως, 'by way of history and narration;' and so the Syriac interpreter puts them together in the place of St. Matthew, εὐλογήσας and εὐχαριστήσας, 'blessing and giving of thanks;' when he did bless it, he made it eucharistical.

7. Fifthly: The Greek church universally taught, that the consecration was made by the prayers of the ministering man. Justin Martyr [c] calls it τὴν δι' εὐχῆς εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφὴν, "nourishment made eucharistical by prayer;"—and Origen [d] calls it ἄρτους σῶμα γενομένους διὰ τὴν εὐχὴν, ἅγιόν τι, "bread made a body, a holy thing by prayer;"—διὰ τῆς ἐπικλήσεως καὶ ἐπιφοιτήσεως τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, so Damascen [e]; "by the invocation and illumination of the Holy Ghost," μεταποιοῦνται εἰς τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ τὸ αἷμα, "they are changed into the body and blood of Christ."—But for the Greek church [f] the case is evident and confessed. For the ancient Latin church, St. Jerome, reproving certain pert deacons for insulting over priests, uses this expression for the honour of priests above the other; "Ad quorum preces Christi corpus sanguisque conficitur;" "By their

[c] Apol. 2. [d] Lib. 8. contr. Celsum. [e] Lib. 4. de Fide, cap. 14.
[f] Vide Ambrosium Catharinum in integro, quem scripsit, libro hac de re. Lib. 3. de Trin. c. 4.

prayers the body and blood of Christ are in the sacrament."—And St. Austin calls the sacrament "prece mysticâ consecratum." But concerning this, I have largely discoursed in another[g] place. But the effect of the consideration, in order to the present question, is this; that since the change, that is made, is made not naturally, or by a certain number of syllables in the manner of a charm, but solemnly, sacredly, morally, and by prayer, it becomes also the body of our Lord to moral effects, as a consequent of a moral instrument.

8. Sixthly: And it is considerable, that since the ministries of the church are but imitations of Christ's priesthood, which he officiates in heaven,—since he effects all the purposes of his graces and our redemption by intercession, and representing, in the way of prayer, the sacrifice, which he offered on the cross; it follows, that the ministries of the church must be of the same kind, operating in the way of prayer morally, and therefore, wholly to moral purposes; to which the instrument is made proportionable. And if these words, which are called the words of consecration, be exegetical, and enunciative of the change, that is made by prayers, and other mystical words; it cannot be possibly inferred from these words, that there is any other change made than what refers to the whole mystery and action: and therefore, 'Take,' 'Eat,' and 'This do,' are as necessary to the sacrament as 'Hoc est corpus;' and declare that it is Christ's body only in the use and administration: and therefore not 'natural' but 'spiritual.' And yet this is yet more plain by the words in the Hebrew text of St. Matthew; "Take, eat this which is my body," plainly supposing the thing to be done already, not by the exegetical words, but by the precedents, the mystic prayer, and the words of institution and use: and to this I never saw any thing pretended in answer. But the force of the argument, upon supposition of the premises, is acknowledged to be convincing by an archbishop[h] of their own; "Si Christus dando consecravit," &c. "If Christ giving the eucharist did consecrate (as Scotus affirmed), then the Lutherans will carry the victory, who maintain, that the body of Christ is in the eucharist only, while it is used, while it was

[g] The Divine Institution of the Office Ministerial, sect. 7.
[h] Archiep. Cæsar. Tractat. varii disp. de Necess. Correct. Theol. Schol.

taken and eaten. And yet on th
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them in his nuncupatory epistle to
fore his book of 'Divers Treatises'[k]
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ther these words are to be taken mat

[i] De Euch. lib. 1. c. 11.

the expression is barbarous and rude, but they mean, whether they be consecratively or declarative. Aquinas makes them consecratory, and his authority brought that opinion into credit; and yet Scotus and his followers are against it: and they that affirm them to be taken significatively, that is, to be consecratory, are divided into so many opinions, that they are not easy to be reckoned; only[1] Guido Brianson reckons nine, and his own makes the tenth. This I take upon the credit of one of their own archbishops.

9. But I proceed to follow them in their own way; whether 'Hoc est corpus meum' do effect or signify the change; yet the change is not natural and proper, but figurative, sacramental, and spiritual; exhibiting what it signifies, being real to all intents and purposes of the Spirit: and this I shall first shew by discussing the words of institution; first those which they suppose to be the consecratory words, and then the other.

10. "Hoc est corpus meum:" concerning which form of words we must know, that as the eucharist itself was, in the external and ritual part, an imitation of a custom, and a sacramental, already in use among the Jews, for the 'major domo' to break bread and distribute wine, at the Passover, after supper to the eldest according to his age, to the youngest according to his youth, as is notorious and known in the practice of the Jews[m]:—so also were the very words, which Christ spake in this changed subject, an imitation of the words which were then used; "This is the bread of sorrow which our fathers ate in Egypt; this is the passover:" and this passover was called 'the body of the paschal lamb:' nay, it was called the body of our Saviour, and our Saviour himself; Καὶ εἶπεν Ἐσδρᾶς τῷ λαῷ, τοῦτο πάσχα ὁ Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν, said Justin Martyr 'Dial. cum Tryph.;' "And Esdras said to the Jews, This passover is our Saviour, and This is the body of our Saviour,"—as it is noted by others. So that here the words were made ready for Christ, and made his by appropriation, by 'meum:' he was 'the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world,' he is 'the true Passover;' which he then affirming, called that which was the antitype of the Passover, 'the Lamb of God,' his body,' the body of the

[1] In 4. Sentent.
[m] Scaliger de Emendatione Tempor. lib. 6.

true passover, to wit, in the same sacramental sense, in which the like words were affirmed in the Mosaical passover.

SECTION V.

1. 'Hoc,' 'This:' that is, 'This bread is my body,' 'This cup,' or the wine in the cup, 'is my blood:' concerning the chalice, there can be no doubt; it is τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον, 'hic calix,' 'this chalice;' and as little of the other. The fathers refer the pronoun demonstrative to 'bread;' saying, that, 'of bread' it was Christ affirmed, 'This is my body;' which I shall have, in the sequel, more occasion to prove: for the present, these may suffice; "Christus panem corpus suum appellat," saith Tertullian[n].—"Nos audiamus panem, quem fregit Dominus, esse corpus salvatoris:" so St. Jerome[o]—τὴν σάρκα σῖτον ὠνόμασε; so St. Cyril of Alexandria[p]; "called bread his flesh." Theodoret[q] saith that "to the body he gave the name of the symbol, and to the symbol the name of his body:"—τοῦτο therefore signifies 'this bread;' and it matters not that 'bread,' in the Greek, is of the masculine gender; for the substantive being understood, not expressed, by the rule of grammar, the adjective must be the neuter gender, and it is taken substantively. Neither is there any inconvenience in this, as Bellarmine[r] weakly dreams upon as weak suggestions. For when he had said that 'hoc' is either taken adjectively or substantively,—he proceeds, 'not adjectively,' for then it must agree with the substantive, which in this case is masculine; 'bread' being so both in Greek and Latin. But if you say it is taken substantively, as we contend it is, he confutes you thus: If it be taken substantively, so that 'hoc' signifies 'this' thing, and so be referred to 'bread,' then it is most absurd,—because it cannot be spoken of any thing seen; that is, of a substantive, unless it agrees with it, and be of the same gender; that is, in plain English, it is neither taken adjectively nor substantively: not adjectively, because it is not of the same gender: not substantively, because it is not of the same gender; that is, because substan-

[n] Lib. adv. Judæos. [o] Ep. ad Hebidiam. [p] In John, xii.
[q] Dial. 1. c. 8. [r] Lib. 1. de Euch. chap. 10. sect. porro. 4.

tively is not adjectively. But the reason he adds is as frivolous; because no man, pointing to his brother, will say, 'Hoc est frater meus,'—but 'Hic est frater meus:'—I grant it. But if it be a thing without life, you may affirm it in the neuter gender; because, it being of neither sex, the subject is supplied by 'thing;' so that you may say, 'Hoc est aqua,' 'This is water;' so in St. Peter[s], Τοῦτο χάρις, 'This is grace,' and [t] δάκτυλος Θεοῦ ἐστι τοῦτο. But of a person present you cannot say so, because he is present, and there is nothing distinct from him, neither 're' nor 'ratione,' in the 'thing' nor in the 'understanding;' and therefore you must say, 'Hic,' not 'Hoc;' because there is no subject to be supposed distinct from the predicate. But when you see an image or figure of your brother, you may then say, 'Hoc est frater meus,' because here is something to make a subject distinct from the predicate. This thing, or this picture, this figure, or this any thing, that can be understood and not expressed, may make a neuter gender; and every schoolboy knows it: so it is in the blessed sacrament; there is a subject or a thing distinct from 'corpus:' 'This bread,' this which you see 'is my body;' and therefore no impropriety is in 'hoc,' though bread be understood.

2. To which I add this, that though bread be the nearest part of the thing demonstrated, yet it is not bread alone, but sacramental bread; that is, bread so used, broken, given, eaten, as it is in the institution and use: Τοῦτο, 'This' is my body; and τοῦτο refers to the whole action about the bread and wine, and so τοῦτο may be easily understood without an impropriety. And indeed it is necessary that τοῦτο, 'this,' should take in the whole action on all sides: because the bread neither is the natural body of Christ, nor yet is it alone a sufficient symbol or representment of it. But the bread "broken, blessed, given, distributed, taken, eaten;" this is Christ's body, viz. as Origen's expression is, "typicum symbolicumque corpus[u]." By the way give me leave to express some little indignation against those words of Bellarmine, which cannot easily be excused from blasphemy; saying, that if our Lord had said of the bread, which the apostles saw and knew to be bread, 'This is my body,' "absurdissima esset locutio," "it had been a most absurd speech."

[s] 1 Pet. ii. 19. [t] Exod. viii. 19. [u] In c. 15. Matt.

—So careless are these opiniators of what they say, that rather than their own fond opinions should be confuted, they care not to impute nonsense to the eternal Wisdom of the Father. And yet that Christ did say this of bread so ordered and to be used, 'Hoc est corpus meum,' besides that the thing is notorious, I shall prove most evidently.

3. First: That which Christ broke, which he gave to his disciples, which he bid them eat, that he affirmed was 'his body.' What gave he, but what he broke? What did he break, but that which he took? What did he take? "Accepit panem," saith the Scripture, "He took bread;" and therefore, of bread it was that he affirmed, 'it was his body.' Now the Roman doctors will, by no means, endure this; for if of bread he affirmed it to be his body, then we have cleared the question; for it is bread and Christ's body too; that is, it is 'bread naturally,' and 'Christ's body spiritually;' for that it cannot be both naturally, they unanimously affirm. And we are sure upon this article: for 'disparatum de disparato non predicatur proprie;' it is a rule of nature and essential reason, If it be bread, it is not a stone; —if it be a mouse, it is not a mule;—and therefore, when there is any predication made of one diverse thing by another, the proposition must needs be improper and figurative. And the gloss of Gratian[x] disputes it well: "If bread be the body of Christ (viz. properly and naturally), then something that is not born of the Virgin Mary, is the body of Christ; and the body of Christ should be both alive and dead." Now that 'hoc,' 'this,' points to bread, besides the notoriousness of the thing in the story of the Gospels, in the matter of fact, and St. Paul calling it 'bread' so often (as I shall shew in the sequel), it ought to be certain to the Roman doctors, and confessed, because by their doctrines when Christ said, 'Hoc,' 'This' and awhile after, it was bread; because it was not consecrated till the last syllable was spoken. To avoid this therefore, they turn themselves into all the opinions and disguises that can be devised. Stapleton[y] says, that 'hoc,' 'this,' does only signify the predicate, and is referred to the

[x] De Consecrat. dist. 2. c. Quis.

[y] Ejusdem sententiæ sunt, Ocham, Petrus de Aliacho, Cameracensis, Antisiodorensis in 4. l. sent. dist. 13. Roffensis, cap. 4. contra Captiv. Babyl. Maldonat. Barradius in Evangel.

body; so as Adam said, "This is flesh of my flesh, and bone of my bone,"—'hoc' not 'this rib,' but this thing, this predicate; so "Hic est filius meus, hic est sanguis Testamenti." Now this is confuted before; for it can only be true, when there is no difference of subject and predicate, as in all figures and sacraments and artificial representments there are. Some others say, 'This is,' that is, 'This shall be my body;' so that 'is,' demonstrates not what is, but what shall be. But this prevailed not amongst them. Others say, that 'this' signifies 'nothing;' so Innocentius the Third, Major, the Count of Mirandula, 'de capite Fontium,' and Catharinus. Others yet affirm, that 'this' signifies, 'these accidents:' so Ruard Tapper, and others whom Suarez reckons and confutes. Thomas Aquinas and his scholars affirm, that 'this' demonstrates neither bread, nor the body, nor nothing, nor the accidents, but a substance indefinitely, which is under the accidents of bread; as when Christ turned the water into wine, he might have said, 'Hoc est vinum,' not meaning that 'water is wine,' but this which is here, or this which is in the vessel, is wine; which is an instance, in which Bellarmine pleases himself very much, and uses it more than once, not at all considering, that, in this form of speech, there is the same mistake as in the former: for in this example there are not two things, as we contend there are in the sacrament; and that to make up the proposition, the understanding is forced to make an artificial subject; and 'this' refers to wine, and is determined by his imaginary subject, and makes not an essential or physical, but a logical predication; 'this which is in the vessel, is wine:' and the proposition is identical, if it be reduced to a substantial. But when Christ said, 'Hoc est corpus meum,' 'hoc' first, neither points to 'corpus,' as the others do to 'vinum,' even by their own confession; nor yet, secondly, to an artificial subject, whereby it can by imagination become demonstrative, and determinate; for then it were no real affirmative, not at all significative, much less effective of a change: nor yet, thirdly, will they allow that it points to that subject which is really there, viz. 'bread;' but what then? It demonstrates something real, that either, 1. is not the predicate, and then there would be two things disparate signified by it, two distinct substances, which, in this case, could be

strates nothing but the predicate, and then the proposition were identical, viz. 'This body of Christ is the body of Christ;'—which is an absurd predication: or else, 3. It demonstrates something that is indemonstrable, pointing at something that is nothing certain, and then it cannot be pointed at or demonstrated; for if by 'this which is under the species,' they mean any certain substance, it must be 'bread' or 'the body of Christ,' either of which undoes their cause.

4. But if it be inquired, by what logic or grammar it can be, that a pronoun demonstrative should signify indeterminately, that is, an 'individuum vagum:' they tell us, no; it does not: but it signifies an "individual, determinate substance under the accidents of bread, not according to the formality of the bread, but 'secundùm rationem substantiæ communem et individuam, vagè per ordinem ad accidentia,' 'but according to the formality of a substance common and individual, indefinitely or indeterminately by order to those accidents:'" so Gregory de Valentia[z]; which is as good and perfect nonsense, as ever was spoken. It is determinate and not determinate, it is substantial in order to accidents; individual and yet common; universal and particular; it is limited, but after an unlimited manner; that is, it is, and it is not; that is, it is the logic, and the grammar, and the proper sense, of transubstantiation, which is not to be understood but by them, that know the new and secret way to reconcile contradictories. Bellarmine[a] sweetens the sense of this, as well as he may; and says, that the pronoun demonstrative does point out and demonstrate the 'species,' that is, the accidents of bread; these accidents are certain and determinate; so that the pronoun demonstrative is on the side of the species or accidents, not of the substance; but yet so as to mean not the accidents, but the substance, and not the substance which is, but which shall be; for it is not the same yet: which indeed is the same nonsense with the former, abused or set off with a distinction, the parts of which contradict each other. The pronoun demonstrative does only point to the accidents, and yet does not

[z] Lib. 2. Exam. Myst. Calvin. c. 1. sect. 4. Objectio.
[a] Lib. 1. c. 11. sect. ad id Vero.

mean the accidents, but the substance under them; and yet it does not mean the substance that is under them, but that which shall be; for the substance which is meant, is not yet: and it does not point at the substance, but yet it means it: for the substance indeed is meant by the pronoun demonstrative, but that it does not at all demonstrate 'it,' but the accidents only. And indeed this is a fine secret: the substance is pointed at before it is, and the demonstration is upon the accidents, but means the substance 'in obliquo,' but not 'in recto;' 'not directly, but as by the by;' just as a man can see a thing before it be made; and by pointing at a thing which you see, demonstrates or shews you a thing, which shall never be seen. But then if you desire to know how it was pointed at before it was, that is the secret not yet revealed. But finally, this is the doctrine that hath prevailed at least in the Jesuits' school. 'This' points out something under the accidents of bread, meaning, 'This, which is contained under the accidents of bread, is my body:' there it rests. But before it go any further, I shall disturb his rest with this syllogism: When Christ said, 'Hoc,' 'This is my body;' by 'this' he meant 'this, which is contained under the accidents of bread, is my body.'—But at that instant, that which was contained under the accidents of bread, was the substance of bread; therefore to the substance of bread Christ pointed; 'that' he related to by the pronoun demonstrative, and 'of that' he affirmed, it was 'his body.' The major is that the Jesuits contend for: the minor is affirmed by Bellarmine, "Quando dicitur 'hoc,' tum non est præsens substantia corporis Christi:" therefore the conclusion ought to be his and owned by them. However, I will make bold to call it a demonstration upon their own grounds, and conclude that it is bread and Christ's body too; and that is the doctrine of the Protestants. And I add this also, that it seems a great folly to declaim against us for denying the literal, natural sense, and yet that themselves should expound it in a sense, which suffers a violence and a most unnatural, ungrammatical torture; for if they may change the words from the right sense and case to the oblique and indirect, why may not we? and it is less violence to say, 'Hoc est corpus meum,' i. e. 'Hic panis est corpus meum;' viz. 'spiritualiter,'—than to say, 'Hoc est,' that is, 'Sub his speciebus

father of the Nominalists: it may be held, that, under the species of bread, there remains also the substance; because this is neither against reason nor any authority of the Bible; and of all the manners this is most reasonable, and more easy to maintain, and from thence follow fewer inconveniences than from any other. Yet because of the determination of the church (viz. of Rome), all the doctors commonly hold the contrary. By the way, observe, that their church hath determined against that, against which neither the Scripture nor reason hath determined.

2. The case is clearer in the other kind, as in translation I noted above[c]. Τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον, 'Hic calix.' I demand to what τοῦτο, 'hic,' 'this,' does refer? What it demonstrates and points at? The text sets the substantive down, ποτήριον, 'this cup;' that is, the wine in this cup; of this it is that he affirmed it to be the blood of the New Testament, or the New Testament in his blood: that is, "This is the sanction of the everlasting testament, I make it in my blood, this is the symbol; what I do now in sign, I will do tomorrow in substance, and you shall for ever after remember and represent it 'thus' in sacrament."—I cannot devise what to say plainer than that this τοῦτο points at the chalice.

——— Hoc potate merum[d] ———

So Juvencus, a priest of Spain, in the reign of Constantine, 'Drink this wine;' but by the way, this troubled somebody; and therefore an order was taken to corrupt the words by changing them into, 'Hunc potate meum;' but that the cheat was too apparent, and if it be so of one kind, it is so in both, that is beyond all question. Against this Bellarmine[e] brings 'argumentum robustissimum,' 'a most robustious argument:' by ποτήριον, or 'cup,' cannot be meant the

[b] In 4. qu. 6.
[c] Numb. 1. sect. 5. Vide Picherel. Doct. Sorbon. in 26 Matt.
[d] Lib. 4. Evang. Hist. verse 456.

Atque ait, hic sanguis populi delicta remittet,
Hunc potate meum] instead of
Hoc potate merum: nam veris credite dictis,
Posthac nonunquam vitis gustabo liquorem,
Donec regna patris melioris munera vitæ
In nova me rursus concedent surgere vina.

[e] Lib. 10. c. 10. de Eucbar. sect. sed addo arg.

wine in the cup, because it follows, Ἐν αἵματί μου τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον, "This cup [is the New Testament in my blood] which was shed for you;" referring to the cup, for the word can agree with nothing but the cup; therefore, by the 'cup' is meant not wine, but 'blood,' for that was poured out. To this I oppose these things; 1. Though it does not agree with αἵματι, yet it must refer to it, and is an ordinary κατάχρησις of case called ἀντίπτωσις: and it is not unusual in the best masters of language: Οὐ προσεκτέον ὑμῖν ἐστι τοῖς τούτων λόγους εἰδότας, for εἰδόσιν, in Demosthenes:—so also Goclenius, in his Grammatical Problems, observes another out of Cicero: "Benè autem dicere, quod est peritè loqui, non habet definitam aliquam regionem, cujus terminis septa teneatur;" many more he cites out of Plato, Homer, and Virgil; and, methinks, these men should least of all object this, since, in their Latin Bible, Sixtus Senensis[f] confesses, and all the world knows, there are innumerable barbarisms and improprieties, hyperbata and antiptoses. But in the present case it is easily supplied by ἐστὶ, which is frequently understood, and implied in the article τὸ; τὸ ἐκχυνόμενον, that is, τὸ ἐστὶ ἐκχυνόμενον, that is, 'in my blood which is shed for you.' 2. If it were referred to 'cup,' then the figure were more strong and violent, and the expression less literal; and therefore it makes much against them, who are undone, if you admit figurative expressions in the institution of this sacrament. 3. To what can τοῦτο refer, but to ποτήριον, 'this cup,'—and let what sense soever be affixed to it afterward, if it do not suppose a figure, then there is no such thing as figures, or words, or truth, or things. 4. That ἐκχυνόμενον must refer to αἷμα appears by St. Matthew and St. Mark, where the word is directly applied to blood[g]; St. Paul uses not the word, and Bellarmine himself gives the rule, "Verba Domini rectiùs exposita à Marco," &c. When one evangelist is plain, by him we are to expound another that is not plain: and St. Basil, in his reading of the words, either following some ancienter Greek copy, or else mending it out of the other evangelists, changes the case into perfect grammar, and good divinity, διαθήκη ἐστὶ ἐν τῷ αἵματί μου τῷ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνομένῳ.

6. Thirdly: Symbols of the blessed sacrament are called

[f] Lib. 8. Biblioth.

[g] Vide Bezam in annot. in hunc locum.

'bread' and 'the cup,' after consecration[h]; that is, in the whole use of them. This is twice affirmed by St. Paul[i]: "The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the *communication* (so it should be read) of the blood of Christ? the bread which we break, is it not the *communication* of the body of Christ?" as if he had said, 'This bread is Christ's body;' though there be also this mystery in it, 'This bread is the communication of Christ's body,' that is, the exhibition and donation of it, not Christ's body formally, but virtually, and effectively; it makes us communicate with Christ's body in all the effects and benefits: a like expression we have in Valerius Maximus, where Scipio in the feast of Jupiter is said "Graccho communicasse concordiam," that is, 'consignasse,' he 'communicated concord;' he consigned it with the sacrifice, giving him peace and friendship, the benefit of that communication: and so is the cup of benediction, that is, when the cup is blessed, it communicates Christ's blood, and so does the blessed bread; for "to eat the bread, in the New Testament, is the sacrifice of Christians;" they are the words of St. Austin[l]; "Omnes de uno pane participamus;" so St. Paul; "We all partake of this one bread."—Hence the argument is plain; That which is broken, is the communication of Christ's body; but that which is broken, is bread, therefore bread is the communication of Christ's body. "The bread which we break,"—those are the words.

7. Fourthly: The other place of St. Paul is plainer yet: "Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of that cup." And, "So often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye declare the Lord's death till he come[m];" and the same also verse 27; three times in this chapter he calls the eucharist 'bread.' It is bread, sacramental bread, when the communicant eats it: but he that in the church of Rome should call to the priest to give him a 'piece of bread,' would quickly find, that, instead of bread, he should have a stone, or something as bad. But St. Paul had a little of the Macedonian simplicity, calling things by their own plain names.

8. Fifthly: Against this, some little things are pretended in answer by the Roman doctors. 1. That the holy eucha-

[h] Regul. Moral. 21.
[i] 1 Cor. x. 16.
[l] Lib. 17. de Civ. Dei, cap. 5.
[m] 1 Cor. xi. 26. 28.

rist, or the sacred body, is called 'bread,' because 'it is made of bread,' as Eve is called of Adam, 'bone of his bone;' and the rods changed into serpents are still called rods; or else because 'it sometimes was bread,'—therefore so it is called after: just as we say, 'The blind see, the lame walk, the harlots enter into the kingdom of heaven.' Which answer although Bellarmine[a] mislikes, yet, lest any others should be pleased with it, I have this certain confutation of it: that by the Roman doctrine the bread is wholly annihilated, and nothing of the bread becomes any thing of the holy body; and the holy body never was bread, not so much as the matter of bread remaining in the change. It cannot therefore be called bread, unless it be bread; at least not for this reason. For if the body of Christ be not bread then, neither ever was it bread, neither was it made of bread: and therefore these cannot be the reasons, because they are not true. But in the instances alleged, the denomination still remains, because the change was made in the same remaining matter, or in the same person, or they were to be so again as they were before; nothing of which can be affirmed of the eucharist, by their doctrine, therefore these instances are not pertinent. 2. Others answer, that the holy body is called bread, because it seems to be so: just as the effigies and forms of pomegranates, of bulls, of serpents, of cherubim, are called by the names of those creatures, whom they do resemble. I reply, that well they may, because there is there no danger of being deceived by such appellations; no man will suppose them other than the pictures, and so to speak is usual and common. But, in the matter of the holy eucharist, it ought not to be called 'bread' for 'the likeness to bread,' unless it were 'bread' indeed; because such likeness and such appellation are, both of them, a temptation against that, which these men call an article of faith: but rather because it is like bread, and all the world are apt to take it for such, it ought to have been described with caution, and affirmed to be 'Christ' and 'God,' and not to be bread though it seem so. But when it is often called bread in Scripture, which name the church of Rome does not at all use in the mystery, and is never called in Scripture, the Son of God, or God, or Christ; which words the church of Rome does often use in

[a] Lib. 1. c. 14. de Euchar.

the mystery; it is certain that it is called bread, not because it is like bread, but because it is so indeed. And indeed, upon such an answer as this, it is easy to affirm an apple to be a pigeon, and no apple; for if it be urged, that all the world call it an apple, it may be replied then as now, 'It is true they call it an apple, because it is like an apple, but indeed it is a pigeon.'—3. Some of them say when it is called 'bread,' it is not meant that particular kind of nourishment; but in general it means any food; and so only represents Christ's body as a celestial divine thing intended some way to be our food. Just, as in St. John, vi. Christ is called 'the bread that came down from heaven,' not meaning material bread, but divine nourishment. But this is the weakest of all, because this, which is called bread, is broken, is eaten, hath the accidents of bread, and all the signs of his proper nature; and it were a strange violence, that it should here signify any manner of food to which it is not like, and not signify that to which it is so like. Besides this, 'bread' here signifies, as wine or chalice does in the following words; now that did signify the 'fruit of the vine;' that special manner of drink (Christ himself being the interpreter); and therefore so must this mean that special manner of food.

9. Sixthly: If, after the blessing, the bread doth not remain, but (as they affirm) be wholly annihilated, then, by blessing, God destroys a creature: which indeed is a strange kind of blessing. Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εὐλογῶν βεβαιοῖ τοὺς λόγους τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ παντοδαπὴν παρέχει φορὰν ἀγαθῶν τοῖς εὐλογουμένοις, saith Suidas, verb. εὐλογῆσαι. "When God blesses, he confirms his words with deeds, and gives all sorts of good to that which he blesses."—And certain it is, that, although blessing can change it, it must yet change it to the better; and so, we affirm, he does: for the bread, besides the natural being, by being blessed becomes the body of Christ in a sacramental manner; but then it must remain bread still, or else it receives not that increase and change; but if it be annihilated and becomes nothing, it is not Christ's body in any sense, nor in any sense can pretend to be blessed. To which add the words of St. Austin[o]: "Ille ad quem non esse non pertinet, non est causa deficiendi, id est, tendendi ad non esse:" "He that is the fountain of all being, is not the cause of not

[o] Lib. 83. quæst. 21.

being, much less can his blessing cause any thing not to be." —It follows therefore, that, by blessing, the bread becomes better, but therefore it still remains.

10. Seventhly: That it is bread of which Christ affirmed "This is my body," and that it is bread after consecration, was the doctrine of the fathers in the primitive church. I begin with the words of a whole council of fathers, in Trullo at Constantinople, decreeing thus against the Aquarii: "In sanctis nihil plus quàm corpus Christi offeratur, ut ipse Dominus tradidit, hoc est, panis et vinum aquâ mixtum;" "In the holy place or offices, let nothing more be offered but the body of Christ, as the Lord himself delivered, that is, bread and wine mingled with water."—So Justin Martyr [p]: Εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφὴν, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν, ἐκείνου τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ καὶ σάρκα τὸ αἷμα ἐδιδάχθημεν εἶναι: "We are taught that the food made eucharistical, the food which by change nourishes our flesh and blood, is the flesh and blood of Jesus incarnate: οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον, we do not receive it as common bread:" No, for it is τροφὴ εὐχαριστηθεῖσα, it is made 'sacramental and eucharistical,' and so it is sublimed to become the body of Christ. But it is natural food still, and that for two reasons. 1. Because still he calls it 'bread,' not 'common bread,' but extraordinary; yet bread still. Cardinal Perron says, 'It follows not to say, It is not common bread, therefore it is bread; so as of those which appeared as men to Abraham, we might say they were not common men; but it follows not that they were men at all. So the Holy Ghost, descending like a dove upon the blessed Jesus, was no common dove; and yet it follows not it was a dove at all.' I reply to this, that of whatsoever you can say, it is extraordinary in his kind, of that you may also affirm it to be of that kind: as concerning the richest scarlet, if you say this is no ordinary colour, you suppose it to be a colour: so the Corinthian brass was no common brass, and the Colossus was no common statue, and Christmas-day is no common day, yet these negatives suppose the affirmative of their proper subject; Corinthian brass is brass, colossus is a statue, and Christmas-day is a day. But if you affirm of a counterfeit, or of an image, or a picture, by saying, it is no common thing, you deny to it the

[p] Just. Mart. Apol. 2.

ordinary nature by diminution; but if it have the nature of the thing, then to say, it is not common, denies the ordinary nature by addition and eminency; the first says it is not so at all, the second says it is more than so; and this is taught to every man by common reason, and he could have observed it if he had pleased; for it is plain, Justin said this of that, which, before the consecration, was known to be natural bread, and therefore, now to say it was not common bread, is to say it is bread and something more. 2. The second reason from the words of Justin to prove it to be natural food still, is, because it is that, by which our blood and our flesh are nourished by change. Bellarmine says, that these words, by which our flesh and blood are nourished, mean by which they use to be nourished; not meaning, that they are nourished by this bread, when it is eucharistical. But besides that this is 'gratis dictum' without any colour or pretence from the words of Justin, but by a presumption taken from his own opinion, as if it were impossible, that Justin should mean any thing against his doctrine: besides this, I say the interpretation is insolent, 'nutriuntur,' i. e. 'solent nutriri;' as also because both the verbs are of the present tense, τρέφονται σάρκες et σῶμα ἐδιδάχθημεν εἶναι, "the flesh and blood are nourished by bread," and "it is the body of Christ;" that is, both in conjunction; so that he says not, as Bellarmine would have him, "Cibus ille, ex quo carnes nostræ ali solent, cum prece mysticâ consecratur, efficitur corpus Christi;" but, "Cibus ille, quo carnes nostræ aluntur, est corpus Christi." The difference is material, and the matter is apparent: but upon this alone I rely not. To the same purpose are the words of Irenæus[q]: "Dominus accipiens panem, suum corpus esse confitebatur, et temperamentum calicis, suum sanguinem confirmavit:" "Our Lord taking bread confessed it to be his body, and the mixture of the cup he confirmed to be his blood." Here Irenæus affirms to be true what Bellarmine[r] says 'non potest fieri,' 'cannot be done;' that in the same proposition bread should be the subject, and body should be the predicate; Irenæus says, that Christ said it to be so, and him we follow. But most plainly in his fifth book: "Quando ergo et mixtus calix, et fractus panis percipit verbum Dei, fit eucharistia sanguinis et corporis Christi;

[q] Lib. 4. c. 57. [r] De Euch. l. 3. c. 19.

ex quibus augetur et consistit carnis nostræ substantia: Quomodo carnem negant capacem esse donationis Dei qui est vita æterna, quæ sanguine et corpore Christi nutritur?" and, a little after, he affirms that we are "flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones; and that this is not understood of the spiritual man, but of the natural disposition or temper; quæ de calice, qui est sanguis ejus, nutritur, et de pane, qui est corpus ejus, augetur:" and again; "Eum calicem qui est creatura, suum sanguinem qui effusus est, ex quo auget nostrum sanguinem, et eum panem, &c. qui est creatura, suum corpus confirmavit, ex quo nostra auget corpora;" "It is made the eucharist of the bread, and the body of Christ out of that, of which the substance of our flesh consists and is increased; by the bread which he confirmed to be his body, he increases our bodies; by the blood which was poured out, he increases our blood;" that is the sense of Irenæus so often repeated. And to the same purpose is that of Origen[s]: Ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ σύμβολον ἡμῖν τῆς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εὐχαριστίας ἄρτος εὐχαριστία καλούμενος. "The bread, which is called the eucharist, is to us the symbol of thanksgiving or eucharist to God." So also Tertullian[t]: "Acceptum panem et distributum discipulis suis corpus suum fecit:" "He made the bread, which he took and distributed to his disciples, to be his body." But more plainly in his book 'de Coronâ Militis:' "Calicis aut panis nostri aliquid decuti in terram anxiè patimur;" "We cannot endure that any of the cup or any thing of the bread be thrown to the ground."—The eucharist he plainly calls 'bread;' and that he speaks of the eucharist is certain, and Bellarmine[u] quotes the words to the purpose of shewing, how reverently the eucharist was handled and regarded. The like is in St. Cyprian[x]: "Dominus corpus suum panem vocat, et sanguinem suum vinum appellat:" "Our Lord calls bread his body, and wine his blood." So John Maxentius, in the time of Pope Hormisda: "The bread which the whole church receives in memory of the passion, is the body of Christ[y]." And St. Cyril, of Jerusalem, is earnest in this affair: "Since our Lord hath declared and said to us of bread, 'This is my body,' who shall dare to doubt it?"

[s] Lib. 8. adv. Celsum.
[t] Tertul. adv. Marcion. lib. 4. c. 40.
[u] Bellar. lib. 4. Euch. c. 14. sect. si rursus objicias.
[x] Cyprian. ep. 76. Dial. 2. contr. Nestor.
[y] Catech. Mystag. 4.

which words I the rather note, because Cardinal Perron brings them, as if they made for his cause, which they most evidently destroy. For if, of bread, Christ made this affirmation, that it is his body, then it is both bread and Christ's body too, and that is it which we contend for. In the dialogues against the Marcionites, collected out of Maximus, Origen is brought in proving the reality of Christ's flesh and blood in his incarnation, by this argument:—If, as these men say, he be without flesh and blood, ἢ τίνος σώματος ἢ ποίου αἵματος εἰκόνας διδοὺς ἄρτόν τε καὶ ποτήριον ἐνετέλλετο, &c. "of what body and of what blood did he command the images or figures, giving the bread and cup to his disciples, that by these a remembrance of him should be made?" But Acacius[a], the successor of Eusebius in his bishopric, calls it 'bread' and 'wine,' even in the very use and sanctification of us: "Panis vinumque ex hâc materiâ vescentes sanctificat," "The bread and wine sanctify them that are fed with this matter."—"In typo sanguinis sui non obtulit aquam sed vinum," so St. Jerome[a], "He offered wine not water in the type [*representment* or *sacrament*] of his blood." To the same purpose, but most plain, are the words of Theodoret[b]: Ἔνγε τῶν μυστηρίων παραδόσει, σῶμα τὸν ἄρτον ἐκάλεσε καὶ αἷμα τὸ κρᾶμα, "In the exhibition of the mysteries he called bread his body, and the mixture in the chalice he called blood."—So also St. Austin, 'serm. 9. de Diversis:' "The eucharist is our daily bread; but we receive it so, that we are not only nourished by the belly, but also by the understanding." And I cannot understand the meaning of plain Latin, if the same thing be not affirmed in the little mass-book, published by Paulus V. for the English priests: "Deus, qui humano generi utramque substantiam præsentium munerum alimento tribuis, quæsumus, ut eorum et corporibus nostris subsidium non desit et mentibus," "The present gifts were appointed for the nourishment both of soul and body."—Who please may see more in Macarius's twenty-seventh homily, and Ammonius in his 'Evangelical Harmony,' in the Bibliotheca Patrum: and this, though it be decried now-a-days in the Roman schools, yet was the doctrine of Scotus[c], of Durandus[d], Ocham[e], Cameracen-

[a] Acacius in Gen. ii. Græc. Caten. in Pentateuch.
[b] Dial. 1. ἀτρέπτα.
[c] Ibid. q. 6. et Centilog. Theol. con. lib. 4. q. 6.
[d] Lib. 2. adv. Jovin.
[e] Sent. 4. dist. 11. q. 3.
[d] Ibid. q. 1.

sis[f], and Biel[g], and those men were for consubstantiation; that Christ's natural body was together with natural bread, which although I do not approve, yet the use that I now make of them, cannot be denied me; it was their doctrine, that after consecration bread still remains; after this let what can follow. But that I may leave the ground of this argument secure, I add this, that, in the primitive church, eating the eucharistical bread was esteemed the breaking the fast, which is not imaginable any man can admit, but he that believes bread to remain after consecration, and to be nutritive as before: but so it was, that, in the second age of the church, it was advised, that either they should end their station, or fast, at the communion, or defer the communion to the end of the station; as appears in Tertullian, 'de Oratione,' cap. 14.: which unanswerably proves, that then it was thought to be bread and nutritive, even then when it was eucharistical: and [h] Picus Mirandula affirms, that if a Jew or a Christian should eat the sacrament for refection, it breaks his fast. The same also is the doctrine of all those churches who use the liturgies of St. James, St. Mark, and St. Chrysostom, who hold that receiving the holy communion breaks the fast, as appears in the disputation of Cardinal Humbert with Nicetas about six hundred years ago. The sum of all is this; If of bread Christ said, 'This is my body,' because it cannot be true in a proper natural sense, it implying a contradiction that it should be properly bread, and properly Christ's body; it must follow, that it is Christ's body in a figurative improper sense. But if the bread does not remain bread, but be changed by blessing into our Lord's body; this also is impossible to be in any sense true, but by affirming the change to be only in use, virtue, and condition, with which change the natural being of bread may remain. For he that supposes that by the blessing, the bread ceases so to be, that nothing of it remains, must also necessarily suppose, that the bread being no more, it neither can be the body of Christ, nor any thing else. For it is impossible that what is taken absolutely from all being, should yet abide under a certain difference of being, and that that thing which is not at all, should yet be after a certain manner. Since therefore (as I have proved) the bread remains, and of bread it was affirmed 'This is my body,' it

[f] Ibid. q. 6. ar. 1. [g] Canon. Missæ, lect. 40. H. [h] Apol. 4. 6.

follows inevitably, that it is figuratively, not properly and naturally spoken of bread, that it is the flesh or body of our Lord.

SECTION VI.

Est Corpus meum.

1. THE next words to be considered are, 'Est corpus,' 'This is my body;' and here begins the first tropical expression; 'est,' that is, 'significat' or 'repræsentat, et exhibet corpus meum,' say some. 'This is my body,' it is to all real effects the same to your particulars, which my body is to all the church: it signifies, the breaking of my body, the effusion of my blood for you, and applies my passion to you, and conveys to you all the benefits; as this nourishes your bodies, so my body nourishes your souls to life eternal, and consigns your bodies to immortality. Others make the trope in 'corpus;' so that 'est' shall signify properly, but 'corpus' is taken in a spiritual sense, sacramental and mysterious; not a natural and presential; whether the figure be in 'est' or in 'corpus,' is but a question of rhetoric, and of no effect. That the proposition is tropical and figurative, is the thing, and that Christ's natural body is now in heaven definitively, and no where else; and that he is in the sacrament as he can be in a sacrament, in the hearts of faithful receivers, as he hath promised to be there; that is, in the sacrament mystically, operatively, as in a moral and divine instrument, in the hearts of receivers by faith and blessing; this is the truth and the faith of which we are to give a reason and account to them that disagree. But this, which is to all the purpose, which any one pretends can be in the sumption of Christ's body naturally, yet will not please the Romanists, unless 'est,' 'is,' signify properly without trope or metonymy, and 'corpus' be 'corpus naturale.' Here then I join issue; it is not Christ's body properly, or naturally: for though it signifies a real effect, yet it signifies the body figuratively, or the effects and real benefits.

2. Now concerning this, there are very many inducements to infer the figurative or tropical interpretation. 1. In the language which our blessed Lord spake, there is no word that can express 'significat,' but they use the word 'is;' the

Hebrews and the Syrians always join the names of the signs with the things signified: and since the very essence of a sign is to signify, it is not an improper elegancy, in those languages, to use 'est' for 'significat.' 2. It is usual in the Old Testament, as may appear, to understand 'est,' when the meaning is for the present, and not to express it: but when it signifies the future, then to express it; "the seven fat cows, seven years; the seven withered ears shall be seven years of famine[i]." 3. The Greek interpreters of the Bible supply the word 'est,' in the present tense, which is omitted in the Hebrew, as in the places above quoted: but although their language can very well express 'signifies,' yet they follow the Hebrew idiom. 4. In the New Testament the same manner of speaking is retained to declare, that the nature and being of signs, is to signify they have no other 'esse' but 'significare,' and therefore they use 'est' for 'significat.'—"The seed *is* the word: the field *is* the world: the reapers *are* the angels: the harvest *is* the end of the world: the rock *is* Christ; I *am* the door: I *am* the vine: my Father *is* the husbandman: I *am* the way, the truth, and the life: Sarah and Agar *are* the two Testaments: the stars *are* the angels of the churches: the candlesticks *are* the churches:" and many more of this kind; we have therefore great and fair and frequent precedents for expounding this 'est' by 'significat;' for it is the style of both the Testaments, to speak in signs and representments, where one disparate speaks of another, as it does here: the body of Christ, of the bread, which is the sacrament; especially since the very institution of it is representative, significative, and commemorative: for so said our blessed Saviour, "Do this in memorial of me[k];" and "This doing, ye shew forth the Lord's death till he come," saith St. Paul.

3. Secondly: The second credibility that our blessed Saviour's words are to be understood figuratively, is because it is a sacrament[l]: for mysterious and tropical expressions are very frequently, almost regularly and universally, used in Scripture, in sacraments, and sacramentals. And therefore,

[i] Gen. xli. 26, 27. xl. 12. 18. xvii. 10. Exod. xii. 11.

[k] Nemo recondatur nisi quod in præsentiâ non est positum: St. August. in Psal. xxxvii.

[l] Hæc enim Sacramenta sunt, in quibus non quid sint, sed quid ostendant, semper attenditur, quoniam signa sunt rerum aliud existentia, aliud significantia. August. lib. 3. contr. Max. c. 22. Sacramentum dicitur sacrum signum, sive sacrum secretum. Bern. Serm. de Cœn. Dom.

it is but a vain discourse of Bellarmine to contend, that this must be a proper speaking, because it is a sacrament. For that were all one as to say, 'He speaks mystically,' therefore he 'speaks properly.' Μυστήριον is the Greek for a sacrament; and all the Greek that is for it in the New Testament: and when St. Paul tells of a 'man praying in the Spirit,' but so as not to be understood, he expresses it by, 'speaking mysteries [m].' The mysterious and sacramental speaking is secret and dark. But so it is in the sacrament or covenant of circumcision. Τοῦτό ἐστι ἡ διαθήκη μου, 'This is my covenant [n],' and yet it was but "the seal of the covenant," if you believe St. Paul [o], it was a sacrament and a consignation of it, but it is spoken of it affirmatively; and the same words are used there as in the sacrament of the eucharist; it is διαθήκη in both places.

4. And upon this account two other usual objections (pretending that this being a covenant and a testament, it ought to be expressed without a figure) are dissolved. For here is a covenant and a testament and a sacrament all in one, and yet the expression of them is figurative; and the being a testament is so far from supposing all expression in it to be proper and free from figure, that itself, the very word 'testament,' in the institution of the holy sacrament, is tropical or figurative: 'est testamentum,' that is, 'est signum testamenti,' 'it is,' that is, 'it signifies.' And why they should say, that a testament must have in it all plain words and no figures or hard sayings, that contend that both the Testaments, New and Old, are very full of hard sayings, and upon that account forbid the people to read them; I confess I cannot understand. Besides this, though it be fit in temporal testaments all should be plain, yet we see all are not plain; and from thence come so many suits of law; yet there is not the same reason in spiritual or divine, and in human testaments; for in human, there is nothing but legacies and express commands, both which it is necessary that we understand plainly; but, in divine testaments, there are mysteries to exercise our industry and our faith, our patience and inquiry, some things for us to hope, some things for us to admire, some things to pry into, some things to act, some things for the present, some things for the future, some things pertaining to this life, some things pertaining to the

[m] 1 Cor. xiv. 2. [n] Gen. xvii. 10. [o] Rom. iv. 11.

life to come, some things we are to see in a glass darkly, some things reserved till the vision of God's face. And after all this, in human testaments men ought to speak plainly, because they can speak no more when they are dead. But Christ can, for 'he being dead yet speaketh;' and he can by his Spirit make the church understand as much as he please; and he will as much as is necessary: and it might be remembered, that in Scripture there is extant a record of Jacob's testament, and of Moses[p], which we may observe to be an allegory all the way. I have heard also of an Athenian, that had two sons; and being asked on his deathbed, to which of his two sons he would give his goods, to Leon or Pantaleon, which were the names of his two sons; he only said, δίδωμι πανταλεόντι, but whether he meant to give 'all πάντα to Leon,' or to 'Pantaleon,' is not yet known. And in the civil law it is noted, that testaments have figurative expressions very often; and therefore decreed, "Non enim, in causâ testamentorum, ad definitionem (strictam, sive propriam verborum significationem, saith the gloss), utique descendendum est, cum plerumque abusivè loquantur, nec propriis vocabulis ac nominibus semper utantur testatores[q]." And there are in law certain measures for presumption of the testator's meaning. These therefore are trifling arrests; even a commandment may be given with a figurative expression, and yet be plain enough: such was that of Jesus: "Pray ye the Lord of the harvest, that he would send men into his harvest;" and that, Jesus commanded "his disciples to prepare the passover;" and some others: so, "Rend your hearts, and not your garments," &c. And an article of faith may be expressed figuratively; so is that of Christ's sitting at the right hand of his Father. And therefore, much more may there be figurative expressions in the institution of a mystery, and yet be plain enough; "Tropica locutio cum fit ubi fieri solet, sine labore sequitur intellectus," said St. Austin[r]. Certain it is, the church understood this well enough for a thousand years together, and yet admitted of figures in the institution: and since these new men had the handling of it, and excluded the figurative sense, they have made it so hard, that themselves cannot understand it, nor tell one another's meaning. But it suffices

[p] Gen. xlix. Deut. xxxiii. [q] Lib. non aliter sect. Titius F. de legat. et fidei com.
[r] Lib. 3. de Doct. Christ. c. 37.

as to this particular, that in Scripture, doctrines and promises and precepts and prophecies and histories, are expressed sometimes figuratively; 'Dabo tibi claves;' and 'Semen mulieris conteret caput serpentis;' and 'The dragon drew the third part of the stars with his tail;' and 'Fight the good fight of faith, Put on the armour of righteousness;' —and very many more.

5. Thirdly: And indeed there is no possibility of distinguishing sacramental propositions from common and dogmatical, or from a commandment; but that these are affirmative of a nature, those of a mystery; these speak properly, they are figurative: such as this; "Unless a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." The proposition is sacramental, mystical, and figurative: "Go and baptize," that is a precept; therefore the rather is it literal and proper. So it is in the blessed sacrament, the institution is in, "Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and brake it, and gave to his disciples, saying, Take, eat." In these also there is a precept, and in the last words, 'Hoc facite,' 'This do in remembrance of me;'—but the sacramental proposition or the mystical, which explicates the sacrament, is, 'Hoc est corpus meum;' and either this is, or there is no sacramental proposition in this whole affair to explicate the mystery, or the being a sacrament. But this is very usual in sacramental propositions. For so baptism is called 'regeneration,' and it is called a 'burial' by St. Paul, "for we are buried with him in baptism;" then baptism is either 'sepulchrum' or 'sepultura,' the 'grave' or the 'burial;' but either of them is a figure, and it is so much used in sacramental and mystic propositions, that they are all so, or may be so; "ut baptismus sepulchrum, sic hoc est corpus meum," saith St. Austin[s]. And this is also observed in Gentile rites.

——— φέρον ὅρκια πιστὰ,
Ἄρνε δύω, καὶ οἶνον ἐύφρονα ——— So Homer[t]:

The slain 'lambs and the wine' were the sacrament, 'the faithful oaths;' that is, the rite and mystery of their sanction; they were oaths figuratively.

6. Fourthly: But to save the labour of more instances; St. Austin hath made the observation, and himself gives in a list of particulars: "Solet autem res quæ significat, ejus rei nomine quam significat, nuncupari; 'septem spicæ, septem

[s] Lib. 20. contr. Faustum Manich. c. 21. [t] Il. γ. 245.

anni sunt;' non enim dixit 'septem annos significant:' et multa hujusmodi. Hinc est quod dictum erat, petra erat Christus, non enim dixit, petra significat Christum, sed tanquam hoc esset quod utique per substantiam non erat, sed per significationem[u]:" "The thing which signifies is wont to be called by that which it signifies: the seven ears of corn are seven years: he did not say they signified seven years, but are; and many like this. Hence it is said, the rock was Christ, for he said not, the rock signifies Christ; but as if the thing were that, not which it were in his own substance, but in signification."—"Pervulgatum est in Scripturâ, ut res figurata nomen habeat figuræ," saith Ribera[x]. That this is no usual thing, is confessed on all hands.

So is that of Exodus, 'The lamb is the passover;' and this does so verify St. Austin's words, that in the New Testament the apostles asked our Lord, Where wilt thou that we prepare to eat 'the passover?' that is, 'the lamb' which was the remembrance of the passover, as the blessed eucharist is of the death of Christ. To this instance Bellarmine[y] speaks nothing to purpose; for he denies the lamb to signify the passover, or the passing of the angel over the houses of Israel, because there is no likelihood between the lamb and the passover; and, to make the business up, he says, "The lamb was the passover." By some straining, the lamb slain might signify the slaying the Egyptians, and remember their own escape at the time when they first ate the lamb: but by no straining could the lamb be the 'thing;' especially, if, for the dissimilitude, it could not so much as signify it, how could it be the very same, to which it was so extremely unlike? but he always says something, though it be nothing to the purpose: and yet it may be remembered, that the eating the lamb was as proper an instrument of remembrance of that deliverance, as the eating consecrated bread is of the passion of our blessed Lord. "But it seems the lamb is the very passover, as the very festival-day is called the passover;" so he. And he says true, in the same manner; but that is but by a trope or figure, for 'the feast' is the feast of 'the passover;' if you speak properly, it is the passover by a metonymy: and so is the lamb. And this instance is so much the more apposite, because it is the forerunner of the blessed

[u] In Levit. p. 57. [x] In Apoc. c. xv. v. 8.
[y] Lib. 1. Euch. c. 11. sect. Quædam citantur.

eucharist, which succeeded *that*, as baptism did circumcision; and there is nothing of sense that hath been, or I think can be, spoken, to evade the force of this instance; nor of the many others before reckoned.

8. Fifthly: And as it is usual in all sacraments, so particularly it must be here, in which there is such a heap of tropes and figurative speeches, that almost in every word there is plainly a trope. For, 1. Here is the cup taken for the thing contained in it. 2. Testament, for the legacy given by it. 3. *This*, is not 'in recto,' but 'in obliquo.' *This*, that is, 'not this which you see, but this which you do not see.' This which is under the species, is my body. 4. 'My body,' but not 'bodily;' 'my body,' without the forms and figure of my body; that is, 'my body,' not as it is in 'nature,' not as it is in 'glory,' but as it is in 'sacrament;' that is, 'my body sacramentally.'—5. 'Drink ye;' that is also improper; for his blood is not drunk properly, for blood hath the same manner of existing in the chalice as it hath in the paten, that is, is under the form of wine as it is under the form of bread; and therefore it is in the veins, not separate, say they [z], and yet it is in the bread, as it is in the chalice, and in both, as upon the cross, that is, poured out, so Christ said expressly; for else it were so far from being his blood, that it were not so much as the sacrament of what he gave; so that the wine in the chalice is not drunk, because it is not separate from the body; and in the bread it cannot be drunk, because there it is not in the veins; or if it were, yet it is made as a consistent thing by the continent, but is not potable: now that which follows from hence is, that it is not drunk at all properly, but figuratively: and so Mr. Brerely [a] confesses sometimes, and Jansenius [b]. There is also an impropriety in the word 'given,' for 'shall be given;' 'is poured out,' for 'shall be poured out [c];' in 'broken,' for then it was not broken when Christ spake it, and it cannot be properly spoken since his glorification. Salmeron allows an enallage in the former, and Suarez a metaphor in the latter: "Frangi

[z] See Brerely Liturg. tract. 4. sect. 8. Glossa in c. si per negligentiam, dist. 2. de consecrat. in hæc verba [de sanguine] ait de sanguine, i. e. de sacramento sanguinis. Sanguis enim Christi à corpore Christi separari non valet, ergo nec stillare nec fluere potest.

[a] See Brerely Liturg. tract. 4. sect. 8.

[b] Concord. in eum locum.

[c] Salmer. in 1 Cor. xi. Gregor. de Valent. lib. 1. de Missa, c. 3. sect. igitur. tom. 3. disp. 47. sect. 4. sect. exempla tertiæ. Ruard Tapper in art. 13.

cùm dicitur, est metaphorica locutio." And this is their excuse, why, in the Roman missal, they leave out the words "which is broken for you;" for they do what they please, they put in some words which Christ used not, and leave out something that he did use;—and yet they are all the words of institution! And upon the same account there is another trope in 'eat;' and yet with a strange confidence, these men wonder at us for saying, the sacramental words are tropical or figurative [d], when even, by their own confession [e] and proper grounds, there is scarce any word in the whole institution but admits an impropriety. And then concerning the main predication; 'This is my body,'—as Christ called 'bread his body,' so he called 'his body bread;' and both these affirmatives are destructive of transubstantiation; for if, of bread, Christ affirmed, it is his body,—by the rule of disparates it is figurative; and if, of his body, he affirmed it to be bread, it is certain also and confessed to be a figure. Now concerning this, besides that our blessed Saviour affirmed himself to be 'the bread that came down from heaven,' calling himself 'bread,' and, in the institution, calling 'bread' his 'body;' we have the express words of Theodoret [f]: Τῷ μὲν σώματι τὸ τοῦ συμβόλου τέθεικεν ὄνομα, τῷ δὲ συμβόλῳ τὸ τοῦ σώματος; "Christ gave to his body the name of the symbol, and to the symbol the name of his body;" and St. Cyprian speaks expressly to this purpose, as you may see above, sect. 5. n. 9.

9. Sixthly: The strange inconveniences and impossibilities, the scandals and errors, the fancy of the Capernaites, and the temptations to faith, arising from the literal sense of these words, have been, in other cases, thought sufficient by all men to expound words of Scripture by tropes and allegories. The heresy of the Anthropomorphites and the Euchitæ, and the doctrine of the Chiliasts, and Origen gelding himself, proceeded from the literal sense of some texts of Scripture, against which there is not the hundredth part of so much presumption as I shall in the sequel make to appear to lie against this. And yet no man puts out his right eye literally, or cuts off his right hand, to prevent a scandal. Cer-

[d] Dico quòd figura corporis Christi est ibi, sed figura corporis Christi non est ibi figura corporis Christi. Holcot. in 4. sent. quæst. 3.

[e] Anselm, Lombard, Thomas, Lyran, Gorran, Cajetan, Dion. Carth. Catharinus, Salmeron, Bened. Justinian, Sà in 1 Cor. xi. et innumeri alii.

[f] Dial. 1. c. 8.

tain it is, there hath been much greater inconvenience by following the letter of these words of institution, than of any other in Scripture: by so much as the danger of idolatry, and actual tyranny, and uncharitable damning others, and schism, are worse than any temporal inconvenience, or an error in a matter of speculation.

10. Seventhly: I argue out of St. Austin's[g] grounds thus: As the fathers did eat Christ's body, so do we under a diverse sacrament, and different symbols, but in all the same reality; whatsoever we eat, the same they did eat; for the difference is this only, they received Christ by faith in him that was to come, and we by faith in him that is come already; but they had the same real benefit, Christ as really as we, for they had salvation as well as we. But the fathers could not eat Christ's flesh in a natural manner, for it was not yet assumed: and though it were as good an argument against our eating of it naturally, that it is gone from us into heaven; yet that which I now insist upon is, that it was 'cibus spiritualis,' which they ate under the sacrament of manna; therefore we, under the sacrament of bread and wine eating the same meat, eat only Christ in a spiritual sense, that is, our spiritual meat. And this is also true in the other sacraments of the rock and the cloud: "Our fathers ate of the same spiritual meat, and drank of the same spiritual drink, that is, Christ;" so he afterward expounds it. Now if they did eat and drink Christ, that is, were by him in sacrament, and, to all reality of effect, nourished up to life eternal, why cannot the same spiritual meat do the same thing for us, we receiving it also in sacrament and mystery? 2. To which I add, that all they, that do communicate spiritually, do receive all the blessing of the sacrament, which could not be, unless the mystery were only sacramental, mysterious, and spiritual. Maldonate[h], speaking of something of this from the authority of St. Austin, is of opinion that if St. Austin were now alive, in very spite to the Calvinists, he would have expounded that of manna otherwise than he did: it seems he lived in a good time, when malice and the spirit of contradiction were not so much in fashion in the interpretations of the Scripture.

11. Now let it be considered, whether all that I have said, be not abundantly sufficient to outweigh their confi-

[g] Tract. 26. in S. Johan.

[h] In S. Johan. 6. 49.

dence of the literal sense of these sacramental words. They find the words spoken,—they say they are literally to be understood; they bring nothing considerable for it; there is no scripture that so expounds it; there is no reason in the circumstances of the words; but there is all the reason of the world against it (as I have and shall shew), and such, for the meanest of which very many other places of Scripture are drawn from the literal sense, and rest in a tropical and spiritual. Now, in all such cases, when we find an inconvenience press the literal expression of a text, instantly we find another, that is figurative; and why it is not so done in this, the interest and secular advantages, which are consequent to this opinion of the church of Rome, may give sufficient account. In the meantime, 1. we have reason not to admit of the literal sense of these words, not only by the analogy of other sacramental expressions in both Testaments (I mean that of circumcision and the passover in the Old, and baptism, as Christ discoursed it to Nicodemus, in the New Testament); but also, 2. Because the literal sense of the like words, in this very article, introduced the heresy of the Capernaites; and, 3. Because the subject and the predicate, in the words of institution, are diverse and disparate, and cannot possibly be spoken of each other properly. 4. The words, in the natural and proper sense, seem to command an unnatural thing, the eating of flesh. 5. They rush upon infinite impossibilities; they contradict sense and reason, the principles and discourses of all mankind, and of all philosophy. 6. Our blessed Saviour tells us, that the "flesh profiteth nothing," and (as themselves pretend) even in this mystery, that his words were "spirit and life." 7. The literal sense cannot be explicated by themselves, nor by any body for them. 8. It is against the analogy of other scriptures. 9. It is to no purpose. 10. Upon the literal sense of the words, the church could not confute the Marcionites[1], Eutychians, Nestorians, the Aquarii. 11. It is against antiquity. 12. The whole form of words, in every of the members, is confessed to be figurative by the opposite party. 13. It is not pretended to be verifiable without an infinite company of miracles, all which being more than needs, and none of them visible, but contestations against art and the notices of two or three sciences, cannot be sup-

[1] Vide infra, sect. 12. n. 22. 32. &c. et sect. 10. n. 6.

posed to be done by God, who does nothing superfluously. 14. It seems to contradict an article of faith, viz. of Christ's sitting in heaven in a determinate place, and being contained there till his second coming. Upon these considerations, and upon the account of all the particular arguments, which I have and shall bring against it, it is not unreasonable, neither can it seem so, that we decline the letter, and adhere to the spirit in the sense of these words. But I have divers things more to say in this particular from the consideration of other words of the institution, and the whole nature of the thing.

SECTION VII.

Considerations of the Manner and Circumstances and Annexes of the Institution.

1. The blessed sacrament is the same thing now, as it was in the institution of it: but Christ did not really give his natural body in the natural sense, when he ate his last supper; therefore, neither does he now. The first proposition is beyond all dispute, certain, evident, and confessed; "Hoc facite" convinces it: "This do;" what Christ did, his disciples are to do. I assume,—Christ did not give his natural body properly in the last supper, therefore neither does he now; the assumption I prove by divers arguments.

2. First: If then he gave his natural body, then it was naturally broken, and his blood was actually poured forth before the passion; for he gave τὸ σῶμα κλώμενον, τὸ ποτήριον, or αἷμα ἐκχυνόμενον, 'his body was delivered broken,' 'his blood was shed:' now those words were spoken either properly and naturally; and then they were not true, because his body was yet whole, his blood still in the proper channels; or else it was spoken in a figurative and sacramental sense, and so it was true (as were all the words which our blessed Saviour spake): for that, which he then ministered, was the sacrament of his passion.

3. Secondly: If Christ gave his body in the natural sense at the last supper, then it was either a sacrifice propitiatory, or it was not; if it was not, then it is not now, and then their dream of the mass is vanished: if it was propitiatory at the last supper, then God was reconciled to all the

world, and mankind was redeemed before the passion of our blessed Saviour: which, therefore, would have been needless and ineffective: so fearful are the consequents of this strange doctrine.

4. Thirdly: If Christ gave his body properly in the last supper, and not only figuratively and in sacrament, then it could not be a representment or sacrament of his passion, but a real exhibition of it: but that it was a sacrament only, appears by considering that it was then alive; that the passion was future, that the thing was really to be performed upon the cross, that then he was to be delivered for the life of the world. In the last supper, all this was in type and sacrament,—because it was before, and the substance was to follow after.

5. Fourthly: If the natural body of Christ was in the last supper under the accidents of bread, then his body, at the same time, was visible and invisible in the whole substance,—visible in his person, invisible under the accidents of bread: and then it would be inquired, what it was which the apostles received, what benefits they could have by receiving the body naturally; or whether it be imaginable, that the apostles understood it in the literal sense, when they saw his body stand by, unbroken, alive, integral, hypostatical.

6. Fifthly: If Christ's body were naturally in the sacrament, I demand, whether it be as it was in the last supper,—or as upon the cross,—or as it is now in heaven? 'Not as in the last supper;'—for then it was frangible, but not broken; but typically, by design, in figure and in sacrament, as it is evident in matter of fact. 2. 'Not as on the cross;'—for there the body was frangible and broken too, and the blood spilled; and if it were so now in the sacrament, besides that it were to make Christ's glorified body passible, and to crucify the Lord of life again: it also were not the same body, which Christ hath now; for his body that he hath now, is spiritual and incorruptible, and cannot be otherwise; much less can it be so and not so at the same time properly, and yet be the same body. 3. 'Not as in heaven,'—where it is neither corruptible nor broken; for then in the sacrament there were given to us Christ's glorified body; and then, neither were the sacrament a remembrance of Christ's death, neither were the words of institution verified, "This

is my body, which is broken;" besides, in this we have Bellarmine's[k] confession; "Neque enim ore corporali sumi potest corpus Christi, ut est in cœlo." But then if it be remembered, that Christ hath no other body but that which is in heaven; and that can never be otherwise than it is, and so it cannot be received otherwise properly; it unanswerably follows, that if it be received in any other manner (as it must if it be at all), it must be received, not naturally or corporally, but spiritually and indeed. By a figure, or a sacramental, spiritual sense, all these difficulties are easily assoiled, but by the natural never.

7. Sixthly: At the last supper, they ate the blessed eucharist, but it was not in remembrance of Christ's death; for it was future then, and therefore not then capable of being remembered any more than a man can be said to remember what will be done to-morrow; it follows from hence that then Christ only instituted a sacrament, or figurative, mysterious representment of a thing, that in the whole use of it was variable by 'heri' and 'cras,' and therefore never to be naturally verified, but on the cross by a proper and natural presence, because then it was so and never else; at that time it was future, and now it is past, and in both it is relative to his death; therefore it could not be a real exhibition of his body in a natural sense, for that as it could not be remembered then, so neither broken now; that is, nothing of it is natural, but it is wholly ritual, mysterious, and sacramental. For that this was the sacrament of his death, appears in the words of institution, and by the preceptive words, "Do this in remembrance of me."—And in the reason subjoined by St. Paul, Ὁσάκις γὰρ ἂν ἐσθίητε, &c. "For so often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye shew the Lord's death till he come[l]." Therefore, when Christ said, 'This is my body given,' or 'broken' on my part, 'taken, eaten,' on yours, it can be nothing else but the εἰκὼν, 'the sacramental image of his death;' to effect which purpose it could not be necessary or useful to bring his natural body, that so the substance should become his own shadow; the natural presence be his own sacrament, or rather the image and representment of what he once suffered. His body, given in the sacrament, is the application and memory of his death, and no more; that as Christ in heaven represents

[k] De Euch. lib. 1. c. 13. sect. 1. [l] 1 Cor. xi. 26.

his death in the way of intercession, so do we by our ministry: but as in heaven it is wholly a representing of his body crucified, a rememoration of his crucifixion, of his death and passion, by which he reconciled God and man: so it is in the sacrament after our manner, "This is my body given for you," that is, "This is the sacrament of my death, in which my body was given for you." For, as Aquinas said, in all sciences, words signify things; but it is proper to theology, that things themselves, signified or expressed by voices, should also signify something beyond it. 'This is my body,' are the sacramental words, or those words by which the mystery or the thing is sacramental; it must, therefore, signify something beyond these words, and so they do; for they signify the death which Christ suffered in that body. It is but an imperfect conception of the mystery to say, it is the sacrament of Christ's body only, or his blood; but it is 'ex parte rei,' a sacrament of the death of his body: and to us a participation, or an exhibition of it, as it became beneficial to us, that is, as it was crucified, as it was our sacrifice. And this is so wholly agreeable to the nature of the thing, and the order of the words, and the body of the circumstances, that it is next to that which is evident in itself, and needs no further light but the considering the words and the design of the institution: especially since it is consonant to the style of Scripture in the sacrament of the passover, and very many other instances; it wholly explicates the nature of the mystery,—it reconciles our duty with the secret,—it is free of all inconvenience, it prejudices no right,—nor hinders any real effect it hath or can have: and it makes the mystery intelligible and prudent, fit to be discoursed of, and inserted into the rituals of a wise religion.

8. Seventhly: He that receives unworthily, receives no benefit to his body or to his soul by the holy sacrament, that is agreed on all sides; therefore, he that receives benefit to his body, receives it by his worthy communicating; therefore the benefit, reaching to the body by the holy eucharist, comes to it by the soul; therefore by the action of the soul, not the action of the body; therefore by faith, not by the mouth: whereas on the contrary, if Christ's body natural were eaten in the sacrament, the benefit would come to the body by his own action, and to the soul by the body. All

that eat, are not made 'Christ's body,' and all that eat not, are not disentitled to the resurrection; the Spirit does the work without the sacrament; and in the sacrament, when it is done, "the flesh profiteth nothing," and this argument ought to prevail upon this account: because, as is the nutriment, so is the manducation. If the nourishment be wholly spiritual, then so is the eating. But by the Roman doctrine the body of Christ does not naturally nourish; therefore neither is it eaten naturally; but it does nourish spiritually, and therefore it is eaten only spiritually. And this doctrine is also affirmed by Cajetan[m], though how they will endure it, I cannot understand: "Manducatur verum corpus Christi in sacramento, sed non corporalitèr sed spiritualitèr. Spiritualis manducatio, quæ per animam fit, ad Christi carnem in sacramento existentem pertingit:" "The true body of Christ is eaten in the sacrament, but not corporally, but spiritually. The spiritual manducation which is made by the soul, reaches to the flesh of Christ in the sacrament;"—which is very good Protestant doctrine. And if it be absurd to say, Christ's body doth nourish corporally, why it should not be as absurd to say, we eat it corporally, is a secret which I have not yet been taught. As is our eating, so is the nourishing, because that is in order to this; therefore, if you will suppose that natural eating of Christ's body does nourish spiritually, yet it must also nourish corporally; let it do more if it may, but it must do so much; just as the waters in baptism, although the waters are symbolical and instrumental to the purifying of the soul, yet because the waters are material and corporeal, they cleanse the body first and primarily: so it must be in this sacrament also; if Christ's body were eaten naturally, it must nourish naturally, and then pass further: but, "that which is natural is first, and then that which is spiritual."

9. Eighthly: For the likeness to the argument, I insert this consideration; By the doctrine of the ancient church, wicked men do not eat the body, nor drink the blood, of Christ. So Origen[n]: "Si fieri potest, ut qui malus adhuc perseveret, edat verbum factum carnem, cùm sit verbum et panis vivus, nequaquam scriptum fuisset, 'Quisquis ederit panem hunc, vivet in æternum:'" "If it were possible for him that perseveres in wickedness, to eat the Word made flesh,

[m] Opusc. tom. 2. tract. 2. de Euch. c. 5. [n] In Matt. xv.

when it is the Word and the living bread, it had never been written, 'Whosoever shall eat this bread shall live for ever.'" —So St. Hilary[o]: "Panis qui descendit de cœlo, non nisi ab eo accipitur qui Dominum habet, et Christi membrum est:" "The bread that came down from heaven, is not taken of any but of him who hath the Lord, and is a member of Christ." —"Lambunt petram," saith St. Cyprian[p], "They lick the rock," that is, eat not of the food, and drink not of the blood that issued from thence when the rock was smitten. They receive 'corticem sacramenti, et furfur carnis,' saith St. Bernard, 'the skin of the sacrament, and the bran of the flesh.'—But Venerable Bede[q] is plain without an allegory: "Omnis infidelis non vescitur carne Christi:" "An unbelieving man is not fed with the flesh of Christ;" the reason of which could not be any thing, but because Christ is only eaten by faith. But I reserved St. Austin[r] for the last: "So then these are no true receivers of Christ's body, in that they are none of his true members. For (to omit all other allegations) they cannot be both the members of Christ and the members of a harlot; and Christ himself saying, 'He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him,' sheweth what it is to receive Christ, not only sacramentally, but truly; for this is to dwell in Christ and Christ in him. For thus he spoke, as if he had said, He that dwelleth not in me nor I in him, cannot say, he eateth my flesh or drinketh my blood." In which words (if the Roman doctors will be judged by St. Austin for the sense of the church in this question, and will allow him in this point to be a good catholic), 1. He dogmatically declares, that the wicked man does not eat Christ's body truly. 2. He does eat it sacramentally. 3. That to eat with effect, is to eat Christ's body truly; to which, if they please to add this, that to eat it spiritually is to eat it with effect, it follows by St. Austin's doctrine, that 'spiritually is really,'—and that there is no true and real body of Christ eaten in the sacrament, but by the faithful receiver: or, if you please, receive the conclusion in the words of St. Austin[s]: "Tunc erit unicuique corpus et sanguis Christi, si quod in sacramento sumitur, in ipsâ veritate spiritualiter manducetur, spiritualiter bibatur:" "Then to each receiver it becomes the body and

[o] Lib. 8. de Trinit. [p] De Cœna Dom. aut quicunque auctor est.
[q] Super Exod. de Agno Paso. [r] Lib. 21. de Civit. Dei, c. 25.
[s] Serm. 2. de Verb. Apost.

blood of Christ, if that which is taken in the sacrament, be, in the very truth itself, spiritually eaten and spiritually drunk:" which words of St. Austin, Bellarmine[t], upon another occasion being to answer, instead of answering, grants it, and tells that this manner of speaking is very usual in St. Austin [the truest answer in all his books]: but whether it be for him or against him, he ought to have considered. Neither can this be put off with saying, that the wicked do not truly eat Christ, that is, not to any benefit or purpose; but that this does not mean, 'they receive him not at all.' Just as we say when a man eats but a little, he does not eat: for as good never a jot, as never the better. This, I say, is not a sufficient escape. 1. Because St. Austin opposes sacramental receiving to the true and real, and says that the wicked only receive it 'sacramentally;' but not the thing whose sacrament it is; so that this is not a proposition of degrees, but there is a plain opposition of one to the other. 2. It is true, St. Austin does not say that the wicked do not receive Christ at all; for he says they receive him sacramentally: but he says, they do not at all receive him truly, and the wicked man cannot say he does: and he proves this by unanswerable arguments out of Scripture. 3. This excuse will not, with any pretence, be fitted with the sayings of the other fathers, nor to all the words of St. Austin in this quotation, and much less in others which I have[u] and shall remark, particularly this; that he calls that, which the wicked eat, nothing but 'signum corporis et sanguinis.'—His words are these: "Ac per hoc qui non manet in Christo, et in quo non manet Christus, procul dubio non manducat spiritualiter carnem, non bibit sanguinem, licèt carnaliter et visibiliter premat dentibus signum corporis et sanguinis[x]:" "He does not eat the body and drink the blood spiritually, although carnally and visibly he presses with his teeth the sign of the body and blood."—Plainly, all the wicked do but eat the sign of Christ's body, all that is to be done beyond, is to eat it spiritually. There is no other eating but these two: and from St. Austin[y] it was that the schools received that famous distinction of 'panis Dominus,' and 'panis Domini;' Judas

[t] Lib. 1. Euch. c. 14. sect. Respond. apud Augustinum.
[u] De Serm. de Verb. Apost. Pauli supr.
[x] Tract. 26. in Joh. vid. etiam. Bellarmine, lib. 1. Euch. c. 14. sect. Respondeo St. August.
[y] Tract. 59. in Joh.

received 'the bread of the Lord' against the Lord: but the other apostles received 'the bread which was the Lord,' that is, his body. But I have already spoken of the matter of this argument in the third paragraph, numb. 7., which the reader may please to add to this to make it fuller.

10. Ninthly: Lastly,—In the words of institution and consecration, as they call them, the words, which relate to the consecrated wine, are so different in the evangelists, and St. Paul respectively, as appears by comparing them together; that, 1. It does not appear which words were literally spoken by our blessed Saviour: for all of them could not be so spoken as they are set down. 2. That they all regarded the sense and meaning of the mystery, not the letters and the syllables. 3. It is not possible to be certain, that Christ intended the words of any one of them to be consecratory or effective of what they signify, for every one of the relaters differs in the words, though all agree in the things; as the reader may observe in the beginning of the fourth paragraph, where the four forms are set by each other to be compared. 4. The church of Rome, in the consecration of the chalice, uses a form of words, which Christ spake not at all, nor are related by St. Matthew, or St. Mark, or St. Luke, or St. Paul, but she puts in some things and changes others: her form is this: "Hic est enim calix sanguinis mei Novi et æterni Testamenti, mysterium fidei, qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum:" "For this is the chalice of my blood, of the New and eternal Testament, the mystery of faith, which shall be shed for you, and for many, for the remission of sins:" what is added is plain, what is altered would be very material, if the words were consecratory; for they are not so likely to be operative and effective as the words of Christ recited by St. Matthew and St. Mark, 'This is my blood:' and if this had not been the ancient form used in the church of Rome long before the doctrine of transubstantiation was thought of; it is not to be imagined, that they would have refused the plainer words of Scripture, to have made the article more secret, the form less operative, the authority less warrantable, the words less simple and natural. But the corollary, which is natural and proper from the particulars of this argument, is, that the mystery was so wholly spiritual, that it was no matter by what words it were expressed, so the spirit of it were re-

tained; and yet if it had been an historical, natural, proper sense that had been intended, it ought also, in all reason, to have been declared, or (much more) effected by a natural and proper and constant affirmative. But that there is nothing spoken properly, is therefore evident; because there are so many predications, and all mean the same mystery: "Hic est sanguis meus Novi Testamenti;" and "Hic calix est Novum Testamentum in meo sanguine;" and, "Hic est calix sanguinis mei," in the Roman missal: all this declares it is 'mysterium fidei,' and so to be taken in all senses: and those words are left in their canon, as if on purpose either to prevent the literal and natural understanding of the other words, or for the reducing the communicants to the only apprehensions of faith: it is 'mysterium fidei,' not 'sanguis naturalis,' 'a mystery of faith,' not 'natural blood.' For supposing that both the forms used by St. Matthew and St. Luke, respectively, could be proper and without a figure; and St. Matthew's 'Hic est sanguis testamenti,' did signify, 'This is the divine promise' (for so Bellarmine[a] dreams that testament there signifies), and that in St. Luke's words, 'This cup is the testament,' it signifies 'the instrument of the testament' (for so a will, or a testament, is taken either for the thing willed, or the parchment in which it is written); yet how are these, or either of these, affirmative of the wine being transubstantiated into blood? It says nothing of that, and so if this sense of those words does avoid a trope, it brings in a distinct proposition; if it be spoken properly, it is more distant from giving authority to their new doctrine; and if the same word have several senses, then in the sacramental proposition, as it is described by the several evangelists, there are several predicates, and therefore it is impossible, that all should be proper. And yet besides this, although he thinks he may freely say any thing, if he covers it with a distinction, yet the very members of this distinction conclude against his conclusion; for if 'testament' in one place be taken for the 'instrument of his testament,' it is a tropical locution; just as I say, 'My bible' (meaning 'my book') 'is the word of God,' that is, contains the word of God, it is a metonymy of the thing containing, for that which it contains. But this was more than I needed, and therefore I am content it should pass for nothing.

[a] Lib. 1. de Euch. c. 11. sect. Ad tertiam dico.

SECTION VIII.

Of the Arguments of the Romanists from Scripture.

1. THUS I have, by very many arguments taken from the words and circumstances and annexes of the institution or consecration, proved, that the sense of this mystery is mysterious, and spiritual,—that Christ's body is eaten only sacramentally by the body, but really and effectively only by faith,—which is the mouth of the soul; that 'the flesh profiteth nothing,' but 'the words which Christ spake, are spirit and life.' And let it be considered, whether besides a pertinacious resolution that they will understand these words as they sound in the letter, not as they are intended in the spirit, there be any thing, or indeed can be, in the nature of the thing, or circumstances of it, or usefulness, or in the different forms of words, or the analogy of the other discourses of Christ, that can give colour to their literal sense? against which so much reason, and Scripture, and arguments from antiquity, do contest. This only I observe, that they bring no pretence of other scriptures to warrant this interpretation, but such which I have or shall wrest out of their hands; and which, to all men's first apprehensions, and at the very first sight, do make against them, and which, without curious notions and devices, cannot pretend on their side: as appears first in the tenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, verses 16, 17.

2. Out of which I have already proved, that Christ's body is not taken in the natural sense, but in the spiritual. But when Bellarmine[a] had, out of the same words, forced for himself three arguments proving nothing; to save any man the labour of answering them, he adds at the end of them these words: "Sed tota difficultas est[b], an corporaliter, realiter, propriè sumatur sanguis et caro, an solùm significativè et spiritualiter. Quod autem 'corporaliter et propriè' probari posset omnibus argumentis, quibus suprà probavimus propriè esse intelligenda verba illa institutionis, Hoc est corpus meum."—That is, after his arguments out of the First Epistle to the Corinthians[c] were ended, all the difficulty of the question still remained; and that he was fain to prove by

[a] Sect. 5. n. 6. lib. 1. Euch. c. 12. [b] Sect. Sed tota difficultas.
[c] Chap. x. ver. 16.

'Hoc est corpus meum,' and the proper argument of that; but brings nothing from the words of St. Paul in this chapter. But to make up this also he does 'corrodere,' 'scrape together' some things extrinsical to the words of this authority; as, 1. That the literal sense is to be presumed, unless the contrary be proved;—which is very true: but I have evidently proved the contrary concerning the words of institution; and for the words in this chapter, if the literal sense be preferred, then the bread remains after consecration, because it is called bread. 2. 'So the primitive saints expounded it'—which how true it is, I shall consider in his own place. 3. "The Apostle, calling the Gentiles from their sacrificed flesh, proposes to them a more excellent banquet—but it were not more excellent, if it were only a figure of Christ's body;"—so Bellarmine: which is a fit cover for such a dish: for, 1. We do not say, that, in the sacrament, we only receive the sign and figure of Christ's body; but all the real effects and benefits of it. 2. If we had, yet it is not very much better than blasphemy, to say that the apostles had not prevailed upon that account. For if the very figure and sacrament of Christ's body be better than sacrifices offered to devils, the Apostle had prevailed, though this sentence were true, that in the sacrament we receive only the figure. And thus I have, for all that is said against it, made it apparent that there is nothing in that place for their corporal presence.

3. There is one thing more, which, out of Scripture, they urge for the corporal presence, viz. "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord's body:" and, "He shall be guilty of the body and blood of Christ[d]." Where they observe, that they, that eat unworthily, do yet eat Christ's body; because how else could they be guilty of it, and condemned for not discerning it?

4. To this I answer many things. 1. St. Paul does not say, "He that eateth and drinketh Christ's body and blood unworthily," &c. but indefinitely, "He that eateth and drinketh[e]," &c. yet it is probable he would have said so, if it had been a proper form of speech, because, by so doing, it would have laid a greater load upon them. 2. Where St. Paul does not speak indefinitely, he speaks most clearly

[d] 1 Cor. xi. 27. 29. [e] Ver. 29.

against the article in the Roman sense; for he calls it ποτήριον Κυρίου, 'the cup of the Lord,' and ἄρτον τοῦτον, 'this bread,' and, 'He that eats this bread unworthily, is guilty of the body and blood of Christ[f]:' and now these comminatory phrases are quitted from their pretence, but yet have their proper consideration: therefore, 3. 'Not discerning' the Lord's body, is, 'not separating it' from profane and common usages, not treating it with addresses proper to the mystery. To which phrase Justin gives light in these words: —Οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν, "We do not receive it as common bread and common drink;" but τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφὴν, &c. "nourishment made eucharistical, or blessed, by the word of prayer;" and so it is the body and blood of the Lord. 4. It is the body of the Lord in the same sense here as in the words of institution, which I have evinced to be exegetical, sacramental, and spiritual; and, by despising the sacrament of it, we become guilty of the body and blood of Christ. "Reus erit corporis et sanguinis Christi, qui tanti mysterii sacramentum despexerit," saith St. Jerome[g]. And it is in this, as Severianus said concerning the statues of Theodosius broken in despite by the Antiochians: Ὕλη ἄψυχος, τοῦ βασιλέως εἰκόνα φέρουσα, τὴν ἑαυτῆς ὕβριν εἰς βασιλέα ἀνάγει: "If you abuse the king's image, the affront relates to your prince."—5. The unworthy receiver is guilty of the body and blood of Christ; not naturally, for that cannot now be; and nothing is a greater probation of the spiritual sense of the words in this place, than this, which they would entice into their party; for Christ's body is glorified, and not capable of natural injury: but the evil communicant is 'guilty of the body and blood of Christ;' just as relapsing Christians are said by the same apostles, 'to crucify the Lord of life again, and put him to an open shame,' which, I suppose, they cannot do naturally or corporally. One is as the other, that is, both are tropical or figurative.

5. These are all that they pretend from Scripture; and all these are nothing to their purpose; but now, besides what I have already said, I shall bring arguments from other scriptures, which will not so easily be put off.

[f] Ver. 27. [g] In 1 Cor. xi.

SECTION IX.

Arguments from other Scriptures, proving Christ's real Presence in the Sacrament to be only spiritual, not natural.

1. THE first is taken from those words of our blessed Saviour; "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast forth into the draught[h];" meaning, that all food that is taken by the mouth, hath for his share the fortune of the belly; and indeed, manducation and ejection are equally diminutions of any perfect thing; and because it cannot, without blasphemy, be spoken, that the natural body of Christ ought or can suffer ejection, neither can it suffer manducation. To this Bellarmine[i] weakly answers, 'that these words of Christ are only true of that which is taken to nourish the body;' which saying of his is not true; for if it be taken to purge the body, or to make the body sick, or to make it lean, or to minister to lust, or to chastise the body, as those who in penances have masticated aloes and other bitter gums, yet still it is cast into the draught. 2. But suppose his meaning true, yet this argument will not so be put off; because although the end of receiving the blessed sacrament is not to nourish the body; yet that it does nourish the body, is affirmed by Irenæus, Justin Martyr, and others; of which I have already given an account[k]. To which I here add the plain words of Rabanus: "Illud [corpus Christi] in nos convertitur, dum id manducamus et bibimus:" "That body is changed into us, when we eat it and drink it;" and therefore, although it hath a higher purpose, yet this also cannot be avoided. 3. Either we may manducate the accidents only, or else the substance of bread, or the substance of Christ's body. If we manducate only the accidents[l], then how do we eat Christ's body? If we manducate bread, then it is capable of all the natural alterations, and it cannot be denied. But if we manducate Christ's body after a natural manner, what worse thing is it, that it descends into the guts, than that it goes into the stomach; to be cast forth, than to be torn in pieces with the teeth, as I have proved[m] that it is by the Roman doctrine? Now I argue thus: If we eat Christ's natural body, we eat it either naturally or spiritually: if it

[h] St. Matt. xv. 17. [i] Lib. 1. Euch. c. 14. sect. Resp. cum Algero.
[k] Sect. 5. n. 9. [l] Ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἄπτον. Aristot. lib. 3. de Anim. cap. 12.
[m] Sect. 3. n. 6.

be eaten only spiritually, then it is spiritually digested, and is spiritual nourishment, and puts on accidents and affections spiritual. But if the natural body be eaten naturally, then what hinders it from affections and transmutations natural? 4. Although Algerus, and out of him Bellarmine, would have Christians stop their ears against this argument (and so would I against that doctrine, of which these fearful conclusions are unavoidable consequents), yet it is disputed in the 'Summa Angelica,' and an instance or case put which to my sense seems no inconsiderable argument to reprove the folly of this doctrine: for, saith he, what if the species pass indigested into the belly from the stomach? he answers; that they were not meat if they did not nourish; and therefore it is probable, as Boetius says, that the body of our Lord does not go into the draught, though the species do. And yet it is determined by the gloss on the canon law[n], that as long as the species remain uncorrupted, the holy body is there under those species; and therefore may be vomited; and consequently ejected all ways by which the species can pass unaltered. "Eousque progreditur corpus, quousque species," said Harpsfield, in his disputation at Oxford. If these things be put together, viz. the body is there so long, as the species are uncorrupted: and the species may remain uncorrupted till they be cast upwards or downwards, as in case of sickness: it follows that in this case, which is a case easily contingent, by their doctrine, the holy body must pass 'in latrinam.' And what then? 'it is to be adored as a true sacrament, though it come from impure places, though it be vomited:' so said Vasquez[o]; and it is the prevailing opinion in their church. Add to this, that if this nourishment does not descend and cleave to the guts of the priest, it is certain that God does not hear his prayers: for he is enjoined by the Roman missal, published by authority of the council of Trent and the command of Pope Pius the Fourth, to pray, "Corpus tuum, Domine, quod sumpsi, et sanguis, quem potavi, adhæreat visceribus meis;" "Let thy body, O Lord, which I have taken, and the blood which I have drunk, cleave to my bowels." It seems indeed they would have it go no further, to prevent the inconveniences of the present argument; but certain it is, that if they intended it for a figurative speech,

[n] De Consecrat. dist. 2. c. Si per negligentiam. Glos. ibid.
[o] In 3. t. 3. d. 195. n. 46.

it was a bold one, and not so fitted for edification, as for an objection. But to return. This also was the argument of Origen[p]: "Quod si quicquid ingreditur in os, in ventrem abit, et in secessum ejicitur, et ille cibus, qui sanctificatur per verbum Dei perque obsecrationem, juxta id, quod habet materiale, in ventrem abit, et in secessum ejicitur:—et hæc quidem de typico symbolicoque corpore."—He plainly distinguishes the material part from the spiritual in the sacrament, and affirms, that "according to the material part, that meat that is sanctified by the word of God and prayer, enters into the mouths, descends into the belly, and goes forth in the natural ejection. And this is only true of the typical and symbolical body." Now, besides that it affirms the words of our blessed Saviour[q] to have effect in the sacrament, he affirms, that the material part, the type and symbols, are the body of Christ, that is, his body is present in a typical and symbolical manner. This is the plain and natural sense of the words of Origen. But he must not mean what he means, if he says any thing, in another place, that may make for the Roman opinion. And this is their way of answering objections brought from the fathers; they use to oppose words to words, and conclude they must mean their meaning; or else they contradict themselves. And this trick Bellarmine uses frequently, and especially Cardinal Perron, and from them the lesser writers: and so it happens in this present argument; for other words of Origen are brought to prove he inclined to the Roman opinion. But I demand, 1. Are the words more contradictory, if they both be drawn to a spiritual sense, than if they be both drawn to a natural? 2. Though we have no need to make use of it, yet it is no impossible thing that the fathers should contradict one another and themselves too; as you may see pretended violently by Cardinal Perron in his answer to King James. 3. But why must all sheaves bow to their sheaf, and all words be wrested to their fancy, when there are no words any where pretended from them, but with less wresting than these must suffer, they will be brought to speak against them, or at least nothing for them? But let us see what other words Origen hath, by which we must expound these. 4. Origen says, that "the Christian people drink the blood of Christ, and the flesh of the Word of God is true food." What then? so say we too; but it is

[p] In cap. xv. St. Matt. [q] St. Matt. xv. 17.

spiritual food, and we drink the blood spiritually. He says nothing against that, but very much for it; as I have in several places remarked already. 5. But how can this expound the other words;—'Christian people eat Christ's flesh and drink his blood?' therefore, when Origen says, 'The material part, the symbolical body of Christ, is eaten naturally and cast into the draught,' he means, not the body of Christ in his material part, but the accidents of bread, the colour, the taste, the quantity, these are cast out by the belly. Verily a goodly argument; if a man could guess in what mood and figure it could conclude. 6. When a man speaks distinctly and particularly, it is certain he is easier to be understood in his particular and minute meaning, than when he speaks generally. But here he distinguishes a part from a part, one sense from another, the body in one sense from the body in another; therefore these words are to expound the more general, and not they to expound these, unless the general be more particular than that, that is distinguished into kinds,—that is, unless the general be a particular, and the particular be a general. 7. Amalarius was so amused with these words and discourse of Origen, that his understanding grew giddy, and he did not know whether the body of Christ were invisibly taken up into heaven, or kept till our death in the body, or expired at letting of blood, or exhaled in air, or spit out, or breathed forth, our Lord saying, "That which enters into the mouth, descends into the belly, and so goes forth into the draught:" the man was willing to be of the new opinion of the real presence, because it began to be the mode of the age[r]. But his folly was soberly reproved by a synod at Carisiacum, about the time of Pope Gregory the Fourth, where the difficulty of Origen's argument was better answered, and the article determined, that "the bread and wine are spiritually made the body of Christ; which, being a meat of the mind and not of the belly, is not corrupted but remaineth unto everlasting life." 8. To expound these words of the accidents of bread only, and say that they enter into the belly and go forth in the draught, is a device of them that care not what they say; for, 1. It makes that the 'ejectamentum' or 'excrement' of the body should consist of colour and quantity, without any substance. 2. It makes a man to be nourished by accidents, and so not only one substance to be changed into an-

[r] Ep. ad Guitard.

other, but that accidents are changed into substances, which must be, if they nourish the body and pass 'in latrinam,' and then beyond the device of transubstantiation we have another production from Africa, a 'transaccidentisubstantiation,' a *μεθυφισταμενομετουσία*. 3. It makes accidents to have all the affections of substances, as motion, substantial corruption, alteration, that is, not to be accidents but substances. For matter and form are substances, and those that integrate all physical and compound substances: but till yesterday it was never heard that accidents could. Yea, but magnitude is a material quality, and ground or subject of the accidents. So it is said; but it is nonsense. For besides that magnitude is not a quality, but a quantity, neither can it be properly or truly said to be material but imperfectly; because it is an affection of matter; and however it is a contradiction to say, that it is the ground of qualities; for an accident cannot be the 'fundamentum,' the ground or subject of an accident; that is, the formality and definition of a substance, as every young scholar hath read in Aristotle's Categories: so that to say, that it is the ground of accidents, is to say, that accidents are subjected in magnitude, that is, that magnitude is neither a quantity nor quality, but a substance. *Ἀεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὑφιστάμενον*: 'An accident always subsists in a subject,' says Porphyry. 9. This answer cannot be fitted to the words of Origen; for that which he calls the 'quid materiale,' or the material part in the sacrament, he calls it the symbolical body, which cannot be affirmed of accidents, because there is no likeness between the accidents, the colour, the shape, the figure, the roundness, the weight, the magnitude, of the host or wafer, and Christ's body: and therefore, to call the accidents a symbolical body, is to call it an unsymbolical symbol, an unlike similitude, a representment without analogy: but if he means the consecrated bread, the whole action of consecration, distribution, sumption, manducation, this is the symbolical body, according to the words of St. Paul; "He that drinks this cup, and eats this bread, represents the Lord's death;" it is the figure of Christ's crucified body, of his passion and our redemption. 10. It is a strange expression to call accidents a body; *Λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται: ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ τοῦ σώματος καταγορηθήσεται,*

says Aristotle[s]; "A body may be called white, but the definition or reason of the accident, can never be affirmed of a body." I conclude, that this argument out of the words of our blessed Saviour, urged also and affirmed by Origen, does prove that Christ's body is, in the sacrament, only to be eaten in a spiritual sense, not at all in a natural, lest that consequent be the event of it,—which to affirm of Christ's glorified body in the natural and proper sense, were very blasphemy.

2. The next argument from Scripture, is taken from Christ's departing from this world; his going from us, the ascension of his body and soul into heaven; his not being with us, his being contained in the heavens: so said our blessed Saviour; "Unless I go hence, the Comforter cannot come[t]:" and "I go to prepare a place for you[u]:" "The poor ye have always, but me ye have not always[x]." St. Peter affirms of him, "that the heavens must receive him, till the time of restitution of all things[y]." Now, how these things can be true of Christ according to his human nature, that is a circumscribed body, and a definite soul, is the question. And to this the answer is the same, in effect, which is given by the Roman doctors, and by the Ubiquitaries, whom they call heretics. These men say, Christ's human nature is every where actually, by reason of his hypostatical union with the Deity, which is every where; the Romanists say no: it is not actually every where, but it may be where, and is in as many places as, he please: for although he be in heaven, yet so is God too, and yet God is upon earth: 'eodem modo,' says Bellarmine[z], 'in the same manner,' the man Christ, although he be in heaven, yet also he can be out of heaven, where he please; he can be in heaven and out of heaven. Now these two opinions are concentred in the main impossibility; that is, that Christ's body can be in more places than one: if in two, it may be in two thousand, and then it may be every where; for it is not limited, and therefore is illimited and potentially infinite. Against this so seemingly impossible at the very first sight, and relying upon a similitude and analogy that are not far from blasphe-

[s] Categor. c. 3. [t] St. John, xvi. 7. [u] xiv. 2.
[x] Matt. xxvi. 11. [y] Acts, iii. 21. Philip. iii. 20.
[z] Lib. 1. Euch. c. 14. sect. Respondeo Argumentum.

my, viz. That as God is in heaven and yet on earth, 'eodem modo,' 'after the same manner' is Christ's body; which words it cannot be easy to excuse: against this, I say, although for the reasons alleged it be unnecessary to be disproved, yet I have these things to oppose: 1. The words of Scripture, that affirm Christ to be in heaven, affirm also that he 'is gone from hence[a].' Now if Christ's body not only could, but must, be every day in innumerable places on earth, it would have been said that Christ 'is in heaven,' but not that 'he is not here,' or that he is gone from hence. 2. "Surrexit, non est hic," was the angel's discourse to the inquiring women at the sepulchre, "He is risen, he is not here:" but if they had been taught the new doctrine of the Roman schools, they would have denied the consequent; 'He is risen, and gone from hence,' but he may be here too. And this indeed might have put the angels to a distinction: but the women's ignorance rendered them secure. However, St. Austin is dogmatical in this article, saying, "Christum ubique totum esse tanquam Deum, et in eodem tanquam inhabitantem Deum, et in loco aliquo cœli propter veri corporis modum:" "Christ as God is every where, but in respect of his body he is determined to a particular residence in heaven[b]," viz. at the right hand of God, that is, in the best seat, and in the greatest eminency. And in the thirtieth treatise of St. John; "It behoveth that the body of our Lord, since it is raised again, should be in one place alone, but the truth is spread over all." But concerning these words of St Austin, they have taken a course in all their editions to corrupt the place; and instead of *oportet* have clapped in *potest;* instead of *must be* have foisted in *may be,* against the faith of the ancient canonists and scholastics; particularly, Lombard, Gratian, Ivo Carnotensis, Algerus, Thomas, Bonaventure, Richardus, Durand, Biel, Scotus, Cassander, and divers others. To this purpose is that of St. Cyril Alexandrinus[c]: "He could not converse with his disciples in the flesh, being ascended to his Father."—So Cassian[d]: "Jesus Christ, speaking on earth, cannot be in heaven but by the infinity of his Godhead[e]:" and Fulgentius argues it strongly: "If the body of Christ be a true body, it must be contained in a particular

[a] St. John, xvi. 28.
[b] Epist. ad Dardan.
[c] Lib. 11. in Jon. c. 3.
[d] Lib. 4. de Incarnat. c. 1.
[e] Lib. 2. ad Thrasimundum, c. 7. Apol. p. 65.

place:" but this place is just so corrupted in their editions, as is that of St. Austin, *potest* being substituted instead of *oportet;* but this doctrine, viz. That to be in several places is impossible to a body, and proper to God, was affirmed by the universality of Paris in a synod under William their bishop, 1340, and Johannes Picus Mirandula maintained, in Rome itself, that it could not be by the power of God, that one body should, at once, be in divers places.

3. Thirdly: The Scripture speaks of his going thither from hence by elevation and ascension, and of his coming from thence at his appearing: Ὃν δεῖ οὐρανὸν μὲν δέχεσθαι, and ἐξ οὗ σωτῆρα ἀποδεχόμεθα: the words have an antithesis; 'The heavens till then shall retain him;' but 'then he shall come from thence;' which were needless, if he might be here and stay there too.

4. When Christ said, "Me ye have not always," and at another time, "Lo, I am with you always to the end of the world;" it is necessary that we distinguish the parts of a seeming contradiction. Christ is with us by his Spirit, but Christ is not with us in body; but if his body be here too, then there is no way of substantial, real presence, in which those words can be true, "Me ye have not always." The Rhemists, in their note upon this place, say, that when Christ said, "Me ye have not always," he means, 'Ye have not me in the manner of a poor man, needing relief;' that is, 'not me so as you have the poor.'—But this is a trifle; because our blessed Saviour did not receive that ministry of Mary Magdalene as a poor man, for it was a present for a prince, not a relief to necessity, but a regalo fit for so great a person; and therefore, if he were here at all after his departure, he was capable of as noble a usage, and an address fit to represent a majesty, or at least to express a love. It was also 'done for his burying;' so Christ accepted it, and that signified and plainly related to a change of his state and abode. But besides this, if this could be the interpretation of those words, then they did not at all signify Christ's leaving this world, but only his changing his circumstance of fortune, his outward dress and appendages of person; which were a strange commentary upon, "Me ye have not always;" that is, 'I shall be with you still, but in a better condition;' but St. Austin[f] hath given sentence concerning

[f] Tract. 50. in Johan.

the sense of these words of Christ; "Loquebatur de præsentiâ corporis," &c. "He spake of the presence of his body, Ye shall have me according to my providence, according to majesty, and invisible grace, but according to the flesh which the Word assumed, according to that which was born of the Virgin Mary, ye shall not have me; therefore, because he conversed with his disciples forty days, he is ascended up into heaven and is not here;" if he be here in person, what need he to have sent his vicar, his Holy Spirit, in substitution? Especially since, by this doctrine, he is more now with his church, than he was in the days of his conversion in Palestine; for then he was but in one assembly at once; now he is in thousands every day. If it be said, 'Because although he be here, yet we see him not;' this is not sufficient: for what matter is it, whether we see him or no, if we know him to be here, if we feel him, if we eat him, if we worship him in presence natural and proper? There wants nothing but some accidents of colour and shape. A friend in the dark, behind a curtain, or to a blind man, is as certainly present, as if he were in the light in open conversation, or beheld with the eyes. And then also the office of the Holy Spirit would only be to supply the sight of his person, which might possibly be true, if he had no greater offices, and we no greater needs; and if he himself also were visible and glorious to our eyes; for if the effect of his substitution is spiritual, secret, and invisible, our eyes are still without comfort; and if the Spirit's secret effect does supply it, and makes it not necessary, that we should see him, then so does our faith do the same thing; for if we believe him there, the want of bodily sight is supplied by the eye of faith, and the Spirit is pretended to do no more in this particular, and then his presence also will be less necessary, because supplied by our own act. Add to this; that if, after Christ's ascension into heaven, he still would have been upon earth, in the eucharist, and received properly into our mouths, and in all that manner which these men dream; how ready it had been and easy to have comforted them who were troubled for want of his bodily presence,—by telling them, "Although I go to heaven, yet fear not to be deprived of the presence of my body; for you shall have it more than before, and much better; for I will be with you, and in you; I was with you in a state of humility and mortality, now I will be with you

with a daily and mighty miracle; I before gave you promises of grace and glory, but now I will become to your bodies a seed of immortality: and though you will not see me, but under a veil, yet it is certain, I will be there, in your churches, in your pixes, in your mouths, in your stomachs, and you shall believe and worship." Had not this been a certain, clear, and proportionable comfort to their complaint, and present necessity, if any such thing were intended? It had been so certain, so clear, so proportionable, that it is more than probable, that if it had been true, it had not been omitted. But that such sacred things as these may not be exposed to contempt, by such weak propositions and their trifling consequents, the case is plain, that Christ, being to depart hence, sent his Holy Spirit in substitution to supply to his church the office of a teacher, which he, on earth, in person, was to his disciples; when he went from hence he was to come no more in person, and therefore he sent his substitute; and therefore to pretend him to be here in person, though under a disguise which we see through with the eye of faith, and converse with him by presential adoration of his humanity, is in effect to undervalue the real purposes and sense of all the sayings of Christ concerning his 'departure hence,' and the 'deputation of the Holy Spirit[5].' But for this, because it is naturally impossible, they have recourse to the divine omnipotency: God can do it, therefore he does. But of this I shall give particular account in the section of reason; as also the other arguments of Scripture I shall reduce to their heads of proper matter.

[5] Heb. ix. 24. 2 Cor. v. 6. 8. Philip. i. 23. iii. 20. Coloss. iii. 1, 2. St. John, xiv. 16. xvi. 7.

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